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HARVARD STUDIES IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 68



Arthur D. Nock

HARVARD STUDIES
IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 68



CAMBRIDGE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1964

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LONDON AND BECCLES

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IN MEMORIAM
Arthur Darby Nock

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PREFATORY NOTE

The *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* are published by the authority of the President and Fellows of Harvard College on behalf of the Department of the Classics. Publication is assisted by the generosity of the Class of 1856, as well as by other gifts and bequests.

As has been customary since the establishment of the Carl Newell Jackson Lectureship in 1957, the text of the most recent series of these lectures appears in the present volume, in somewhat revised form; Professor James A. Notopoulos delivered his lectures, "A Poetics of Early Greek Poetry," on April 17 and April 24, 1962.

Although the chief purpose of the *Harvard Studies* is to publish articles by instructors and graduate students at Harvard, scholars in other institutions are invited to submit articles. Manuscripts should be sent to The Editorial Committee, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 320 Boylston Hall, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

The editors wish to express more than the usual thanks to their colleagues for help in preparing a peculiarly large and diverse issue, and especially to Professor Mason Hammond.

J. P. Elder
John H. Finley, Jr.
Cedric H. Whitman
Editorial Committee

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ARTHUR DARBY NOCK

A Minute presented to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences on February 11, 1964, by the following committee: Professors Crane Brinton, F. M. Cross, Jr., F. N. Robinson, Krister Stendahl, and Zeph Stewart (chairman).

Arthur Darby Nock was born in Portsmouth, England, on February 21, 1902, the son of Cornelius and Alice Mary Ann Page Nock. In his family's quiet and somewhat austere home, he and his elder sister were always urged to excel in their school work and had little opportunity for easy contact with friends. In later years Nock felt that early loss. Meanwhile, however, he flourished in the atmosphere of forced learning, and distinguished himself both at the Portsmouth Grammar School and at Trinity College, Cambridge, to which he had won a Scholarship.

From the start Nock gravitated toward Classics and Ancient History, and from the start he showed a kind of genius: with a prodigious memory and an unerring linguistic skill he combined an uncanny speed and accuracy in reading and a delight in the discovery, ordering, and establishment of facts. At first he worked at the interests into which his classical training at school and university had taken him, becoming at the unheard-of age of twenty the annual reviewer of Latin literature in *The Year's Work in Classical Studies*. His first major effort, however, was a response to Gilbert Murray's plea for an adequate treatment of Sallustius *On the Gods and the Universe*. He produced in 1926 an edition of this fourth-century Greek text, with a translation and a masterly introduction. Here already one finds that extraordinary balance of thoughtful generalization with specific fact which was a decade later to make his two chapters in the *Cambridge Ancient History* on Roman religious developments small masterpieces of exposition. In later years Nock would shake his monumental head over the introduction to *Sallustius* and say, "How did I know so much then?"

His enormous energies were not confined in the least, however, to the literary and philosophical studies which were making his early reputation. In a flood of articles and reviews he touched during the next few years on almost every branch of classical learning, but with increasing emphasis on the fields of ancient religion and magic (including the evidence of papyri, inscriptions, and coins) which were to become the center of his life work. In his middle twenties he was already an international figure. Perhaps the crowning achievement of this period was his essay in 1928 on "Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background." The next year he was invited to come to Harvard as a visiting

Arthur Darby Nock

lecturer and the following year was asked to remain as Frothingham Professor of the History of Religion.

Nock did not hesitate to accept the chair which he was to hold until his death. He considered himself above all an historian, and for him history was primarily knowledge and interpretation of the raw materials from which one might reconstruct the life and culture of an age. In the history of religion in particular he was to dwell on the practice and the expression of little people, of the common man, rather than on literary and philosophical sources, though he knew them perfectly. He saw the essence of religion not in philosophy or theology, but in piety and cult. He had a contempt for self-declared "profundity," and his unusual combination of genius and common sense allowed him to treat the actual manifestations of religion without condescension. This was not just a matter of empathy. Once a practicing Anglo-Catholic, his religious sentiment remained the same even in later years of agnosticism.

Moving into Eliot House when it opened in 1931, he and his library remained an immovable object even to the Navy in the war years. In 1937 he became a Senior Fellow of the Society of Fellows, which was henceforth his major concern and his second home. Shuffling busily between these centers of interest, he flourished amid the books and the anecdotes which gathered and heaped around him. He had been unhappy in the Fellowship at Clare to which he had gone in 1923. In this new position and new land he found at once a freedom and an appreciation — of his eccentricities as well as of his abilities — which won his heart. He became a United States citizen in 1936.

In these and the following years his production of articles and important reviews continued unabated. In 1933 appeared *Conversion*, an imaginative and exacting study of religious currents in the Hellenistic and Roman world, in 1936 *St. Paul*, and in 1945 and 1954 the four volumes of the Hermetic Corpus, an edition planned twenty years before and completed in collaboration with A.-J. Festugière. At Harvard his thirty-three-year editorship of the *Harvard Theological Review* made it a leading international journal. His regular teaching of the History of Religions and in the Classics Department and the Divinity School had the aberrant effectiveness of enormous learning and good humor mixed with explosive incoherence of speech. Those who could penetrate the second profited from the first. His prodigious advisory work for the Library helped keep it supreme in more than one field. To many in this community, however, his most valued gift was his friendship, which spanned a host of interests and three generations of age. Those who knew him well saw even his noisy exuberance sometimes as the almost childlike

simplicity of an emotional life without guile, sometimes as an over-enthusiastic attempt to be friendly or sociable, sometimes as the outward bravado of a somewhat lonely man. He could be gay and mirthful, as they know who remember his elaborate birthday parties or his booming recitations of his parody of his own obituary. He could also be serious, as they know who have had his generous help or have felt the exactness and amplitude of his intellectual standards. His dearest friend at Harvard, Willard Sperry, expressed it well in dedicating a book "To Arthur Darby Nock, whose accurate and conscientious scholarship has greatly furthered my feeling for 'the sacredness of fact' and in so doing has strengthened, rather than impaired, my part in our common faith."

Nock's scholarly world was, like his standards, international. Three honorary doctorates, membership in eight foreign academies, the Société des Bollandistes, and the American Philosophical Society, associate editorship of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* and of *Vigiliae Christianae* were among his distinctions. From the walls of his rooms in Eliot House a magnificent collection of photographs of the leading classicists and religious historians of the last hundred years — many of them his personal friends — looked down on him as he worked. They were most truly his colleagues and peers. Theodor Mommsen was wreathed always with red ribbon, Martin Nilsson with fronds.

During the last fifteen years Nock slowly and at first painfully came to play a new role. Already in the late 1930's he had refused a request that he write the second volume of Nilsson's monumental history of Greek religion. Nilsson himself finally undertook the work only on condition that Nock help revise his manuscript. In 1939 and 1946 he had delivered Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen surveying religious developments in the Hellenistic and Roman age. As he collected more and more notes and corrections he found it increasingly difficult to bring them into final shape for publication, and he eventually abandoned the task. He had become a perfectionist acutely conscious of his own imperfections. "I see only half the literature," he would say, though he was realistic enough to add, "I realize that others see only a third, but still I should miss things." So he poured his immense learning as in the past into shorter articles and critiques, but also put it with ever increasing generosity at the disposal of others. He had always maintained a voluminous correspondence, but now his rooms became a world center of advice, suggestion, criticism, and encouragement for scholars of all degrees of age and eminence. He had that rare gift of seeing an author's intention and of aiding him in his own terms. Thus after some years of discouragement

Arthur Darby Nock

ment and doubt he had moved into a new period of heightened productivity and influence at the time of his unexpected death.

Nock had a realistic sense of his eminent position in scholarship. He was considerably less sure of himself in personal relationships, though they concerned him deeply. So he might have taken special pleasure in a tribute paid to him by undergraduates in the *Harvard Crimson*: "His colleagues can better appreciate the loss to scholarship, but to the University community the death of Arthur Darby Nock is a family loss. One of the last members of a vigorous and humane tradition, he never used high learning to shut out the rest of the world. His many friends in all of Harvard mourn his passing, and must resign themselves to life in a place made suddenly smaller by his absence."

Nock died on January 11, 1963, following an operation for cancer. He is survived by his sister, Alice E. M. Nock.

HARVARD STUDIES IN
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STUDIES IN EARLY GREEK ORAL POETRY

BY JAMES A. NOTOPOULOS

THE substance of these studies, given as the C. N. Jackson lectures in 1962, aims at exploring three questions arising from Milman Parry's work. 1) What light does the singing of heroic tales in the Balkans throw on the recitation of Homer's poems? 2) Does the creation of epic poetry with the oral technique cease with Homer and the introduction of the alphabet at the latter part of the eighth century? 3) What kind of "poetics" shall we apply to poetry created orally? These problems will be dealt with "writ large" and not with the fullness they ultimately deserve. These studies aim at asking some questions which differ from the traditional Homeric problems, at least in the technique with which they are approached. This technique involves the interplay of field work with surviving oral poetry and the old principle of the Alexandrians, ἡ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως λύσις. The impulse has come from Parry's work, Lord's *The Singer of Tales*, a splendid poetics of oral poetry, and from my own field work with modern Greek heroic poetry, a continuous oral tradition from the times of Byzantium. Understanding early Greek poetry as poetry constitutes a major challenge in philology. Parry confined himself to the mechanics of the formulaic style; Lord has shown that *poesis* is possible within the formulaic technique. These three interrelated studies, as will become apparent, continue in the direction of Lord, but they are based on the evidence of the early Greek tradition of oral poetry.

I. THE RECITATION OF THE HOMERIC POEMS

Some of the Homeric problems which have vexed past scholarship now lend themselves to more solid advance, if not solution, if they are re-examined in the light of forces at work in oral composition.¹ The recitation of the Homeric poems is one of these. I propose to examine this problem in the light of field work with singers of heroic tales in Yugoslavia and Greece. The term "recitation" will be confined to Homer's own singing of his poems on the occasion of their composition, which in an oral context is synonymous with the recitation. It does not

include the method of recitation in their transmission by the Homeridae or rhapsodes. This constitutes a separate problem about which we have some information in the Pindar scholium on the Homeridae and in the sources pertaining to the recitation in the Panathenaea in the sixth century.²

The relevant questions involved in the problem have been posed succinctly by Page. "It is very important," he says, "to recognize that we are wholly ignorant of the manner in which the Homeric poems were recited before the sixth century B.C. Here are some of the questions to which we do not know (and presumably never shall know) the answers:

"(1) On what occasions, and before what audiences, were the Epics most commonly recited?

"(2) Was there ever a recitation of continuous Epics, of the length of the *Il.* and *Od.*, at particular festivals, extending over several days, before the sixth century? There is no evidence either for or against; . . .

"(3) When an early Epic poet composed (if anyone ever did) an Epic of the length of the *Il.* or *Od.*, knowing (as he must have done) that it would never be recited from start to finish without interruption, did he so design it that it would be specially suitable for interrupted recitation? The technique of composition might be very much affected even if 'interruption' means no more than extension over a period of several days.

"(4) Which was the commoner practice: the recitation of episodes from the *Il.* and *Od.*, or the continuous recitation of the poems over a period of days? Or were both alike common? Observe that although it is true (as is commonly stated) that the *Iliad* does not fall easily apart into a succession of separate lays, it is still more obviously true that numerous episodes in the *Iliad* are exceedingly well suited to separate recitation.

"(5) If it was a common practice to recite poems of this length over a period of days, how long would each daily recitation last, and how would the poems be divided for the purpose? Or was there perhaps no common standard either for the length of time or for the division? (It is generally held that the present division into *Books* goes back no earlier than Zenodotus . . .)"³

Until these questions are answered we are in the impasse stated by Page: "The judicious reader may comment that if the answers to such fundamental questions are wholly unknown, it is very improbable that we shall ever arrive at a well-founded understanding of the development of the Homeric poems. I am inclined to agree; and I am sure that

it is important to refrain from making up the gap in our knowledge by firmly upholding one hypothesis where others would serve as well." ⁴

Up until recently these questions were answered by hypothesis, the last resort of so many of the Homeric problems. Recent field work in oral poetry, however, can begin to answer some of the above questions. ⁵ Before the data from the singing of heroic tales in the Balkans are brought to bear on our problem, a question must be faced: does analogy from the Balkan practice of singing heroic tales constitute proof for our problem? We must beware of stretching analogy into proof, for analogy involves differences as well as similarities in the objects of comparison. Yet the evidence from field work to be used in recitation is least subject to this objection. In oral literature there are certain facts which do not change, which, quality apart, apply to the practice of oral poetry in the time of Homer and in our own day, namely, the physical capacity of the singer to sing a tale effectively at one sitting, be it at a court, an agora, a λέσχη, or a festival. This applies equally to composers of opera, to the ancient tragedians where, as in the *Prometheus Bound*, long speeches are broken up by choral interruptions to rest the speaker, and, as we shall see, in the oral epic where the episode, framed within a book division, is made necessary by certain physical factors in recitation. There may be degrees of difference in the capacity of singing a tale among bards, but even Homer is aware of a point where the voice breaks,

φωνή δ' ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη. ⁶

Even among the best professionals, ancient or modern, there is a limit to endurance in singing a tale, when the voice breaks, and there is also a limit to the endurance of an audience in listening to a tale. The singing of a quantitative syllable may be different from that of a stressed syllable; the basic melody to which a line is sung and the musical instrument used in accompaniment may affect the rate of singing, yet the physical factors involved in the singing of tales, ancient or modern, constitute a basis for comparison. Statistics from various bards in different parts of Greece will bring this out clearly. This is the basic fact from which we must start, and all the answers to the questions posed must flow from it.

The answer to most of the questions posed by Page depends on (1) the rate of singing hexameters; (2) whether singers of tales sing with pauses; (3) the relation of the optimum comfortable length in singing a tale to the book divisions of the Homeric poems. If we can learn something about these three matters we may come nearer to knowing

in what context the Homeric poems were recited on the occasion of their creation, whether it was a festival, recitation in the agora, or recitation such as is presented in the social context of the eighth book of the *Odyssey*.

In determining the rate of singing hexameters we find the oral poets of Crete and Cyprus can help us. The average number of syllables in a Homeric hexameter is fifteen; if all the first five feet were dactylic, the maximum syllables to be sung in a line would be seventeen; if they

Ὁ Διγενῆς καὶ ὁ Χάρως

1^η

Δα-σκά-λοι καὶ δα-σκά-λι-νες εἶ-παν μου ν'άρ-κι-νῆ-σω

τ'ἀν-τρεῖ-ω-μέ-νου Δι-γε-νῆ-τρα-γού-δι νὰ ποι-ή-σω

2^η

ἄς πὰ νὰ τὸ ποι-ή-σω-μεν τὸ-σὺν πού-τὸ παι-νέ-σαν

καὶ χά-ρη 'πού-τον Πλά-στην μου δὲν ἔ-χει ψέ-μαν μέ-σαν.

3^η

Ἔ-στρα-ψεν ἡ ἀ-να-το-λή κ'ε-βρόν-τη-σεν ἡ δύ-ση

ἔ-ο-ξεν καὶ τοῦ Χά-ρον-τα νὰ βγῇ νὰ δια-γυ-ρί-ση.

Ἔπικον. Τονική



Δασκάλοι καὶ δασκάλινες εἶπαν μου ν'ἀρκινῆσω,
τ'ἀντρεωμένον Διγενῆ τραγούδι νὰ ποιήσω.
Ἄς πὰ νὰ τὸ ποιήσωμεν, τόσον πού τὸ παινέσαν
καὶ χάρη 'πού τὸν πλάστην μου δὲν ἔχει ψέμαν μέσαν.

Ἔστραψεν ἡ ἀνατολή καὶ βρόντησεν ἡ δύση,
ἔοξεν καὶ τοῦ Χάροντα νὰ βγῇ νὰ διαγυρίσῃ

Τοῦ Δασκαλογιάννη Τὸ Τραγούδι.

1st 208-210 ★)

Θεέ μου καὶ δός μου λο. γι_σμός καὶ νοῦν εἰς τὸ κε_φά λι νὰ κά τσω

(parl.) 2nd

νὰ συλ_λο. γι_α_στῶ τὸ Δα_σκα_λο τὸ Γιάν νη Ἄ πού_η_τον πρῶ_τος τῷ Σφα_κιῶ

καὶ πρῶ_τος νοι_κο_κὺ ρης μέ τήν καρ_διά του ἦ_θε_λε τήν Κρή_

3rd

τη Ρω_μιο_σύ_νη Κά_θε Λαμ_πρή καὶ Κυ_ρια κή ἔ_βαλ_

λεν τὸ κα_πέλ λο καὶ τοῦ πρ_ω_πα_πᾶ ἴ_λε_γε τὸ Μό_σχο_βο θὰ φέ_ρω κλπ.

★)

μου καὶ δός μου

Ἰ_ποτ_Τον

Θεέ μου, καὶ δός μου λογισμόν καὶ νοῦν εἰς τὸ κεφάλι,
 νὰ κάτσω νὰ συλλογιαστῶ τὸ δάσκαλο τὸ Γιάννη,
 ἀπού ἦτον πρῶτος τῷ Σφακιῶ καὶ πρῶτος νοικοκύρης,
 μέ τήν καρδιά του ἦθελε τήν Κρήτη Ρωμοσύνη.
 Κάθε Λαμπρή καὶ Κυριακή ἔβαλλεν τὸ καπέλλο
 καὶ τοῦ Πρωτοπαπᾶ ἔλεγε: τὸ Μόσχοβο θὰ φέρω,

were all spondees, the maximum would be twelve.⁷ The average number, however, in a test of one hundred verses shows fifteen. By good coincidence the basic meter of all modern Greek heroic poetry is fifteen.⁸ Examples of the singing of fifteen-syllable lines from Crete and Cyprus are shown in the accompanying excerpts.⁹ The main caesura in the Homeric line occurs normally at the end of the seventh or eighth syllable; in the modern Greek at the end of the eighth syllable. Since the fifteen-syllable line is the exact equivalent of the average number of syllables in the Homeric hexameter we can get a rough estimate, *mutatis mutandis*, of the length of time required to recite the *Iliad* and

the *Odyssey*. None of the other oral literatures is metrically capable of giving us so close an approximation to the time required to sing the Homeric poems. The following table gives the average number of lines sung per minute by a number of the better singers of tales in Crete and Cyprus in 1953. It enables us to approximate an answer to this important question in Homeric studies.

CRETE

Singer	Average of 15-syllable verses sung per minute
Ἀνδρέας Κανκαλᾶς	12.6
Δημήτριος Σκορδίλης	10.0
Μανούσος Καρκάνης	10.0
Σπῦρος Γάσπαρης	8.0
Γεώργιος Μανουράς	7.0
Νικολῆς Δρακάκης	10.0

Limits 8–12.6; average 9.6

CYPRUS

Χαράλαμπος Ἀζινος	13.0
Ἀνδρέας Μαπουράς	13.5
Ἀριστοτέλης Νικολάου	8.0
Νεόφυτος Χριστοδούλου	10.0
Μαгдаληνή Βρυώνη	7.5
Κυριάκος Ἰορδάνου	8.0
Γιάννης Σταυρινού	9.0

Limits 8–13; average 9.86

Thus the average number of fifteen-syllable lines sung in Crete and Cyprus is 9.73 lines per minute with variations ranging from 7 to 13.5 lines per minute.

Applying this rate of singing to the total number of lines of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* we get the following results:

<i>Iliad</i> (15,693 lines)	26.9 hours
<i>Odyssey</i> (12,160 lines)	20.7

Longest and shortest books of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*:

<i>Iliad</i> V (909 lines)	93.4 minutes
<i>Iliad</i> XIX (424 lines)	43.6
<i>Odyssey</i> XI (640 lines)	65.7
<i>Odyssey</i> V (331 lines)	34.1

If Homer used the lyre¹⁰ to accompany the basic melody of the line, the above statistics would be as approximate as field work can give in determining physical factors at work in oral singing. If, however, he also used the lyre to strum in pauses for purposes of rest, the time intervals would be longer. Yet nowhere in our ancient sources is there reference to instrumental pauses, and rarely are they to be found in the practice of singing tales in the Balkans.

The problem of interruption for a pause in recitation must be reckoned with. In the invocation to the Muses before the Catalogue of Ships, Homer speaks of a voice that does not break, *φωνή δ' ἄρρηκτος* (II, 490).¹¹ Parry and Lord have made a special study of this problem.¹² Though their observations on the pauses in Yugoslav singing are based on fact, their conclusion that the Homeric singer did not divide the Homeric poems into books or chants is a false analogy. They failed to observe that the average length of Yugoslav songs is just about the average of the Homeric books, a point to be developed later in this study. Their observations, however, on the singer's pauses during a song are valuable for Homeric application. When the singer gets tired he stops for a pause during which he eats, drinks, or smokes — a situation comparable to food and drink placed before Demodocus (VIII, 67). The pauses may last from a few minutes up to fifteen.¹³ The number of pauses will vary with the singer, depending upon his age and experience. In my recordings from Crete I have two instances where the voice of the singer breaks. In both cases the meter becomes faulty, the singing winds down to songless prose and comes to a stop. Another symptom of fatigue in singing, observed in a singer from Cyprus, was the confusion in the text and the irrelevance of some lines.

It is the common experience of readers to pause in the midst of any extended reading, and this is all the more necessary for the singers of tales. When one listens to their singing one becomes aware that it is a strenuous activity usually requiring pauses during the singing of tales over 150 lines. These pauses are not disturbing to an oral society for the tales are traditional and it knows the plot. It demands a unified tale but expects pauses which the experienced singer adjusts to his convenience. This is evident in Yugoslav poetry where we have the formula, "Where were we, where did we leave off?"¹⁴ The documentation of songs in the first volume of the Parry-Lord, *Serbocroatian Heroic Songs*, enables us to see with what frequency the pauses occur in the various singers. The accompanying table¹⁵ sets forth the pauses of the singers in relation to the length of their song:

Number in Parry-Lord collection	Singer	Age	Length of decasyllabic lines	Pauses	Particular lines in which pauses occur
1	{ Salih Ugljanin	85	1620	7	72, 246, 495, 731, 926, 1066, 1359
2			1272	4	212, 344, 689, 1056
3			1811	5	105, 163, 508, 763, 1349
20	{ Sulejman Fortić ?		545	None	
22			880	1	345
23			814	1	392
24	Đemail Zogić	38	1369	2	283, 1038
26	{ Sulejman Makić	50	710	2	157, 229
27			578	None	
30	{ Alija Fjuljanin	29	545	2	304, 460
31			995	2	402, 613

As may be seen, the pauses vary not only with the length of songs but with the age of the singers. No valid conclusion may be drawn to determine the average number of lines sung between pauses so as to establish a norm for guidance in Homeric recitation.¹⁶ There is no fixed interval in singing in Yugoslavia. Murko's information on this point¹⁷ shows that the singer expands or contracts his songs according to the time he has at his disposal, the mood of the audience, the kind of audience he has, and the amount of pay he expects to get. The long songs are sung with pauses which rest the singer, who is supplied with Turkish coffee, cigarettes, or drink. The interval of continuous singing is half-an-hour to an hour. Murko cites an exceptional feat of a fifty-year-old singer at a wedding in Herzegovina in 1911 who sang an hour-and-a-half without stopping. No general statistics are given by Murko as to the duration of song, but he cites one singer who sang for four hours.

Parry's and Lord's account of the singer as recorded in their interviews is richer in details.¹⁸ The Moslems of Yugoslavia, who for centuries were the ruling class and had more leisure, developed much longer songs than the Christians. The Feast of Ramazan, with its thirty nights of entertainment, provided opportunity for listening to songs from one night to the next. Yet the restless audiences in the *kafan*, where guests come and go, men are ordering drinks, conversations are going on, and where there are other forms of entertainment such as dancing the kolo, offer no stability of performance to the singer such as Parry afforded his singers during his recordings. Yet data given by the

singers in their interviews are of value. The guslar sings two hours on the average, with rests approximately every half-hour, when he takes refreshment. Some of the singers reported that they could sing longer, some four to six hours. The picture presented in the *Odyssey* is not different with respect to interruptions imposed on the singer by the audience. Phemius is stopped by Penelope, who cannot bear the grief of the song;¹⁹ Demodocus is interrupted by Odysseus' outburst of grief in the midst of the tale.²⁰ The context of recitations in Homer presents parallels. Demodocus' performance in the eighth book takes place in the following sequence: song, athletic contest, dancing, song, dancing, song. The Delian festival as portrayed in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* lists

πυγμαχίη τε καὶ ὀρχηθμῶ καὶ ἀοιδῇ²¹

Since the composition of long poems like the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* implies, because of their length and fullness, a context of recitation other than the frequent interruptions imposed upon the singer, the data of the Parry-Lord recordings and my own, where full freedom was given to the singers, are more valuable for the solution of our problem. Both recordings show the singers taking pauses for rest and refreshment during the singing of their tales. As already noted, Demodocus takes a rest (VIII, 67), and this must have been the case with Homer. This means that the longer books — at least those of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* — were sung with pauses.²²

The evidence from the singing of tales in the Balkans shows that the book divisions of the Homeric poems, which, as Page and others²³ have noted, "are exceedingly well suited to separate recitation," are not Alexandrian in origin but are the units of recitation of Homer himself. Outside of the *tour de force* performance of Avdo Mededović, who composed the *Wedding of Smailagić Meho* in 13,331 lines for Parry in 1935,²⁴ and the still unpublished oral epic of Hadji-Sehretes, a court poet of Ali Pasha,²⁵ which runs over 10,000 lines, the singer of tales in the Balkans adjusts the length of the tale in a single recitation with pauses to the optimum endurance of his physical capacity in singing a tale effectively at one sitting and the corresponding capacity of an audience in listening to it. Thus far, evidence from the singing of tales in the Balkans has shown that the average rate of singing lines which correspond in length to the Homeric hexameter is approximately 10 verses per minute, that the singer sings his tales with pauses which vary from one singer to another. There remains the determination of the point where the singer has adjusted his optimum strength to the

length of a tale sung at one unit of recitation. Again, though there is variation in the length of the tales, subject to the needs of the subject matter and the singer's powers of ornamentation, there is a point reached where the length is adjusted to a physical optimum in singing — for an experienced singer never pushes himself to a point where his voice breaks — and to the endurance of the audience. Within this interval he shapes his tale with all the artistic powers in his possession. This point can easily be determined by comparing the length of the longer tales in the Balkans with the book divisions of the Homeric poems. If they roughly correspond we then have the unit of Homeric recitation by Homer himself on the occasion of his composition of his poems.

The basic meter of Serbocroatian heroic tales is the ten-syllable line.²⁶ In order to make a comparison possible with the Homeric poems, their length must be equated to the average fifteen-syllable line of the Homeric poems. The accompanying table lists the length of some of the sung versions in the first volume of the Parry-Lord collection. The average of these sung versions is 1012 ten-syllable lines, or 675 Homeric hexameters.

Number in Parry-Lord collection	Singer	Length of decasyllabic lines	Equivalent length in 15-syllable hexameters
1	{ Ugljanin	1620	1180
2		1272	848
4		1811	1207
20	{ Fortić	545	363
22		880	587
23		814	543
24	Zogić	1369	913
26	{ Makić	710	473
27		578	385
30	{ Fjuljanin	545	363
31		995	663

The narrative heroic poems of Crete vary from a thousand lines to less than one hundred. The oral tradition shows that the longer poems belong to the eighteenth century. *The Song of Daskaloyiannes*²⁷ was dictated to a scribe in a sung version by the oral bard Barba Pantzelyo in 1786 and runs to 999 lines, excluding its famous epilogue of 44 lines which describes the circumstances of the dictation. The *Tower of Alidakes*,²⁸ composed sometime in the same period as *The Song of Daskaloyiannes*, contains 536 verses. The longest songs of those collected

in 1953 were sung by a singer, *Καυκαλᾶς*, from Sphakia — the first a poem of 642 lines on World War II as he experienced it, and another of 306 lines on the abduction of the German general Kreipe by the British officers Moss and Fermor with the aid of Cretan guerrillas.²⁹ Another dictated poem on World War II by an illiterate bard runs to 526 lines. All the other versions collected were much shorter. The average of the longer Cretan poems is 562 lines.

A comparison of the average length of the Serbocroatian and Cretan heroic poems with the average length of the books of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and with the length of the Hesiodic poems and the longer Homeric Hymns, both of which can now be authenticated as oral poetry,³⁰ brings out a startling correspondence:

Serbocroatian	675	Homerically equivalent lines
Crete	562	
<i>Iliad</i>	654	
<i>Odyssey</i>	505	
<i>Works and Days</i>	828	
<i>Theogony</i>	1022	
<i>The Shield of Herakles</i>	480	
<i>Hymn to Demeter</i>	495	
<i>Hymn to Apollo</i>	546	
<i>Hymn to Hermes</i>	480	

The close correspondence in the length of the longer Balkan heroic poems with the average of the Homeric books (*Iliad* V, 909 lines being the longest and *Odyssey* V, 331, the shortest) and the Hesiodic poems and *Homeric Hymns* points to the conclusion that the present division of the Homeric poems rests not, as has hitherto been thought, on the arbitrary arrangement of Zenodotus, a division of arbitrary and mechanical neatness bearing "the stamp of an age which sought to arrange its literary material in a way convenient for study and reference,"³¹ but rests fundamentally on the endurance of the singer's voice in singing, and the audience's endurance in listening to an episode, originally connected with a long poem but capable of being withdrawn from its oral architectural form for separate recitation. Hesiod's poems, the longer *Homeric Hymns* and the division of the Cyclic epics into books³² show that this was the norm for singing all early Greek oral poetry. An important conclusion of our study for the architecture of the oral epic is that Homer skillfully adjusted the point where the voice tires, if not breaks, with the length of the episodes which have a unity in themselves. The pre-Alexandrian titles to the books, cited by Herodotus and Plato,

point in this direction.³³ So does the numbering of the books, α - ω , an Ionian alphabetic taxonomy applied to the first book-rolls, which contained the original units of Homer's oral recitation, from the Ionic script in which the Homeric poems were first written down.³⁴ That the book divisions were intrinsic to the design of the poems has been pointed out by many working from formal, artistic, and aesthetic criteria.³⁵ What has been surmised by literary critics on the basis of formal analysis³⁶ and aesthetic criteria is now proved by evidence from field work in the Balkans.

It is time now to summarize the results from field work with respect to the problems arising concerning Homeric recitation, as noted by Page at the beginning of this study:

(1) The rate of singing hexameters was approximately 10 verses per minute; thus it would take 26.9 hours to recite the entire *Iliad*, as we have it, and 20.7 hours for the *Odyssey*. This is the very minimum that must be posited for the recitation of the poems, no matter what the context of recitation may be.

(2) Homer would sing the longer books of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, at least, with pauses for rest. We are told by Homer that food and drink were placed before Demodocus, *πιεῖν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγει* (VIII, 67.) This corresponds to the pause for rest and refreshment noted for the Balkan singer. The number of pauses will vary with the singer, his age, and experience. These pauses will add to the total time required for singing the poems in their entirety. How much cannot be determined.

(3) The division of the Homeric poems into books is not the product of Alexandrian scholarship but represents the singer's skillful adjustment of fatigue with artistic finish of a unit of recitation. The books were in their origin oral units of recitation before they became book divisions. The alphabetizing of the books from α - ω comes from the Ionic alphabet in which the Homeric poems were first written down and denotes the numbering of the rolls which contained Homer's own original units of recitation.

There remains now to examine the social context of recitation. Our choice of context must be decided not by hypotheses but by the physical factors at work in oral recitation. Two main choices have been suggested: recitation at a festival or at a court, at a nobleman's table, of which we have a parallel in Homer's account of Phemius and Demodocus. The festival context is a natural suggestion from the Panathenaic festival at Athens in the sixth century. Murray was the first to suggest the festival of the Panionion at Mt. Mykale or the festival of the

Ionians at Delos.³⁷ He was aware of the physical impossibility of Homer's singing the entire *Iliad* at one sitting. "It would occupy," he says, "twenty to twenty-four hours of steady declamation." This is not a bad guess in view of the estimate reached from field work. But he realizes the difficulties: "No audience could endure it, no bard could perform it, in one stretch."³⁸ He therefore comes to the conclusion that it was sung at a festival, the Ionian counterpart of the Attic Panathenaia. This is a complete physical impossibility for an ancient or modern bard. No bard by himself could sing for 26.9 hours, which is the minimum requirement for the recitation of the *Iliad*, over a space of three days. Nor — *pace* the Dionysiac festival where tragedies were performed — could the audience endure it. If the Ionian festival at Mt. Mykale³⁹ were similar to that at Delos, which is described for us in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, there were a variety of activities besides epic recitation, such as boxing, dancing, choir singing. The festival recitation, as envisaged by Murray, is completely impossible in the light of physical factors at work in oral recitation.

The theory of festival recitation has been recently amended to overcome the fact that it was physically impossible for Homer himself to sing the entire poem during the three-day duration of the festival. Wade-Gery has projected the circumstances of the Panathenaia, where the Homeric poems were recited not by one bard but by a relay of bards, to the Panionian festival at Mykale and would have the recitation arranged in the following order:

First day: Books I-IX

Second day: Books X-XVIII, 353

Third day: Books XVIII, 354-XXIV⁴⁰

Wade-Gery's hypothesis of a public recitation at a pre-Panathenaic festival in Ionia in the eighth century via a relay of bards has been accepted in the main by Webster, Davison, and Whitman.⁴¹ Today it is the most popular view of the recitation of the *Iliad*, because such a performance stresses the complete artistic unity of the poem as against the marring of this unity by recitation of single episodes by Homer over a number of days in the context of a court recitation.

The festival recitation via a relay of bards cannot be dismissed on the grounds that there is no evidence for it prior to the Panathenaia, but there are in my judgment serious objections to its acceptance. In the first place, the Panathenaia and the Dionysia were state festivals deliberately stressing literary recitations and performance of dramas as a self-conscious state *paedeia*. The *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, the first

part of which is of eighth-century composition, gives us a different picture of the activities during the Delian festival.⁴² There the blind bard from Chios, who may be Homer according to Thucydides,⁴³ is presented as singing alone, and his fame to be sung by Delian girls rests on his activities in the traditional sense of the *αοιδός* singing by himself.⁴⁴ Furthermore, as already noted, the activities of this festival make it unlike the Bayreuth festival for the presentation of the *Ring*, an analogy suggested by Wade-Gery.⁴⁵ The *Hymn* presents a variety of activities, as we have seen, besides epic singing. There were poetic contests at Delos, and this would reduce the recitation to short lays or episodes selected from a larger whole.⁴⁶ If anything, the Ionian festival at Mykale would be closer to that described in Delos than the Athenian Panathenaia. In view of the evidence of the *Homeric Hymn* we cannot project into the Ionian festival conditions found in the later Panathenaia, a self-conscious literary festival created by Pisistratus for patriotic purposes.

The second objection to the festival recitation by a relay of rhapsodes, where "the Homeridae must, from the first, have performed in teams", comes from identifying the later Homeridae with the earlier. The Pindar scholium on the Homeridae specifically states: 'Ομηρίδας ἔλεγον τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου γένους, οἱ καὶ τὴν ποιήσιν αὐτοῦ ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἦδον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ οὐκέτι τὸ γένος εἰς "Ομηρον ἀνάγοντες. The word *διαδοχῆς* means successors in the family who sang Homer's poems after his death,⁴⁷ and this can hardly be stretched to mean a brood of sons to be used as a relay of rhapsodes.

The final objection comes from recent discoveries in field work with oral bards. Lord has shown that in the oral practice of poetry there is no *verbatim* memorization.⁴⁸ My own field work has verified this conclusion. If the Homeric poems were oral in their genesis, as Parry's work has shown, without a fixed text there is no possibility at all of a *verbatim* memorization of Homer's poem by a relay of rhapsodes. Without a fixed text we would have a *Homeristic* recitation, not a *Homeric* text orally presented. Verbatim memorization is possible only from a fixed written text and we have such an instance in Crete where the seventeenth-century epic-romance of *Erotokritos* of over 10,000 lines, written by Cornaros, is faithfully sung by many people from memory.⁴⁹ Such must have been the basis for the performance of the *Iliad* at the Panathenaia. But for a recitation of the Homeric poems by a relay of rhapsodes on the occasion of the première performance of the poems a written text is required as the basis of *verbatim* memorization. Wade-Gery resorts to a *deus ex machina* and makes Homer a literary poet who

wrote his poem on the basis of the recently introduced alphabet.⁵⁰ A poet is literary or oral, not both.⁵¹ An oral poem may be dictated to a scribe, as Lord suggests,⁵² thus resulting in a written text. But this could have come long after the *Iliad* had taken form and shape through oral recitation, when the poem had acquired the fame that led to the desire to preserve it in writing. Until we can even be sure of a dictated text by Homer himself — for one written by Homer is impossible in the present status of oral study about him — the first recitation of the *Iliad* through a relay of bards is a hypothesis motivated more by a desire for aesthetic appreciation of its unity in a limited performance than by the evidence of the factors at work in oral poetry. Until we definitely know, if ever, when the text of Homer came into being,⁵³ a festival recitation via a relay of bards is a very tenuous hypothesis if not a *mirage* of Homeric scholarship.

We are thus left with Homer's own première recitation of the Homeric poems, created orally, either before the common people or before the nobility. We must not confuse the fifth-century concern of the πόλις for mass culture through the Panathenaia and Dionysiac festivals with the poetry of the eighth through the sixth century which was created for the aristocracy. To be sure epic recitations by wandering bards⁵⁴ were heard at the λέσχη, the agora, at festivals where bards competed, but the recitation in such contexts, with their diversity of entertainment, interruptions, and lack of a stable audience, is more conducive to shorter poems or selected episodes. The creation of a long oral poem is possible only in the leisurely life of the nobility⁵⁵ who support the professional ἀοιδός as part of their retinue; their way of life, with feasts night after night, alone makes possible the birth of a long poem presented in separate recitation of the parts. Episodic portions of this long tale may be detached and recited before the people, but a long tale is possible only in the context of the aristocracy whose pattern of life assigns an important role to song as daily entertainment. The longest oral poem we have in modern Greek poetry, the Epic of Ali Pasha, running over 10,000 lines, was composed by the blind bard Hatz-Sehretes in the court of Ali Pasha. Lord's report, mentioned earlier, shows that the long songs of the Moslems were occasioned by their leisured life and the opportunity provided by the Feast of Ramazan.⁵⁶ The length of poems is not necessarily the result of limitations in the bard's art or training. Parry showed that the bard Avdo Međedović, when given the leisure and time, composed a long poem of 13,331 lines, far longer than those of his regular repertory.⁵⁷ Some such opportunity given to Homer in a court of an Ionian nobleman enabled him to expand the

episodic night-after-night recitation, such as we see in the eighth book of the *Odyssey*, into the *gross epos*, on whose quality and magnitude⁵⁸ his later reputation as ὁ ποιητής rested. Some of the genres of art have potentialities for magnitude later achieved by some master. This may be seen in the large Dipylon vases as compared with the smaller Protogeometric pots; the trilogy of Aeschylus as compared with the lyrical single plays of his predecessors; the pediments and frieze of the Parthenon as compared with the small temple treasuries at Delphi; the symphonies of Beethoven as compared with those of Haydn. Such, too, must have been the achievement of Homer as compared with the works of his predecessors.

The evidence from the *Odyssey*, the *Certamen*, Hesiod, and Xenophanes all point to the after-dinner table of the aristocracy as the traditional setting for epic recitation.⁵⁹ When Homer calls song the wedded mate of the feast (συνήορος, *Od.* VIII, 72) he is noting the basic context of recitation in early Greek poetry. In the *Certamen*, when Hesiod asks Homer, "What think you in your heart is most delightful to men?", Homer replies (quoting his own words in *Od.* IX, 5-11): "When mirth reigns throughout the town and feasters about the house, sitting in order, listen to a minstrel; when the tables beside them are laden with bread and meat, and a wine-bearer draws sweet drink from the mixing-bowl and fills the cups: this I think in my heart to be most delightful." Of this reply the author of the *Certamen* notes: "When Homer had recited these verses, they were so admired by the Greeks as to be called golden by them." Regardless of the historicity of the context these lines show what the general Greek tradition took to be the context of epic recitation. The *Melampodeia* echoes this. "For pleasant it is at a feast and rich banquet to tell delightful tales." The first elegy of Xenophanes gives an elaborate picture of epic-singing at a feast. Later tradition extends this context to lyric *skolia* and the literature associated with symposia. Comparative oral literature shows minstrelsy to be an accompaniment of the feast. It is one of the keenest of male pleasures, extending from Homer down to modern Crete, where we have τραγούδια τῆς τράβλας, songs of the table. We have a vivid picture of such in the *Song of Daskaloyiannes*, dated 1786: "And old men, white-haired, sitting at the table eating and drinking, and singing with a loud voice, reciting songs of heroic deeds and the sufferings of war."⁶⁰ In view of all this evidence, a feast is the normal context for epic recitation, and it is definitely the most frequent for singing episodes by the ancient αοιδός, though episode singing in ἀγῶνες and festivals is to be included.

The question arises whether or not a long poem can develop in such a context. The evidence from the *Odyssey* shows that it can. The picture of the aristocracy in the Phaeacian court and the court of Ithaca satisfies all the conditions requisite for the creation of long poems: an aristocracy with leisure to listen to a long tale, night after night,⁶¹ after a feast; one which had among its retinue a professional bard who was a virtuoso master of his oral tradition; audiences who were passionately devoted to heroic poetry (τέρποντες ἀείδειν [VIII, 91], κληθμῶ δ' ἔσχοντο [XIII, 2]) and considered it the charm of mortals (βροτῶν θελκτήρια [I, 337]); who directed the bard, connoisseurs that they were, to sing κατὰ κόσμον, κατὰ μοῖραν (VIII, 489, 496). They were imbued with a desire to hear songs ceaselessly, ἄμοτον (XVII, 520), which implies also night after night of singing. Without a good audience the singers tend to shorten a song. Wherever we have such a devoted audience and a virtuoso bard who earns his bread and wins his fame (VII, 497-498) for songs⁶² to be listened to even by men to come (ἔσσομένοισιν, VIII, 580), we have the proper condition for the creation of the long Homeric poems. As far as context for recitation of oral poetry, Homer's picture of the Phaeacian court is applicable to the Mycenaean and the Ionian practice of oral poetry. It could apply to the court of King Agamemnon of Cyme, dated *ca.* 700 B.C.⁶³ as well as to Phaeacia. The Ionian aristocracy, which fostered art and literature in the Archaic age, furnished Homer with the only possible occasion for the creation of long poems. Homer, trained like the bard in the *Odyssey* in the single episode, continued it as the basis of his new creation, but with the technique of ornamentation⁶⁴ expanded one such episode — the wrath of Achilles — into a major poem embracing subsidiary episodes which contribute to the main theme even as subsidiary figures in pedimental sculpture. As the temple in Greek art offered the sculptor an opportunity for sculptural synthesis, so did the aristocracy of Ionia offer the oral poet, at a peak in the development of the oral art, the opportunity for a comprehensive and expanded creation of the long poem.

The solution of the problem of Homeric recitation is found in the text of Homer himself. The principle of Aristarchus, Ὀμηρον ἐξ Ὀμήρου σαφηνίζειν, is still sound. Many have suspected that Demodocus is a self-portrait of Homer. It has remained for evidence from recitation in the Balkans to show that Homer's own recitation of his epics coincides with the portrait of Demodocus. It is the only bit of self-biography that he has left in the poems. Field work in Balkan oral poetry shows that, genius apart, the oral art of singing tales rests on

the same factors and involves the same elements of production, ancient or modern. The solution reached may not help us much in solving the problem of what happened to the Homeric poems between the première oral performance, as suggested above, and the Pisistratid text of the sixth century. This is the most troublesome problem in Homeric studies. Was the transmission via a dictated text? Did the Homeridae transmit the Homeric poems *verbatim* from the text, or did they tamper with it in their recitations, as the Pindar scholium on the Homeridae charges? Was it sung in complete form or in episodes in the interval between these two centuries? These are difficult problems which may or may not be advanced toward solution by our increasing knowledge of oral poetry, but in no way may these problems be confused with Homer's original première creation through self-recitation. If all the questions posed by Page have not yet been answered it is hoped that some of them have been advanced beyond the stage of hypothesis through a study of oral recitations in the Balkans.

II. THE ORAL ATLAS OF EARLY GREEK POETRY:

A Study of the Cyclic Epics as Oral Poetry

Greek literature is the story of two words: *ἔπεα* and *λόγος*. Winged words, it will be shown, affected Greek literature until the fifth century. The Greek mind expressed itself until then largely through the oral tradition out of whose trunk branched lyric and dramatic poetry. As oral poetry withered, the olive tree of Greece renewed its vitality through *λόγος*, and this takes us to Plato, who, though he had many predecessors in logical thinking, was the first to see the true relation between *ἔπεα* and *λόγος*. This story has been told well by Havelock in his *Preface to Plato*.¹ In the second of these studies I wish to deal with the longevity of the oral tradition. Two previous articles on Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns have illustrated certain aspects of this longevity.² Here I wish to deal with the Cyclic epics, to show that they are oral poetry and to set them in an oral atlas of early Greek poetry which will include other aspects of the oral tradition.

That the Greek oral tradition did not stop with Homer first occurred to me while recording the heroic oral poetry of modern Greece, its Akritan and klephtic ballads, and heroic poems composed orally on events of World War II. In my field notebook I wrote: "Here is an oral tradition of heroic poetry a thousand years old, which has survived side by side with the literary tradition from Byzantium. The tenacity of oral literature sufficient to survive and persist in the midst of literacy

is a fact here and in the Parry-Lord oral heroic poetry from Yugoslavia. Could this be true of early Greek poetry after Homer, after the introduction of the alphabet into Greece? Test this." Since this was written I have tested this hypothesis, enriched by an intimate knowledge of field work in oral poetry, by a rereading of Parry, and of Lord's *The Singer of Tales*, whose conclusions were corroborated by my own field work. The work on this problem took the form of an atlas, with a vertical axis for chronology and a horizontal axis for geographical distribution of poets or poems for which we have evidence. The material tested for inclusion in this oral atlas was all the surviving heroic or nonheroic hexameters, surviving as wholes or fragments, dated in our ancient testimonia from the eighth to the fifth centuries. The litmus test for deciding whether or not a poem is oral in character is the formula — a method of analysis developed with exacting standards by Parry.³ In addition, other criteria emerged from Parry's work, namely, composition by traditional theme, a paratactic structure which is the by-product of oral composition; the presence of such typological patterns as recurrent type-scenes, catalogues, genealogies, similes, ring-composition.⁴

Relying on all these criteria, the following poets or poetry were tested: the Hesiodic corpus, the Homeric Hymns, all the surviving fragments of the cyclic and noncyclic poets; the hexameter lines cited in the *Certamen* and in the ancient *vitae* of Homer and Hesiod, the comic epics *Margites*, the oracular responses of Delphi, and the mantic poetry of Epimenides. The results of this formulaic examination show that (1) we have an oral atlas whose coordinates of time extend, as shown by recent studies of the Homeric Catalogue of Ships and of certain formulae in Homer,⁵ without interruption from Mycenaean times down to the beginning of the fifth century B.C., a continuous oral tradition close to a thousand years; (2) its coordinates of space extend to Ionia, in the east, its coastal cities, and Aegean islands, including Crete and Cyprus; on the mainland Boeotia (Ascra and Orchomenus), Naupactus, Corinth, Troezen and Sparta: to Pontus in the north, to Cyrene in the south.

If this oral atlas be such in extent of time and space the consequences are significant as far as our historical and critical perspectives of early Greek literature are concerned. In our reappraisal we must give up the long-held notion that Homer is the *fons et origo* of Greek literature. This is true as far as quality is concerned but it does not fit in with the evidence examined in the light of our knowledge of oral poetry. We must admit in our story poetry created completely independent of Homer, whose formulae, or themes, were derived directly from the

Mycenaean oral tradition and not from a literary mimesis of Homer. With our increased knowledge of the workings of the oral technique we must now dispense with the usual literary borrowing, or imitation, of Homer which has been the stock-in-trade of literary historians of Greek literature.⁶ For we now realize that when two oral poets use the same formula, or theme, it is not to be explained in terms of mimesis or adaptation but in the poet's training and borrowing and adapting material from a common oral tradition. The result will not be a lessening of Homer's greatness but rather a realization that the early Greek tradition is more creative, in the oral sense of the word, than we have realized. The creativity of the Greek oral tradition can best be grasped when we see its wide diversity. The use of the same oral diction can lead to widely different kinds of poetry:

(1) The heroic epic as embodied in the Homeric and Cyclic epics.

(2) The personal epic as embodied in Hesiod's *Works and Days*. Hesiod made a sharp break with his Boeotian tradition of epic poetry of which we have traces in the Theban cycle, in the heroic sagas and myths of which we have glimpses in Boeotian fibulae and vases of the Geometric period.⁷ He dealt with himself and with contemporary problems of life at Ascra. He hates war, yet using the same oral diction as Homer he creates a personal poem which has scarcely any connexion, outside of common formulae, with Homer.

(3) Genealogical poems. The Homeric warrior will boast of his γένος to impress an opponent, but Hesiod, in the *Theogony*, uses γένος in a fabric of organization applied to family genealogies, to evolving the world out of chaos and injustice into order and justice; he uses γένος again in the Five Ages to organize history and use it as an αἰτία, why men must work. He organizes the rhythms of nature into a calendar year to guide man's daily life, and finally he organizes the world of men and of gods and brings them into causal relation with ethos long before Solon and Aeschylus.

(4) The hymn, used both as short prologues and as longer narratives dealing with the deeds of gods often connected with aetiological accounts of the founding of religious institutions.

(5) The comic epic, which emerges in Demodocus' hymn about Aphrodite and Ares, continues in the *Hymn to Hermes*, the *Margites*, and *Cercopes*.

(6) Amoebaeon verse contests which we find in the *Certamen*.

(7) Mantic poetry which was sung (Thuc., II, 54) and such religious poetry as seen in Epimenides.⁸

- (8) The historical epic as seen in Eumelus' *Corinthiaka*.
- (9) Folk songs.⁹

The various facets of life expressed by the early oral poetry show the flexibility and the originality possible in the oral technique.¹⁰ This point needs to be emphasized, for our historians of early Greek literature have failed to see the richness and diversity of the oral tradition. They have tended mainly to see it as a literary mimesis of Homer. We have just learned to stop doing this in assessing the relation of Virgil to Homer and we must make some similar reappraisal of Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and the Cyclic epics in relation to Homer. Our admiration of Homer's genius has been at the expense of distorted historical perspective. Failure to grasp how oral literature works has resulted, as will be shown in a distortion of chronology so as to make possible a Homeric influence. Furthermore, the near deification of the Homeric epics, the admiration of his dramatic quality and unity, have made our criticism of other early Greek poets rest on later points of view. The low esteem of the Cyclic epics in the Alexandrian period is not shared by Sophocles, who prized them highly.¹¹ In oral literature evolutionary patterns are not so evident as in other forms of literary creation. An oral poet who creates with a traditional diction in the sixth century is not necessarily different from one who creates oral poems in the eighth century. The sacrifice of historical perspective to criticism that concentrates on value and essence calls for a protest from the historian of early Greek poetry. Value and history call for a double vision in literary criticism, and the classical philologist must not confuse them. The genealogy of early Greek poetry has suffered from making Homer the tree from which the other literature branches out, whereas the truth is the tree is the oral tradition which blended history and myth, and Homer is one of the branches. Our knowledge now of the workings of the oral technique calls for a reappraisal closer to the realities of the oral tradition. Mnemosyne must also be for us the mother of the Muses. The oral poet works and thinks with his memory.¹² It is not a memory of books but a memory of winged words.

By extending the time and space dimensions of the early Greek oral tradition Homeric scholarship is enriched by an unexpected blessing. Hitherto our efforts to understand the workings of Homer as an oral poet, in the absence of oral poetry earlier than or contemporary with Homer, have relied on a comparative study¹³ with Serbocroatian or Modern Greek heroic oral poetry. Though these employ a formulaic technique, they differ widely from early Greek poetry by virtue of being

creations of different traditions, mythologies, even linguistic structure.¹⁴ This later poetry is so lacking in the genius of early Greek poetry that the comparison is valuable only at the level of technique. Though comparative oral literature will continue to offer insights into Homer — and let us remember that even protozoa can yield valuable insights into the study of more complex forms of life — we will find it more profitable to compare Homer with Hesiod, the poets of the Cyclic epics and the Hymns, many of whom, according to our ancient testimonia, are contemporary, or near contemporary, practitioners of the oral art. The realization that they are all oral poets working with the same oral tradition enables us now to start on the solution of problems which deal with the degree of individuality, epichoric differences, and the ways of oral influence. For example, knowing that Homer and Hesiod were contemporaries, as Herodotus, the ancient lives of Homer and Hesiod, the *Certamen* and fragment 265 of Hesiod say, we now can account for the presence in Hesiod of Homeric formulae in ways other than lowering the traditional date of Hesiod. Conversely we can explain better the presence of Boeotian and Hesiodic material in Homer through the oral transmission of mainland themes in the migration of the tenth and ninth centuries. Whatever Homer and Hesiod share in common, be it diction or theme, is better accounted for by mutual borrowings from the survival of the Achaeian tradition of oral poetry after the Dorian invasion.¹⁵ Thus the discovery that the oral tradition extends beyond Homer opens up a new frontier of comparative oral material within the early Greek poetry itself.

Our oral atlas must also be related to the emergence of writing in Greece, which such competent authorities as Carpenter, Dunbabin and Jeffrey date in the last quarter of the eighth century.¹⁶ Whether or not Homer within his own lifetime dictated his poems to a scribe, as Lord suggests, or whether, as Kirk recently maintains,¹⁷ the Homeric poems continued to be recited with almost verbatim memory, is an issue which does not affect the existence of an oral atlas in Greece after Homer. Epic poetry long after Homer shows the same formulaic texture and oral physiognomy. Lord has shown that the genuine oral bard must not be confused with an oral reproducer of a fixed memorized text,¹⁸ such as were the rhapsodes who recited in relays the memorized text at the Panathenaia. In this period we are dealing with creative bards who composed their poems with the oral technique of composition. Writing exists to preserve an oral poem. Even if the Homeridae had a fixed text the strong orally ingrained habits tended to reproduce them with the oral variations which accounts for the existence of the five civic editions

(αἱ κατὰ πόλεις), and for the dissatisfaction with the oral texts of the Homeridae seen in the Pindar scholium which accuses them of inexactness (ἐλυμήναντο δ' αὐτῇ πάνυ).¹⁹ The first real evidence we have for written epics appears in the prologue of the *Batrachomyomachia*,

Ἀρχόμενος πρώτης σελίδος χορὸν ἐξ Ἑλικῶνος
ἐλθεῖν εἰς ἐμὸν ἦτορ ἐπεύχομαι εἵνεκ' αἰοιδῆς,
ἦν νέον ἐν δέλτοισιν ἐμοῖς ἐπὶ γούνασι θῆκα

This poem is attributed by the *Suda* to Pigres,²⁰ the brother of Artemesia, who distinguished herself at the battle of Salamis, hence its date, *ca.* 480 B.C., is an indication of the change from oral to written epics. The use of writing to record but not create epics could have occurred shortly after their oral composition, as in the case of the itinerant bards of Cyprus, called ποιητάρηδες, who went to printers and dictated their texts for the purpose of selling their songs to villagers after their oral recitation.²¹ The strong urge of archaic Greece to immortalize its names and deeds through monuments and inscribed epigrams may also have been felt by oral bards, for we find a copy of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* preserved on a λεύκωμα in Delos, and a lead tablet text of the Hesiodic *Erga* was seen in faded letters by Pausanias.²² The Pisistratid period seems to have been characterized by a self-conscious effort to collect oral poems in books, and the Pisistratids were said to have possessed a library of poetry.²³ But even the existence of books does not affect the oral bard in the way we think. Avdo Mešedović, one of Parry's best bards, had a text of a story read to him, but when he re-created it in his own version it was not a verbatim text but a story retold with his own oral technique.²⁴ The literary and the oral techniques of composition do not mix in a true oral bard, for even the same bard does not retell his own tale twice the same. Literary poets may incorporate the oral style, as has been done in instances in Yugoslavia and modern Greece, but it is easy to detect the differences between a literary and an oral text. Reasons will be given later for the survival of the oral method of composition in the midst of literacy in ancient and modern Greece, but it must be realized that manuscripts or books are the *sine qua non* of the survival of oral poetry in a literate society, not its essence. Many of the mistakes in classical scholarship, past or present, come from not realizing, as one critic has aptly put it, "that working exclusively with books breeds an academic mind which most frequently works, by training no less than by temperament, according to the principles of an exclusively prosaic logic; it tends to assume a similar mental process in ancient poets."²⁵ Particularly is this true in the case of

poets who composed with the oral technique of verse-making. These bards, as observed by Parry, Lord, and myself, work with oral instincts and habits and not with conscious concepts which the academic mind constructs. It is only when we allow the poets of this oral atlas to express their thoughts and feelings through their oral style that we will be able to have a better understanding of them as oral poets. Thus writing exists at the time of our oral atlas but merely to preserve it, not to create it.

Though Ionia, in particular Chios, is the foremost center of our oral atlas by reason of Homer ²⁶ and the Homeridae, and many of the poets of the Cyclic epic, our atlas has a far wider extent in time and space. Prior to Homer we have evidence in Homer himself. In the Catalogue of Ships, in the section dealing with the cities in the Pylos district, Homer inserts a valuable piece of information on the bard Thamyras:

. . . καὶ Δώριον, ἔνθα τε Μοῦσαι
 ἀντόμεναι Θάμυριν τὸν Θρήϊκα παῦσαν ἀοιδῆς,
 Οἰχαλίηθεν ἰόντα παρ' Εὐρύτου Οἰχαλιῆος·
 στέυτο γὰρ εὐχόμενος νικησέμεν, εἴ περ ἂν αὐταὶ
 Μοῦσαι ἀεῖδοιεν, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
 αἱ δὲ χολωσάμεναι πηρὸν θέσαν, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὴν
 θεσπεσίην ἀφέλοντο καὶ ἐκλέλαθον κιθαριστύν.²⁷

Since this passage comes from the Catalogue of Ships, the most historically authentic Mycenaean document in the *Iliad*, as Page and others have shown, Thamyras of Thrace, which we know to be connected with Orpheus, is our first historical bard in the Mycenaean tradition, and Thrace and Pylos are our earliest fixed centers in the oral atlas. In the light of our present knowledge of oral poetry we are in a better position to understand what ἐκλέλαθον (line 600) means: the Muses destroyed the bard for *hybris* by destroying his memory of formulae and themes. The oral bard works with his memory. Since Pylos was destroyed *ca.* 1200 B.C., we have a rough date for Thamyras. He is the first of our wandering bards. When the Muses met him, he was journeying from Oechalia, a city in the Pylos district now known to us from the Pylos tablets.²⁸ If the bard fresco from the Pylos palace is really that of a bard, we have a further detail for positing Pylos historically as a center of Mycenaean poetry.²⁹ The fact that Thamyras was a bard from Thrace singing in Pylos implies the existence of an early oral *koiné* capable of being understood in Thrace and in Pylos. Whether or not the three other bards mentioned in the Homeric poems — the bard with whom Agamemnon left his wife when he went to Troy,

Phemius of Ithaca, and Demodocus of Phaeacia — have as good a case for being historical as Thamyras is uncertain. At any rate, Plato spoke of Thamyras and Phemius as historical persons.³⁰ The case for positing oral centers in Thrace and Pylos in Mycenaean times looks good; for Argos, Ithaca, and Phaeacia probable but not capable of proof. The strong case made for Mycenaean poetry by Page and Bowra on the basis of memory of Mycenaean artifacts and cities long destroyed by the time of Homer is solid, though we cannot identify the centers which fashioned this oral diction.

In Mycenaean and post-Mycenaean times Boeotia looms large in our oral atlas.³¹ Owing to lack of thorough archaeological excavations in Boeotia and to the confused picture we have in Pausanias and Strabo of the early waves of tribal migrations in Boeotia, our focus of Mycenaean Boeotia is not clear. Yet its poetry reflects a past of splendor, wars, dynastic quarrels, some of the very basic myths of Greek literature.³² That it had a rich oral tradition which was carried over to Ionia with the migrations may be seen in the Boeotian elements in Homeric poetry, such as the prominence of Boeotia in the Catalogue of Ships;³³ the shades of Boeotian fair women in the *Nekyia* who come forward to drink sacrificial blood and recite to Odysseus their pedigree in the manner of Hesiod's catalogues of women;³⁴ references in Homer to the stories of Oedipus and the Seven Before Thebes, the Argo which reflects the extension of the power of Minyan Orchomenus to Thessaly.³⁵ When we add these Boeotian elements in Homer to the heroic sagas depicted in early Boeotian vases and fibulae,³⁶ to the fragments surviving from the *Oedipodeia*, the *Thebais*, and the *Epigoni*, to all the poems genuinely ascribed to Hesiod and the rest that were attracted to the corpus of Hesiodic poetry, it becomes apparent that Boeotia is by far the most pre-eminent center of oral poetry in our atlas. Were it not for Homer's genius and the unique propagation of his poems by the Homeridae we would not make Ionia the center of post-Dorian renaissance and leave Boeotia at the same time in the Dark Ages, as is done in current thinking. This deception is in large measure fostered by the fact that Homer deals not with contemporary Ionia, which archaeology is showing to be no more advanced than the mainland culture,³⁷ but with the heroic past, whereas Hesiod deals with the contemporary social and economic world of Boeotia. As the eighth century opens, the evidence from Hesiod, from early Boeotian art, shows a cultural renaissance in Boeotia equal to that of Ionia. In some ways it is spiritually more advanced, for while Homer re-creates beautifully the Mycenaean past, Hesiod puts the glory of war behind him and forges a personal epic

dealing with the present under the moral aegis of the gods and of justice; he shapes his divinities and organizes them in a framework of law and order; he becomes the first pre-Socratic thinker and lays the spiritual foundation of the emerging *polis*. What has blinded us to all this are (1) the brilliance of Homer; (2) the tendency to equate the physical destruction that attended the Dorian Conquest with the spiritual life of the mainland as reflected in Hesiod; (3) the arbitrary assumption of nineteenth-century scholarship, which followed Aristarchus in making Hesiod, not a contemporary of Homer, as Herodotus tells us, but a follower by as much as a century. The truth of the matter is that the Dorian destruction of material things does not necessarily apply to the spiritual life of a people. Oral poetry, myths, religious beliefs, sagas, legends, survive better than material culture, better than Mycenaean palaces. It is emerging more clearly that epic poetry thrived well in the so-called Dark Ages, which is the germination period for both the Homeric and Hesiodic epics. It is ironic that Athens, which survived relatively untouched by the Dorian Conquest, has no epics;³⁸ yet the most precious things the Ionian colonization took with it to Asia Minor were poetry and religious festivals. We must not take too seriously Thucydides' gnomic remarks on the Corcyra stasis, that men's characters in crises are reduced to the level of their circumstances. This interpretation of history has wrongly been applied to post-Dorian Greece. There is a higher feeling for religion in the poverty-stricken Ascræ of Hesiod than in Homer. The nostalgia for past splendor saved the "seed of fire"³⁹ in the oral epic during this period and rekindled the epos of Homer. The adjustment of the epic tradition by Hesiod to deal with the present and the personal problems of living experience led to the spiritual splendor of the *Works and Days* and the *Theogony*, to the first formulation of *δίκη* as man's and Zeus' *ἀρετή*. Classical scholarship, affected by evolutionary patterns, thinks this is a development after Homer. The fact is that it is not. Herodotus, our source earliest and closest to Homer and Hesiod, makes them contemporaries. This is supplemented by the date of the Lelantine war in which Amphidamas was killed,⁴⁰ at whose wake Hesiod competed and won the prize of tripods; by fr. 265 of Hesiod, which will be discussed in the next study; by the *Certamen* and the ancient lives of these poets which make them, with some exceptions, contemporaries. The lowering of the date of Hesiod was started by Aristarchus, who equated Homer with a golden age and a subsequent decline.⁴¹ Aristarchus was followed by nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship. Literary mimesis was the only way in which these scholars could conceive of the relationship

between Homer and the other early Greek poets. Our knowledge of oral poetry gives us a better understanding of this relationship. This is true not only of Homer's relation to Hesiod but also to the so-called Cyclic epics whose original physiognomy has been distorted ever since Alexandrian times.

The Cyclic epics — those included in the framework of Proclus' summary and others which are not ⁴² — constitute for us a new facet of oral poetry. They are largely independent of Homer and stem directly from the oral tradition of the Greeks. As will be shown, some of them are earlier, some contemporary with Homer, and some later. In our study of them we must apply Aristarchus' dictum of knowing Homer through Homer to the Cyclic epics themselves. Aristarchus divided all early Greek poets into Homer and the νεώτεροι.⁴³ This distinction, largely based on their literary inferiority to Homer and not on the chronology surviving in our sources, has been responsible for the distorted picture we have of these early non-Homeric poets. Aristotle, in the *Poetics*, contributed to this distortion by his depreciation of these epics as compared with Homer. This distortion was continued later by imposing these early poems on the Procrustean bed of a cycle. Severyns has shown their ultimate fate — how through Aristarchus' prestige, authority, and prejudice these cyclic poems were used by scholiasts to point out the superiority of Homer over them, until they disappeared, replaced by prose mythography and summaries such as are found in Proclus and in the scholia of Venetus A.⁴⁴ It is impossible now through the few fragments that survive to rehabilitate them as poetry. That they once enjoyed, before Aristotle and Alexandrian times, a better status as poetry is seen in Sophocles' admiration of them, in their influence on lyric and dramatic poetry, and in the iconography of black- and red-figured vases whose themes come overwhelmingly from the Cyclic epics rather than from Homer.⁴⁵ All that will be attempted in this study is to show that the Cyclic epics were once not a cycle, that they are oral in character and largely independent of Homer. As such, they borrowed their themes not from Homer but from the Mycenaean heritage of oral poetry even as Homer and Hesiod. Our knowledge of the workings of oral poetry demands that we look upon them not in the light of past quarrels but in that of oral poetry. As oral poetry they show the creativity inherent in the oral medium.⁴⁶

These Cyclic epics, whether it be those dealing with the Trojan war as contained in the more formal cadre of Proclus' summary, or those loosely drawn into a less formal cycle by reason of Thebes (*Oedipodeia*, *Thebais*, *Epigoni*), or those left to exist independently of a cycle

(*Titanomachia*, *Danaides*, *Aegimios*, *Minyas*, *Capture of Oechalia*), or many others listed in Kinkel's corpus,⁴⁷ constitute for us a new facet of early Greek oral poetry. They are part and parcel of the same oral tradition which gave birth to the Homeric, the Hesiodic, and Homeric Hymns. They extend to all parts of the Greek world. Once their oral character is established by the criteria of oral poetry, we must stop thinking of them as literary creations heliocentrically moving around the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. As oral poetry, freed from their Alexandrian or post-Alexandrian arrangement into cycles and from the critical evaluation of them by the Alexandrians, who were so ignorant of the existence of oral poetry that they often athetized repeated formulae or elements in Homer which were found only in the Cyclic epics,⁴⁸ they will take on a more creative character in early Greek poetry, and as oral creations their form and style will be judged in the light of forces at work in oral poetry.

In order to determine their oral physiognomy three criteria of oral poetry will be applied: 1) formulaic analysis, such as Parry developed; 2) frequency of enjambment; 3) thematic analysis such as Lord has developed in the *The Singer of Tales*. With respect to the first two oral criteria, only a total of 120 lines survive from these epics. A formulaic analysis of these shows that almost 100 per cent of the verses exhibit formulae, ready-made or created by analogy to pre-existing systems. A formulaic analysis of three of the longest fragments, from three different poems, illustrates beyond doubt the formulaic character of these poems. The first fragment comes from the *Cypria* [frag. 6 Kinkel]⁴⁹

τοὺς δὲ μετὰ τριτάτην Ἑλένην τέκε θαῦμα βροτοῖσι,
_____1_____2

τὴν ποτε καλλίκομος Νέμεσις φιλότῃτι μιγεῖσα
-----3-----4-----5

Ζηνὶ θεῶν βασιλῇ τέκε κρατερῆς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.
-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

φείυγε γάρ, οὐδ' ἔθελεν μιχθήμεναι ἐν φιλότῃτι
-----11-----12-----13

πατρὶ Διὶ Κρονίωνι. ἐτείρετο γὰρ φρένας αἰδοῖ
-----14-----15-----16-----17

καὶ νεμέσει. κατὰ γῆν δὲ καὶ ἀτρύγετον μέλαν ὕδωρ
-----18-----19-----20

φεῦγε, Ζεὺς δ' ἐδίωκε· λαβεῖν δ' ἐλιλαίετο θυμῷ.
 21 22 23

ἄλλοτε μὲν κατὰ κῦμα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης
 24 25

ἰχθυῖ εἰδομένη πόντον πολλὸν ἐξορόθουνεν,
 26 27

ἄλλοτ' ἂν ὤκεανὸν ποταμὸν καὶ πείρατα γαίης,
 28 29 30

ἄλλοτ' ἂν ἥπειρον πολυβώλακα· γίγνετο δ' αἰεὶ
 31 32 33
 34

θηρί', ὅς' ἥπειρος αἰνὰ τρέφει, ὄφρα φύγοι νιν.
 35 36

The second fragment comes from the *Thebais* [Kinkel frag. 2]:⁵⁰

Αὐτὰρ ὁ διογενὴς ἥρως ξανθὸς Πολυνείκης
 1 2

πρῶτα μὲν Οἰδιπόδῃ καλὴν παρέθηκε τράπεζαν
 3 4

ἄργυρέην Κάδμοιο θεόφρονος· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
 5 6 7

χρῦσεον ἔμπλησεν καλὸν δέπας ἡδέος οἴνου.
 8 10
 9

αὐτὰρ ὁ γ' ὥς φράσθη παρακείμενα πατρὸς ἐοῖο
 11 12

τιμῆεντα γέρα, μέγα οἱ κακὸν ἔμπεσε θυμῷ,
 13 14 15

αἶψα δὲ παισὶν ἐοῖσι μετ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπαρὰς
 16 17 18
 19

ἀργαλέας ἡρᾶτο· θεῶν δ' οὐ λάνθαν' ἐρινύν·
 20 23 22
 21 24

ὥς οὗ οἱ πατρώϊ' ἐν ἡθείῃ φιλότῃτι
 25 26
 27

δάσσαιντ' ἀμφοτέροισι δ' αἰὲ πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε
 28 30

 ----- 29

The third fragment comes from *Ilias parva* [Allen, frag. XIX]⁵¹

Αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλῆος μεγαθύμου φαίδιμος υἱὸς

 ----- 2
 Ἑκτορέην ἄλοχον κάταγεν κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας

 ----- 5
 ----- 4
 παῖδα δ' ἑλὼν ἐκ κόλπου ἐνπλοκάμοιο τιθήνης.

 ----- 7
 ῥύβε ποδὸς τεταγὼν ἀπὸ πύργου, τὸν δὲ πεσόντα

 ----- 8 9
 ἔλλαβε πορφύρεος θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή.

 ----- 10
 ἐκ δ' ἔλεν Ἀνδρομάχην, ἡύζωνον παράκοιτιν

 ----- 14
 ----- 11
 ----- 12
 ----- 13
 Ἑκτορος, ἦν τε οἱ αὐτῷ ἀριστῆες Παναχαϊῶν

 ----- 17
 ----- 15 16
 δῶκαν ἔχων ἐπίηρον ἀμειβόμενοι γέρας ἀνδρί,

 ----- 20
 ----- 18 19
 αὐτὸν τ' Ἀγχίσαιο κλυτὸν γόνον ἵπποδάμοιο

 ----- 23
 ----- 21
 ----- 24
 ----- 22
 Αἰνείαν ἐν νηυσὶν ἐβήσατο ποντοπόροισιν

 ----- 27
 ----- 25 26
 ----- 28
 ----- 29
 ἐκ πάντων Δαναῶν ἀγέμεν γέρας ἔξοχον ἄλλων

 ----- 32
 ----- 30
 ----- 31
 ----- 33

This solidly formulaic texture, exhibited also in all the smaller fragments, constitutes the *sine qua non* test of the oral character of these

early epics. Another characteristic is the degree of enjambment, necessary and unessential. An analysis of these three longest fragments shows that out of a combined total of 33 lines, 10 display necessary enjambment, and 6 unessential enjambment. Out of 828 lines of the *Iliad* tested for enjambment, Parry found 220 lines showed necessary, and 206 lines showed unessential, enjambment.⁵² The percentage in both is roughly equivalent, and the cyclic poems also exhibit this characteristic of oral poetry.

The final test of oral poetry is, as Lord has shown, composition by traditional theme.⁵³ The singer of tales, in order to improvise facilely, has need (1) of ready made diction; (2) of themes which he reticulates into the architecture of his poem. He learns both from hearing other singers during his apprenticeship. Neither the formulae nor the themes are memorized as detached elements but as parts of the story sung. The themes are learned as incidents in the life of a hero, each of whom has a certain fixed cluster associated with his life. The same holds true for wars, campaigns, raids. These themes may start out as incidents in history but in time they are applied to other heroes with only a change of name. Other themes come from magic, folklore, or the daemonic powers of gods. Thus a typology of formulae and themes clustered in traditional patterns constitutes the basic elements of the oral art. In listening to singers of Akritan and kleptic ballads in Greece I became aware how the same theme appears in singer after singer. The furthest one can go in this direction is to ask what singers a bard had heard. It became evident that singers in various parts of the country, unknown to each other, sing the same themes. Collections of oral poetry show the same phenomenon. To prove this point it is only necessary to show that the same themes appear in the oral heroic poetry of Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria.⁵⁴ To be sure, we must posit a genesis for a theme in the dim past, a noble deed of a hero which outgrew historicity to become a favorite motif in oral poetry. Other themes come from the inventiveness of some oral bard and enter the oral tradition as themes. But once a theme enters the tradition it is hopeless to introduce the concept of a stemma.

A theme may have an independent existence and may float from one hero to another, or have a fixed locus in a larger complex. We find both instances in oral poetry. For example, the slaying of a dragon may appear in a feat of Digenes Akritas, other Akritan heroes, or saints.⁵⁵ But certain themes are confined to one special hero, such as the wrestling with Charos which appears only in the story of Digenes Akritas.⁵⁶ This theme is constant in the ballads but it is mixed with other themes, and

there is often a difference in the thematic architecture. Thus it is the architecture of themes that constitutes the individual contribution of the singer. The themes are traditional but they may be enlarged by integrating other themes with the main one. Furthermore, there is no *verbatim* memorization of formulae and themes in these bards.

It is in the light of these factors at work in all oral poetry that we must re-examine the summaries of the Cyclic epics as they survive in Proclus.⁵⁷ They consist of themes which have their origins in the events of the Trojan war. Some of the *aristeia* are the unique property of certain heroes; for example, only Achilles can kill Hector. Other *aristeia* are variable and are found in different heroes. Themes are also associated with the lives of the gods and, in contrast to the heroes, the themes pertaining to the gods are more constant by reason of the attributes and functions of each god. The epic is an intermingling of the themes of gods and men. How common all these themes are to heroic poetry was observed long ago by Plato, who has Socrates converse thus with Ion:

Soc: Are the themes of Homer different from those of other poets [i.e., Hesiod and Archilochus], does he not treat principally of war, and the mutual intercourse of men, good and bad, and the ways of the gods in their intercourse with each other, and with men, and the happenings in the heavens and in the underworld, and the origin of gods and heroes? Are not these the subject of Homer's poetry?

Ion: What you say is true, Socrates.

Soc: And what of the other poets? Do they not treat of the same things?

Ion: Yes.⁵⁸

Here is evidence that Plato long ago knew the role of common themes in traditional early Greek epic poetry. This should be a salutary reminder to the historian of early Greek literature not to attribute to Homer the inventiveness that we associate with post-classical genius or to cite the presence of similar themes in other early Greek poets as evidence of literary mimesis.

Some illustrations will clarify this important aspect of oral poetry. We have about eleven instances⁵⁹ in our sources dealing with the wrath of heroes, of which the wrath of Achilles is the most magnificent. Wrath is an inevitable characteristic of highly strung heroes in the epic tradition. Achilles, Ajax, Philoctetes, and many heroes in Serbocroatian and modern Greek heroic poetry exhibit it. To maintain that the wrath of other heroes is a pale copy of the wrath of Achilles would only point to an unimaginative bookish mentality. Wrath is a theme also associated with the gods and we often find the wrath of a hero associated with the will of

Zeus. This may be seen in various epics. The wrath of Achilles brings the will of Zeus into play — Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή (I, 5). When Demodocus sings in the presence of Odysseus his theme is the quarrel of Achilles and Odysseus which had dire consequences:

... τότε γὰρ ῥα κυλίνδετο πῆματος ἀρχή
Τρωσί τε καὶ Δαναοῖσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλᾶς⁶⁰

Demodocus' song resembles in structure the theme of the prologue of the *Iliad*. That this is no mere coincidence but rather a common oral architectural pattern may be seen in the theme of two Cyclic epics whose authors are dated in the eighth century, the *Cypria* and the *Ilias parva*. In the *Cypria* we have a fragment which tells us that Zeus

ῥιπίσσας πολέμου μεγάλην ἔριν Ἰλιακοῦ,
ὄφρα κενῶσαιεν θανάτου βάρος· οἳ δ' ἐνὶ Τροίῃ
ἦρωες κτείνοντο· Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή.⁶¹

In the *Ilias parva* we find the decision in the quarrel between Odysseus and Ajax about the arms of Achilles made by βούλησιν Ἀθηναῶς.⁶² The structure of the *Odyssey* involves the wrath of Poseidon which is resolved in the *Epigoni*, after Odysseus has fulfilled the prophecy of Tiresias. Once it is realized that the theme of a quarrel involving the will of a god is a common theme in old oral epics it is unreasonable to insist on the dependence of the *Cypria* on the *Iliad*, as scholars have done. Not only is the date of the *Cypria* too early for literary mimesis of the *Iliad* but Herodotus points to the variance in the accounts of Helen and Paris in the *Cypria* and *Odyssey*.⁶³ Finally, any attempt to tie the *Cypria* to a literary mimesis of the *Iliad* is disproved by the fact that the key phrase, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή is a formula, as the following instances show:

οἰωνοῖσί τε πᾶσι, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή	A 5
θέσφατα πάντα εἰπόντα, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή	λ 297
ἔζε δ' ἄρ' ἐν μέσσοισι, Διὸς δ' ἐξείρετο βουλήν	Υ 15
πρῶτον ἐπηπείλησε, Διὸς δ' ἐξείρετο βουλήν	ν 127

There are also variations of this formula,

ἡμεῖς δὲ μέγαλοιο Διὸς πειθώμεθα βουλή	M 241
Ἴλιον αἰπὺν ἔλοιεν, Ἀθηναίης διὰ βουλᾶς	O 71
ἦν ποτ' ἐπύργωσαν βουλή Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο	Vita Homeri

ῥήτοί τ' ἄρρητοί τε Διὸς μέγαλοιο ἔκκητι	Herodotea 14
παρθένῳ αἰδοίῃ ἵκελον Κρονίδεω διὰ βουλᾶς	Hes. Op. 4
	Hes. Op. 71

παρθένῳ αἰδοίῃ ἵκελον Κρονίδεω διὰ βουλὰς
 αἰγιόχου βουλῇσι Διὸς νεφεληγερέταο
 οὐνεκ' ἐρίζετο βουλὰς ὑπερμενεί Κρονίωνι
 αὐτὶς δ' ὀπλοτάτην, βουλῇ Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο

Hes. *Theog.* 572Hes. *Op.* 99Hes. *Theog.* 534

H. H. Ven. 23

Thus the formulaic character of this phrase prevents us from considering this fragment of the *Cypria* as anything else than a borrowing by the poet from the traditional diction of oral poetry.

A comparative study of a theme in the *Iliad* and the *Aethiopis* of Arctinus (eighth century) will show how the theme functions in oral architecture. The structure of the *Aethiopis*, as given in Proclus' prose summary, consists of a thrice-repeated sequence: (1) a warrior or ally (Penthesileia, Memnon, Achilles) entering a contest; (2) his *aristeia*; (3) his death and fate of his body. The repetition of this pattern three times shows not only the themes associated with each respective hero, but, more important, the habitual association in the oral technique of certain related themes. We meet this cluster of themes many times in the battle scenes of the *Iliad*. With simply a change of name the oral poet can apply this association of themes to any epic battle. Uniting all these patterns in the *Aethiopis* is the figure of Achilles who twice kills enemies, and himself is killed. The use of the same theme by two different oral poets, Homer and Arctinus, shows the individuality possible in the oral technique. The death of the two allies (Penthesileia and Memnon) is separated by the pollution of Achilles in killing Thersites and his purification, a religious concept absent from the Homeric poems. The pattern in the case of Memnon is varied by a description of his armor. The three themes are so developed that we have a crescendo in dramatic effect. The Penthesileia episode is simple, consisting of her arrival, *aristeia*, death, burial. The Memnon episode is more ornamented. Being the son of a goddess, he enters battle wearing armor fashioned by Hephaestus. With only a change of name we have the same situation as Achilles in the *Iliad*, and Herakles in the *Shield of Herakles*; thus it appears that in the case of warriors descended from a goddess the hero wears resplendent armor fashioned by Hephaestus. It is oral typology with only a change of name. But the similarity does not end here. Antilochus (cf. *Ody.* XXIV, 78) the bosom friend of Achilles, enters battle and is killed by Memnon. Like his counterpart Patroclus, he is avenged by Achilles. The death of a best friend serves to rouse the hero to greater heights of anger. Memnon's body is unique, like Hector's, and its rescue involves the intervention of Zeus, who grants immortality as a favor to Eos. The great crescendo of the poem's finale — the *aristeia* of Achilles,

his death, the struggle over his body, the burial attended by the lamentation of Thetis and the Muses, and the funeral games is highly dramatic and exhibits the oral ornamentation of the basic cluster of themes. A comparison of this final episode with the *Iliad* shows an oral typology. The *τειχομαχία* of Achilles before Troy, dying at the hands of Paris and Apollo, is the counterpart of Patroclus' *τειχομαχία* and his death at the hands of Hector and Apollo. The struggle for the body of Achilles finds its counterpart in the fight over the body of Patroclus, with one significant difference: Achilles' armor is not stripped by the enemy. The rest of the action, the burial of Antilochus followed by the burial of Achilles, parallels, *mutatis mutandis*, the burial of Patroclus and Hector, but again with a significant difference — the burial of Achilles follows typologically the burial of Patroclus, with laments, funeral games, and prizes. The final episode, the quarrel between Ajax and Odysseus over the arms of Achilles, is also typological and belongs to the pervasive themes of quarrels which constitute the framework of such oral epics as the *Iliad*. In the *Aethiopis* the poet chose to end with a quarrel rather than begin with one, as Homer does, and has Demodocus do in his sketch of the epic over the quarrel of Odysseus and Achilles. Yet no better argument could be offered that Arctinus was not following the model of the *Iliad* than this final episode. Other reasons will be given later for the priority of the *Aethiopis* over the *Iliad* but the explanation for closing the epic with its final episode is sufficient. Were Arctinus copying the *Iliad* he would have ended with the burial of the central hero rather than with the quarrel. The explanation is to be found in Aristotle. Arctinus is building his epic linearly on chronology, while Homer builds in terms of drama, a quality which won for him his eminence.⁶⁴

The structure of the themes in the *Aethiopis* exhibits similarities to the *Iliad* but, as we have seen, this similarity is based on the oral process of composition. That this is oral typology and not literary imitation is seen in the fact that some themes of the *Aethiopis* reappear in other Cyclic epics — for example the *τειχομαχία* appears in the *Cypria*; description of arms fashioned by Hephaestus in the *Ilias parva* (fr. 6) and the *Cypria*; the *aristeia* of a warrior in the *Ilias parva*; quarrels between heroes in the *Cypria*, *Nostoi*, and *Ilias parva*; bodies maltreated before burial in the *Ilias parva* and *Iliu persis*. Plato's observation on the thematic typology of the early epics is borne out by other illustrations. Pausanias informs us that *véκνυα* scenes appear in the *Odyssey*, the *Nostoi* and *Minyas*. A thematic analysis of the Cyclic epics shows oracles and prophecies, catalogues, genealogies, Hades episodes, embassies, recognition scenes, and many other oral themes found in any

collection of comparative oral literature.⁶⁵ The attempt of scholars from Alexandrian until recent times to see in the themes and formulae of the Cyclic epics a literary imitation of Homer falls to the ground. Even if any of the oral poets who composed the Cyclic epics had heard the Homeric poems orally, we know now from the practice of oral poetry that their oral utilization of the Homeric poems would be no different from the Southslavic bard's use of this material in ways normal to the practices of oral poetry. The Cyclic epics would still be oral in character.

An analysis of the Cyclic poetry in terms of the three criteria of oral poetry — formulaic analysis, enjambment and thematic analysis — shows them to be oral in character even in the form we have them. One other feature of oral poetry, parataxis, to be discussed at fuller length in the next study, is exhibited in them. They display a looser parataxis, the additive technique of oral poetry, a feature which Proclus calls *διὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πραγμάτων*.⁶⁶ Aristotle noted this characteristic and the prose summaries corroborate him.

One important question remains, even if we now take them to have been oral poetry. Did these epics constitute a cycle at the time of their composition? Wilamowitz has made an important contribution to the problem by noting that "um 500 sind alle Gedichte von Homer; um 350 sind von Homer im wesentlichen nur noch Ilias und Odyssee."⁶⁷ The Greek tradition closest to these poems never knew of them as a cycle; they were, with some exceptions, by Homer, and even if this was a mistaken idea the fact remains that their similarity to the Homeric poems was recognized. This similarity now turns out to rest on their oral character. Nor does Aristotle, who contrasts their quality with Homer, know of any cycle form. The retailoring of these early epics into a cycle is clearly a later event. Scholarship, beginning with Welcker in 1835, has shown that there is a marked discrepancy in the plots as we have them in Proclus' summary, in Aristotle, and in the *Tabula Iliaca*. Welcker, Wilamowitz, Munro, Severyns, and others have shown in their studies of this problem that the redaction of these poems into a cycle is a very late phenomenon whose details have no bearing on our problem.⁶⁸ It is inconceivable that these oral poets of whom Hesiod says, *φθονέει καὶ ἀειδὸς ἀειδῶ* (*Op.* 26) "clubbed together to compose a Cycle."⁶⁹ These poems were altered from their original structure, as can be seen in the comparison of Proclus' summaries with the episodic structure as seen in Aristotle and in the *Tabula Iliaca* and in the omission of prologues which open all early poems.⁷⁰ An example of this is seen in the *Aethiopis* which begins with some rhapsodist's or editor's joining of the poem with the last line of the *Iliad*. Who altered these poems? Was it the

scholars of Alexandria or of the early empire period? Whoever it was does not change the fact that these oral poems were altered from their original form. The intention of those who did this is clear. It emanates from a desire to regroup these poems into a cycle which begins with creation and ends with the aftermath of the *Odyssey*. The intent is clearly based on the archival use of poetry to create a historical scheme.

The oral bards who created these epics were not historians consciously filling in gaps before or after or in between Homer, but poets composing as poets, adding to their repertory material which any bard traveling around Greece needs in order to satisfy local requests for songs, to vary their repertory for a prolonged stay in their travels up and down Greece. The retailoring of these poems so as to fit into a historical cycle is a later event. It reveals a scholarly mentality which utilizes poetry as historical sources, which makes these poems revolve in an orbit around the foci of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The word κύκλος⁷¹ plays a large role in Alexandrian times and it has been falsely foisted upon historians of Greek literature who still refer to these poems and others loosely centered on Thebes as a cycle.⁷² We must delete this term from our future histories of Greek literature and call them early oral epics. These poems are not what Robert Frost calls "a hit them where they ain't" kind of poetry⁷³ with respect to Homer. Scholarly taxonomy of these poems around Homer, a process begun by Aristotle,⁷⁴ prevents us from seeing them in their true perspective. They best fit into early Greek poetry as diverse manifestations of a very rich Greek oral tradition of poetry. If imitation is a form of flattery, great tribute must be paid to these non-Homeric oral epics, for they, rather than Homer, form the overwhelming core of Greek tragedy. A glance at Brommer's *Vasenlisten zum griechischen Heldensage*⁷⁵ shows that the Greek vases reveal a greater dependence on these poems than on Homer. Those who depreciate them run the risk of diverging from what the Greeks prior to Aristotle thought of them. As far as the *testimonia* go, many of these poems were attributed to Homer himself. Pausanias tells us that the *Thebais* was the best poem he had read, next to the Homeric poems. Pindar and Sophocles praised them highly.⁷⁶ For the proper understanding of the atlas of early Greek poetry this testimony reminds us of the loss brought about by the accident of survival. They are, as it were, shadows of a one-time greatness. Our new awareness of their oral character should change our attitude toward them, for oral poetry is one of the greatest creations of the early Greeks.

Aristarchus, by classing all poets other than Homer as νεώτεροι, proceeded to distort the character of early Greek epics. Severyns' account

of the pejorative treatment by Alexandrian scholarship of the *κυκλικοί* should warn the historian of early Greek poetry to re-examine his assumptions about the post-Homeric chronology for all these poems. Let it be clearly understood that one of the results of our increasing knowledge of oral poetry is that it is a genre of literature least subject to evolutionary concepts of development. The oral technique which works with traditional formulae and themes makes it very difficult to distinguish early and late. The second part of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* which was composed by Cynaethus of Chios in 504 B.C. differs very little in formulaic style or technique from the Delian portion whose *σφραγίς* shows it was the work of the eighth-century blind bard of Chios described in lines 165-178. Unless archaeological or historical data are contained in an oral poem it is very difficult to date by criteria

Poet	Poems attributed	Date	Source
Arctinus (Miletus)	<i>Aethiopis</i> <i>Iliu persis?</i> <i>Titanomachia?</i>	ol. 8 (748) ol. 1 and 4.2 (776, 762) <i>παλαιότατος ὦν ἡμεῖς</i> <i>ἴσμεν ποιητῆς</i>	<i>Suda</i> Eusebius Dion. Halic. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1, 68, 2
Eumelus (Corinth)	<i>Corinthiaka</i> <i>Europia</i> <i>Titanomachia</i> <i>Asma Prosodion</i> <i>Bougonia</i> <i>Nostoi</i>	ol. 4.2 (762)	Eusebius
Cinaethon (Sparta)	<i>Epe</i> <i>Telegonia</i> <i>Heracleia</i> <i>Oedipus</i>	ol. 4.2 (762)	Eusebius
Antimachus (Teos)	<i>Epigoni</i>	ol. 6.3 (753)	Plut. <i>Romulus</i> 12.
Lesches (Mytilene)	<i>Ilias parva</i>	ol. 18 (708)	Clem. Alex. <i>Strom.</i> , 1, 21.
Eugammon (Cyrene)	<i>Telegonia</i>	ol. 53 (568)	Eusebius.

of style. Older criteria of dating such as the digamma, synizesis, or contracted vowels no longer are valid in oral poetry.

Alexandrian scholarship is somewhat confusing as to the authorship and dates of these poets. We have on the one hand Aristarchus' classification of Homer *versus* the νεώτεροι and on the other the chronology shown in the table based on Eusebius, Clement of Alexandria, the *Suda*, and other *testimonia*:⁷⁷

These are the poets who have a definite chronology by olympiads. The rest, including Agias of Troezen, composer of the *Nostoi*, Chersias of Orchomenus, Carcinus of Naupactus, composer of *Naupactia*, have no dates given in our sources, but the *testimonia* about them include them among the early epic poets. Two of the most famous epics, the *Thebais* and the *Cypria*, both of doubtful authorship, belong to the very earliest period of our chronology. The *Thebais* is ascribed to Homer in the *Certamen* (1.255 ed. Oxon.) and by Pausanias (IX, 9.5). The *Cypria* is attributed to Hegesinus or Stasinus of Cyprus by Athenaeus (682 D), though Demodamas attributes it to a Halicarnassian (*FHG* II, 444). Herodotus (II, 117) on internal evidence doubted its Homeric authorship, which means that in the fifth century the poem was ascribed to Homer.

If we compare Aristarchus, who roughly categorizes the early poets as Homer and the νεώτεροι (which includes Hesiod as well as the rest of the poets) with the chronology of Eusebius, Clement of Alexandria, the *Suda*, and other *testimonia*, we find a wide difference. The olympiad chronology shows that most of these poets were earlier than or contemporary with, Homer — if we accept an eighth-century date for him — and only a few are later. Moreover, if we accept even roughly the olympiad dating of these poets, the cyclic form of these epics and their literary mimesis of Homer are wholly disproved. Conversely, it strengthens the case for their oral character. We are faced with a series of choices: (1) accept Aristarchus; (2) accept the Eusebian chronology of olympiads; or (3) be skeptical of all this early chronology. Aristarchus' classification is suspect for three reasons: (1) it is in conflict with Herodotus' statement that Homer and Hesiod were contemporaries; (2) Aristarchus knew nothing about oral poetry or its workings and could only conceive of the relationship of these poets in terms of literary mimesis; (3) he tends to use the criterion of quality as the basis of his chronology. The case for the Eusebian chronology by olympiads is put by Allen: "In general these dates [750-550 B.C.] rest on the same evidence on which the whole chronology rests, and unless we are prepared to question the eras of Sappho and Alcaeus, Solon and Pisistratus, Pindar and Aeschylus

lus, these dates, which rest on as good, if not better — since more impartial — evidence, must stand. From the first olympiad early Greek chronology is as sound as later, and the personages are real.”⁷⁸ Whether we can accept Allen’s conclusion wholeheartedly is open to doubt, which increases now with the realization that these are oral poets. A study of the evidence shows that where we are dealing with oral poetry the role of the author is somewhat different from that in written composition. This, I suspect, made it difficult for the later Greeks to have any real traditions about the authors and they began to speculate principally in the light of later traditions. As Wilamowitz has pointed out,⁷⁹ all the early epic poems were attributed to Homer in the fifth century, and it was Aristotle in the fourth century who singled out the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as belonging alone to Homer. This tendency may also be seen in the *Homeric Hymns*, all of which were ascribed to Homer before the Alexandrian period. The name of Hesiod, who shares the limelight with Homer in early Greek poetry, also acts as a magnet and consequently we have an equally large body of epic poetry assigned to him. The confusion in Alexandrian scholarship as shown in the differences between the Aristarchan and Eusebian chronology also increases our skepticism about the solidity of the dates of these early poets. All that we can be sure of is that the eighth century was the most vigorous in creation of oral epics and that this tradition continued in the seventh and sixth centuries.

The most vexing question comes when we try to assign a date for Homer in relation to these other early oral poets. Allen, convinced of the reality of the cyclic status of these early poets and their dependence on Homer, proceeds to date Homer earlier than the date of the earliest of these poets, who happens to be Arctinus. The most conservative of recent Homeric scholars dates Homer in the last quarter of the eighth century. His date still continues to be subject to adjudication in Kirk’s recent study of the poet.⁸⁰ One of the implications of the oral status of the so-called Cyclic poets is that we can no longer, in the light of the forces at work in oral poetry, use literary mimesis as a valid argument for backing Aristarchus’ view of Homer *versus* the νεώτεροι. That he is better is beyond doubt, but to evolve a chronology from this is one of the major blunders of Greek literary history. If the Eusebian chronology by olympiads is right, it succeeds in explaining some things about Homer better than before. Homer shows a knowledge of the earlier tradition about the Trojan War, described in fuller detail in the so-called Cyclic poets.⁸¹ If the Cyclic poets followed Homer they would be more likely to imitate his dramatic method. By having the linear

chronological method precede the dramatic, Homer's contribution stands out as more significant. The same holds for the length of his poems. Homer increased the length of the epic from that of the *Cypria*, eleven books, the *Thebais*, 7,000 verses, the *Oedipodeia*, 6,600, the *Epigoni* 7,000 verses, the *Aethiopis*, five books, into the *gross* epos of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, a *μῆκος* which impressed the ancients by its size as well as its quality.

Professor Kakridis had come to this conclusion by the application of his neo-analytic method. He challenges the opinion that "the cycle epics were written after the *Iliad* for the purpose of describing systematically what happened before or after it." "Yet," he continues, "if we consider that the *Iliad* is aware more or less of the entire tradition, as the Cycle gives it to us, then another possible solution of our problem presents itself: it is possible that a later compiler took the pre-Homeric epics and changing them slightly at the beginning and at the end, connected them with one another and then with the *Iliad*, so as to form about it the unified and indivisible 'cycle' which he had planned."⁸² Quite independently in terms of the workings of oral poetry, this study has come to the same conclusion. The implications for the future literary historian of early Greek poetry are that he must re-examine the whole problem, which takes on a new aspect as a result of the discovery that we are dealing with oral poetry. The results attest to the vitality and creativity of the early Greek tradition of oral poetry.

The vitality of this oral tradition is best seen if we plot it in the time and space co-ordinates of an oral atlas. Into this map we must fit a prosopography of about forty names of poets who are dated in our sources from the eighth to the end of the sixth century.⁸³ Most of them are mere names, a few are great names, others are names with a few fragments. The major names falling in the eighth century on the basis of the ancient *testimonia* are Antimachus of Ceos, Cinaethon, Arctinus, Eumelus, Hegesias, Hesiod, Homer, Lesches, Stasinus; those in the seventh century are Agias, Aristas, Asius, Carcinus, Peisander; those in the sixth century, Cercops, Cynaethus (for whom we have an exact date of 504 B.C. in the Pindar scholium), Epimenides, Eugammon, Melampus. Some of these can be dated in terms of olympiads, others can be given only the most approximate dating, while many others have no date at all, except that they fall into this early period in our sources. Yet the chronology shows that, quality apart, there is no lessening of the oral tradition in the sixth century.

Approximately eighty-seven poems are attributed to various poets who are otherwise unknown to us. A sample testing of fragments which

survive showed a formulaic texture. To these we must add many fragments of papyri. A study should be made of the relation of all this material to early vases that reflect known or lost epics as their iconographic source. A new corpus of all this material is badly needed to replace Kinkel's *Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*.⁸⁴ But even a cursory glance at the titles in Kinkel's corpus shows the vast range of the oral tradition of early Greek poetry. It exhibits all facets of life — the heroic, hymnal, historical, genealogical; comedy, myth, saga; utilitarian treatises on astronomy, agriculture; and, by no means least, the mantic poetry that continued to be practiced orally at Delphi, as a formulaic analysis of surviving mantic poetry shows. When we remember the words of the Heliconian Muses to Hesiod — that they knew how to tell lies like unto the truth, and, when they wished, to tell the truth — we realize how poetry of the imagination and poetry of practical value characterize this oral tradition. It combines myth, history, religion, systematization of knowledge and speculation, and passes down this tradition orally from one generation to another. The Greeks did this for several centuries, even when they possessed the alphabet and used writing to preserve this oral tradition. The potentialities of writing to create prose was a rather late phenomenon of the archaic period, so effective was oral poetry in satisfying the needs of early Greece.

The distribution of these poets and poems to oral centers in the Greek world shows a Panhellenic culture of oral poetry and a vast geographical range. Though we have been accustomed to thinking of early Greece in generic areas like Ionia, the islands, the mainland, Africa, Scythia, the early Greeks thought of themselves in terms of their πόλις. Consequently, our oral atlas is dotted with cities. No attempt will be made here to study each center thoroughly. Our scholarship has not yet correlated the local oral centers with migration settlements, or local histories, and archaeology has not dug many of these sites. The degree to which these epics were parochial or Panhellenic awaits clarification. All that will be attempted here is to plot these centers as evidence of the vitality of oral tradition.

It is a traditional view in our histories that epic poetry is *ex oriente lux*. It has been shown now that the Mycenaean oral tradition did not die out on the mainland after the Dorian Conquest; a phase of it went with the migrations to Ionia, culminating in the Homeric epics. Yet the Mycenaean oral tradition on the mainland shows no less a vitality or renaissance than Ionia does. On the mainland we find centers of oral poetry as Ascrea, Orchomenus, Chalkis, Delphi, Naupactus, Troezen, Corinth, and Sparta. The importance of Boeotia has already been men-

tioned in connection with Hesiod, to whose name the Hesiodic corpus attaches thirteen different works of poetry. The Heliconian Muses explain in large measure the prominence of the Boeotian poetry. We have several late inscriptions which refer to "the fellow sacrificers of the Hesiodic Muses."⁸⁵ These imply a cult center in Boeotia devoted to the propagation of Hesiodic poetry. There Hesiod dedicated his tripod won at Chalkis, and Pausanias saw a copy of Hesiod's *Works* engraved on a faded lead tablet.⁸⁶ As we have seen, the Boeotian school is earlier than the Ionian, for we find definite Boeotian sources in Homeric poetry, whereas we find very little Homeric material in Hesiod, outside of formulaic diction, the explanation for which we find in the workings of oral poetry. The extension of Boeotian poetry is so strong that we find the cult of Heliconian Poseidon transferred from Boeotia to Ionia. Geometric vases and fibulae also iconographically attest to the poetry of Boeotia in the eighth and seventh centuries. When one adds to all this the early epics dealing with Thebes we see how copious the inspiration of the Heliconian Muses was. On the mainland, outside of Hesiod and the nameless poets attached to poems gravitating to the Hesiodic corpus, we have Chersias of Orchomenus carrying on the Hesiodic tradition. Naupactus, where Hesiod's death occurred, continues the Boeotian influence with Carcinus, composer of the *Naupactia*. In the eighth century, Corinth emerges as an important oral center. Its poet is Eumelus, a Bacchiad of the ruling family, which shows that even aristocracy can produce an eminent bard. The only mainland poem included in the Cyclic epic is the *Nostoi* composed by Agias of Troezen. Last but not least is Sparta whose early cultural life includes the epic. Cinaethon of Sparta⁸⁷ composed many epics in the eighth century. The epic themes on Laconian vases, dated from the eighth to the sixth century, attest to the vigor of oral poetry at Sparta.⁸⁸ The epic formulae in the elegies of Tyrtaeus are more to be accounted for through the Spartan oral tradition than Homeric influence, as has been thought.⁸⁹

All these centers of oral poetry on the mainland, with the majority of the poets dated in the eighth century, cannot have felt any direct Homeric influence. They owe this epic technique and thematic material to the survival of the Mycenaean oral tradition on the mainland. Homeric influence comes via the Homeridae, and we first hear of them in our sources in Sikyon in the early sixth century, where Cleisthenes forbade rhapsodes to sing epics strongly tinged with Argos' glory. Homeric themes directly inspired by the Homeric poems first appear at the beginning of the sixth century,⁹⁰ and this may be a clue to the high watermark of Homeric influence on the mainland. Prior to this the

mainland oral poetry sufficed to offer the mainland its epic instruction and entertainment. Though the Homeridae may have been on the mainland earlier, the acme of Homeric influence does not come until the Pisistratid choice of Homer as the official state παιδεία. This means that Hesiodic poetry was the main oral fare for several centuries, and the high position that Hesiod occupies, being co-ordinated later with Homer as the teacher of men, attests to this.

In Ionia the epic reached a high degree of maturity, for it always flourishes better on the frontiers of a civilization than in the center of it, as the complete absence of epic poetry in Athens shows. The vigor of Ionian epic poetry is exhibited by a long and distinguished list of poets. The most famous center of Ionian poetry is Chios, the birthplace of Homer⁹¹ and the Homeridae, and its sustained vitality is shown by the fact that Cynaethus, the Homerid from Chios, continued oral poetry as late as 504 B.C.⁹² Miletus is the home of Arctinus, the most prolific of the bards in the Cycle. Teos is the home of Antimachus. Mytilene is a thriving oral center with two poets, Lesches and Cercops. We see an instance of Hesiod's and Homer's *Certamen* in Lesches' contest with Arctinus. The islands also appear prominently as oral centers, even as they do in later lyric poetry.⁹³ Cyprus is prominent with Stasinus and Hegesias, both of whom are referred to as poets of the *Cypria*. Rhodes is the home of Peisander, Samos of Asius, Melos of Melampus, and Paros of Archilochus, who began his career as an oral bard.⁹⁴ Crete, too, emerges in the oral atlas as the home of Epimenides, that strange shaman-like mantic bard of the seventh century, whose fragments show a formulaic texture.

Though the mainland and Ionia constitute the more important areas of the atlas, the northern and southern limits of the early Greek-colonized world must also be included. Cyrene in the sixth century produced Eugammon, who composed the *Telegonia*, included in the Cycle. Cyrene, a colony of Thera, included many colonists from Sparta, the mother city of Thera. As is shown by the presence of Laconian vases in Cyrene, her culture was oriented toward Sparta.⁹⁵ Since Cinaethon of Sparta composed a *Telegonia* it is likely that Eugammon was influenced by Spartan epic poetry. The northernmost limit of our oral atlas is Scythia where Aristaeas of Proconnesus, whose second disappearance is dated by Herodotus *ca.* 670, composed oracular poetry. Two fragments of his poetry exhibit a formulaic texture.⁹⁶

All these poets in the oral atlas of Greece have been identified in terms of their πόλις. Yet we know that they wandered to all parts of Greece where their poems could be understood because the language of

the epic is an interregional *Koine*.⁹⁷ We have a picture of such bards in the portrait of the blind bard of Chios at the Delian festival: "... as I roam over the earth to the well-inhabited cities of men."⁹⁸ Such a bard also appears in the *Margites*: "There came to Colophon an old man and divine singer, a servant of the Muses and of far-shooting Apollo."⁹⁹ One sees the extent of their wanderings in the *vitae* of Homer which list Cyme, Smyrna, Colophon, Phocaea, Chios, Erythrae, Samos, and Ios as places visited by Homer. Many of these bards wandered to festivals, courts of princes and tyrants, striving to win livelihood and fame. The *vitae* of Homer and Hesiod give us other details of the bard's life. The villagers are said to have listened to Homer when they ceased from work. Bards recited their poems in the *λέσχη*, frequented by old men, of which we have a counterpart in the coffee houses of Yugoslavia and Greece. We have seen in the first study the prominence of the feast as the occasion for epic song; how Homer says the best thing in life is "when feasters about the house, sitting in order, listen to the minstrel."¹⁰⁰ When I heard in the Cretan village of Askephou in Sfakia old Manousos Karkanis, a "Kapetanio" eighty-three years of age, who had fought the Turks in his youth and the Germans in 1941, sing a variant of these lines to a group of men seated around the *tavla* heaped with lamb and Cretan wine, I realized why oral poetry survives so long. There is a vitality to epic singing that books can never capture. It binds tradition, the bard, and the audience into one. An oral society has developed the art of singing tales to perfection, to a point where the audience cannot tell whether the story imitates life or life the story. To hear of man's capacity for gallant living, whether it is sung at the court of an Ionian noble or the rude hut of a Cretan shepherd, is one of man's greatest pleasures. It is largely a male pleasure, and food and drink enhance it. There is a pleasure in oral poetry that books cannot replace, especially when the oral bard sings of a world where men live and die without dishonor, defying mortality by that "delirium of the brave" that counts no cost on earth, and looks for no reward in heaven — unless it be the heaven of poetry.¹⁰¹ It is the lips of men that the Muses of Pieria and Helicon blessed, not books. Such is the story of early Greek poetry. Failure to grasp it can only lead to our failure in entering the kingdom of early Greek poetry.

III. TOWARD A POETICS OF EARLY GREEK ORAL POETRY

The implications of Parry's work in the two preceding studies, the oral factors at work in recitation and the changed perspective in early

Greek literature, also affect our understanding of the mentality and form of poets who work with the oral technique. There are no absolutes in any poetry; this is because technique is at the basis of any poetics. There is a definite relation between technique and aesthetics, whether it be working with reinforced concrete building techniques evolved by Pier Luigi Nervi in recent architecture, the technique of the Gothic, or the technique of oral poetry. To evolve an aesthetics apart from the specific technique which produced the art is as senseless as applying the aesthetics of the Parthenon to Gothic art. We must not be deceived by what C. S. Lewis calls "the doctrine of the unchanging heart." This doctrine, so dear to literary criticism, claims that "if you remove from people the things that make them different, what is left must be the same"; and that "the Human Heart will certainly appear as Unchanging if you ignore its changes." Instead, Lewis maintains: "To enjoy our full humanity we ought, so far as is possible, to contain within us potentially at all times, and on occasion to actualize, all the modes of feeling and thinking through which man has passed. You must, so far as in you lies, become an Achaean chief while reading Homer, a medieval Knight while reading Malory, and an eighteenth-century Londoner while reading Johnson. Only thus will you be able to judge the work 'in the same spirit that its author writ,' and to avoid a chimerical criticism."¹

This study claims the same for technique — that the oral technique is not the same as the literary, even if it appears so in translations. Each of these techniques is bound to affect our criticism, even though both deal with men and women. Achilles and Ajax exhibit a heroic wrath, but the technique available to Homer and to Sophocles creates profound differences in our evaluation as may be seen in the recent study of their respective wraths by Adam Parry and B. M. Knox.² The poetics of oral and written poetry cannot be pushed to the breaking-point so that they have nothing in common; yet to proceed in literary criticism as if there were no differences that affect our evaluation is a fiction too long foisted on the classics. There is a great difference between the oral technique that produced the *Iliad* and the bee-like technique that produced Virgil's *Aeneid*. Even if we stripped the formulaic technique from the *Iliad* and considered its form in relation to the *Aeneid* we still would find great differences. One of the misguided chapters in Latin criticism involves the once-held notion that Virgil is a second-rate copy of Homer. There are great differences between them, and C. S. Lewis perceived them with clarity, once he discarded the doctrine of the universal heart. The contemporary classicist must avoid Procrustean treatment of early Greek poetry by putting oral and literary techniques in the same bed.

In the preceding study we saw the damage it produced with respect to the Cyclic epic; we see it in any modern reappraisal of the Homeric Question in the form that it took in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One of the most important implications of Parry's work is the need for understanding that an awareness of the difference between oral and literary techniques will affect our literary criticism profoundly. Already we are seeing its effects. Recently Wade-Gery has called Parry the Darwin of Homeric studies and Combellack says of Parry, "If we accept Parry's view . . . (and in the present state of our knowledge of oral poetry, we ought to accept this), then we must, in dealing with Homer, renounce a large area of normal literary criticism, and 'appreciations' of Homeric poetry must be thrown overboard."³

Living in a world of dislocations and the breaking-up of traditional patterns is an experience uncomfortable for some, challenging to others. These changes are not confined merely to the world of international relations, economics, and science, but are even invading the oldest literature we have and disturbing the foundations of our traditional literary criticism. The old Homeric Question in the form it once took is dead, except for those who have not heard of Parry, or if they have, proceed as if he made no difference. The new question which challenges our times is centered on the effect Parry's work will have on literary criticism. It is not easy for minds long nourished by great traditions of literary criticism going back to Aristotle to see the problem with fresh eyes. The literature on Homer is so entwined in our teaching that it requires a new generation whose introduction to Homer starts with Parry instead of Wolf, Lachmann, Wilamowitz, and the rest. Furthermore, even if we conceptually understand Parry's oral work, it takes, as Parry himself realized, an intimate knowledge of field work with oral poetry to understand the factors at work in oral verse-making. That is why Lord's *The Singer of Tales*, which has advanced Parry's work, is a *sine qua non* propaedeutic in understanding Homer in the post-Parry era. Analogies from it must not be confused with proof; yet it is the most suggestive way to reappraise the Homeric problem. There is a tendency to depreciate Balkan oral poetry; surely, the Achilles of the ninth book of the *Iliad* is to be found nowhere in comparative oral literature. Yet in Homeric scholarship, where one theory is exchanged for another, entering a laboratory of field work has its value. No biologist ever spurns primitive forms of life if in studying them he can find clues to higher forms of life. No less a person than Aristotle reminds us, "We must not recoil with childish aversion from the examination of the humbler animals. Every realm of nature is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the

strangers who came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to go in, is reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in that kitchen divinities were present, so we shall venture on the study of every kind of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something natural and something beautiful."⁴

Thus one of the most important implications of Parry's work is the need for an aesthetics which emanates from an understanding of the oral technique of composition, the form and mentality of oral poetry. This problem presented itself to me in the following way. When I was recording the heroic oral poetry in Greece I experienced it as part of the audience who was listening to the bard reshape his tradition. The next stage occurred when I replayed the tapes in my study. The last stage was when I transcribed some of the sung poetry into songless text and began studying it with the traditional philological concepts of criticism long ingrained in me. Suddenly the magic was gone — the audience, the bard, the sung tale. I asked myself what had happened, why was my text flat? Why was I one with the audience when I heard the song, completely unaware of contradictions, of bad joints, of the existence of formulae as formulae? The text had lost its magic. This happened again and again. The cause was not to be found in calling it poor poetry, for as soon as I replayed the tape the song got better, and it became better yet when I associated it with my memory of the bard singing it and the audience hearing it. I suddenly realized what happens to oral poetry when it becomes a text. It loses much of its magic; it loses even more when we evaluate it with the principles of literary criticism which ignore the forces at work in oral poetry. Even my notions of metrics were different from those of the bard. I asked a bard how he knew he had come to the end of a fifteen-syllable line; did he count the syllables as he went along? He replied, "I didn't know the line had fifteen syllables — the melody shapes my line." From him and others I discovered that they did not look on the poem in the same way as those trained in the academic traditions of literature. They work with habituated instincts of rhythm; they are unaware of contradictions as they sing; they add or subtract as the mood dictates; they vary the song with each recording. As to the criteria which make a song good, they rely, like Demodocus, on the way the audience is affected. Parry's conversations with the Yugoslav bards show that the singers have criteria, but they have to be elicited from them in the way Parry did, through skillful questioning.

These experiences lead one to ask: What is the relation of literary criticism to oral poetry? Literary criticism is a *poesis* of a kind; it exists

in a symbiotic relation to the poet's *poesis*. It is a rational, self-conscious effort, as Socrates shows in the *Apology*, and aims to find out what the poet says and what his poem means to us. There are no permanent interpretations, for each age sees Homer differently. Whitman's interpretation of Homer is different from that found in any nineteenth-century criticism. Provided literary criticism lives in a true symbiotic relation with a poem, it enriches our understanding of the poet's technique and meaning which is conveyed from and through the poem, not outside of it. It is the true use of *δίκαιος λόγος*. It is a physical impossibility for our times to experience oral poetry under the conditions in which it was created and recited before a living audience. It is no longer possible to turn back the clock and experience the Homeric poems in the same way as its first audiences did. Since those days readers of literature have developed capacities in human nature for *λόγον διδόναι* initiated by Socrates. The real critical problem for our time is to determine whether or not our literary criteria give us an *ὀρθὸς λόγος* for poetry created orally, for understanding its unique form and mentality. The answer to this question must be "no." Much of the traditional criticism must be discarded and replaced by insights arising from a study of oral poetics. There is very little genuine literary criticism of Homer, Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns as poetry *per se*, as a glance at our bibliographies will show.⁵ It is the influence of the Newer Criticism that has led to some of the finest criticism we have of the Greek drama, which is one of the significant achievements of modern classical scholarship. However, the poet, like the god Glaucus, is encrusted with the Homeric Question, and there is some danger that the oral formulaic style will be added. These are relevant but do not constitute the heart of early Greek poetry. A survey shows that the mentality underlying the criticism of early Greek poetry is largely logical, a product of the philologist's training and temperament. It is a by-product of Alexandrian athetesis, to the extent that as recently as 1930 Jacoby's edition of Hesiod's *Theogony* is filled with excisions amounting to nearly half the poem. With respect to the Homeric Question, no poetics can rest on it whether we base it on the analysts or the unitarians. Neither side based its literary criticism on an intimate knowledge of the form and mentality of oral poetry. Some of their criteria may turn out to be right but for the wrong reason. For example, layers may be discernible in oral poetry but that is not due to x, y, z poets, but is the result of a bard's working with traditional themes which he weaves into the architecture of his poem. Conversely, the unity of the unitarians may be a subjective one, having no bearing on the unity of a poem produced by oral methods. Much of

the Homeric Question is the product of trying to adjust a poem to a preconceived mentality that is an obstacle to understanding older literature. An oral poetics demands a transformation from a bookish mentality to one which apprehends books merely as modes of preservation of oral poetry. Only with that transformation will the mist be clarified.

The soundest procedure in arriving at an oral poetics is through the Alexandrian dictum ἡ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως λύσις so successfully followed by Parry. It must start with the facts of life about oral poetry. The following are emerging from Parry's and Lord's work, supplemented by some observations from my own field work:

(1) The oral tradition offers the bard formulae, type-scenes, themes, which he organizes into a poem. The architecture of the poem may be his own, or influenced by traditionally associated themes in certain folk-motifs, myths, sagas, or biographical sequence. In the case of the latter no two poets treat their traditional material in the same way. There are marked differences from bard to bard, as Lord has shown, and as a comparative study of the *Shield of Achilles* and the *Shield of Herakles* shows, both being oral poems.

(2) An oral poem is the product of many poets in its tradition, yet of one poet at the moment of recitation. It is both a re-creation of tradition and a new creation at the moment of recitation. There are no archetypes in oral poetry as in manuscripts.

(3) You cannot step into the same river twice in oral poetry. *Verbatim* memorization is not the practice of a genuine oral bard; it is found where we have a fixed text in a book that is memorized and presented orally. Thus there are two kinds of memory — static (*verbatim*) and creative. The αἰδιόδης is an example of the latter, Ion in Plato of the former.

(4) It is possible in the light of oral poetry to believe in a single poet who works with analytical methods, but such methods would not be the same as those used in literary mimesis.

(5) Wolf was wrong in not believing that long oral poems are possible.

(6) Principles of literary criticism based on a strict application of Aristotle's organic conception of poetry are not easily transferable to oral poetry.

(7) The oral process is not mechanical; it has room for individuality.

(8) The factors of recitation affect the form of the oral poem.

(9) Internal contradictions are part of the price an oral poet has to pay by reason of the needs of spontaneous improvisation.

(10) The formula is not merely a linguistic feature confined to oral

poetry. The society which gives birth to oral poetry is characterized by traditional fixed ways in all aspects of its life. The oral society of the Balkans lives in a world of formulae, as exhibited in their music, their ikons, in social, agricultural, and religious patterns of life. Hence the oral formula is a natural way of life for them.

These are only the most superficial aspects of the oral process. The larger problems of criticism, characterization, philosophy of life, mentality and psychology of the oral mind have not yet been explored in oral literature. Comparative oral literature has not advanced beyond the study of techniques and is largely descriptive in character. Therefore much remains to be done before comparative oral poetry can be of help toward shaping a poetics for early Greek poetry. The help it offers is confined to the level of technique, yet even here it can be of great help. In this study certain of the above factors at work in oral composition will be selected to show how they affect a possible poetics of early Greek poetry.

The first of these factors is the role of the audience in oral poetry. An oral poem is the product of tradition, the bard, the audience. Homer takes great pains to describe the audience and the role it plays in the Phaeacian episode by its interests, requests of the bard, interruption of him, and by the effect the poet has on them. In the *Iliad* the Catalogue of Ships seems more explicable in terms of the interest of the audience in its ancestors than its organic relationship to the story. The similes, as has been observed, come largely from the contemporary world of Homer's audience, such as the references in the *Iliad* to the *panegyris* of Poseidon Heliconius at Mycale (XX, 403-5), or the trumpet call in XVIII, 219-20, about which the ancient commentator says "the heroes do not know of the trumpet, the poet does." The passage is plainly describing some danger to a city, such as the seizure of Smyrna by the Colophonian exiles or the capture of Erythrae by troops from Chios. The birds flying in the Caystros valley (II, 459-60), the comparison of Nausicaa to a palm tree in Delos, a tree which the audience knew about, and the reference to the skillful potter, to contemporary armor—all show the effect the audience had in intruding contemporary material into old sagas.⁶ The intrusion of the contemporary world in the Homeric poems, detectable by archaeological and historical evidence, or maritime experiences only known in the era of Greek colonization, show how Homer takes his audience into partnership, thereby affecting the form and content of his poems.

The seeming discreteness of the elements of the structure of the

Works and Days does not make the poem inorganic from the point of view of the Boeotian farmer whose life and problems enter into it. The loose parataxis of the poem must not have bothered Hesiod's audience as much as it does the scholar. Hesiod could make jumps and abrupt transitions with an audience that held in its mind the necessary knowledge of interconnection. Hemingway's story *Ten Grand* with its staccato tattoo of dialogue is completely meaningless to an audience that does not know the context of that sector of American life which it describes. It would be meaningless to an audience in India or the Near East. Hesiod, like Hemingway, relies on his audience to make the connections that seem difficult to us, so far removed from his world. Alexandrian scholars were aware of these difficulties and made it their task to give in their scholia the information that the intervening centuries made necessary. But some aspects of this old poetry have defied illumination even with the help of ancient scholia. Why, for instance, does Alcmene, at the opening of the *Shield of Herakles*, sleep with her husband Amphitryo who slew her father, but refuses to sleep with him until he avenges her brothers' slayers? The audience of the poem knew that Briseis slept with Achilles even though he slew her husband, but it also was aware of the instinctive close relationship of Orestes and Electra, Antigone and her brother; we find a parallel to this in a certain *μοιρολόγι* (lament) in modern Sparta where we feel the sister-brother relationship a unique element in the revenge of a brother.⁷

The Hymn to Apollo, an eighth-century composition of oral texture, illustrates how the bard takes the audience into partnership. The blind bard of Chios, who appears in lines 169-78 is one of the finest portraits of an oral bard in Greek poetry. After describing the festival of Apollo at Delos, where the long-robed Ionians gather with their children and shy wives, he addresses the girls of Delos, the handmaidens of Apollo: "Whom think ye, girls, is the sweetest singer that comes here, and in whom do you find most delight?" Then answer, each and all, with one voice, "He is a blind man and dwells in rocky Chios; his songs are evermore supreme." "As for me, I will carry your renown as far as I roam over the earth." Allen, Sikes and Halliday comment on these lines: "The poet has lost his sense of proportion when he brought the Delian girls and himself into the picture, and has some difficulty picking up his thread."⁸ All lovers of poetry are glad that the poet did this. The digression is inorganic only to the logical mind, but it exhibits the very point that has to be made — the audience is ever important to the bard and influences the architecture of the poem. Later the Chian bard again shows his concern for the audience. He gives it a choice: Shall I follow

Apollo in his amours, in the families he founded (catalogue poetry), or shall I tell of Apollo's foundation of Delphi? He decides on the latter.⁹ It was the bard of Chios who taught Aeschylus in the *Prometheus Bound* to give the chorus two choices, the telling of the sufferings of Io or the story of the deliverance from his woes.¹⁰ Later the Greek drama made a more sophisticated use of the audience in Sophocles' effective use of irony which is possible only by reason of the audience, and in Euripides' use of speeches which are a diaphanous mask of fifth-century sophistic debates.

The audience of the oral bard even when we cannot detect it, is responsible for much of what seems inorganic in that it supplies the motivations and makes connections in the material not perceptible to us.¹¹ Its mentality is as traditional as the formulae and themes of the poet. The epic formula looks different to an oral audience from what it does to us. For us it is a linguistic oral phenomenon to which we have become sensitive by Parry's work. Yet why does not Aristotle, Longinus, or any other ancient critic single out formulae as part of the epic style?¹² It is because the Greek audiences for centuries had been habituated to the formulaic as part of the epic style. Wade-Gery makes an acute observation: "The instinct to use the given (which dictated choice of subject to the Tragedians: which made Virgil change the context, place, and persons of, but practically never invent, an episode: which determine the Doric entablature) is not laziness but a form of *αἰδώς*, a respect for the given as such."¹³ True as this is, the traditional oral art is only natural and inevitable for an oral society whose whole life is traditional. The poet, his art, his audience, are part of it. A modern Greek villager lives, as we have seen, completely in a world of formulae, exhibited in his poetry, in his music, the patterns in a girl's weaving of her dowry, in the ikons, in all social, agricultural, and religious patterns of life. Hesiod's lore to his farmer is a formulaic inheritance of life in all its facets. The oral formula was a natural way of life. Hence we must not single out the formulaic style from the context of a completely formulaic life for early Greece. The formula is both a linguistic and sociological phenomenon. It is imposed on the form of the poem both from within the poet and from without by his audience. Any oral poetics must take into consideration the audience no less than the poet and his tradition if we are to get an omnifarious knowledge of early Greek poetry. With the exception of Bassett's suggestive chapter, no study exists as yet of the audience of the early Greek poetry that is comparable to Whitelock's pioneering study, *The Audience of Beowulf*.¹⁴ Such a project remains one of the *desiderata* of classical scholarship. This audience did not have the same mentality as

a modern audience, and the assumption that it did constitutes the source of many errors in our thinking in past Homeric scholarship. Despite the efforts of classical scholars to show that the Greeks were like us, the truth of the matter is that they were not. Once we realize this it will make a considerable difference in the construction of our oral poetics for early Greek poetry. The full comprehension of this poetry requires a third element, the audience, in addition to the study of the poet and his traditional art.

The next factor that affects our oral poetics is the recitation, which was discussed in the first study. The length of the Homeric episodes, the Hesiodic poems, the *Homeric Hymns*, is determined by factors of fatigue in the bard singing and the audience listening. The physical factors connected with the singing of tales have a profound effect on the form of the poems. An oral poetics which seeks to account for the architecture of the Homeric poems should take these factors into account. If we go back to the recitation of the Homeric poems, night after night, after a feast in some nobleman's court, we can see the role which the recitation plays in the form of the oral epic. The audience knows the plots as part of its traditional inheritance, in the same way that the Christian knows the parables of the Bible. In hearing the tale episodically they were guided by the unity which the prologue imposed on the material. It acted as a table of contents, a synopsis. Euripides later was to adapt the prologue in this fashion, thus enabling the spectator to concentrate on how the action was done rather than on what was done. Thus the scenes of the drama replace the episodes of the epic. This was possible only because of the oral tradition of poetry. The episode is the focus of the poet and of his audience. Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff said of Sophocles that he wrote primarily for the effect of the individual scenes rather than the unity or coherence of the whole.¹⁵ This is not to say that the oral bard or Sophocles sacrificed the whole to the part, rather that the part is more important than the whole *while it is heard orally or witnessed*. In oral literature the moment at hand is supreme. The architecture of the whole is an experience of which we are more aware in reading, and on the whole turns out to be the by-product of literary criticism. An oral experience of literature affects us differently from a critical one, and this has not been taken sufficiently into account in literary criticism.

It was Aristotle who changed all this. Though he was aware that poetry arose out of improvisation (*Poetics* 1448b 23ff), was he aware that Homer was an oral poet; and if so, did this fact make no difference in his criticism? Though he stresses catharsis he largely took the audience of oral poetry out of the picture. The Homeric poems now undergo

a mode of experiencing that was never present in early Greek poetry. The way for this was prepared by the rhapsodes of the Panathenaic festival who recited the poems of Homer in swift relays, possibly in songless recitation.¹⁶ The whole of the *Iliad* then could be heard in three days instead of three and one-half weeks. What effect does this shortening of the time have? It gives greater opportunity for the emergence of the complete architecture of the poem, a greater awareness of the relation of the parts to the whole. This new mode of experiencing heroic epics emerges even more in a reading of them. Here the reader or critic can stop the cinematic flow of oral poetry and turn back and forth in a book, discover contradictions, seams, and see how the poem hangs together. A new concept of literature had emerged in the fifth century, that of organic unity¹⁷ which Aristotle applied via tragedy to Homer and the Cyclic epics. For Aristotle the entelechy of all poetry is the drama that embodies organic unity, whose soul is a certain kind of dramatic plot, affecting the emotions in a certain way, whose beauty is a matter of certain size and order. He ironically failed to see that Euripides, the most tragic by reason of his emphasis on *πάθη*, is the least organic in literary form and that episodically he is closer to Homer. Homer is singled out from all the other epic poets because outside of length, diction, and a few other minor differences he fits all the highest specifications of perfect tragedy. In fact Aristotle removes him from the genre of epic poetry and puts him into the category of the drama. As Professor Else says in his commentary on the *Poetics*, Aristotle "measures the epic not by criteria of its own but by the standard of tragedy, i.e. of poetry at its peak . . . Homer's personal achievement was great, but the genre he worked in (epic poetry) was irredeemably defective . . . Aristotle sees Homer as a man between two worlds; epic poet, but also precursor and in a sense inventor of the drama. If this is treason to the epic as such, it springs from allegiance to a greater cause, that of poetry as a whole, of which tragedy is the exemplar and Homer was the first prophet."¹⁸ In order to fit Homer into such a role, Aristotle does some strange things. To make the plots of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* conform to the plot of a drama which is *εὐσύνοπτον* — easy to grasp at once — he reduces the size of these epics to the length of time occupied by three tragedies, that is, *ca.* 4,200 lines. This would result in a six- or seven-book *Iliad* or a seven- or eight-book *Odyssey*, a reduction in bulk by three-fourths or two-thirds respectively of their entire length.¹⁹ What this actually means is destroying the epic form with its bulk and stripping it down to a presentation of its dramatic central action. Surely this is Procrustean criticism at its best. Under it the *Iliad* gets a split personality (1) of a dramatic core consisting of

Books 1, 9, 18-24; and (2) the remaining books comprising a non-dramatic episodic narrative epic.

Valuable as Aristotle's *Poetics* is for grasping the dramatic character of the Homeric epics it does not give ground for basing an *oral poetics* upon it. Its treatment of the epic *qua* epic is inadequate, selective, neglectful of the very criteria of form which make an epic different from drama. The epic is different, but the differences do not make it irredeemably defective. Furthermore, Aristotle's treatment of the Cyclic epic does not escape the pejorative treatment for what it is not, rather than for what it is. Outside of Homer, Aristotle's *Poetics* can give us no criteria applicable to other non-Homeric oral poetry, such as Hesiod or the Hymns. It is unfortunate that later critics applied to them the criteria of the *Poetics* for their evaluation, and by so doing confused the whole realm of criticism of early Greek poetry.

A brief historical perspective will give us a greater awareness of the problem. A study of the reactions of the audience to Demodocus' singing shows us the criteria by which Homeric audiences judged epic poetry, none of which reveals logic to be a factor. The criterion of a good poem is whether or not it is sung *κατὰ κόσμον* (*Od.* VIII, 489). A good song moves the heart, if the Muses inspired it; hence the emphasis on emotional reaction, *κηληθμῶ δ' ἔσχοντο* (*Od.* XIII, 2) *θελκτήρια βροτῶν* (*Od.* I, 337). Pindar advances literary criticism by bringing in the distinction of *φύα* and *σοφία* (*O.* 2.86, *N.* I.25). The fifth century amplifies this distinction by classing *φύα* with *μονία* and associating *σοφία* with the concept of organic unity. Poetry is subjected to *λόγον διδόναι*, and, as Socrates soon found out, poets who created the poems, unlike the Alexandrian poet-critics, were merely creatures of inspiration, incapable of giving an account of it. Professional criticism soon spread. Aristophanes refers in the *Frogs* to the "sniffy nostrils" of critics (line 893) hard to please, who demand subtlety, sophistication, novelty. Verbal and metrical analysis has not gone beyond the *Frogs*, nor has the evaluation of poetry for ethos or lack of it; looseness versus tightness of structure is all there, as well as realism and idealism. Plato's coming to grips with poetry in the *Republic* is a chapter now refreshingly told by Havelock in *A Preface to Plato*. Poetry which even in Plato's time is an oral inheritance orally presented by rhapsodes is found wanting in all aspects of Plato's hierarchical values and is replaced by philosophy, the *μεγίστη μουσική* (*Phaedo*, 61 a3). *Αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό* replaces *εἰκασία*, the lowest status permissible for oral poetry. Aristotle, a lesser poet than Plato but a greater critic, had sense enough to rest the case of poetry not on truth but on its effect on our emotions, on its gravitation to the

marvelous, which is pleasant. It is the Alexandrians, however, who developed literary criticism into the kind that has formed the framework for all treatment of early Greek poetry. They were the first to use logical consistency, resulting in their device of *athetesis*, rejection of spurious lines, passages, episodes, parts of books. This was to lead to the Homeric Question as posed by Wolf.²⁰ Such a road can no longer lead us to an understanding of oral poetry. We must in groping toward an oral poetics by-pass the later quarrels and get as close as possible to the mentality of the audience that listened to Demodocus. It will free our criticism of many errors of the past and guide us to an evaluation of poetry as poetry.

In order to find a way out of this impasse in literary criticism we must relate it to the oral process of composition. Resorting again to the principle of Aristarchus, we can lay a more solid foundation for an oral poetics if we know what Hesiod means by the phrase *ράψαντες αἰοιδήν*, "stitching a song." By interpreting this phrase — used by an oral poet to describe his own and Homer's method of composing poetry — in the light of the oral technique, we can best understand the form of oral poetry and its method of organizing material. The phrase is found in fr. 265 of Hesiod:

Ἐν Δήλῳ τότε πρῶτον ἐγὼ καὶ Ὅμηρος αἰοδοί
μέλομεν, ἐν νεαροῖς ὕμνοις ράψαντες αἰοιδήν,
Φοῖβον Ἀπόλλωνα χρυσάορον, ὃν τέκε Λητώ.

It is also quoted by Eustathius. Both sources attribute the fragment to Hesiod. It is a genuine fragment of Hesiod. It comes from the Pindar scholium on the Homeridae, which is one of the fullest, most knowledgeable sources of information on early Greek bards and their practices. It is chronologically possible, for Herodotus makes Homer and Hesiod contemporaries; so do the *Certamen* and many of the ancient *vitae*. That Homer visited Delos is not impossible, for Thucydides identifies the bard of the Delian Hymn with Homer.²¹ That Hesiod visited Delos is doubtful in view of his assertion in *Works and Days* that he hates the sea and the farthest he has traveled is Chalkis where he won the tripod he dedicated to the Muses.²² Yet we know from Thucydides²³ and the ancient *vitae* of Hesiod that the poet wandered about after his conversion to poetry by the Muses of Helicon. Yet there is nothing to prevent ascribing a later bardic career to Hesiod after the composition of the *Works and Days*. He acquired considerable fame outside of his village in Ascrea. Chersias of Orchomenus, a seventh-century poet, speaks of Hesiod's widespread fame:

Ἄσκη μὲν πατρίς πολυλήϊος, ἀλλὰ θανόντος
 ὅσ τεα πληξίππων γῇ Μινυῶν κατέχει
 Ἡσιόδου, τοῦ πλείστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις κλέος ἐστίν
 ἀνδρῶν κρινομένων ἐν βασιάνῃ σοφίης²⁴

This speaks of a fame acquired by travels beyond the confines of Boeotia. The fragment is biographical, and this is characteristic of Hesiod, who gives us several biographical details about himself. The fragment is genuine and thus enables us to see in the phrase *ῥάψαντες αἰοιδήν* the oldest description by eighth-century bards of their oral technique. Philochorus (*FHG* I, 417) interprets the phrase *ἀπὸ τοῦ συντιθέναι καὶ ῥάπτειν τὴν ᾠδὴν* as adding together and stitching a song. Eustathius says the same.²⁵ This is not only the method of the *ῥαψωδοί*, who derive their name from the phrase, but also, as the Hesiod fragment tells us, of the *αἰοδοί*. It is a technique common to both.

The phrase describes what has actually been discovered in Balkan poetry to be the technique of oral poetry. It means (1) stitching formulae to create a verse, such as *τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη* plus the terminal noun-epithet formula; (2) stitching themes to create the tale, of which we have an instance at the end of the *Theogony*, to which is stitched the *Hoiai*. The phrase thus describes the formulaic technique of oral poetry, its method of organizing material. It corresponds in oral poetry to what Aristotle calls *σύστασις πραγμάτων* for the drama.²⁶ There is, however, a world of difference between the two. For *ῥάψαντες αἰοιδήν* is an additive process and thus leads away from the organic concept of literature. As we survey the style and organization of oral poetry of all nations in various periods it is apparent that the form most characteristic of them is not organic unity. Aristotle was aware of this style and form and refers to it in the *Rhetoric* as *λέξις εἰρομένη*,²⁷ the "strung-along style," but we have no systematic treatment of it. The name I prefer to give to this oral style is *parataxis*.²⁸ The word was first used by grammarians to illustrate certain verbal arrangements. Chantraine devotes a chapter to this style in his Homeric grammar. As a result of Parry's work on the stringing-along of formulae to create a verse, the word *parataxis* may now be equally applied to the oral style. Some years ago after studying the style of Geometric vases marked by a strong pictorial parataxis in decoration, I asked myself the question, is parataxis the form of the Homeric epics as well as of the Geometric vases? The structural arrangement of the Homeric poems, the *Homeric Hymns* and, even more, of the Hesiodic corpus and the Cyclic epics, appeared to me to be closer to parataxis than to the organic unity of *Oedipus Rex* or the Parthenon. I saw the same differences between early

Greek and fifth-century art. Probing deeper into the thought processes of the early Greek mind, I began to see that it saw relations differently from those apparent to the logical mentality that emerged in the fifth century. It saw elements in linear or antithetical relations, never in the periodic style of thought. It saw a whole but did not sacrifice the part to it; it kept to one thought at a time, and put that thought forth in its complete plainness. Homer was as much interested in the scar on Odysseus' leg as he was in using it as a means to the recognition that followed; he looked at the similes as ends in themselves as well as a means for making comparisons. Time after time he showed how the simile, once the point of likeness had been established, goes its own way regardless of its starting point; how it may even develop into something wholly inappropriate to its context.²⁹ This splendid capacity of the early Greek mind to see things separately and as a whole constitutes the beauty of early Greek oral poetry.

This trail of observations and reflection which started with the phrase *ῥάψαντες αἰοιδῆν* leads to one inevitable conclusion: the oral poetics of early Greek poetry must be founded on parataxis, which characterizes its verbal style, its method of organizing material into a whole, its mental processes. Yet the oral bard does not allow parataxis to reach the point of unconnected discreteness. The oral art has certain devices for integrating material and style: (1) the prologue, which is an oral table of contents; (2) the technique of foreshadowing and flashback, when a poet uses the *medias res* technique in telling a story; (3) an inner armature of relationship that holds together biographic, historical, or genealogical treatment of material; (4) the placing of summaries in certain parts of the poem which recapitulate for the listeners the main theme or what has already taken place; (5) ring-composition, which introduces and terminates a digression by the same or variant words; (6) the repetition of certain key words interlaced throughout a poem, like *δίκη*, *ἐργάζεσθαι*, *καιρός*, whose frequent repetition throughout the *Works and Days* binds the three themes of the poem — justice, work, and timeliness for work; (7) the repetition of certain key images like fire, so well illustrated by Whitman for the *Iliad*;³⁰ (8) the use of particles in creating chain effects between sentences and sections of a poem; (9) the use of enjambment which propels a terminal formula into the next line; (10) the use of divine intent to keep together an episodic story. The marked use of such devices shows that the singer of tales is conscious of artifices for tying together the episodes, or themes.³¹

These artifices constitute the brake on the centrifugal tendencies of all oral poetry, but they never achieve Aristotle's kind of unity. The

reason for this has been given above, but it may be more forcefully explained by reference to Greek art. The organic literary artist separates the foreground from the background; oral poetry, like the Geometric artist, loves life in its fullness and never separates the background from the foreground. It is for this reason that the concept of unity as articulated by Aristotle's *Poetics* cannot be the foundation of an oral poetics. I should like to suggest that our prospective oral poetics considers parataxis as the unique form of the mentality and technique of oral poetry, and stresses its origin both in the episodic manner of oral recitation and in the stitching technique of oral versification. Though later literature was composed with the written word, the bardic tradition left its structural influence upon it. Consequently the form of archaic Greek literature, and even some written in the fifth century, such as that of Pindar, Parmenides, Herodotus, is intimately connected with oral literature. Even when the written word had triumphed there was a nostalgia for winged words. Plato in the *Phaedrus* is the enemy of the book, and throughout the dialogues oral dialectic, which parallels amoebaeon verse in the *Certamen*, is the ideal. Alcidas, the fourth-century orator, in his essay *περὶ τῶν τοῦς γραπτοῦς λόγους γραφόντων* asks the orator to improvise his oration like the rhapsode, and illustrates the vitality of *αὐτοσχεδιάζειν* in a life of Homer which has been embodied in the existing *Certamen*.³² The spoken word is closer to the instincts of life than is a book. That is why Aristophanes, Plato, the orators, pay so much attention in their writings to the audience, which is the intimate factor in oral literature — a factor too often neglected by literary criticism.

The word *poetics* involves creation, and the question has arisen whether or not individual creation is possible in oral poetry. This question must be faced if we are to make a valid search for an oral poetics. Parry's work has solved some of the past problems of Homeric scholarship by showing that they were irrelevant to Homer, but in their place other problems have arisen, hydra-headed. These will continue to be the major problem in classical scholarship in our time. Two main questions arise for our consideration: first, what is the exact status of the Homeric poem between its oral creation by Homer in recitation and the time of Pisistratus when our sources reveal a written text?³³ The second deals with the consequences of Parry's study of the mechanics involved in oral verse-making. The oral poet does not fashion fresh phrases, as the literary poet does, because he does not have the time in the midst of improvisation. Therefore he must spontaneously use the formula, a group of words already fashioned by the oral tradition, to express any

and every idea or action possible in the poem. Parry's proof of this was overwhelming. He did not live long enough after his exposition of the oral style to deal with the issue. An objective approach to his work shows that he never went beyond the description of how oral epic style functions. He never dealt with the question whether the Homeric poems as they stand are the product of one or many poets, and he couched his phrasing as "poet(s)." Thus all the other problems of originality and transmission he left as a legacy to others.

A brief glance at the reaction to Parry's work in the thirty years since his death shows a variety of responses. There was enthusiastic acceptance of his work by Lord, who collaborated with him and has since carried out a major portion of his work in the recordings made in Yugoslavia, and in *The Singer of Tales* has shown that he has gone beyond Parry's work. The result is that we have a major study of contemporary oral poetics to help us in our examination of problems connected with early Greek poetry. My own field recordings in Greece have given the needed corroboration to the field work of Parry and Lord and the validity of the oral poetics in Yugoslavia. Carpenter's conclusions about the late introduction of the alphabet into Greece, recently reinforced by Miss Jeffrey's solid book,³⁴ came in time to strengthen Parry's proof of the oral Homeric style. Bowra, an early advocate of Parry's work, broadened the oral spectrum by his *Heroic Poetry*, which covers a wide field of comparative oral literature.³⁵ Following the support of Parry's work by Dodds in *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*³⁶ English Homeric scholarship started to give its support to the oral status of Homeric poetry.³⁷ On the Continent the implications of Parry's work are, as of the moment, neglected.

Yet a survey of the reaction to Parry's work here and in England shows one major concern—the implications of Parry's work for the problem of the possibilities inherent in the oral style. Bassett and Calhoun, though acknowledging the oral character of the Homeric poem, voiced opposition to the mechanics of the formulaic style.³⁸ They saw a creative poet in Homer even though he worked with oral formulae. Yet their evidence was not objective enough to silence the pessimism that followed Parry's work. Wade-Gery gave a strong statement of the nihilistic effect of Parry's work on originality: "The most important assault made on Homer's creativeness in recent years is the work of Milman Parry, who may be called the Darwin of Homeric studies. As Darwin seemed to many to have removed the finger of God from the creation of the world so Milman Parry has seemed to some to remove the creative

poet of the *Iliad*.”³⁹ This view was stated in stronger terms by Combellack in his article “Milman Parry and Homeric Artistry”: “The regrettable feature of Parry’s work, as I see it, is not that Parry has taken the great creative poet out of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but he has taken from Homeric critics a considerable body of phenomena which literary critics normally consider a legitimate and significant part of their study. If Parry’s conclusions are sound, it is now hard, or impossible to find artistry in many places in the Homeric poems where critics of the pre-Parry age found beauty and where contemporary critics still find it . . . If we accept Parry’s view about the traditional formulaic nature of the Homeric style, his contention that the oral poet chooses a phrase primarily because it is convenient, not because of any delicate nuance in its meaning (and I shall say in the present state of our knowledge of oral poetry we ought to accept it), then we must, in dealing with Homer, renounce a large area of normal literary criticism and a vast and varied collection of earlier and contemporary criticism and ‘appreciations’ of Homeric poetry must be thrown overboard.”⁴⁰

These views must be accepted or rejected on objective evidence. The issue which constitutes the Darwinian aspect of our problem holds promise of solution. The first step is to be found in Lord’s *The Singer of Tales* which shows beyond doubt that even in a body of oral poetry not comparable to the greatness of Homer’s there is positive evidence against the views stated by Wade-Gery and Combellack. Yugoslavic oral poetry shows that the singer of tales, even when working with a formulaic tradition, has room for individuality both in creating new formulae and sound patterns, in shaping poems which have a marked stamp of individuality, in shaping the architecture of his poems. The singer has no concept of originality, in the modern sense of the word, but his poems show that there is room in the oral tradition for individuality and creation. Yugoslav poetry is not a product of unchanging, automatic repetition.⁴¹ If this is true of Yugoslav poetry, and of modern Greek poetry, as I have found it, there are possibilities of its being true for early Greek oral poetry. The only thing that remains is to detect it. Parry confined himself to Homer; in two previous papers I have given evidence that Hesiod and the *Homeric Hymns* are oral poetry; in the second of the present studies I have given evidence that the Cyclic and non-Cyclic epics are oral and that some of them are earlier than Homer, some contemporary, some later than Homer. If this is true then we have a sudden, major breakthrough in our problem. For here, as has been shown in the second study, we have a body of comparative oral poetry within the early Greek period itself in which we can test such questions

as creativity, individuality, degrees of variation within a traditional style, epichoric specimens of oral poetry. That all this is possible in early Greek poetry is proved once and for all from the fact that the various poets in this oral tradition, while using the same formulaic diction, as a formulaic analysis of their poems shows, can create such diverse, individually different poems as the Homeric, the Hesiodic, the Hymns, and the so-called Cyclic epics. Several examples will show the degree of individuality possible in the early Greek tradition of oral poetry. Rzsch's edition of the Hesiodic poems shows how pervasive are the Homeric formulae in the texture of the *Works and Days* and the *Theogony*. Now that we know that these formulae are not the product of literary mimesis but an inheritance on the mainland from the Mycenaean oral tradition we can see the independence of Hesiod. If there is one original poem in all early Greek oral poetry it is his *Works and Days*. It is a realistic epic about himself and the problems that confront him in dealing with his brother Perses. This is not to deny that there is traditional material in the poem, but it is incidental to his individual problems. The poetry is indelibly stamped with the seal of a personal Hesiod. That all this can happen through the use of Homeric formulae shows the individuality possible within the Greek oral tradition. Equally convincing evidence for the possibility of individual creation is to be found in the prologue to the Muses in the *Theogony*.⁴² It is a very personal prologue, unlike any other in all of Greek poetry. It tells of Hesiod's conversion to poetry by the personal inspiration of the Muses of Helicon, and it contains three waves of invocation, each one expanding on something in the previous wave, until the Muses, like the *Theogony* itself, envelop all mortal and heavenly creation. A comparative study of this prologue with those of the Homeric poems, the *Homeric Hymns*, and the several surviving prologues in the Cyclic epics shows that while all the rest are conventional prologues with a fossilized formula of ἔννεπε Μοῦσα, or its variants, the prologue of the *Theogony* and its Homeric formulae are used to orchestrate a deep and moving personal experience. It consists of one hundred and twelve lines, in contrast to the ten-line prologues of the Homeric poems, which are used as a table of contents. The nearest parallel to this prologue is to be found in the equally moving and personal prologue of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*. The prologue to the *Works and Days*, like those of Homer in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is different; yet both poets use the same formulaic diction. That individuality and creation are possible in the early Greek oral tradition is now a fact; all that remains is *how* it is done. Comparative study of the same thematic material such as the *Shield of Achilles*

and the *Shield of Herakles*, the Pandora story in the *Works and Days* and in the *Theogony*, the similes in all early Greek poetry, the themes and type scenes, will show the individuality possible in an oral poetics.

Already the evidence is pointing toward the fact that the character of the formulaic style involves something more than a mechanical stitching of formulae and themes. Parry himself was the first to show that at the verbal level the bard creates *new* phrases by analogy to pre-existing systems. About a third of the lines in the twenty-five line excerpts which he chose for formulaic analysis show instances of this type of creation by analogy. There is evidence in comparing noun-epithet formulae in Homer and in Hesiod and other early Greek poetry that there is more creation by analogy than has been apparent. Many of the formulae in Hesiod show changes from their Homeric use, despite the strong tendency to localization of the epic formula. Recent studies of the Homeric formulae show that many of them exhibit dramatic qualities in their context.⁴³ They are more than metrical fillers, and perform in their contexts the role of *le mot juste*. Even when the formulae are used as metrical fillers without dramatic relevance they exhibit a personality of their own. The sea is not the sea but the "holy brine"; Achilles is not swift-footed because he is chasing an enemy every time the adjective occurs, but because that is the key to his personality; he is swift to pursue, to fly to anger, in making choices. They endow inanimate objects with permanent personalities and their incantational role contributes to the magic of the epic style. It is becoming apparent now that metrical function does not deprive the formulae of grandeur any more than the necessary functioning of physiological parts of the body deprives one of personality. An oral poetics must take this into account.

Parry, in his famous review of Arend's *Typischen Szenen bei Homer*,⁴⁴ being under the influence of his noun-epithet studies, saw in these scenes merely the typological. Armstrong's paper on the arming motif in the *Iliad* is strong proof that even in the so-called static-type scenes there is strong evidence of individuality in adjusting this type of scene to the dramatic context.⁴⁵ Several other scenes that have been studied by me or by my students show the same results; they are expanded or contracted according to the dramatic needs of the story, as Lord also has shown in *The Singer of Tales*. The study of structural patterns in the Homeric poems shows that variation is a strong force at work,⁴⁶ and whenever it appears it is evidence of the flexibility possible with the oral style.

Lord has shown that the most distinctive claim to individuality in the Yugoslav poetry is architecture.⁴⁷ This must constitute the keystone

in our oral poetics for it gives us in the realm of technique the greatest evidence for individuality. Aristotle already has given us the differences between the Homeric and Cyclic epics — that Homer is closer to drama, the Cyclic epics closer to linear chronology. This shows clearly the potentialities inherent in the epic technique for expressing individual differences. The excellences of Homer were used by later critics merely to emphasize the inferiority of the other epics, not the differences which need to be emphasized in architectural patterns of the early epic. Much of this constitutes the content of the pre-Parry poetics. What is needed, however, is the study of the relationship of the formulaic technique to human characterization. Pioneer studies, such as Adam Parry's study of "The Language of Achilles," are needed to see the relation of characterization to the epic technique — to what extent characterization is confined to action and to what extent the poet can penetrate by means of the formulaic style into the inner state of mind. The extent to which the oral technique can go beyond the typological "Man" of Geometric vases and exhibit full-bodied men and women acting and reacting to human situations with all the potentialities of mankind is a problem that remains to be solved. That they emerge so in Homer has been shown in Whitman's study. His attempt to deal with the oral material beyond technique is a challenge to a future poetics. This challenge lies in starting with the oral technique and maturing to a humanistic engagement with poetry as poetry. The latter can rest on a secure foundation only if related to the factors at work in oral poetry. To divorce the two is impossible. Form is meaning; it is not an envelope for meaning. It is not the residuum of abstraction from poetic or dramatic context. Like imagery and metaphor, it arises organically out of the material. Early Greek mentality expresses meaning through form; hence our insistence that the oral poetics must start with forces at work in shaping form through winged words. This study has been intended merely as a preface to this problem imposed on us through Parry's revolutionary turn in Homeric studies. An oral poetics fashioned out of the oral facts of life is the challenge to our generation of classical scholars. It will result in what Plato calls *εὐρημά τι Μοισᾶν*⁴⁹ and will lead us to the true Muses of Helicon who long ago sang to men, "We know, when we will, to utter true things."⁵⁰

NOTES

I

1. See E. R. Dodds, "Homer," *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*, ed. M. Platnauer (Oxford 1954), 16.
2. Schol. on *Nemean* II, 1 (*Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina*, ed. A. B. 3 + H.S.C.P.

Drachmann III 29-32); for the sources on the Panathenaea see T. W. Allen, *Homer, The Origins and the Transmission* (Oxford 1924), 42-50, 225-248; J. A. Davison, "Peisistratus and Homer," *TAPA* 86 (1955) 7ff.

3. D. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford 1955) 75-76.

4. *Ibid.* 76.

5. For a bibliography of Parry's work, see *AJA* 52 (1948) 43-44. The most detailed account of his field work is to be found in *Serbocroatian Heroic Songs*, 2 vols.; collected by Milman Parry, ed. and trans. A. B. Lord (Cambridge, Mass. -Belgrade 1954); A. B. Lord's, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960) is basic. The evidence for field work in modern Greek heroic poetry comes from my notes and recordings made in Greece 1952-1953, with the aid of the Guggenheim Foundation and the American Philosophical Society. Copies of recordings are on deposit with the Library of Congress. A selection of these songs has been issued by Folkways Records FE 4468, *Modern Greek Heroic Oral Poetry*, with an introduction, "Modern Greek Heroic Oral Poetry and its Relevance to Homer, the Oral Poet," (New York 1959) 1-34. For a useful collection of texts see Δ. Α. Πετροπούλου, *Ἑλληνικά Δημοτικά Τραγούδια* (Athens 1958).

6. *Iliad* II, 490.

7. Only six verses in the Homeric poems are completely spondaic; see T. D. Seymour, *Introduction to the Language and Verse of Homer* (Boston 1886) 81-82. "Dactyls are about three times as frequent as spondees in the Homeric poem" (p. 82). For the more recent colometric analysis of Homeric metrics see H. N. Porter, "The Early Greek Hexameter," *YCS* 12 (1951) 3-63.

8. Σ. Π. Κυριακίδου, *Τὰ πινυδιὰ τοῦ δεκαπενταπυλλάβου, Ἡμερολόγιον Μεγάλης Ἑλλάδος* (1923) and *Αἱ Ἱστορικαὶ Ἀρχαὶ τῆς Δημῶδους Νεοελληνικῆς Ποιήσεως* (Salonika 1954) 6-9.

9. The musical transcription was made by Mr. Spyros Peristeres of the Folklore Archives of the Academy of Athens; for musical transcriptions of Serbocroatian singing see *Serbocroatian Heroic Songs* I 438-462; *The Singer of Tales* 39-41; Chadwick, *Growth of Literature* III 872-875.

10. For the lyre on eighth-century vases see G. Hanfmann, "Ionia, Leader or Follower?" *HSCP* 61 (1953) Fig. 5; L. Deubner, "Die siebensaitige Leier," *AM* (1929); W. Schadewaldt, *Von Homers Welt und Werk*² (Stuttgart 1944) 60-62.

11. Lord informs me there is a parallel to this (*Il.* II, 490) in the Yugoslav formula "If my throat will obey me" (ako će me gulo josluiati).

12. M. Parry, "Homer and Huso: I. The Singer's Rests in Greek and South-slavic Heroic Song," *TAPA* 66 (1935) xlvii. This abstract of Parry was expanded by Lord into an article in *TAPA* 67 (1936) 106-113.

13. *Serbocroatian Heroic Songs* I 65, 238, 240, 374.

14. *Ibid.* I 407 n.14; 466, n.12.

15. These data come from Lord's notes on the songs in vol. I.

16. In Cyprus, where the *ποιητάρηδες*, the itinerant bards who are in the last stages of a tradition going back to Byzantium, sing their songs through before the audience, there are no pauses, but the average length of their songs — *ca.* 270 lines — gives an indication of the average number of lines sung in pauseless recitation. These statistics come from the average length of their songs which I recorded and from their printed songs which they sell to villagers after the recitation. I have a large collection of these in my possession. They usually compose these songs orally and go to printers and dictate to them their oral texts.

These texts often differ from the sung version. A study of the art of the ποιητάρηδες in Cyprus is lacking but one may consult Λαογραφία 5 (1915) 504-506; 7 (1923) 115-120; 15 (1953-54) 374-400; and N. Γ. Κυριαζή *Κυπριακή Βιβλιογραφία* (Larnaka 1935) 260-298.

17. M. Murko, *La Poésie populaire épique en Yougoslavie au début du XX^e siècle* (Paris 1929) 1-31; Plates XXI with valuable comments; see also bibliography in *Serbocroatian Heroic Songs* I 46-49.

18. *Serbocroatian Heroic Songs* I 59-67, 225, 235-245, 263-267, 289-292.

19. *Odyssey* I, 337-344.

20. *Ibid.* VIII, 537; cf 97ff, 492ff.

21. Line 149.

22. The directions given to Demodocus ἐνθεν ἐλών (VIII, 500), ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετὰβηθι (VIII, 492), and the intimate knowledge of the subject matter possessed by the audiences in the Phaeacian court show that the pauses by the bard were not so damaging to the unity of the poems as modern critics like to believe. See study III below.

23. A particularly strong case for the unity of the chants or books of the Homeric poems has been made by P. Mazon, *Introduction à l'Iliade* (Paris 1948) 136-140; C. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1958) 249-309; T. L. Sheppard, *The Pattern of the Iliad* (London 1922); J. L. Myres, *Who Were the Greeks?* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1930) 517-525; *JHS* 52 (1932) 264-296; *JHS* 72 (1952) 1-19; *JHS* 74 (1954) 122-141; *ABSA* 45 (1950) 229-260.

24. Lord, *Singer of Tales* 79-80, 85-89, 92-93, 95-96, 100-101, 105-108, 162, 266, 288.

25. The manuscript of this poem is in the National Library of Athens, MS. 1280; for a description of it see Ἰωάννου καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου Σακκελίωνος, *Κατάλογος τῶν χειρογράφων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐθνικῆς Βιβλιοθήκης* (Athens, 1892) 233. Another manuscript has recently been acquired in the Gennadius Library in Athens. Portions of the manuscript have been published in Σ. Π. Ἀραβαντινοῦ, *Ἱστορία Ἀλῆ Πασᾶ* (Athens 1895) 23-27 and Appendix, 523ff; K. N. Σαθᾶ, *Τουρκοκρατημένη Ἑλλάς* (Athens 1869) 595-604; *Ἱστορικαὶ Διατριβαί* (Athens 1870) 123-236; W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece* (London 1835) I 463-497.

26. *Singer of Tales* 32.

27. J. A. Notopoulos, *AJP* 73 (1950) 225-250.

28. E. Légrand, *Recueil de poèmes historiques* (Paris 1877) 240-257.

29. For an account of this poem see J. A. Notopoulos, "The Genesis of an Oral Heroic Poem," *GRBS* 3 (1960) 135-144.

30. J. A. Notopoulos, "Homer, Hesiod and the Achaean Heritage of Oral Poetry," *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 177-197, and "The Homeric Hymns as Oral Poetry," *AJP* 83 (1962) 337-368.

31. R. Jebb, *Homer*² (Boston 1894) 98. For the Alexandrian origin of the book divisions see Cicero, *de Orat.* III 33; "Pseudo-Plutarch Life of Homer," in Wilamowitz, *Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi* (Berlin 1929) 25; V. Bérard, *Introduction à l'Odyssée* (Paris 1925) III 125-165; Mazon, *Introduction à l'Iliade* 137-141.

32. For the division of the Cyclic epic into books see *Proculi Chrestomathia in Homeri Opera*, ed. T. W. Allen (Oxford [OCT]) V 102-109.

33. Bérard (above, n.31) III 134ff. For a belief in a pre-Alexandrian division of the Homeric books see Mazon (above, n.31) 137-141; Page (above, n.3) 76. Wilamowitz believes that the letters belong only to Alexandrian scholarship

(*Homerische Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1884, 369 n.47). The evidence of some early papyri with no book divisions (see Bolling, *AJP* 42 [1921] 258-259) is not telling in view of Osan. *An. Rom.* 289, and *Vita Romana (Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi)*, ed. Wilamowitz, p. 32, lines 26-27); cf. Bérard (above, n.31) III 146.

34. G. P. Goold, "Homer and the Alphabet," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 288.

35. "It seems, too, a normal practice for reciters of long poems to finish each separate performance at an appropriate place like the end of an episode." C. M. Bowra, *Heroic Poetry* (London 1952) 438. For the division of the 40,000-line Kara-Kirghiz poem *Manas* into books which correspond with the recited version of the bard, see *ibid.* 439. A study of the conversations of the bards in *Serbocroatian Heroic Songs* shows that they think in terms of story units, even though they give no formal titles to their songs. A long poem is orally inconceivable without thematic units whether or not they are artistically tied into a whole. See Lord, "Composition by Theme in Homer and Southslavic Heroic Song," *TAPA* 82 (1951) 71-80.

36. Cf. Mazon (above, n.31) 138.

37. G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic* ² (Oxford 1911) 209-217.

38. *Ibid.* 209.

39. G. Wilamowitz, "Über die Ionische Wanderung," *Sitz. Ber. Berl.* (1906) 38-57; 59-79; "Panionion," *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin 1937) vol. V no. 1, pp. 128ff; H. T. Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* (Cambridge 1952) 2-5; C. Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization* (New York 1959) 9-10, 24-31; M. B. Sakellariou, *La Migration grecque en Ionie* (Athens 1958) 35-36; J. M. Cook, "Greek Settlements in the Eastern Aegean and Asia Minor," Fascicle of *CAH* II, chap. xxxviii (rev. ed.) 24-32.

40. Wade-Gery (above, n.39) 14-18; 69 n.39. It is to be noted that Wade-Gery dates the relay recitation to the Panathenaia, instituted by Pericles in 442 (*ibid.* 30, 77-78).

41. T. B. L. Webster, *From Mycenae to Homer* (London 1958) 268-269; C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958) 81-82; J. A. Davison, *Proc. Class. Assn.* 46:25 (1949), where a Delian festival is suggested. For the prominence of the festival recitation in recent Homeric studies see Davison, *A Companion to Homer* (London 1962) 255.

42. *Hymn to Apollo*, 146-178.

43. *Thuc.* 3. 104.

44. Blindness, delight to men, fame hereafter are common features of the bard as portrayed in the *Odyssey*.

45. Wade-Gery (above, n.39) 69.

46. Cf. *ἐνθεν ἐλὼν*, *Od.*, VIII, 500; I, 10.

47. This is clearly brought out by Harpocration (quoting Crates) s.v. *Ὀμηρίδαι*: *Ὀμηρίδας ἀπογόνους εἶναι τοῦ ποιητοῦ*.

48. *Singer of Tales* 129, 137; a *verbatim* memorized transmission without a text is advocated by G. S. Kirk in "Homer and Modern Oral Poetry: Some Confusions," *CQ* 10 (1960) 271-281. The only evidence he cites are Vedic Hymns, but there is a difference between hieratic and heroic poetry. For the lack of complete rigidity in oral transmission in oral literature of Ancient India, see H. M. and N. K. Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature* (Cambridge 1940) III 867. They find improvisation to be the normal form of oral tradition (*ibid.* 868). Neither Lord nor I, on the basis of field work, believes in this possibility for the Homeric poems. For evidence of improvisation in oral transmission of

Homeric texts, see Pindar scholium on Homeridae, and the variant texts in the "city" editions of Homer.

49. Cf. Σ. Α. Ξανθοῦδιδη Ἑρωτόκριτος (Candia 1915); J. Mavrogordato, *The Erotokritos* (Oxford 1929); Γ. Σεφέρη, Ὁ Ἑρωτόκριτος (Athens 1940); J. A. Notopoulos, "Modern Greek Heroic Poetry," (above, n.5) introduction, pp. 29-31. In 1953 I met an illiterate Cretan, aged ninety, in the village of Voukolies, who recited passages I picked at random from various parts of a printed copy of *Erotokritos* I had in my possession. He knew the poem *verbatim*, a common experience in Crete; see Xan Fielding, *The Stronghold* (London 1953) 107-108; G. Psychoundakis, *The Cretan Runner* (London 1955) 13.

50. Wade-Gery (above, n.39) 9-13, 38-40.

51. This point is illustrated in a Greek folksong on St. Basil from Caesarea. He is asked,

Basil, do you know letters, Basil, do you know songs?

I have learned letters, songs I do not know.

I owe this reference (*Popularia Carmina Graeciae Recentioris*, ed. A. Passow, Athens, 1860, p. 221) to the kindness of Professor Cedric Whitman. This is not to deny that an oral bard may be influenced by written literature, for there are instances in the Parry-Lord material of oral bards who have obtained their themes and plots from books read to them, or who could read books themselves. But in composing their songs they transformed the literary into the oral. Comparative oral poetry shows instances where literary poems become oral and vice versa. But any trained collector of oral poetry can spot immediately the pseudo-oral text. Cf. *Singer of Tales* 124-138.

52. Lord, "Homer's Originality: Oral Dictated Texts," *TAPA* 84 (1953) 124-134.

53. For the date of introduction of the alphabet into Greece and writing possibilities for a text in the eighth century, see L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 10-57; H. L. Lorimer, *Homer and the Monuments* (London 1950) 526-527.

54. See F. Schadewaldt, *Legende von Homer dem fahrenden Sänger* (Leipzig 1942).

55. Schmid-Stählin, *Griechische Literatur Geschichte*, vol. I, pt. I, p. 79. For the nobility and their retinue of bards see Bowra (above, n.35) 406-418; Chadwicks, *Growth of Literature* (above n.48) III 854ff. For transition to recitation before the bourgeois and poor people see Bowra, *ibid*, 418.

56. *Serbocroatian Heroic Songs* 16. The length of the tale that a bard sang to King Harold III of Norway extended over the twelve evenings of a Christmas festival; see *Growth of Literature* (above, n.48) III 857. Several weeks were required for the complete recitation of the *Mahabharata* (*ibid*. 772).

57. See above, n.24.

58. For the tendency of later poets to be more expansive than earlier poets in the same tradition see Bowra (above, n.35) 330. That all the Cyclic epics, with shorter book divisions, ranging all the way from two to eleven books, are not post-Homeric will be shown in the second study. For an earlier chronology of some of the cyclic epics see J. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (Lund 1949) 89-95.

59. *Odyssey* IX, 5-11; *Certamen*, lines 85-90, which is a quotation from the *Odyssey* IX, 5-11; Hesiod, *Melampodeia*, fr. 163 (Rzach); Xenophanes, *Elegy* 1 (ed. Diehl). For feasting and song see Bowra (above, n.35) 412-413.

60. Τὸ Τραγούδι τοῦ Δασκαλογιάννη ed. B. Laourdas (Heraklion 1947) lines 919-922.

61. There is in the *Odyssey* itself a suggestion that the long winter nights are the season for the development of the long tale:

... αἶδε δὲ νύκτες ἀθέσφατοι· ἔστι μὲν εὖδειν,
ἔστι δὲ τερπομένοισιν ἀκούειν. (XV, 392-393; cf XI, 373).

Ferguson, in "Polis and Idia in Periclean Athens" (*AHR* 45 [1939-40] 225-227) rightly stresses the relation of leisure to the climate and work habits of the ancient Greeks. This leisure coincides with the νύκτες ἀθέσφατοι, the endless winter nights when harvesting is over, the rough season for sailing ventures. In modern Greece this season is called *σαραντάμερος*, the season of forty nights, and is generally the time for the long recitation of folktales (cf. Σ. Κυριακίδης, *Ἑλληνικὴ Λαογραφία* [Athens 1922] 294-297). This is true elsewhere (see Bowra, above, n.35, 412). It is the context of some such a *σαραντάμερος* in the Ionia of the eighth century, that offered the Ionians the proper occasion to listen night after night to the creation of a long epic in the aristocratic setting of the *Odyssey*.

62. Cf. *Hymn to Apollo*, 173-175; for renown among bards see Bowra (above, n.35) 405-406.

63. See Wade-Gery (above, n.39) 6-8; Page (above, n.3) 145-146. For an account of the interest shown by eighth-century Greeks in their heroic past, see W. Jaeger, *Paedeia* (Oxford 1939) 16-17.

64. For the role of ornamentation in oral poetry see Parry, *CP* 21 (1936) 359; *Serbo-croatian Heroic Songs*, 239-241; *Singer of Tales* 88ff.

II

1. E. A. Havelock, *A Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963).

2. J. A. Notopoulos, "Homer, Hesiod and the Achaeian Heritage of Oral Poetry," *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 177-197; "The Homeric Hymns as Oral Poetry," *AJP* 83 (1962) 337-368.

3. Cf. *HSCP* 41 (1930) 73-147.

4. Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, 68-98, 141-197; J. A. Notopoulos, "Parataxis in Homer," *TAPA* 80 (1949) 1-13; W. Arend, *Die typischen Scenen bei Homer* (Berlin 1933) and Parry's review in *CP* 31 (1936) 357-360; D. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1959) 118-177; H. Trub, *Kataloge in der Griechischen Dichtung* (Zurich 1952); C. R. Beye, "The Catalogues as a Device of Composition in the Iliad," *HSCP* 65 (1961) 351-353; H. Fraenkel, *Die homerische Gleichnisse* (Göttingen 1921); W. A. A. van Otterlo, *De ring-compositie als opbouwprincipe in de epische gedichthen van Homerus* (Amsterdam 1948).

5. Page (above, n.4) 218-296; C. M. Bowra, "Homeric Epithets for Troy," *JHS* 80 (1960) 16-23; cf. V. Karageorghis, "Myth and Epic in Mycenaean Vase Painting," *AJA* 62 (1958) 383-388.

6. See J. A. Davison, "Quotations and Allusions in Early Greek Literature," *Eranos* 53 (1955) 125-140.

7. R. Hampe, *Frühe griechische Sagenbilder in Böotien* (Athens 1936); cf. K. Marót, "La Béotie et son caractère hesiodique," *Act. Ant. Hung.* I 261-320.

8. W. E. McLeod, "Oral Bards at Delphi," *TAPA* 92 (1961) 317-325; for

Epimenides as an oral poet see R. Glass, *Epimenides of Crete* (Harvard Senior Thesis 1962).

9. See "Carmina popularia," *Anthologia Lyrica* (ed. Diehl), II 192-208.
10. For originality in oral poetry, see Lord, *Singer of Tales*, 44-45.
11. *Athen.* VII, 227 e.
- 12 See J. A. Notopoulos, "Mnemosyne in Oral Poetry," *TAPA* 69 (1938) 465-493.
13. See C. M. Bowra, *Heroic Poetry*, and n.I., 5 above.
14. G. S. Kirk, "Homer and Modern Oral Poetry: Some Confusions," *CQ* 10 (1960) 271-281.
15. See *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 177-197; J. A. Davison in *Companion to Homer*, 256-257.
16. See n.I, 53 above.
17. G. S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge 1962) 301-315.
18. Lord, *Singer of Tales* 129, 137.
19. Schol. Pindar *Nem.* II, 1 (ed. Drachmann, III, 31).
20. The *Suda*, s.v. Πύργος.
21. See n.I, 16 above.
22. *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (ed. Allen) lines 320-321; Paus IX, 31, 4.
23. L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 20.
24. Lord, *Singer of Tales* 79-80, 100-109.
25. *Times Literary Supplement* (London) February 6, 1959; cf. Chadwicks, *Growth of Literature* III 757.
26. See Pindar, fr. 279 (Bowra ed.); *Companion to Homer* 235-236.
27. *Il.* II, 594-600. That the muses traveled from place to place is evident from their appearance in Helicon, Troezen, and Pylos; cf. Plut. *Moral.* 150a. For a fresco of a bard at Pylos see *Archaeology* 13 (1960) 56.
28. L. R. Palmer, *Mycenaeans and Minoans* (London 1961) 87.
29. For evidence of a Pylos saga in *Il.* XI, 670ff, see F. Bölte, *Rh. Mus.* 83 (1934) 319-347; G. Huxley, *BICS* 3 (1956) 21.
30. *Ion*, 533 b-c; for Clement of Alexandria's interpretation of this as thievery, see Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6, 2, 25.1.
31. Paus. IX; Strabo IX, 400ff; cf. *RE* s.v. Boeotia.
32. See M. P. Nilsson, *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology* (Berkeley 1932) 100ff.
33. Page (above, n.4) 118-177; *Companion to Homer*, 286, 288.
34. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford 1955) 35-39. It must also be noted that the prologues which precede the Catalogue and the invocations to the Muses before the battle scenes in the *Iliad* (XI, 218-220, XIV, 508-510, XVI, 112-113) resemble the Boeotian prologue to the Muses in the *Theogony*, which stresses correct information. Cf. W. W. Minton, "Homer and the Muses," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 292-309.
35. *Od.* XI, 271; 284; XII, 70; *Il.* V, 800ff; Nilsson (above, n.32) 139.
36. Hampe (above, n.7) 45ff, 58ff, 80ff; Table, pp. 90-111.
37. G. Hanfmann, "Ionia, Leader or Follower?," *HSCP* 61 (1953) 1-37; R. M. Cook, "Ionia and Greece in the Eighth and Seventh Centuries B.C.," *JHS* 66 (1946) 67; E. Akurgal, "The Early Period and the Golden Age of Ionia," *AJA* 66 (1962) 369-380.
38. For possibilities of an epic in Athens see T. B. L. Webster, *BSA* 50 (1955) 49-50.

39. *Od.* V, 490.
 40. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958) 8.
 41. A. Severyns, *Le Cycle épique dans l'école d'Aristarque* (Liège 1928) 39. Aristarchus dates Homer about 140 years after the Trojan War (*Vita Homeri*, ed. Allen, p. 244, lines 17-21, and Proclus summary, ed. Allen, p. 101, lines 14-17).
 42. Severyns considers the epic cycle as an agglutination of several groups of epics, having between them points of contact but no hiatus.
 43. Severyns (above, n.41) 42-47, where it is shown that the word was invented by Aristarchus to denigrate all poets later than Homer and all poets prior to Aristarchus; for the subjective element in Alexandrian criticism see M. van der Valk, *Textual Criticism of the Odyssey* (Leiden 1949).
 44. Severyns (above, n.41) 70-81.
 45. F. Brommer, *Vasenlisten zur griechischen Heldensage*² (Marburg 1960); T. J. Dunbabin, *The Greeks and Their Eastern Neighbours* (London 1957) 77-87.
 46. There is ancient evidence that the word *κυκλικός* referred to the formulaic character of these poems. Aristonico's athetized *Il.* XV, 610-614, because *κυκλικῶς ταυτολογεῖται* (Severyns, above, n.41, 156). The scholiast on Aristophanes' *Birds* 919 says, *κύκλια ἔλεγον τὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχοντα*. Pollianus, who lived in the time of Hadrian, wrote an epigram which shows how readily the formulaic style is associated by the scholiasts with literary mimesis:

Τοὺς κυκλίους τούτους τοὺς αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα λέγοντας
 μισῶ λωποδύτας ἀλλοτρίων ἐπίων - -
 οἱ δ' οὕτως τὸν Ὅμηρον ἀναιδῶς λωποδυτοῦσιν
 ὥστε γράφειν ἥδη μῆνιν αἶεθε θεά (Anth. Pal., XI, 130).

This epigram reflects the Aristarchus prejudice.

47. G. Kinkel, *Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1877) vol. I.
 48. Severyns (above, n.41) 69, 328ff.
 49. (1) Hesiod, fr. 110 (Rzach), 5, *Cypria* fr. 6, 1 (K); (2) λ 287, cf. μ 125, *Hymn to Apollo*, 25; (3) Φ 35; (4) Hes. *Op.* 75, Ψ 525; (5) τ 266, Hom. *H.* VII, 57; Hes. *Theog.* 375; (6) X 302, δ 78, ι 552; (7) *Theog.* 47, λ 341; (8) λ 258, *Theog.* 956; Hes. fr. 135, 14; (9) ω 146; (10) κ 273; (11) γ 167; (12) *Hym. Ven.* 25, A 112, Φ 580; (13) *Theog.* 306; (14) H 194, Θ 210; (15) Θ 283; (16) ι 454, τ 122; (17) X 242; (18) Γ 156; (19) *Batr.* 60; (20) Π 161, Φ 202; (21) cf. line 4 of this fr.; (22) H. *Merc.* 350; (23) A 256; (24) E 595, lines 10-11 of fr.; (25) ν 85, B 209; (26) β 268, γ, 372; (27) ο 456; (28) Hes. *Op.* 825, 552, Ω 10, *Cypr.* fr. 6, 8, 11; (29) λ 639, cf. *Theog.* 242, 959; (30) δ 563, E 200; (31) cf. *Cypr.* fr. 6, 8, 10; (32) B 841, Γ 74; (33) E 46; (34) E 434, μ 396, Π 634; (35) *Theog.*, 582; (36) Z 195, A 524, Ω 350.
 50. (1) Φ 17, E 308, Φ 268, Hes. *Scut.* 37; (2) Γ 284, P 6, *Theog.* 947; (3) Z 179, Ψ 142, ψ 131, χ 448; (4) ε 92, Ω 476, φ 416, σ 120, α 138, ε 92; (5) α 442, ο 104; (6) new noun epithet formula created by analogy; (7) α 123, Γ 273, 315; (8) λ 91, 569; (9) A 156, B 81, Z 74; (10) γ 51; (11) M 40, Φ 550; (12) B 662, E 11; (13) α 312, ν 129; (14) ι 423; (15) P 625, μ 266; (16) B 664, π 359; (17) A 496, M 403, *Theog.* 162; (18) Γ 110, Δ 38; (19) Γ 321, γ 136; (20) Δ 4, λ 291; (21) γ 62, 64, ζ 323; (22) ο 234, T 87; (23) O 442, 649; (24) O 583; (25) X 265, 348; (26) θ 271, 313, κ 43; (27) N 207, 603, Ω 281, γ 294; (28) ι 42, 549; (29) N 79; (30) *Theog.* 926.
 51. (1) A 348, I 628, Δ 664; (2) γ 189; (3) B 416; (4) H 392; (5) E 26, Φ 32,

cf. *H* 78, ω 50; (6) Ω 585; (7) *Z* 467; (8) *A* 591 cf. Ω 735; (9) Δ 463; (10) *E* 83, Π 334, Υ 477; (11) *E* 144, *A* 346; (12) *T* 118, *A* 346; (13) *Z* 371, 377; (14) *I* 590; (15) *Z* 460, 498; (16) *K* 316, *P* 202, α 282; (17) *T* 193, *K* 1, *B* 404; (18) *A* 347; (19) Reading $\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota\beta\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ for $\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota\beta\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ (Allen, Oxford V) *A* 604, ω 60; (20) *M* 23, γ 245, Δ 49; (21) *N* 684, Ω 558; (22) *H. H.* XIX, 1; (23) δ 741, *E* 635; (24) γ 17; (25) *E* 378, 435; (26) γ 287, δ 513; (27) η 135; (28) κ 1; (29) *H* 72, *N* 381; (30) Δ 96, β 433; (31) *A* 90; (32) *H* 471; (33) *Z* 194.

52. M. Parry, "The Distinctive Character of Enjambement in Homeric Verse," *TAPA* 60 (1929) 200-220.

53. Lord, *Singer of Tales* 68-98, 158-197.

54. Cf. K. Dieterich, "Die Volksdichtung der Balkanländer in ihren gemeinsamen Elementen," *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde*, vol. XII (1912).

55. A comparative study of this theme will appear in a study, "Akritan Iconography on Byzantine Plates," in *Hesperia*.

56. S. Impellizeri, "La morte de Digenis Akritas," *Annali del Museo Pitre* 1 (1950) 82-119.

57. *Homeric Opera*, ed. T. W. Allen, V 93-151; E. Bethe, *Homer* (Leipzig 1922) II 149-293.

58. *Ion* 531 c-d5. That Archilochus was an $\alpha\omicron\iota\delta\acute{o}\varsigma$, or rhapsode, as well as a lyric poet, is evident not only from the information given in the *Ion* but in *testimonia* of Diog. Laert. IX, 1, Athenaeus XIV, 620 c, Theocritus epigram XIX, 5.

59. See P. Mazon, *Introduction à l'Iliade* (Paris 1948) 243.

60. *Od.* VIII, 81-82; cf. note 46 above.

61. *Homeric Opera* (above, n.57) V, fr. 1, p. 118

62. *Ibid.* 106.

63. Herod., II, 117.

64. *Poetics* 1459 b 30ff. Pestalozzi and Kakridis have reached somewhat the same conclusion on the basis of "neo-analytic" method. See H. Pestalozzi, *Die Achilleis als Quelle der Ilias* (Zurich 1945); J. Th. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (Lund 1949); W. Schadewaldt, *Von Homers Welt und Werk* 2 (Stuttgart 1944) 158-176.

65. Catalogue of allies: *Iliad* and *Cypria*; Hades episodes: *Od.*, *Minyas*, *Nostoi* (Paus. X, 28.7), and a poem $\epsilon\iota\varsigma \alpha\delta\omicron\nu \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is ascribed to Cercops or Prodicus (Allen, *Homer* 71); rape of Helen: *Il.*, *Od.*, *Cypria*, *Ilias parva*, *Iliu persis*; Helenus prophecies: *Il.*, *Cypria*, *Ilias parva*; Paris at Sparta and Sidon: *Il.*, *Cypria*; Nestor digresses on past events: *Il.*, *Od.*, *Cypria*, *Telegony*; gathering of leaders at Aulis: *Il.*, *Cypria*; Calchas: *Il.*, *Cypria*; Philoctetes: *Il.*, *Od.*, *Cypria*, *Ilias parva*, *Iliu persis*; quarrels between warriors: *Il.*, *Od.*, *Cypria*, *Nostoi*; burial of dead: *Il.*, *Cypria*, *Aethiopis*; embassies: *Il.*, *Cypria*; *aristeia* of warriors: *Il.*, *Cypria*, *Aethiopis*; $\tau\epsilon\iota\chi\omicron\mu\alpha\chi\iota\alpha$: *Il.*, *Cypria*; attack on Lemnos: *Il.*, *Cypria*; armor of Hephaestus: *Il.*, *Aethiopis*, *Aspis*. Cf. *Companion to Homer* 257.

66. *Homeric Opera* (above, n.57) V 97.

67. Wilamowitz, *Homeric Untersuchungen* (Berlin 1884) 353; for a correction to Wilamowitz's overstatement see J. A. Scott, *The Unity of Homer* (Berkeley 1921) 11-38.

68. F. G. Welcker, *Der epische Cyclus oder die Homerischen Dichter* 2 vols. (Bonn 1865); Wilamowitz (above, n.67); D. B. Munro, *Homer's Odyssey* (Oxford 1901) II 340-384; Severyns (above, n.41) G. Murray, *The Rise of the*

*Greek Epic*² (Oxford 1911) 352-360. For a comparison of the Cyclic epics with the *Tabula Iliaca* and the Homeric bowls, see bibliography cited in Bethe, *Homer* II 150-151; K. Weitzmann, *Ancient Book Illumination* (Cambridge, Mass. 1959) 41-62.

69. Murray (above, n.68) 354.

70. Only three prologues survive (*Thebais*, *Epigoni*, *Ilias parva*); for other prologues see Arist. *Rhet.*, III 14; Diog. Laert. VIII 36.

71. The exact meaning of κύκλος in Alexandrian terminology is by no means clear; see Munro (above, n.68) 346.

72. *Oedipodeia* (Cinaethon); *Thebais* (Homer?); *Epigoni* (Homer? or Alcmaeon).

73. I have heard this phrase, which comes from baseball, from Robert Frost who applied it to poets who tried to write poetry by finding niches in extant poetry.

74. See Wilamowitz (above, n. 67) 353ff.

75. F. Bommmer, *Vasenlisten zur griechischen Heldensage*² (Marburg 1960).

76. Paus. IX, 9, 5; Athen. VII, 277 e; Schol. on Arist. *Pax*, 1270.

77. For the sources of this chronology see T. W. Allen, *Homer, Origins and Transmissions* (Oxford 1924) 60-69.

78. *Ibid.* 68; the oral tradition is probably the source of this dating and for Thucydides' view of it see I, 20.

79. Wilamowitz (above, n.67) 348ff.

80. See W. Schadewaldt (above, no.64) 87-129; H. Lorimer, *Homer and the Monuments* (London 1950) 132-451; *Companion to Homer* 259; Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* 282-287.

81. W. Kullmann, *Die Quellen der Ilias* (Wiesbaden 1960); G. Schoeck, *Ilias und Aethiopis: Kyklische Motive in homerischer Brechung* (Zurich 1961).

82. J. Th. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (Lund 1949) 90.

83. For more detailed information about them and their dates see Kinkel (above, n.47) and Pauly-Wissowa, *RE*, for articles on these poets.

84. A new edition has been promised by W. Kullmann; another need is a study of fragments of early epics lurking in the papyri fragments; see R. A. Pack, *The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Graeco-Roman Egypt* (Ann Arbor 1952) 64-67, 102

85. *IG*, 7, 1785; for this cult see Bacchylides, 5. 191; votive relief from Μουσείον of Thespieae (*BCH* 1890, pp. 546ff); Nicostratus and Amphion of Thespieae (*FHG*, 4, 301, 465).

86. Paus. IX, 31.

87. See G. Huxley, *Early Sparta* (London 1962) 133-134 n.422.

88. For Laconian vase painting ca. 600-550 B.C. see Huxley (above, n.87) 133 n.414.

89. W. Jaeger, "Tyrtaios über wahre Arete," *SPAW* (1932) 537-568; Wilamowitz (above, n.67) 268, sees the influence of Cinaethon rather than Homer on early Spartan poetry.

90. See W. Zschietzschmann, "Homer und die attische Bildkunst um 560," *MDAI* 46:45-60 (1931); K. Friis, *Iliaden: tidlig graesk Kunst* (Copenhagen 1934); *Hesperia* 29:184-186 (1960); *Companion to Homer* 238.

91. Pindar (ed. Bowra), fr. 279 a.

92. Schol. Pindar *Nem.* II, 1.: Wade-Gery (above, n.40) 17-36.

93. See Clem. Alex., *Strom.* I, 21, 131, p. 144; Schol. *Od.* III. 267.

94. Kinkel (above, n.47) 38.
95. Huxley (above, n.87) 73.
96. See J. D. P. Bolton, *Aristeas of Proconnesus* (Oxford 1962) 9-19. An analysis of these fragments by Mr. Robert Glass in a forthcoming study shows a formulaic texture.
97. See *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 196-197.
98. *Hymn to Apollo*, 175.
99. Fr. 1.
100. *Od.* IX, 6-8.
101. Some phrases in this sentence are echoes from Gilbert Murray and W. B. Yeats.

III

1. C. S. Lewis, *A Preface to Paradise Lost* (London 1942) 61-63.
2. Adam Parry, "The Language of Achilles," *TAPA* 87 (1956) 1-7;
- B. M. W. Knox, "The Ajax of Sophocles," *HSCP* 65 (1961) 1-37.
3. H. T. Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* (Cambridge, England 1952) 38-39; F. M. Combellack, "Milman Parry and Homeric Artistry," *Comparative Literature* (1959) 196.
4. Arist. *Part. An.*, I, 5, 644 b 22; for an underestimate of Yugoslavic oral poetry see Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* 83-95.
5. An exception is C. Rothe's *Die Ilias als Dichtung* (Paderborn 1910) and *Die Odyssee als Dichtung* (Paderborn 1914); C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958).
6. Wade-Gery (above, n.3) 2-4.
7. K. Πασαγιάννη, *Μανιάτικα Μοιρολόγια* (Athens 1928), no. 149, pp. 90-92.
8. Allen, Halliday, Sikes, *The Homeric Hymns* ² (Oxford 1936) 190.
9. Lines 207-215.
10. Aeschylus, *P.V.* 778-785.
11. See S. E. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer* (Berkeley 1938) 129ff.
12. See n.II, 46, above.
13. H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958) 29 n.1.
14. D. Whitelock, *The Audience of Beowulf* (Oxford 1951).
15. T. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles* (Berlin 1917) 39.
16. The Kleophrades vase represents a rhapsode, an almost exactly contemporary with Cynaethus. Cf. Wade-Gery, *Poet of the Iliad*, Fig. 2, pp. 30-31. The fact that he does not carry a lyre but a staff has been interpreted as evidence that the epics were recited in songless recitation. The evidence from the Pindar scholium on the *ράβδος* does not settle the problem. The epics could have been sung even without the accompaniment of the lyre, as is found in modern singers of heroic tales. The evidence from the *Suda* on songless recitation is equally enigmatic. It says of Alcman: *πρῶτος εἰσήγαγε τὸ μὴ ἑξαμέτροις μελωδεῖν*. This can mean either (a) he was the first to adopt the practice of not accompanying the hexameter with music, or (b) of singing to the lyre or flute songs whose chief meter was not hexameter. Cf. *Lyra Graeca* (Loeb) 1 45.
17. For the emergence of this concept see my study "Parataxis in Homer," *TAPA* 80 (1949) 2-7.

18. G. F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957) 572, 620.
19. *Ibid.* 603-605.
20. See *Companion to Homer* 234-265.
21. Thuc. 3. 104.
22. *Works and Days* 648-662.
23. Thuc. 3. 96.
24. *Anth. Pal.* vii, 54; cf. T. A. Sinclair, *Hesiod, Works and Days* (London 1932) xxix.
25. See Pindar schol. on *Nem.* II, 1.
26. *Poetics*, 1450 a 15.
27. *Rhet.*, 1409 a 29.
28. C. Hentze, *Die Parataxis bei Homer* (Göttingen 1888, 1889, 1891); P. Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique* (Paris 1953) II 351-364; Van Otterlo, *Untersuchungen über Begriff, Anwendung und Entstehung der griechischen Ringkomposition* (Amsterdam 1944) 131-196; J. A. Notopoulos, "Parataxis in Homer," *TAPA* 80 (1949) 1-23; Φ. Ι. Κακριδῆ, 'Η Παράταξη τῶν Οὔσιαστικῶν στὸν Ὅμηρο καὶ στοὺς Ὅμηρικοὺς Ὑμνοὺς (Salonika 1960); B. A. Van Groningen, *Le Composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (Amsterdam 1958).
29. See D. L. Page, *CR* 10 (1960) 108.
30. Whitman (above, n.5) 128-153.
31. See J. A. Notopoulos, "Continuity and Interconnexion in Homeric Oral Composition," *TAPA* 82 (1951) 81-101; Van Groningen (above, n.28) 29-99.
32. See E. Vogt, "Die Schrift von Weltkampf Homers und Hesiods" *RhM* 102 (1959) 193-221, and bibliography cited.
33. A. B. Lord, "Homer's Originality: Dictated Texts," *TAPA* 84 (1953) 129ff; *Singer of Tales* 150-157; *Companion to Homer* 193-197.
34. L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 10-57; *A Companion to Homer* 555-559.
35. C. M. Bowra, *Heroic Poetry* (London 1953), and *Homer and His Fore-runners* (Edinburgh 1955); Davison, *A Companion to Homer*, pp. 26-74.
36. *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*, ed. M. Platnauer (Oxford 1954) 13-17.
37. Among other important supporters of the oral Homer may be listed Davison, Miss Gray, Stanford, Page, and Kirk.
38. S. E. Bassett (above, n.11) 15-19, 115-116; G. M. Calhoun, "Homeric Repetitions," *Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Philol.* XII 1-25; "The Art of Formula in Homer," *CP*, 30 (1935) 215-227.
39. Wade-Gery (above n.3) 38-39.
40. F. M. Cornbellack (above, n.3) 196.
41. *Singer of Tales* 13-138; *Companion to Homer* 179-197.
42. See P. Walcot, "The Problem of the Prooemium of Hesiod's *Theogony*," *Symbolae Osloenses* 33 (1957) 37-47.
43. W. Whallon, "The Homeric Epithets," *YCS* 17 (1961) 97-142; *Companion to Homer* 26-74; A. W. Gomme, "Homer and Recent Criticism," *More Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford 1962) 13-14.
44. *CP* 31 (1936) 357-360.
45. *AJP*, 79 (1958) 337-354.
46. See G. Strassburger, *Die Kleinen Kämpfer der Ilias* (Frankfort 1954); W. H. Friedrich, *Verwundung und Tod in der Ilias* (Göttingen 1956); R. Spieker,

Die Nachrufe in der Ilias (Münster 1957); F. Mertz; *Die Heldenbiographie Homers* (Zurich 1953).

47. *Singer of Tales* 68-123.

48. A. Parry, "The Language of Achilles," *TAPA* 87 (1956) 1-7.

49. *Ion* 534 d.

50. *Theogony* 28.

THREE LATIN INSCRIPTIONS IN THE McDANIEL COLLECTION

BY MASON HAMMOND

TWO Latin inscriptions were purchased in 1961 by the Department of Classics of Harvard University from the fund established by Professor Walton Brooks McDaniel to add to the collection of antiquities which he presented to the department in memory of his wife, Alice Corinne McDaniel, and which is kept in the Smyth Classical Library. A third fragmentary inscription was given to the collection in 1959. These inscriptions broaden a collection acquired by the department early in this century, the present state of which is briefly reported in IV at the end of this article. In the preparation of the following discussions, Professor Herbert Bloch has contributed generously from his epigraphical knowledge and skill.

I

The most significant of the three new inscriptions is a bronze plaque bearing in four lines the text: NAVICVLA FL·VAL / EVTROPIAE NOB FE / M·ET·FILIORVM EIVS / LEGE·ET RECEDE; see Plate I. A photograph of the inscription was also published on the cover of *Hesperia Art* (publ. George Allen, Philadelphia), Bulletin XVII (no date; issued in the fall of 1961) as item no. 112. The plaque is said to have come from Ostia and has a yellowish patina often found on bronze long submerged in water. Its usual character raises at once the question of genuineness. It has therefore been examined by Mr. William J. Young, Head of the Research Laboratory of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, who has kindly furnished the following description and analysis:

Latin Bronze Tablet (T. L. 11,750): *Magnification*: The tablet was examined with the aid of a binocular microscope. There appeared a thin, red cuprite layer adhering to the surface, on top of which is a darker red layer. In the interstices there is a fine silt deposit. The cutting appears oxidized and some of the letters show the pattern left by a chisel approximately 1 mm in width. In general, the plaque has a cold-worked structure

and has the characteristics of being of ancient origin. *X-ray spectrographic, semiquantitative analysis*: 90% copper; 5% tin; 3% lead; 1.5% iron; 0.1% zinc.

The most readily available table of analyses of Roman bronze is now old, namely Table II in Hugo Blümner, *Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Künste bei Griechen und Römern* (Leipzig; Teubner) IV (1887) 188–189. This list of fifty analyses of Greek and Roman objects of bronze is arranged chronologically; it uses but adds to the apparently not chronological table of objects in Ernst von Bibra, *Die Bronzen und Kupferlegierungen der alten und ältesten Völker* (Erlangen, Enke, 1869) 70–73, which gives analyses of thirty-four Roman objects. The last ten objects in Blümner, all found in Gaul, Germany, or Britain, show proportions roughly: copper from 75 per cent to 91 per cent, tin from 9 per cent to 25 per cent, lead from none to over 10 per cent, iron from none to 0.8 per cent, no zinc, and no silver. In terms of these proportions, the bronze plaque is high in copper, low in tin, high in iron, and shows a trace of zinc but no silver. Coinage of the late Empire shows equally varied alloys in Bibra's tables of brass on pp. 56–57 and bronze on pp. 60–63. Indeed, the summary statement under *bronze* in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (ed. 1961) IV 240 suggests that at all periods, the proportion of alloy in bronze varies greatly and depends on a number of factors: the traces of other metals not fully refined out of the basic copper, the quality and hardness of bronze required for different purposes, and the metals available for alloy in different localities or to the individual making the bronze. It is also possible that older bronze might be melted down for re-use at a later date. R. F. Tylecote, in *Metallurgy in Archaeology* (London, Edwin Arnold, 1962), gives on pp. 53–57 an up-to-date discussion of "the composition of copper alloys of the Roman period" but the objects listed in Table 17 (p. 54) are all from England and not arranged chronologically. His discussion confirms the difficulty of using composition of bronze as a criterion for dating and points out the unreliability of zinc as evidence because of the very volatile character of this metal when heated. Thus the analysis of the plaque, while perfectly consistent with ancient examples, does not permit any precise conclusion as to date.


The plaque is curved towards the front diagonally from lower left to upper right. Its edges are slightly irregular; measured along the curves the maximum dimensions are: width 28.5 cm, height 20 cm, and thickness approximately 0.3 cm. The weight is approximately 1700 grams, or 3 pounds 12 ounces. The back has no significant marks except a slight crack about 2 cm long running in from the right (as seen from the

IN VICINA FLVIA
EUTROPIA MNOBEE
METFIORVM EIVS
LECEETRICEDE

PLATE I. Bronze "No Trespassing" plaque of Eutropia.



a. Marble funerary slab of Felix.



b. Fragment of marble funerary slab of Mallia.

front) margin about 3.8 cm from the upper edge. There are no holes or marks of attachment. From the front, the left margin has five nicks near the top. The face is variously scarred; in particular it appears as if blows with the edge of the head of a hammer had been applied to the first half of the first line and the middle of the second line of the inscription, but not so as seriously to deface them. There is a lightly incised margin about 15 cm in from the edges which encloses a space approximately 25.2 cm wide and 17 cm high.

The four lines of the inscription inscribed within the margin may be expanded to read: *Naucula Fl(auiae) Val(eriae) | Eutropiae nob(ilissimae) fe[m(inae) et filiorum eius.] Lege et recede*. That is: "This ship (is the property) of Flavia Valeria Eutropia, the most noble lady, and of her sons. Read and go away." *Naucula* was used in classical Latin of a small boat and might therefore mean here a barge for transporting goods on the Tiber or even a pleasure boat. However, *naucularius* was the regular term for the merchant skippers of Ostia; see Russell Meiggs, *Roman Ostia* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960) 592 index *s.u.* Hence a *naucula* presumably might also have been a seagoing trading vessel. The plaque would thus have been a "No Trespassing" sign placed either at the gangway of the ship or on shore where she was moored. Since there are no evidences for attachment, it must have been set in a wooden or masonry frame.

The incised letters are fairly consistently of a height of 2.5 cm or slightly less, but their width and spacing varies, as can be seen on Plate I. The impression of larger lettering in the last line is due to the wider spacing and greater breadth (rather than height) of the letters and their more even shape. Points are placed in mid line between *FL·VAL*, *M·ET·FILIORVM*, and *LEGE·ET*; it is difficult to determine whether one has been defaced away between *EVTROPIAE NOB* but it seems that none were ever made in the other spaces between words. The cross-bar of the *A* of *NAVICVLA* is missing; a faint mark may indicate that it has been defaced away. The cross-bars of the other *A*'s are high and slope up to the right; also the right sides of the *A*'s are curved towards the top and extend beyond the peak. Otherwise the letters are straight and firm; *B*, *P*, and *R* have rather high loops, extending less to the right in *B* and *R* than do the lower portions, but joined firmly to the left upright. The lower curve of *G* is bent inwards to the left quite sharply and low down. The ends of straight staves have firmly marked short cross-bars; apart, however, from the *A*'s, they show none of the ornamental flourishes which begin to appear in the fourth century, e.g. the bottom of the *L*'s is at right angles to the stem, not

sloping below the line, and the cross of the *T*'s is firmly at right angles to the stem, not wavy and sloped up to the right. The incising, as Mr. Young notes, seems to have been finished across the grooves with a very narrow chisel.

Illustrations of exactly dated inscriptions of the later Empire are not common, and especially not for inscriptions on bronze. Ernest Diehl, *Inscriptiones Latinae* (Bonn, Marcus & Weber, 1912) pl. 32, gives a series of Christian inscriptions from 71–359 on a wall in the Lateran Museum. Number 28, dated in 355, is not unlike the inscription under discussion, given the difference in material and the probably cheaper workmanship of the Lateran example. H. Thylander, *Inscriptions du Port d'Ostie* (Lund, Gleerup, 1952) 341 no. B 234 and pl. CXVI no. 5, gives a Christian inscription from Portus which he dates about 300 and which states that Bishop Donatus adorned the tomb and basilica of the martyrs Eutropius, Bonasa, and Zosima. This again is not unlike the present inscription, but similarities could also be found with B 273 (p. 359) shown in pl. CXVIII no. 5, which he dates at earliest about 480 and perhaps in the 540's. Indeed lettering similar to that of the plaque can be found as early as the second century.¹ Thus the possible limits of time from available dated examples is great. However, the firmness of the letters on the plaque and their lack of ornament suggest that while their general character is that of the fourth century, they may well fall in the first half thereof, with the caution that an inscription made by a good workman might at even a very late date still show conservative and "epigraphic" forms.

The most obvious clue to the dating and identification of the inscription is its use of *nobilissima femina*. The title *nobilissimus* was restricted during the late second and third centuries to imperial heirs (*Caesares*) but from the time of Constantine it was extended to other members of the imperial house, including ladies; see *RE* half-vol. 33 791–800 (and for *nob. fem.* especially col. 798), which cites J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* I 8. Thus the lady should be an empress or imperial princess of the fourth century if the inscription has been properly dated from its letter forms.

The cognomen *Eutropius/a* is not common. Before the fourth century, there was a martyr of Portus commemorated in the inscription of Bishop Donatus mentioned above (Thylander 341 no. B 234); Meiggs, *Roman Ostia* 529–530, would date the martyr under Septimius Severus rather than under Aurelian, as one tradition says. For the later empire, *RE* II 1519–152F lists only two *Eutropiae* and ten *Eutropii*, including the historian of the mid fourth century. Moreover, apart from their use

by Constantius I (later called *Chlorus*) and Constantinus I (known as "Constantine the Great"), the combination *Flavius Valerius* is rarely attested by the indices to *CIL* VI 6.1 and Seeck's edition of Symmachus or by *RE*. No instance is given of the occurrence of both with the third name *Eutropius*.²

The two *Eutropiae* given in *RE* 11 were both members of imperial families and therefore had a rank consistent with the title of the inscription, *nobilissima femina*; they were indeed grandmother and granddaughter. The elder Eutropia was the first wife of Maximian; see *RE* 11 1519 no. 1. She is said to have been from Syria and hence could have had no connection with a Balkan ("Dardanian") Eutropius who is purported to have been the husband of Claudia, daughter of Crispus, the brother of Claudius *Gothicus*.³ She had apparently been married before she became Maximian's consort, possibly to Hannibalianus, a distinguished general under Probus and Constantius I; see *RE* 14 2531 no. 1. This marriage would account for the later appearance of the name Hannibalianus among Constantius' children and grandchildren. Her gentile names are not known but on the analogy of other imperial wives she may, as Maximian's wife, have assumed his and been *Aurelia Valeria Eutropia*; for the names *Aurelius Valerius* as used by both Diocletian and Maximian see *RE* 14 2419 no. 142; *RE* 28 2486 no. 1; *DE* II 1878-1882 (Maximian has not yet appeared in *DE*). There is no reason to assume that her first name was *Flauia* since this appears only with Constantius I. By her first marriage she had a daughter who became the second wife of Constantius I, probably about 289 after he separated from Helena the mother of Constantinus I; see *RE* 7 1041 lines 32ff; *RE* 10 1774 line 4. This daughter appears as *Flauia Maximiana Theodora*; see *RE* 10 1773 no. 2.⁴ Among the six children of Constantius I and Theodora was the younger Eutropia, to be discussed presently. By Maximian, the elder Eutropia had two children, the later pretender *M. Aurelius Valerius Maxentius* (see *RE* 28 2419) and *Flauia Maxima Fausta*, the second wife of her step-son, Constantinus I; see *RE* 12 2084 no. 3; *DE* II 653 under *Constantinus I*.

Since *filiorum* on the plaque might include female as well as male children (see *Thes. Ling. Lat.* VI 757 s.u. F lines 43ff), the elder Eutropia would qualify by her three children to be the *Eutropia* concerned. Even if her older daughter Theodora were off in Britain with Constantius I, who went there soon after his appointment as Maximian's *Caesar* in 293 (see *RE* 7 1042-1043; he seems to have visited Rome only once thereafter in 297), she may have lived in Rome, apart from her husband, with their two children; certainly there seems never to have

been any affection between Maxentius and his father, and Maxentius' later career suggests a close connection with Rome.⁵ However, Fausta married Constantinus I in 307, probably as a girl of only nine or ten; see *RE* 12 2085 lines 10ff. And although Eutropia outlived Maximian (who committed suicide in 310), after the defeat and death of her son Maxentius in 312 she passed her later years in Palestine; see *RE* 11 1519 line 49. Thus to identify her with the Eutropia of the plaque necessitates two assumptions—that her first name was *Flauia* and that she lived in Rome apart from her husband and owned property independently from him, and also dating the plaque very early in the fourth century.

To identify the lady of the plaque with the younger Eutropia, granddaughter of the elder, involves equal assumptions. The names *Flauia Valeria* seem at first sight to support the identification, since they were used by Constantius I, father of the younger Eutropia, and Constantinus I, her half-brother; see *RE* 7 1040 no. 1, 1013 no. 2; *DE* II 661, 643.⁶ But that the younger Eutropia should have been named *Flauia Valeria Eutropia* runs counter to what evidence survives for the nomenclature of the families of both Constantius I and Constantinus I, which seem to have combined *Flavius* not with *Valerius* but rather with either *Iulius* or *Claudius*.⁷

For instance, when Constantine's mother Helena returned to favor under his reign, she appears occasionally as *Flauia Iulia Helena Augusta*; see *RE* 14 2820 no. 2; *DE* II 666, III 657. Of the six children of Constantius I and Theodora, the father of Julian and Gallus is attested as *Iulius Constantius*; see *RE* 7 1043 no. 3; *DE* II 667 under *Constantius I*. And the probably oldest daughter, who married Licinius, is given as *Flauia Iulia Constantia*; see *RE* 7 958 no. 13.⁸ Gallus and Julian, in the next generation, both show *Flavius Claudius*; see *RE* 7 1094 no. 5 (Gallus); *RE* 19 26 no. 26 and *DE* IV 206 (Julian).⁹ Of the children of Constantinus I, his son by Minervina is attested as *Flavius Iulius Crispus*; see *RE* 8 1722 no. 9; *DE* II 654 under *Constantinus I*.¹⁰ Of his three sons by Fausta, Constantinus II regularly shows *Flavius Claudius*, with the rare occurrence of *Iulius* or *Valerius* for *Claudius*; see *RE* 7 1026 no. 3; *DE* II 656. Constantius II and Constans show regularly *Flavius Iulius*; rarely *Claudius* or, for Constantius, *Valerius*; see *RE* 7 1044 no. 4 and *DE* II 671 (Constantius II); *RE* 7 948 no. 3 and *DE* II 629 (Constans).¹¹

The younger Eutropia was one of the six children of Constantius I and Theodora. In only three of the seven passages cited on her in *RE* 11 1519 no. 2 is her name given, and then simply as *Eutropia*.¹² On the

analogy of her brother *Iulius Constantius* and her sister *Flauia Iulia Constantia*, she would be expected to have been *Flauia Iulia Eutropia*, rather than with the *Valeria* of the plaque. Though, as suggested, *Valerius* occurs sporadically on inscriptions and coins for the half-brothers and -sisters of Constantinus I and for the various children of the next generation, it is hardly likely that a careful mark of ownership such as this plaque is would have been in error as to her name. Hence, if she is to be identified with the lady of the plaque, it must be assumed that, contrary to what is known of the names of the rest of her family, she kept her father's and half-brother's names of *Flauia Valeria*.

In short, of the known imperial ladies, *nobilissimae feminae*, of the fourth century, only two had the last name *Eutropia*; of these the elder would be assumed to have had the middle name *Valeria* but not the first name *Flauia* while the younger would be assumed to have had the first name *Flauia* but the middle name *Iulia*. Of the two, the younger has the better claim to be considered the lady of the inscription, both because her life extended well into the fourth century and hence would permit the inscription to be dated later, and because it is not impossible that she, unlike her brothers and sisters, might have perpetuated the *Valeria* of her father while it is less likely that the elder anticipated Constantius I in adopting *Flauia*. There remains, however, the possibility that there was a third, otherwise unattested, imperial *Flauia Valeria Eutropia*; if so, she would have been connected both with the elder, perhaps by blood, and with the Constantinian house, perhaps by marriage. Yet it does seem unlikely that such a person would not be mentioned in the fairly full sources for the period.

The younger Eutropia is best known as the mother of *Flavius Popilius (Virus) Nepotianus*, who revolted in Rome in 350 against the western pretender Magnentius, in support of his cousin (his mother's half-nephew) Constantius II. Magnentius suppressed the revolt and, in a ruthless slaughter at Rome, put to death both Nepotianus and Eutropia; see *RE* II 1519 no. 2; *DE* II 667. From her son's name, Seeck concluded in *RE* that Eutropia had married a *Popilius Virius Nepotianus*, consul in 301. Ensslin, however, in the articles on three *Nepotiani* in *RE* 32 2511–2512 nos. 1, 2, 3, argued from the ages involved that she must have married a son of the consul of 301, the consul of 336 named *Flavius Popilius Virius Nepotianus*, so that their son was relatively young when he revolted in 350. Ernest Stein does not commit himself to either view in his *Histoire du bas empire* I (Fr. trans., Desclée de Brouwer, 1959) 1939, and in his note 47 in II 489 refers only to Seeck. It would be a weak argument against Ensslin that the use of *Flavius* by the consul of

336 shows that he was the son, not the husband, of a *Flauia Eutropia*, both because of the flexibility of nomenclature in the Constantinian family and because of the frequency in the fourth century of *Flauius* as a first name. However, it would be quite possible for Eutropia to have married the consul of 301 as a considerably younger wife, either at the time of his consulship or later, and to have had a son who, being connected with the emperor, became consul in 336 in his thirties and lived to be the pretender of 350 in his fifties. His mother would then have been perhaps in her seventies and may well have been widowed long before. The use of *Flauius* as a first name by the consul of 336 and, if he was not the same, by the revolter of 350 suggests that Eutropia had *Flauia* as a first name. If she lived as a widow in Rome, she had at least one son to be co-owner of the ship, and lack of mention in the sources affords no sure proof that she did not have other children, not necessarily sons since, as indicated, *filiorum* might mean "of her children" whether male or female.

There remains the possibility that even though the bronze plaque seems, according to Mr. Young, to be ancient, a forger might have used an old plate and imitated lettering of the fourth century. The facts that the plaque shows no indication of how it was affixed and that bronze appears a rather expensive material for a simple "No Trespassing" sign (though perhaps not unworthy of an imperial princess) might raise doubts. A well-informed forger, seeking for a good name, might pick on Eutropia and assume that she bore her father's name, without checking on the changes introduced by other members of the family. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that a forger would think of manufacturing a "No Trespassing" sign of a unique form, rather than a more usual funeral inscription or the like, and that he would select a ship to be the property of a little-known lady of the fourth century and of her children, when she is only known to have had one.

Though the warning *lege et recede* is perhaps alien to modern terminology, it resembles the direct address occasionally found on tombstones, as indicated in the index of *acclamations sepulcrales* in Dess. *ILS* III.2 p. 947. "No Trespassing" signs do not figure in the ordinary collections, e.g. in the *tituli aedificiorum* in Dess. *ILS* II.1 6002-6043, so that both the nature of the inscription and its phraseology appear unique, but this suggests its genuineness. In short, the evidence of the material and of the lettering and the unlikelihood of an inscription of this sort occurring to a forger offer strong considerations in favor of the genuineness of the inscription. The lack of any other known *Eutropia nobilissima femina* except the two Eutropias, the wife of Maximian and her grand-

daughter, encourages the identification of one of them, and probably the younger, with *Flauia Valeria Eutropia*, despite the fact that apart from this inscription neither would be expected to show all these three names.

The conclusion that *naucula Fl(auiae) Val(eriae) Eutropiae nob(ilissimae) fem(inae) et filiorum eius* refers to a ship belonging to the younger Eutropia and her sons (or children), including Nepotianus, assumes that the material and text of the inscription are genuine and to be dated in the first half of the fourth century, that there was no unknown Constantinian princess Eutropia, that the younger Eutropia used *Valeria* and not *Iulia* for her middle name, and that she had more children than Nepotianus. Whether the ship in question was a cargo vessel, a Tiber barge, or a yacht cannot be determined. Nevertheless it is tempting to imagine that the widowed Eutropia and her family owned one of the late imperial houses at Ostia so well described by Giovanni Becatti in his *Casa Ostiensi del Tardo Impero* (Rome, Libreria dello Stato, n.d.), that rather than drive or ride down by road, they sailed back and forth from Rome by river, that they therefore had a private wharf at Ostia at which to moor their yacht, and that on the wharf or on the yacht itself was affixed this "No Trespassing" sign.

II

The second inscription is a square marble slab bearing the words FELICI-INPACE and beneath in outline a cleaver and a pig (or boar); see Plate II-a. It came from the estate of Professor Wetmore of Williams College and, though no precise record can be found of when or where he bought it, he may have done so about 1900 and perhaps in Rome.

The marble square measures about 21.7×21.7 cm, with a maximum thickness of about 3.5 cm and a weight of about 2,825 grams, or 6 pounds 3 ounces. The back is very uneven and in particular has on the left (as viewed from the front) an irregular gouge which has reduced the thickness of the left edge to almost nothing for about 13 cm of distance. The gouge extends irregularly inward from the edge for roughly 5.5 cm. The edges and front surface of the slab are finished off evenly; the edges (except for the gouged section on the left) to an average (but very irregular) thickness of 1 to 1.5 cm from the front. These finished surfaces are fairly coarse in texture except for a narrow strip along the upper right margin of the front and the corresponding edge beneath it and a small surface just to the left of this between the end of the

inscription and the top margin. These have a smooth finish. The strip begins slightly below the upper right corner and extends downwards for about 10 cm with an irregular width of 1 cm. The smooth area to its left is very irregular with maximum dimensions, of about 4 cm in width by 2 cm in depth. These carefully finished surfaces suggest that the whole square may have originally been a polished floor or wall tile and that the coarseness of most of the finished surfaces was due to wear, not to a deliberate refinishing, though wear would not have coarsened the edges of a tile set into a wall or floor. The re-usè of an already finished piece of marble is very common in Christian inscriptions; see P. Testini, *Archeologia Cristiana* (Rome, Desclée & Co., 1958) 338.

The front surface has various scars and small pits and from two of the pits extend scratches, as visible on Plate II-a.¹³ The inscription is about 2.5 cm down from the upper margin, 3.4 cm in from the left, and 2.6 cm in from the right. The letters are well formed and cut, particularly to the left where they are spaced out. The inscriber did not judge his space well, however, and to the right the letters become more crowded and narrower. At the left they are about 2.5 cm high, at the right only about 2 cm; and whereas *PACE* at the right occupies only about 3.5 cm, the first four letters to the left, *FELI*, occupy some 5.5 cm. This suggests that a fairly good workman was executing a cheap order carelessly; an impression which is supported by the good quality but poor spacing of the two pictures below.

The letters are rustic (or actural) capitals; see Testini (above) 346-348, and Grossi Gondi (n. 13) I 19-20. Their lines have a V-shaped cross section which in the more generous letters to the left seems somewhat wider across the top than deep at the center but in the crowded letters to the right considerably narrower with about the same depth. The staves of *F*, *I*, *L*, *N*, and *P* have well-cut triangular finials, broader than they are high. Only one point is inserted, between *FELICI·IN*, but not between *INPACE*; it is placed slightly above mid-line and, though damaged, appears to have been triangular with point up and broader than high. The letters are cut with considerable freedom, as appears particularly in the slight up-slope of the upper bar of *F*, in the swing of the bottom bar of *L* below the line, in the acute (rather than right) angle in which the lower curve of *P* meets the upright, and in the probable overlap (despite damage) of the right stem of *A* beyond the left. R. Cagnat, *Cours d'épigraphie latine* (Paris, Fontemoing, ed. 4 1914) 11, states that the right bar of *A* may overlap in all periods, on pp. 14-15 that the equal length of the bars of *E* and *F* (as here) is evidence "of a good epoch," on p. 18 that the drop of the bar of *L* below the line begins

on monuments of the second century, and on p. 20 that the acute angle appears in *P* in Spain and Africa as early as the third century. Further evidences of good workmanship at all periods are the central placing of the bar of *A* and the equal length of its staves at the bottom (p. 11), and the well-formed and broad first *C* and *N* (pp. 13, 19). Thus, as with the bronze inscription discussed above, it is difficult to date this inscription with any exactness from its letter forms. Indeed the plates of Christian inscriptions on the walls of the Lateran Museum given by Ernest Diehl in *Inscriptiones Latinae* (Bonn, Marcus & Weber, 1912) pl. 32-34, though small in scale, suggest that these capitals might have been cut almost any time in the fourth or first half of the fifth centuries, though probably not earlier or later. The freedom of cutting and general excellence of form indicate a fourth- rather than a fifth-century dating.

The phrase *in pace* is so regular on Christian funerary inscriptions as to justify regarding this as one; it occurs either simply with the name, or with additional modifiers or phrases; see Grossi Gondi I 221-223; Diehl *ILCV* (n. 13) III index VII under *pax*, especially the statement at the bottom of the right column on p. 379 (*ad f-h*) that there are too many instances of *in pace* with a name alone to justify indexing them. In Diehl's examples, the name may be in the nominative (II nos. 2501-2515), genitive (2516-2519), dative (as here, nos. 2520-2523), or accusative (nos. 2524-2525). The various cases also occur in Diehl's succeeding inscriptions, which contain more than a single name or longer formulas. The name *Felix* is also extremely common in Christian inscriptions; see Diehl *ILCV* III index I pp. 61-62, especially p. 62 under *Felix* without further qualification.

About 1.3 cm below the inscription (6.3 cm below the top margin) and off center to the right is a cleaver outlined by a V-shaped incised line and having an incised line across the handle to indicate a knob. The point is about 9.2 cm in from the left margin and the knob about 4.5 cm in from the right. The top of the blade is about 5.7 cm long and the handle about 2.3 cm, for a total length of about 8 cm. The blade is about 2.8 cm wide.

About 1 cm beneath the lowest part of the cleaver (10.1 cm from the top margin) is the outlined pig (or boar), more nearly centered than the cleaver since the tip of the snout is about 4.2 cm in from the left margin and the end of the curly tail (as well as the rear knee) about 5.8 cm from the right. The maximum length of the design is about 11.7 cm and its height about 6.8 cm. The hooves extend to within about 5 cm above the lower margin. The animal is drawn with vigorous liveliness and the incisions show a somewhat less pronounced V cross section than do those

of the letters and cleaver; the inciser was working even more freely in this design.

Christian epitaphs commonly mention the ecclesiastical office or the trade of the deceased; for trades see Grossi Gondi I 107-108; Testini 377; Diehl ILCV I ch. X nos. 580-749, where two inscriptions (nos. 689 and 690) commemorate *porcinarii*, the second of which is as late as 543. The epitaphs also often show incised symbols of the Christian faith or, less frequently, implements of trade, e.g. Testini 376 figs. 163-167, 496 fig. 234; Grossi Gondi II p. 48.

In conclusion, therefore, this marble slab commemorates Felix, a Christian and a pork butcher. Though it cannot be precisely dated, it probably falls in the fourth century. The letter forms and the designs of cleaver and pig show considerable skill but careless execution, and the marble slab itself seems to be a re-used piece, perhaps originally a polished floor or wall tile. While at first sight, the slab resembles in size and shape those placed during the early empire in front of niches for ashes, cremation had even in the pagan world gone out of fashion by the end of the second century, as shown by Professor A. D. Nock in "Cremation and Burial in the Roman Empire," *Harvard Theological Review* 25 (October 1932) 321-359. And Christians regarded cremation as inconsistent with belief in the actual resurrection of the body; see Testini 79; *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1949) 256 under "Dead, disposal of" 8. Hence this stone undoubtedly commemorates an inhumation. Though early Christian tombs might be above ground (see Testini 81-91 with fig. 12 on p. 88), the unweathered condition of this slab suggests that it was inserted in the wall closing a *loculus* in a catacomb; see Testini 92-111, where no illustration shows an epitaph in place. Felix was far beneath Eutropia in social station, as his profession and the careless execution of his memorial indicate. Yet just as the bronze plaque evokes a grand lady of the fourth century, so this slab speaks for the faith and profession of the humbler Felix.

III

The third piece, for which see Plate II-b, is a triangular fragment from the upper part of a marble funerary plaque. It bears the letters: D·M / ... IALLIAE ... / ... NIVC ... / ... ^ ^ ... The line preserved at the edge of the break to the left of the second line has the same slope as the right line of *M* in the first line and may be safely restored as such. *Mallius/a* is not a common gentile name, nor were its members distinguished.¹⁴ The upper left of a letter surviving at the

right, after the broken *E*, shows a straight stave and a curve extending beyond it to the left, presumably part of a *D*, *B*, *P*, or *R*. In the third line, *CO* may confidently be restored at the left, before the broken *N*. The slight curve surviving at the right top of the line after the broken *G* may be the top of an *S*, since such funeral inscriptions may show the genitive dependent on *D.M.*; see R. Cagnat, *Cours d'épigraphie latine* (Paris, Fontemoing, ed. 4 1914) 283. However, the dative is if anything more frequent, dependent on some such verb as *fecit* and leaving *D.M.* to stand absolutely. While *benemerenti* is a very common epithet for a spouse, such terms as *sanctissimae* also occur or the trace might be of *S* of the reflexive possessive *suae*. Finally, the curved remnants of the tops of letters either side of the broken angle at the bottom, representing a fourth line, are too slight to admit of sure conjecture; they might represent the *O* and *S* of *filio suo*. Granted that *Malliae* in the second line was not preceded by anything, the *CO* of *coniugi(s)* would take about the same space as the *M* and a following space above, and this would afford a left margin for the letters. If so, a corresponding margin on the right would permit about four letters in the second line after *E* and about eight in the third after the presumed *S*. However, all that can be restored with confidence is:

D.M. / Malliae? / co]niugi? / ?? /

The maximum width is 17 cm and height 16 cm. The piece weighs 1,107 grams, or 2 pounds 7 ounces. The thickness at the upper edge is about 2.9 cm and at the inscribed surface about 2.6 cm. The back, upper edge, and surface of the margin and beads are finished off smoothly but the inscribed surface is finished with fine, close, irregular grooves such as might have been made by a toothed scraper or chisel. The material is a fine-grained marble. The front surface has become dark gray and the discoloration has penetrated the surface of the marble, as can be seen on the edges. The remainder of the edges and back are white. This suggests that the front was exposed to weather, that is, on the front of a tomb rather than inside before an urn niche. On the upper edge is an oblong mark with rounded corners, about 2 cm from the right (as seen from the front) corner and 4.9 cm wide and 1.7 cm high which seems to be the trace of a modern label.

The letters are incised in broad V-shaped grooves roughly right-angled at their bottoms; presumably with a chisel rather than a gouge. The letters *D.M.* in the first line are about 3 cm high and give an impression of squareness. The point between them, the only one remaining in the inscription, is an exaggerated triangle with its point down and

the two sides somewhat curved while the top is straight. The letters of the second line are 2.6 cm high and closer set than those in the first line so that they appear narrower compared to their height. The letters of the third line are only 2.2 cm high and even more crowded than those of the second line, though the proportions of the individual letters seem about the same. The curve of the *D* is narrowed at top and bottom and carried in thin points beyond the upright. The second *A* has a wider groove to the left and the *V* to the right. In *M* the second and fourth staves are wider than the first and third. The straight staves have exaggerated triangular finials, though there are none at the apexes of *A*, *V*, *M*, and *N*. The base staff of *L* is narrowed to an up-curving point. Similarly the two surviving laterals of *E* thin upwards. In general, the letters give an impression of thickness and solidity.

A. E. and J. S. Gordon, *Album of Dated Latin Inscriptions from Rome and the Neighborhood down to Nerva* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1956) vol. II pl. 65 give three inscriptions, nos. 154-156, with slightly thinner and less florid letters than those of this fragment; in vol. I pp. 145-147 these are dated under Domitian. Cagnat, *Cours d'épigraphie latine* pl. XI no. 1, shows an inscription from Timgad commemorating the gift of baths by Antoninus Pius. The letters have the same variations in the width of grooves as in the fragment but are more formal and monumental as might be expected from an official inscription in a province. The closest parallels are to be found in H. Thylander, *Inscriptions du Port d'Ostie* (Lund, Gleerup, 1952) among the pagan sepulchral inscriptions from the time of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, for example under Hadrian pl. XXIV.1 showing no. A 73, discussed on p. 72; pl. XXVI.1 showing no. A 80, discussed on p. 76; pl. XXXIII.2 showing no. A 111, discussed on p. 95; and under Antoninus pl. XXXIV.2 showing no. A 133, discussed on pp. 109-110. The last shows the same broad letters.

This fragment, given by Miss Aimée Lamb of Boston, is of unknown provenance and had been in her family for an unknown length of time. There is no reason to suppose that so unimportant a fragment is a forgery. The discoloration of the front suggests exposure to weather and the form is that of the common type of plaque placed on the outside of brick chamber tombs, such as are found from the second century at Ostia, on the Via Latina outside of Rome, or under St. Peter's.

IV

A collection of thirty-six Latin inscriptions, mostly funerary, was purchased for the Department of Classics early in this century and

published by Professor Clifford H. Moore in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 20 (1909) 1-14. After various moves in recent years, nineteen of these have been placed in a corridor off the Smyth Classical Library in the Widener Library Building, namely, nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 30, 31. It is hoped that further search may recover the rest. Professor Moore also published three inscriptions (nos. 37, 38, and 39) in his own possession. On the death of Mrs. Moore these were given to the Fogg Museum in 1949 and are catalogued by it under nos. 1949. 78, 109, 110. It is hoped that these may be placed with the others. There has also been placed in the corridor with the inscriptions a cast of the archaic inscribed cippus found in the Roman Forum; this case is mentioned by E. H. Warmington at the end of his note on p. 245 of *Remains of Old Latin* (Loeb Classical Library, 1940) IV: *Archaic Inscriptions*. There are likewise two broken pieces of a similar cast.

Associated with the inscriptions are two uninscribed marble funeral slabs with reliefs. Since these were not published by Professor Moore, the following brief descriptions, without pretending to detailed study, are given in the event that anyone should desire to make use of them.

The first slab is well preserved except for the loss of the lower right-hand corner. It has a maximum height of about 56 cm and a width at its pediment of about 32 cm and a thickness at the top of the pediment of about 10 cm. The pediment has a central and two small gable acroteria and a moulding; its total height with moulding is about 12 cm. Below it the surface is blank for a depth of about 14 cm, presumably for an inscription. The bottom portion consists of a recessed relief framed on sides and bottom by the flat surface. The relief is about 22 cm high and 21 cm wide. At the left, a lady sits, facing right, on a stool with a cushion and with her feet on a footstool. She wears a long tunic and a mantle wrapped around her lower body and over her shoulders and upper arms. Both forearms are forward, the right (in front) straight and the left raised; though nothing appears in the hand, the gesture is that of holding a distaff in the left hand and twisting off the thread with the right. To the right of the relief is a girl (maid) of smaller scale standing with her body almost full front but her head turned left towards the lady. She wears a long undertunic with a shorter over fold girded under the breasts.¹⁵ Her left arm hangs at her side; her raised right arm holds a mirror towards the lady.

The second slab is rectangular and has lost its top, including whatever ornament there may have been and the heads of the two larger figures in its relief. The surviving height is about 64 cm, width about

41 cm, and thickness about 10 cm. The recessed relief is in the top portion, surviving for a depth of about 39 cm and a width of about 31 cm. The bottom portion, about 21 cm deep, is blank for an inscription. The relief shows three figures full front. The left figure (headless) is a man in a toga which envelops his bent right arm and is draped around his left arm, which hangs at his side. In the middle is a woman (also headless) wearing a long tunic girded under the breasts and a mantle over the left shoulder and arm and brought around the lower body from the right. Her right arm is not shown since the man's left arm overlaps it. The third figure, to the right, is a boy about two-thirds the height of his parents. He wears a knee-length tunic and a mantle which leaves his right arm free, hanging at his side, but crosses from the right shoulder to be caught on the slightly extended left forearm. The feet of the lady are rather indistinct but she may be wearing sandals; the man and boy seem to be barefoot.

While these two pieces have no great artistic distinction they are characteristic funerary reliefs of the early empire, and the absence of inscriptions suggests that they were prepared by a monument-maker but never used, rather than that suitable inscriptions were painted on the blank surfaces. Since they have been kept with the other inscriptions, it may be presumed that they were purchased at the same time (1905/6) in Rome.

NOTES

1. An inscription from Ostia published by H. Bloch, "Ostia: Iscrizioni rinvenute tra il 1930 e il 1939," *Notizie degli Scavi* VII ser. viii fasc. 7-12 (1953) 270-272 no. 33 with figs. 24 a & b is dated in the second century but shows similarities to the bronze plaque in its rather high and narrow letters with a more flowing treatment of *F* and a slight prolongation of the right stave of *A*, whose crossbar is, however, straighter and nearer the middle, and the sharp incurve of the lower part of *G*. In the photograph of the Ostia stone, however, the loops of *B*, *P*, and *R* do not seem quite to join the stems. The points are in mid-line, and straight staves generally have triangular end pieces, as in the plaque.

2. The following few names containing *Flavius Valerius* or *Flavius* . . . *Eutropius* are given in *RE*. A certain *T. Flavius Valerius Theopompus Romanus* is commemorated in *CIL* VI 6993 = Dess. *ILS* 1201; see *RE* 10 2223 under *Theopompus* No. 12. He was a young man born a patrician and quaestor designate by the emperor at the time of his death; since the patriciate became more and more a bestowed rank during the third century and entirely so after Constantine, Dessau would date the young man shortly before Constantine because of the emphasis on his having been born a patrician. A *Flavius Septimius Eutropius* is mentioned in Ditt. *OGI* 723 = Dess. *ILS* 8809; see *RE* 11 1520 no. 5 (*Claudius*, wrongly). He was the *lamprotatos hēgemōn*, i.e. *praeses clarissimus* or governor, of

the Thebaid at a date fixed by the emperors mentioned as between 384 and 392; he may well have been the same as the Eutropius, *c(larissimus) v(ir)*, who was consul with Valentinian II in 387 in *CIL* III 3222 & Suppl. 6340 = Dess. *ILS* 5911; see also *CIL* X 5792 = Dess. *ILS* 4918; he is given simply as *Eutropius* in the consular *Fasti* as compiled by Liebenam (Bonn, 1909) and Degraasi (Rome, 1952) *s.a.* Finally a *Flavius Eutropius* corrected a manuscript of Vegetius in Constantinople probably about 450; see *RE* 11 1521 no. 7. These few instances of the occurrence of *Flavius* with either *Valerius* or *Eutropius* (and never with both together) do not assist in identifying the lady of the inscription.

3. Constantinus I may have simply invented parentage for Constantius I, namely the Dardanian Eutropius and Claudia daughter of Crispus, to connect the family with Claudius *Gothicus*; see *RE* 6 2887 no. 398, 11 1520 no. 1; *PIR*² III 93 E no. 129 (*Eutropius*, by A. Stein). If so, Eutropius may have been invented simply to reflect credit on Eutropia, as perhaps Crispus, the brother of Claudius, reflects Constantine's oldest son.

4. The second name of Theodora, wife of Maximian, may have been *Maxima*, not *Maximiana*, since *Maxima* seems to have been that of her half-sister Fausta, discussed later as wife of Constantine I. In any case, Theodora took her first name, *Flavia*, from her husband, her second probably from her father, and used a third name whose origin is not attested.

5. *RE* 28 2419 lines 42ff discusses the report that Eutropia in fact passed off a bastard of her own on Maximian as his son, in order to win his favor. That Maxentius called his son *Valerius Romulus* is not sure additional evidence of his connection with Rome since some ancient sources say that he was named for Romula, mother of the emperor Galerius, whose daughter Maxentius married; see *RE* 1 1105 no. 14.

6. In the Constantinian names, *Valerius* derived from its use by Diocletian and Maximian, noted earlier. *Flavius* was a not uncommon first name in the third and fourth centuries, presumably because of its extensive use as a gentile name by those to whom the Flavian emperors granted citizenship at the end of the first century. It might easily have been the given name of Constantius I, or it might have been adopted by him because of the good reputation of the Flavians and because the "Antonine" name of *Aurelius* had been used by Diocletian and Maximian.

7. Family trees (stemmata) of the Constantinian family may be found in most lives of Constantinus I, e.g. in Joseph Vogt, *Constantin der Grosse usw.* (Munich, Bruckmann, ed. 2 1960) 293, or in Ludwig Voelkl, *Der Kaiser Konstantin usw.* (Munich, Prestel, 1957) at the back, or in André Piganiol, *L'Empereur Constantin* (Paris, Rieder, 1932) 227; they differ in minor details.

8. Besides *Iulius Constantius*, whose first name may safely be assumed to have been *Flavius*, and *Flavia Iulia Constantia*, the other four children of Constantius I and Theodora were:

Dalmatius (or *Delmatius*); see *RE* 8 2455 no. 2. The names of his sons are attested as *Flavius Dalmatius* (*RE* 8 2456 no. 3) and *Flavius Hannibalianus*; see *RE* 14 2352 no. 3. Hence the father was probably also *Flavius* and all may have had the middle name *Iulius*.

Hannibalianus; see *RE* 14 2352 no. 2. By analogy he may have been *Flavius Iulius*.

Anastasia, who married Bassianus; see *RE* 2 2065 no. 1. Her other names are not attested.

Eutropia, discussed presently.

These six children and two grandchildren are given briefly under *Constantius Chlorus* in *DE* II 667–668 but have no individual articles therein. It may be noted that *Constantia* and *Licinius* had a son who bore his father's name, *Valerius Licinianus Licinius*, a name which reflects the adoption of *Licinius* by *Diocletian*; see *RE* 25 222 no. 31a, 231 no. 31b, where the son is considered a bastard by a slave woman, not a son of *Constantia*.

9. *Gallus* was son of *Julius Constantius* by *Galla*; Seeck (*RE* 7 1094 line 46) regards his one coin showing *Iulius* for *Claudius* as in error. *Julian* was son of a second wife, *Basilina*. *Julius Constantius* is said also to have had a daughter who became one of the wives of *Constantius II*, but nothing is known of her name; see *RE* 7 1045 line 29; *DE* II 675. Voelkl's guess of *Constantia* in his stemma seems reasonable.

10. *Flavius Iulius Crispus*, oldest son of *Constantinus I*, married an otherwise unknown *Helena*; see *RE* 14 2822 no. 3. No children are attested.

11. Besides the three sons who succeeded him, *Constantinus I* had by *Fausta* two daughters, whose last names only are known: *Constantia*; see *RE* 7 958 no. 14; *DE* II 655 under *Constantinus I* (where she is called *Constantina* and the possibility that there were two daughters of the same name is denied), and *Helena*; see *RE* 14 2822 no. 4; *DE* II 655 under *Constantinus I*. In the following generation, no children are attested for *Constantinus II*. *Constantius II* apparently had several successive wives, one of whom is said to have been the daughter of his half-uncle *Julius Constantius*, as indicated above. By his last wife he had his only attested child, a posthumous daughter *Constantia*, who later married the emperor *Gratian*; see *RE* 7 959 no. 15. *Constans*, the youngest of the three sons of *Constantinus I* and *Fausta*, is said to have been enamored of a girl named *Olympias* but apparently never to have married either her or anybody else and not to have left any attested children; see *RE* 7 948 lines 49–58; *DE* II 631. *Constantia*, the older daughter of *Constantinus I*, married first her half-uncle *Hannibalianus* and then his nephew and her own cousin *Gallus*, to whom she bore a daughter; see *RE* 7 959 lines 9–27. The younger daughter *Helena* married her cousin *Julian* and bore a son who died in infancy; see *RE* 14 2822 line 68–2823 line 8.

12. The younger *Eutropia* is named in *Zosimus* II 43 2, *Victor Epit.* 42.3, and *Athanasius Apol. ad Const.* 6 (*Migne Pat. Gr.* LXV 604; where there is a pun on the name and the text is uncertain for the ending). *Victor* calls her a sister of *Constantinus I* and in *Caes.* 42 6 refers to her son *Nepotianus* as *materna stirpe Flauio propinquus*. *Eutropius* X 11 2 speaks of *Neopotianus* as *Constantini sororis filio* (the earlier ref. in *RE* to *Eut.* IX 22 1 is for the six children of *Constantius I* and *Theodora*). *Julian Enc. ad Const. (Or II)* 58 D refers generally to the slaughter by *Magnentius* of men and women related to the imperial family. All the references are concerned with the revolt of *Nepotianus*. Seeck's note on the younger *Eutropia* on p. 6 line 10 of vol. IV (ed. 2 1922) of his *Gesch. des Untergangs der ant. Welt* (Stuttgart, Metzler), to be found in IV *Anhang* (1923) 383, does not add to his article in *RE*.

13. The pits and two scratches on the inscription of *Felix* are such as might have been made by a sharp instrument, generally simply striking but twice striking and being pulled downward. They are of the same color as the rest of the surface, as against a few abrasions which show the white marble and are therefore recent. But it naturally cannot be determined whether the pits and

scratches were made while the stone was still in place, perhaps in an effort to dislodge it with a pick, or at some later date. If they were made while it was still in place, one might think of one of the diggers, or *fossores*, who appear in inscriptions and paintings as members of the staffs of early churches; see F. Grossi Gondi's two volumes on *I Monumenti Cristiani* (Rome, Univ. Gregoriana), I; *Trattato di Epigrafia Cristiana* . . . (1920) 151-152, and II: *I Mon. Crist. Iconografici* . . . (1923) 47, 394-395; Ernest Diehl, *Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres* (Berlin, Weidmann, 3 vols. ed. 2 1961) III index VII p. 357 *s.u.* Testini, p. 152 fig. 31, shows drawings of typical picks and in a facing colored plate I a picture of a *fossor* picking away at a wall with an oil lamp hung behind him.

14. *RE* 27 909-913 lists several *Mallii* under the Republic, of whom only one reached the consulship as a "new man" in 105 B.C.; see col. 911 no. 13. Under the empire only two are given, an undistinguished figure under Domitian and a *Flavius Mallius Theodorus*, consul in 391, for whom see *RE*² 10 1897 under *Theodoros* 70. However, *CIL* VI 3 pp. 2271-2272 nos. 21869-21887 gives the funerary inscriptions of a number of less distinguished *Mallii/ae*, occasionally showing only one χ .

15. For the costume of Roman women, see the recent brief description in J. P. V. D. Baldson, *Roman Women: Their History and Habits* (London, The Bodley Head, 1962) 252-253, where the costume of the servant is called *tunica* or *stola* and the mantle of the lady a *palla*.

MENANDER AND THE *HELEN* OF EURIPIDES

BY L. A. POST

I. SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

IT is agreed that Menander learned much from Euripides. In fact he is much more like Euripides than he is like Aristophanes. The recent discovery of the *Dyscolus* of Menander, almost complete, makes it possible to compare with it a happy play of Euripides. Analysis will show the greater range of tragedy but will also demonstrate Menander's very considerable original contribution to the drama. For this occasion I shall disregard the influence of Aristophanes. It is easily separable since it is restricted to the scurrilous characters Getas and Sicon, to the scene in which Cnemon addresses the audience, using trochaic tetrameters in a vestigial parabasis, and to the final scenes in which the two scurrilous characters bait the hermit-crab Cnemon and make him join in the final revelry. Here again tetrameters (iambic) are used. F. H. Sandbach has pointed out to me the logic of comedy that requires Cnemon to be given his comeuppance at the end to balance his promotion in the parabasis to the role of mentor. This kind of comic pattern is notably Aristophanic and is fitted into the realistic part of the play with no great dislocation at the joins; yet the cleavage is apparent. In the iambic trimeters we have a Euripidean theme, the winning of brides for the young men, just as Perseus won a bride in the *Andromeda*. When tetrameters come in, whether iambic or trochaic, we get the more Aristophanic theme of the obstinate character who must be softened, as in the *Wasps*.

Most of the points that I raise will require no lengthy discussion. I shall, however, set forth at some length an analysis of Euripides' treatment of gods and of religious and moral issues in the *Helen*, particularly the significant role of Theonoe, in order to make clear his difference from Menander. To balance this I devote some study to Menander's use of a more vivacious and flexible style in order to make his characters seem genuine, serious, and worthy of interest. These two special studies are complete in themselves and separable; but they are indispensable to my comparison and are therefore included here.

There are many obvious differences between happy tragedies and New Comedy. The latter does not, so far as we know, use the musical solos or the choral songs of tragedy. Comedy may begin a play with a minor god, but may not end with a god or introduce gods or miracles in the course of a play. It may use the elevated style of tragedy only rarely, when such a style suits the romantic self-dramatizing mood of someone in love. Comedy is more realistic than tragedy, not only in the language used, but also in the motivation and complication of incident that appear in its plots. New Comedy is restricted in subject matter by the exclusion of political clashes and patriotic glory from its field of observation; it compensates by showing men as they are in the world of domestic and social relations, not magnified as in tragedy, nor caricatured as in Aristophanes.

But there is a very important sense in which Menander is not purely realistic, as Claire Préaux pointed out¹ even before the publication of *Dyscolus*. I paraphrase her summing up: "I hope that I have demonstrated that Menander's comedy is neither the undistorted mirror of a community, nor a commitment to unusual adventures, but that it is, like every comedy, a blend of reality and escape from reality. Furthermore its dreams of escape give us a clearer view of the hidden tensions, the sore places, and the hopes of a community than would a photographic reproduction of real life." Though I agree with this statement, I should like to analyze further the kind of escape from dull experience that is provided by Menander. All drama and literature offers a means of escape from ordinary activity or inactivity. Escape may be to a world of criminals and detectives, or to a world of primitive passions, or to the sophisticated immorality of English comedy of manners. Escape may be to a romantic world distant in time or space or to a nightmarish world of the future. In Menander it would be better to call this element uplift, and I shall do so without apology. Menander shows characters acting reasonably and philanthropically and voicing noble sentiments so obviously and suddenly that the hearer is enchanted and not disposed to reflect on the improbability of finding such sentiments coming from such characters in real life. At the same time there is a plausibility in the presentation of philanthropic ideals that might well induce life to imitate art. The escape becomes an escape of life itself from present to future, from actual to ideal. In short, the dramatist may by his pointing out a way of escape initiate a new development in human life. What else were Ibsen and Shaw doing?

In the *Epitrepontes* the slave Syriscus is eloquent in defense of human rights. I have seen a modern audience spontaneously burst into applause

at the end of this scene. They did not think it too long or find it irrelevant. They wanted the baby to be saved. In the same play the young wife Pamphila upholds an ideal of marriage that puts her philosophic husband to shame. He in turn makes a decision that opens a way to more rational and philosophic living. There are romance and comedy in the play, but the whole is dominated by concern for the improvement of life, which is philanthropy.² This element of uplift or philanthropy in drama evidently derives from tragedy. In Aeschylus the unmotivated philanthropy of Prometheus is a powerful spur to the imagination. Even against a mythical background, realistic depiction of character produces a serious play. In Sophocles' *Antigone* the heroine's surprising declaration, that there are unwritten laws that no power on earth can annul, raises life to a new level. It is the germ of Plato's *Apology*. In Euripides, scenes of self-devotion are frequent and moving. His greatest scene of the sort is in *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, when the heroine offers her life for panhellenic unity against the barbarian. I am told that at Dodona in 1961 this scene was greeted with the utmost enthusiasm by a modern Greek audience. Euripides has thrown this uplifting scene into relief by making it a welcome escape from the bickering and indecision of the earlier part of the play. The ideal of young love had been forcibly presented by Euripides in the lost *Andromeda*. Menander transmuted the same theme to something more realistic in *Dyscolus*, but the uplift is still there.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE *Helen*

For purposes of comparison there is no better material than that provided by the *Helen* of Euripides. It provides escape by comedy, by heroic adventure with theatrical appeals to honor, by the puckish morality, and also by the almost pure uplift of Theonoe's part in the play. The king Theoclymenus is always a comic figure as well as a paragon of wickedness and false piety. Helen is a persecuted fairy-tale heroine but also a demure and comic deceiver in the final scene where the king is fooled. Menelaus in his early scenes is ridiculous as well as destitute. He recovers his heroic status by steps, first by recognition of the false and the true Helen, then by virtue of Theonoe's support, and finally by the transformation wrought when he is bathed and clothed by order of the king (1283, 1382-84). This rehabilitation by bath and new habiliments strikingly resembles the ceremony by which a freed slave assumed his new status. The romantic touch introduced when Menelaus and Helen resolve to die rather than suffer indignity is obvious. Helen and Theonoe are bulwarks of morality. The former is a repudiation of the false Helen.

This carries with it a repudiation of the Trojan War and to some extent of war in general as a grand illusion, as well as a repudiation of the soothsayers who encouraged war. Theonoe is an example of true piety in contrast with the false piety of her brother the king. There is a fairy-tale effect in her infallible oracle. It is on a par with the divine help that is recommended in preference to soothsayers (753f). She also represents, I shall suggest, the true concept of divine power in human life as opposed to the silly interference that is attributed in traditional mythology to such vain and spiteful gods as Hera and Aphrodite. Finally Theonoe in her scene introduces a piece of religious speculation that belongs to the category of pure uplift. It is as casually introduced as is Iphigenia's great scene in her play. With the *Trojan Women* Euripides had found a new kind of plot, the plot of poet against audience.³ If his scenes move the audience, he is content with any means to get them on. It grieved Aristotle to see such exhibitions of power that could not be traced to any proper use of dramatic machinery or dramatic construction. It is sad to think of the consequences if the poet had known and heeded the philosopher.

The central importance of Theonoe's part in the play has recently been emphasized by Grégoire in his Budé edition (1950) with particular appreciation of her philosophic or religious views. G. Zuntz has a masterly discussion of the whole play and of Theonoe's central part in it in his contribution to *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique VI*.⁴ He calls her (203) "the omniscient fairy" and designates the part of the play centering upon her as "its central and most problematical part." His final verdict (227) is that the *Helen* is "a *paignion* as light as it is profound, an ethereal dance above the abyss." It is evident that I was too hasty when I dismissed the play as a cheerful mixture of burlesque and sentiment in my Sather lectures.⁵ My assumption that Menelaus' heroic attitude in face of Theonoe was intended to provoke laughter by contrast with his previous groveling before the doorkeeper must be abandoned. With recognition Menelaus has suffered a peripety and is really nobler than before. Theonoe could also have been made comic. Her one prophecy in the play, that Menelaus would appear in Egypt, was a prophecy after the event, for the audience had seen Menelaus before their eyes while Helen was consulting the prophetess. But Theonoe proves her quality by recognizing Menelaus at once when he appears before her. It might easily have been hinted that Helen was setting a trap for the prophetess and that Theonoe turned the tables on her, but there is no such hint. The scene is meant to be imposing.

It is imposing, however, only within the frame of a lighthearted play,

subject only to equally lighthearted criticism. It is no refutation of the charge that Augustine brings against the pagans in *City of God* 2.19. He points out that they have no moral commandments divinely sanctioned and "issuing from shrines or from the clouds in a voice of thunder." Theonoe is like the pale pre-dawn light of a mountain sunrise in contrast with the blazing midday sun of a desert. She is not the first mysterious wise woman in Euripides. His *Melanippe the Wise* had shown the heroine arguing that there is no such thing as a portent. Plutarch (*Mor.* 756 B-C) tells us that the poet had been obliged to change the first line of the play before the people would allow a performance to proceed. He changed "Zeus, whoever he may be" to "Zeus, as speaks the voice of truth." After that lesson we need not be surprised that Euripides is somewhat vague in giving his views on true divinity. Nor is there much that was new. The temple of justice (1002) that exists in nature for Theonoe — or perhaps, exists in her nature, as the translators have it — is not very different from the temple of eloquence that exists in human nature according to fragment 170 (Nauck). Amphion in fragment 192 drew *pneuma* from the gods. Aether is elsewhere the home of Zeus (487) or Zeus himself (877). *Pneuma* is said to go home to aether (971). Belief in punishment for sin before or after death and the premiss that the dead know what their offspring do or suffer in this world are commonplaces. All this is vaguely inspirational, but it need not raise problems of consistency or philosophical import. Nor must we expect the characters in this play to behave like real people. Euripides has his own motives, and his characters conform to his plot as best they can.

I have one positive suggestion to make. I suggest that Euripides gives us more than one hint that Theonoe is somehow playing the part of Athena, goddess of wisdom, in the quarrel between Hera and Aphrodite. We are told in the prologue (25) that Athena competed with the other two for the prize of beauty. She is mentioned here only in the play and not by name but as the virgin sprung from Zeus. Theonoe is twice addressed (894, 939) by Helen simply as virgin without her name. The name is an oracle, says Menelaus (822). We find Theonoe given by Plato as etymological original (*Crat.* 407 B) of Athena's name. The name may well have come to Euripides and Plato alike from some forgotten source. Theonoe has the power of a god when she takes it upon herself (887) to decide the dispute between Hera and Aphrodite in favor of Helen and Menelaus. The mythical Athena had as much reason as Hera to hate Aphrodite, but to bring into the story a mythical Athena would be to belittle the great goddess of Athens. Euripides shows her in a woman who is incarnate wisdom and righteousness. Theonoe

embodies true religion in contrast with the spiteful and petty gods of fable.

Gods in Euripides, as in Greek life generally, come in many categories. The mythical gods had treated Menelaus very badly. Aphrodite took his wife from him. Hera saved Helen in Egypt, but did nothing to save Menelaus while he fought for a phantom. His recognition that the war with Troy and his triumph were illusory came spontaneously with his recognition of Helen. She declares that to recognize dear ones is itself a god (560). It is an unforeseen and saving event, and such events are part of the power of fortune. Theonoe's part in his salvation is an intervention of providence. It is a manifestation of the good judgment and the good counsel that are, according to Menelaus' man (757), the best of oracles. Menelaus in the end gets an opportunity to do something for himself when he slays the Egyptians and seizes the ship. Up to that point he is precariously dependent upon the virtue of Theonoe and the ingenious devices of Helen, not a glorious role. The poet is not really pro-Spartan in this play.

The theatrical gods Castor and Polydeuces, who end the play with a flourish, have no religious message. Taken from mythology, they save Theonoe from her brother's vengeance, reassure Helen, foretell the future for her and Menelaus, and explain why there is an island Helene off the coast of Attica. Theonoe had foreseen her brother's anger — no second sight was required for that — but had not foreseen the intervention of the gods. They provide an epilogue to match their sister's prologue. Raising a machine with gods on it is like raising a finger, said the comic poet Antiphanes (frag. 191 Kock, line 15, cited in Athenaeus 6.222 c). Since his phrase is still unaccountably misinterpreted even by authorities on the theater, I point out again that the English "easy as raising a finger" has nothing to do with the case. The Latin dictionary tells us what *digitum tollere* means, and *Suda* gives the same explanation of the Greek *dactylon airein*. The gesture of raising a finger to admit defeat or submission is often illustrated in ancient art. English equivalents are "throw up the hands" or "toss in the sponge." Latin also has *manus dare* with the same meaning. The Greek poet who throws up his hands in despair when he raises a god usually is cutting only a minor knot that he has taken care to provide for the purpose. It is a convenient and conventional way to end a play, but so is the final scene of feasting and scurrility that we find in the *Dyscolus*. Such an ending is only loosely joined to the play and was probably no harder than a god from the machine to contrive. Terence can do without it. Does that mean that he had a curtain?

How does Euripides stage the epiphany of his wise woman in the *Helen*? Her brother comes on later (1165) for good reasons and greets his dead father. He calls attention to the piety with which he has placed his father's tomb at his front door where he can pay his respects every day as he passes. He also lets Helen take sanctuary at the tomb, but does not, as Theonoe does, preserve his father's reputation for piety by imitating his honest treatment of Helen (1020f, 1028f). Theonoe must make him pious in spite of himself. Theonoe makes a ceremonious entrance (865) that emphasizes her oracular function. Yet her previous oracle was delivered offstage; and no one asked for, no one needs, another. Helen needs only the connivance by silence of the seeress. To remain silent requires no particular prophetic gift. Helen is not expecting an oracle, nor has she any doubt of the omniscience of Theonoe. What could be more artless than to stage such a scene with no explanation of motives? Yet the poet is all the time providing an impressive introduction for the judgment scene and the religious declaration of Theonoe. Helen needs no oracle but a decision in her favor. It might be supposed that Theonoe, seeing the need, entered when she did to satisfy it. But why need she pretend that someone wants an oracle, and why pretend that she may reveal the presence of Menelaus? These are theatrical needs. To look for human motives behind the scene in Theonoe is as futile as to search behind a cinema screen after the show to see where the actors have gone to, as I have seen happen with marsh Arabs in Amara on the Tigris in the year 1917.

The audience at least are led to expect an oracle. How does the poet make the shift from oracle to judgment? He does it by two sudden questions from Theonoe, one at line 873, which needs emendation, and one at line 892, which does not, with due respect to Zuntz. Unemended texts have for line 873

Ἑλένη, τί τὰ μάλιστα — πῶς ἔχει — θεσπίσματα;

In regard to this, Campbell in the preface of his edition (Liverpool, 1950) quotes with approval Dingelstad's statement that it is inconsistent with Theonoe's dignity as a virgin priestess to ask so pettishly what Helen thinks of her prophecies and their state of health. Campbell adds that "the sense is as trivial and irrelevant and inappropriate as the expression is feeble and awkward and unidiomatic. Both are quite unlike Euripides." His proposal, ποταίνι' ὡς ἔχῃς θεσπίσματα, is unsatisfactory on two counts. He assumes that Theonoe knows that Menelaus is before her, but does not know that Helen has recognized him. Hence she thinks it worth while to point out his identity in the next line. This

leaves Theonoe less than omniscient and something of a fraud. Furthermore, Campbell's emendation departs too far from the manuscript. The unemended text has been defended as a double question. But in double questions two different questions are put (who, where) in a single sentence with one verb. In the present case the two questions *τί τὰμὰ θεοσπίσματα* and *τὰμὰ πῶς ἔχει θεοσπίσματα* ask the same thing in two different constructions, as punctuation by dashes tacitly concedes. It is not good enough. There is an easy emendation that makes good sense: *Ἑλένη, τί τὰμὰ προσδέχει θεοσπίσματα*; "Helen, why are you waiting for an oracle from me? Here he is, your husband Menelaus, plain to see, arrived." Helen was of course not expecting an oracle, but the audience was and needed the jolt to redirect their attention. Euripides is artful in his artlessness.

To return to Theonoe, after her rhetorical question that dispels the idea that there is to be a prophecy she expresses pity for Menelaus. This encourages hope that she will decide in his favor. She then explains that she is arbiter between Hera and Aphrodite. If she favors the former, she will say nothing to her brother about the arrival of Menelaus. But, she reflects, she has orders to report. Then another rhetorical question: "Who will go with information to my brother, to keep me out of harm?" This is indeed a quick reversal, and something may have been lost that would have lent verisimilitude to this sudden threat to the suppliants. Euripides, however, is not interested in the psychology of his wise woman. She is as unpredictable as any other fairy. Euripides knows his theater, and has taken the best way to make Helen's pleading seem important. He leaves no time for reflection. Since Theonoe's attendants have been dismissed and the chorus is in sympathy with Helen, it is not surprising that no one volunteers to go. Helen has her cue and moves at once to plead her case; the great scene starts.

III. HOW MENANDER DIFFERS

Menander has no such spectacular scene set apart from the rest of the play. His inspiring sermons and generous acts are brought in without fanfare. In one case, at *Dyscolus* 615f, he compresses a whole philosophical theory into two words, *φίλος, πρὶν ἰδεῖν*. Euripides in fragment 902 had made a character say, "A good man is a friend in my judgment, though he live far away, even though I never set eyes on him." According to Cicero (*De Natura Deorum* 1.44: 121) this was also Stoic doctrine. The editor who proposed to give these words to Getas because they must be a joke should study what the Greeks had to say about friendship and philanthropy. There are many such touches in the

words and acts of Sostratus. Menander does not always present morality in the form of a sermon. He characterizes Cnemon's daughter by letting us see her brave her father's anger in order to save the old slave woman from a beating. Such fine touches produce conviction and concern in the audience and give Menander's plays the bite that was lacking in Terence. Euripides' *Bacchae*, *Trojan Women*, and *Hippolytus* have plenty of bite, but not the airy *Helen*. That is to the tragic plays as Shakespeare's *Tempest* is to his *Othello*. It is a delightful fantasy. There are some elements of the fairy tale in *Dyscolus*. Vice and virtue are well marked. The god Pan not only makes Sostratus fall in love; he seems to keep him devoted to one object throughout the play. But the hero might have fallen in love without Pan, so that there is nothing very unrealistic in the action. Cnemon's political comments to the audience (743-46) and the final scene of the play, when slave and cook take over the stage and haze the obstinate old man, are the chief departures from realism. That could happen only on the comic stage. If the last scene were to be taken seriously, the tormenting of Cnemon would produce more pity and terror than moral satisfaction. It is a conventional ending tacked on after the realism is over.

It is in the part of the play between Pan and the riotous ending that the poet produces his dynamic effect. He has in some ways an advantage over Euripides in the *Helen* when it comes to getting a grip on the spectators. First, his characters are made to seem genuine and human. They have no trailing clouds of glory drawn from previous appearances in Homer and elsewhere. They belong to the one play, and have no life apart from it. In the second place, Menander is free from most of the static conventions of tragedy. There is no line-by-line repartee in comedy of the sort that translators find so trying in tragedy. Much of what is said in stichomythy inevitably sounds like padding, since the simplest question or answer is required to fill a whole line. Any sense of action is lost as the exchange goes on. Consider how much Menander puts into Getas' brief reply to Cnemon (475) οὐδὲ κοχλίαν ἔγωγέ σε. This I have translated: "If you're asking me, I shouldn't suppose that you sacrifice so much as a single snail." Vellacott has "You wouldn't sacrifice a wrinkle," which keeps the brevity but makes Getas show antagonism. I now suggest: "Not I, not even a snail." But it is often necessary to dilute Menander in order to render nuances of character and mood. In the repartee of Euripides, on the other hand, a great deal can be omitted without loss.

Menander often suggests a subtle shifting interplay of thought and motive between two speakers. The action advances rapidly, for instance,

in the scene of Gorgias, Daos, and Sostratus in the *Dyscolus* (315-81) after Gorgias has ended his sermon. There is a rather static slanging-match, it is true, between Sosias and Daos in the *Perikeiromene* (183-207), but the impression given is that of a siege that fails. There are also set speeches in Menander, those of the litigants in *Epitrepontes*, and in *Dyscolus* the sermons of Gorgias (271-98) and Sostratus (797-812). Menander's rhetoric repays serious study. Often there are humorous touches, personal prejudices, or anticlimax instead of climax, or attempts at logic that go askew. The reaction of the other party may be imagined or depicted. This is all interesting on the stage. Comedy is to some extent stylized like tragedy. The set speeches inevitably seem a little stilted, but the Greeks were brought up on oratory, and they liked what they found in Menander. What would Shakespeare be without eloquence?

In the third place, when it comes to realism in character and action, comedy has a particular advantage in the flexibility of its rhythms. Menander is a rival of Homer and Sophocles in the art of making speech by its sound and rhythm convey a sense of movement, feeling or tension. When Agamemnon says (*Iliad* 1.29): τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω. πρίν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν, the monosyllables and assonances as well as the muscular feeling of contraction in the sound *in* make the anger of Agamemnon palpable. There is nothing like this that I can discover in the *Helen*—unless Euripides meant to put a sob of self-pity into line 790, τοῖσδ', ἔνθεν ὥσπερ πτωχὸς ἐξηλαυνόμεν. Hector was pitying Andromache when he said (*Iliad* 6.463) χήτεϊ τοιοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς. The sound *to* is used similarly in a lament by Milton (*Samson* 81) "total eclipse." The same effect is obvious in combinations like "untold misery" and "torn remnants of a mighty thrust."

Sophocles has one remarkable line where Chrysothemis reports the presence of Orestes in the *Electra* (877) πάρεστ' Ὀρέστης ἡμῖν, ἴσθι τοῦτ' ἐμοῦ κλύουσ'. Here the repeated *rest* outdoes Homer's ἡλθ' Ὀδυσσεύς (*Odyssey* 23.7). Sophocles follows this with a triple *oo* that lets us feel the girl's happy excitement. Since such effects are comparatively rare and always different in any author, they are not subject to demonstration by parallels or statistics. A modern author can say: "Go and don't come back," she hissed. Menander makes sounds and rhythm throb with serious purpose to suit the character.

IV. SPECIAL EFFECTS IN MENANDER

I have observed from time to time various special effects in the work of Menander that was extant before *Dyscolus* appeared, I have been

slow to notice them, but others hardly appear to notice them at all except for Polemon's cry at *Perikeiromene* 256f:

Γλυκέρα με καταλέλοιπε, καταλέλοιπέ με
Γλυκέρα, Πάταικε.

Here the effect of chiasitic repetition and of the mournful vowel sounds *oi* and *ā* needs no comment. Before I turn to other special effects from Menander, let us note the effect that Homer gets in *Iliad* 1.29-31:

τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω· πρὶν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν
ἡμετέρῳ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ, ἐν Ἀργεῖ, τήλοθι πάτρης,
ἵστον ἐποιχομένην καὶ ἐμὸν λέχος ἀντιώσαν.

Line 29 is the angriest line in Homer. First, an effect of compression is produced by the use of short words, including four monosyllables and three disyllables. Second, there are regular breaks arranged to produce four caesuras, each after the first long of a foot. Third, there is assonance of long *o* and also of *in* in successive monosyllables. Fourth, but not least, the sound *in* is perfectly adapted to dramatic delivery as a snarl. In line 30 a curt effect is produced by the two breaks in rhythm that are marked by commas. Line 31 shows a release of pressure as Agamemnon dwells on the imagined future that will give him satisfaction. In these lines the forcible effect represents inner feeling within the speaker. For a somewhat similar effect of squeeze and release that represents physical motion rather than psychic emotion note *Iliad* 1.439: ἐκ δὲ Χρυσηῖς νηὸς βῆ ποντοπόροιο. The care with which Chryseis steps out, halting a moment, before she moves on in her usual smooth pace is indicated by the three *etas* all in the second half of a foot. They are placed in successive words that diminish from three syllables to one. I owe this example to Richmond Lattimore. His translation reproduces the effect: "Then Chryseis herself stepped forth from the boat." If lines as cunningly wrought as this and as faithfully preserved are not within the range of an oral poet, then Homer was not an oral poet when he wrote these lines.

Menander, writing for actors representing a great variety of characters and emotions, was famous for his adaptability. His verse imposes fewer limitations than that of tragedy or even that of Aristophanes. He has lines without caesura, lines without diaeresis, and lines that fall into two or three equal parts. He makes use of many patterns forbidden to tragedy in order to make his characters lifelike. For brevity I shall speak of cuts and splits instead of caesuras and diaereses. Where there are successive cuts or splits in a line, the word-ends must obviously fall

regularly, within the foot or between feet, and produce a recurrent beat. A regular effect may also, in iambic verse, which permits resolution, be produced by a succession of words that have the same rhythm, though they do not contain a whole number of iambic feet. There is a good example of this at *Epitrepontes* 706-9:

προπετῶς ἀπάγω τήν θυγατέρ', ἱερόσυλε γραῦ;
ἀλλ' ἦ περιμένω καταφαγεῖν τήν προῖκά μου
τὸν χρηστὸν αὐτῆς ἄνδρα καὶ λόγους λέγω
περὶ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ;

In line 706 the two anapests do coincide with metrical feet; in line 707 the successive words with scansion $\cup \cup \cup$ — are effective without coincidence. In line 708 there are five words, each one foot in length. By beginning with four cuts and ending with two splits regular jolts are produced to accompany the action. Smicrines is here vigorously shaking the old nurse. Menander uses all the devices of Homer and many more of his own to produce much more frequent and remarkable special effects.

There is a good example of squeeze and release at *Dyscolus* 379f when Sostratus makes it known how seriously he is in love. He begins with a sentence of two one-foot words that produces an impressive stop at the end of the first dipody. A single word fills the next dipody. The third dipody is again broken in the middle. There are four successive monosyllables if we include the first foot of line 380. The assonances of *eta* and *delta* add to the resolute tone. After the monosyllables there is release in a swift run as Sostratus thinks of his possible future with the girl. This too has its tinkling assonance in the run of consonants *kh n t, t n k, r n*:

οὕτως ἔχω. παραποθανεῖν ἤδη με δεῖ
ἢ ζῆν ἔχοντα τὴν κόρην.

To demonstrate the effect orally, all these points must be fluently stressed in speaking.

Besides 379 there are many examples in Menander of lines that fall into equal parts. Simike's thrice repeated $\tilde{\omega}$ *δυστυχής* in line 574 shows to what lengths the poet will go in order to be dramatic. In *Epitrepontes* the goatherd begins his plea (66) with a disjointed line that betrays the inexperienced speaker:

ἐν τῷ δάσει τῷ πλησίον τῶν χωρίων
τούτων

In the same play Onesimus' alarm, for fear that he may suffer if Chariusius is drawn again to Pamphila, becomes more and more acute. He has successive lines (246f) with a stop after the first dipody:

ἀναδύομαι. καὶ τῶν πρότερόν μοι μεταμέλει
μηνυμάτων.

Line 246 falls into three equal parts. Note that the enclitic pronoun must be taken with the word that follows it. In line 582 we find four monosyllables and four dissyllables to indicate mental tension:

οὕτως ἔχων γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄν ἴδῃ μέ που
τὸν διαβαλόντα, . . .

At 587 the terror of Onesimus culminates in a line with six cuts, the maximum possible, emphasized by the assonance *ter: per*. I have no doubt now that the final pronoun is emphatic: Ζεῦ σῶτερ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ δύνατον, σῶζε 'μέ. The excited Glycera at *Perikeiromene*, 307-12 produces some unusual effects. In the lines 308-9 occur pairs of successive words with assonance of initial vowel and final *n*. In line 309, in fact, if my supplement is right, all words end in *n*. In line 310 the close repetition of *t'ou* should not be overlooked, nor in line 312 the two words with V-scansion υυ-, υ, υυ-. The other repetitions of sound and rhythm are obvious:

εὐλόμην δ' οὕτως ἐγὼ
ἀφρόνως ἔχειν ἔχθραν τε πρᾶξ[αι τοῖς φίλοις
ὕμῖν θ' ὑπόνοιαν καταλιπεῖν [ἦν ἐκβαλεῖν
ἦν ἐξαλειψαί τ' οὐκέτ', οὐδ' αἰσχύνομαι,
Πάταικε; καὶ σὺ ταῦτα συμπεπεισμένος
ἦλθες, τοιαύτην θ' ὑπέλαβές με γεγονέναι;

I have called attention before to the ladylike tone of Pamphila's protest to her father Smicrines at *Epitrepontes* 510f. There is here none of the volubility of Glycera. Pamphila begins with two runs of five syllables ending each in an emphatic spondee. In the next line the two five-syllable runs ending with emphatic words are separated by a calm -- υ.

ἀλλ' εἴ με σώζων τοῦτο μὴ πείσαις ἐμέ,
οὐκέτι πατήρ κρίνοι' ἄν ἀλλὰ δεσπότης;

Smicrines answers with a line as rough and uncouth as hers is gentle. Note the sequence of consonants *lg d d t t t k s p s s*:

λόγου δὲ δεῖται ταῦτα καὶ συμπίσεως;

Pamphila's excitement when she recognizes her baby (544f) is shown by the four breaks in her sentence of eight words:

γύναι, πόθεν ἔχεις, εἰπέ μοι, τὸ παιδίον
λαβοῦσ' ;

Charisius, when he makes a corresponding discovery (638) begins a line with six short syllables:

Ἀβρότονον, ἱκετεύω σε, μή μ' ἀναπτέρου.

I have filled out a speech of Pyrrhias at *Dyscolus* 94f in a way that produces a similar effect, unconsciously introducing an assonance of the two vowels of *ego* with the first two vowels of the preceding word:

νῆ Δί', ἐξωλ[ῆς ἐγώ,
Σώστρατ', ἀπολο[ῦμ'. ἄκο]υέ πως φυλακτικῶς.

Other scholars have resorted to frivolous buffoonery to fill out these lines. Pyrrhias is genuinely frightened, just as his master is genuinely in love. This comes out in the sequence of choking sounds in line 54 *kō*, *gō*, *kō*, *khō*:

σκώπτεις, ἐγὼ δέ, Χαιρέα, κακῶς ἔχω.

For once Menander echoes Aristophanes. Compare Dionysus at *Frogs* 58 with his *kō*, *khō*, *kō*:

μὴ σκώπτέ μ', ὦδέλφ', οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' ἔχω κακῶς.

Davus is genuinely indignant at *Dyscolus* 222–25. In my version he has only two cuts in three lines, and each of these precedes a monosyllable followed by a word that exactly fills a dipody. He has already cursed Cnemon κακὸν κακῶς and keeps up a rattle of *kappas*. He ensures the connection of προκειμένην with κόρην μόνην by the striking assonance of vowels and consonants *k r n m n n*: *p r k m n n*. Line 224 has one cut. To introduce two more cuts and an anticlimax as well, by reading ὥς προσῆκεν ἦν in line 223, is perverse.

ἄκακον κόρην μόνην ἀφείς ἐν ἐρημίᾳ
ἐᾶς, φυλακὴν οὐδεμίαν — ὥς προκ <εἰμ >ένην⁶—
ποιούμενος. τουτὶ καταμανθάνων ἴσους
οὗτος προσερρύη.

Sicon, the braggart cook, has a pompous way of starting a speech with a sentence that ends with the first dipody. I have noticed this elsewhere only at *Dyscolus* 379, cited above (p. 110). After Cnemon's accident Sicon declares (639) εἰσὶν θεοί, νῆ τὸν Διόνυσον. There *are* gods, for

Cnemon has been punished for violating the sanctity of a cook. Sicon takes himself seriously, which makes him a laughing-stock to others. Later (943) he introduces a grandiloquent account of the wine-bibbing and dancing offstage with the sentence *σπουδῇ γὰρ ἦν*, perhaps a reminiscence of Demosthenes' famous phrase in *De Corona* 169 *ἐσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν*, a double cretic, used as solemn introduction to a narrative. So the silent cinema used the oft-repeated caption: "Came the dawn." Here we have a special effect in the tetrameters. Elsewhere my citations are only from iambic trimeters. Earlier (660-64) Sicon orders the ladies offstage to pray that Cnemon may be saved to his sorrow:

ἀνάπηρον ὄντα, χολόν' οὕτω γίνεται
 ἀλυπότατος γὰρ τῷδε γείτων τῷ θεῷ
 καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ θύουσιν.

When he speaks of lameness, the line (662) too limps. It has no split and has adjectives ending in *on* twice a dipody apart. The first time we get *on* in the next syllable as well. (Compare Keats, *The Eve of St. Agnes* 3: "The hare limped trembling through the frozen grass," where the piling up of consonants with the assonance *mp: mb* produces a similar effect.) In the next line comes the usual release as Sicon looks on the bright side of Cnemon's lameness, but the limping effect continues as three successive cuts set off a trochee and a spondee with *tō* repeated at the interval of a dipody. Except for the previous lines, however, no one would notice this.

We come now to the most moral and determined characters in *Dyscolus*: Sostratus, Cnemon, and Gorgias. Gorgias is inhibited by honest poverty and preaches severely to Sostratus as long as he suspects him of dishonorable intentions. He is especially fierce after that only in a passage where he is describing the fierceness of Cnemon. Cnemon is consistently fierce and exasperated until he falls into the well; thereafter he is handled Aristophanically and need not concern us here. Gorgias has little to say after he begins to co-operate with Sostratus against Cnemon. He lets Sostratus take the lead. Though Sostratus is in his love as firmly moral, as willing to work, and as resolute as anyone could be, he is also gay, humorous, and volatile. Comparison with the older lovers of *Perikeiromene* and *Epitrepontes* will show how much more reserved they are. Their excitement is known partly by report. They do not address the audience and take it into their confidence. In age Sostratus comes close to the two Moschions of *Samia* and *Perikeiromene*, but he is much more a man of the world than they, much more the architect of his own

success. I have discussed one speech of his (p. 110) and will take up two more. My investigation of stylistic traits is far from complete. Lines with four splits might repay study. Sostratus has two in succession (265f) and Gorgias has one (276). In lines 317-24 Gorgias in his runs of three and four lines ends every line with an iambic word. No doubt many other unusual combinations will come to light, once they are looked for.

Sostratus' account (535-38) of his labor with the mattock is descriptive and physical rather than psychological. There is no self-pity. I call attention only to the words that are expressive of the seesaw effect as he swings his mattock up and down:

ὁ ἥλιος κατέκα', ἑώρα τ' ἐμβλέπων
ὁ Γοργίας ὥσπερ τὰ κηλώνειά με
μόλις ἀνακύπτοντ', εἶθ' ὅλω τῷ σώματι
πάλιν κατακύπτοντ'.

In 536 the vowels of ὥσπερ τὰ κηλώνειά με seesaw between long *o* and *a* and the tighter *e*-vowels in a way to suggest the well-sweep rising and falling. In the next two lines the words for upswing and downswing are symmetrically placed. The two prefixes are given quite different treatment to slow down the upswing and hasten the downswing. In the latter case the two shorts are rattled off as half a foot. In the former they belong to different feet. The initial short vowel lags notably as the missing second short of a resolved long with which it has no close connection. In tragedy such a verse would excite emendation.

Lines 666-69 show Sostratus in his great moment of happiness when he describes the joy of gazing at his beloved, regardless of the fallen Cnemon who needed his help:

ἄνδρες, μὰ τὴν Δῆμητρα, μὰ τὸν Ἀσκληπιόν,
μὰ τοὺς θεούς, οὐπώποτ' ἐν τῷ μῶ βίω
εὐκαιρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἀποπεπνιγμένον
ἑώρακα — μικροῦ.

He addresses the audience, begins with three oaths, then produces a jubilant line that has only three words—a record for brevity—all of different lengths (five, three, and six syllables) and all ending in *on*. This is just the opposite of the effect produced by compression into short words, regular beat, and tight assonance. His joy is unaffected by Cnemon the opportune victim. Only by an afterthought does it appear that the victim, however opportunely, was not altogether drowned. Then he gloats in a lingering exclamation over his own happiness before he can bring himself to turn his attention to the rescue of Cnemon. It is

all comically lifelike with the sort of comedy that would be utterly ruined by a Plautine or Aristophanic joke in the wrong place.

We come now to Cnemon. Two instances will suffice. The tone of exasperated refusal in lines 505-8 addressed to Sicon is plain enough:

οὐκ ἔχω

οὔτε χυτρώγανλον οὔτε πέλεκυν οὔθ' ἄλλας
οὔτ' ὄξος οὔτ' ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἴρηχ' ἀπλῶς
μὴ προσιέναι μοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ.

Line 507 has five elisions. It is almost a sputter. The repeated *all* is intentional and warns us not to insert *ὀρίγανον* from fragment 671. That fragment belongs to a much more polite character in some other play. The sentence has seven negatives separated in each case by a single word. Then in line 508 we get seven short words, five of one syllable with two of two each, in a line that falls into three parts. Editors should consider printing the pronoun as emphatic with an accent *μοί*.

Cnemon's earlier sarcastic lines to Sostratus (174f) are even more remarkable:

πρὸς τὰς ἐμὰς θύρας εἰδὲν τινα
βούλησθε, συντάττεσθε πάντα παντελῶς . . .

Sostratus has tested the sanity of Cnemon by asking him if he is going to hit Sostratus. There is a parallel at *Samia* 229 where Demeas puts the same question to Niceratus in order to bring him to his senses. Getting no direct reply Sostratus asks Cnemon whether he is angry and explains his own presence at Cnemon's door. At last he gets a reply that addresses him with a plural verb as one of the great conspiracy to intrude on Cnemon's privacy. Line 174 is split into six feet by the maximum number of splits. The first foot is itself cut into equal parts. Line 175 by contrast has no splits at all. It has four words with assonance at the ends of the first two and at the beginnings of the second two. The first two cuts come just a dipody apart. The third comes just a foot later. It is a great mistake to spoil the effect by introducing an emendation. Cnemon is at his nastiest and should be allowed to bite his words off and to sputter with fury.

Let us see how Gorgias in his descriptions reproduces the obstinate ferocity of Cnemon, which he reports to Sostratus in lines 321-37. Take first lines 323-25:

ταύτη πατήρ

ἔσθ' οἷος οὐδεὶς γέγονεν οὔτε τῶν πάλα
ἄνθρωπος οὔτε τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς.

Here are three negatives. Each comes after a cut in the second foot of a dipody. The first and third are preceded by the same syllable at the same point in the line. The second and third form part of a repetition of two identical words. The lines throb with emphasis. Take again lines 329-31, which are remarkable for the three successive rhymes of final iambic word with the preceding word. One such case, or even two, would not be unusual, but here are three:

μόνος, συνεργὸν δ' οὐδέν' ἀνθρώπων ἔχων,
οὐκ οἰκέτην οἰκεῖον, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τόπου
μισθωτόν, οὐχὶ γείτον', ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μόνος.

In line 330 the *kappas* reach a climax in two successive words ending in *kappa*. I have no parallel for this. Note also the chiasitic repetition of initial diphthongs in the first four words. In line 331 note the repeated *ton* at an interval of one dipody and the assonance of the second *ton* with *on* at the same point in line 330. The movement of the first three words of the line is the same as in Cnemon's line 175. The rest reproduces the end of his line 507. Such lines demand emphatic reading. Clearly Menander is producing many new effects in his trimeters, all aimed at making language more lifelike and expressive of character and feeling. He has done what Horace recommends (*AP* 317f). He has taken life as a model and has drawn from it *vivas voces*.

V. SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The tighter construction required in New Comedy needs little exposition. The *Helen* has eight speaking characters besides the gods. The *Dyscolus* has eleven, not counting Pan, as well as three mutes who are addressed and have a place in the story. There are at least two houses on Menander's stage as against one in tragedy, five entrances as against three. The two houses imply two families. In *Dyscolus* a third family establishes itself at the shrine of Pan, and in the end all three families are brought together at the shrine. This requires close plotting and leaves no room for episodes. The *Helen* has two families, since there are rival suitors for Helen. In the end she has to depart offstage when she is united to Menelaus. In *Perikeiromene* Glycera need not leave the stage to part from Moschion. She goes first to her father Pataecus, then, legitimately married, to the house of Polemon, circling back in a virtuous progress. This is more complicated than *Dyscolus* and much more complicated than *Helen*. Add to this the fact that comedy takes its situations and incidents from daily life, and that they must be convinc-

ing to an audience who are immersed in that life (Horace, *Ep.* 2.1. 168–70). The audience must be kept interested by verisimilitude combined with idealism and optimism. But success in overcoming such difficulties gave Menander a grip on the audience that lighthearted tragedies could not aspire to.

How does all this square with Aristotle. We know that he found no pity and fear in a happy ending, only *to philanthropon*. There are those who think that this is a lesser degree of pity and fear, such as might be felt for the slaughtered suitors in the *Odyssey*. Since those slaughtered in the *Helen* are anonymous and unknown, it seems unlikely that an audience would feel even minimal pity and terror for them. They would be too busy rejoicing over the escape of the Greeks. The disappointment of Theoclymenus would also cause joy rather than sorrow. The ending of *Helen*, like that of *Dyscolus*, contributes only to philanthropic feeling, concern for the welfare of the good.

Earlier in the *Helen* there is indeed pity and fear for the abused hero and heroine, who are confronted by the danger of death or dishonor. In New Comedy there is usually no threat of death, and in the *Dyscolus* even pity and fear for Cnemon's daughter are brief and tempered by the certainty that she will be rescued. In tragedy there was no such certainty. Where infants appear in New Comedy, they may be threatened with death. In the *Epitrepontes* the infant's fate is linked with that of his parents and arouses pity and fear in a modern audience. It is only recently that plays like *Fanny* and *They Knew What They Wanted* have introduced an infant into a happy love story. In the modern plays, however, there is no danger that the infant will starve to death or be brought up as a slave; all parties are ready to befriend him. Still, it is remarkable that a baby is brought in at all. It indicates that we are catching up with the advanced drama of Menander.

Let me conclude this critique with a lighthearted attempt to reconcile the views of those who hold that Aristotle's catharsis is something medical and those who hold that relief from pity and fear through homeopathic fiction comes from reflection on greater sorrows than our own. The comic poet Timocles expounds this view in frag. 6, II 453 Kock. Let us start with the assumption that catharsis is used by Aristotle as a medical term. We must still ask what tragedy cures and how it cures what it cures. Obviously tragedy is not intended as a cure for leprosy, measles, or insanity. It is good for the soul, not primarily for the body. The soul or mind may be suffering either from error or from weakness. The best catharsis of the mind is rigorous thinking according to Plato (*Sophist* 230 D). I see no reason why Aristotle should disagree. Tragedy

is hardly the same as rigorous thinking. That leaves us with a statement that I am willing to accept, namely, that tragedy is a cure for weakness. To face in imagination the worst that fate or gods or men can do is fortifying, and it produces a special pleasure that happy endings do not bring. The distraction provided by Aristotelian tragedy is different in kind from that provided by any kind of comedy or of ethical plot in tragedy.

But no one, as Phrynichus discovered, wants to be reminded of his own incurable grief. For soldiers living a tragic life in the trenches there was no relief in theatrical tragedy. They flocked to gay plays. I have known those who after a murder in the family no longer found distraction in detective stories. For Athenians in the terrible situation produced by the Sicilian disaster, the lighthearted *Helen* was just right. Imaginary terrors are a milder remedy if they are shown dispelled in the imaginary world, just as nightmares are less disturbing if the lost passport or lecture notes are found in the dream before the sleeper awakes. In my own life, the latter type of nightmare replaced the other at about my sixtieth birthday. Old age also mitigates seasickness. There is, I suppose, about as much catharsis in New Comedy as in happy tragedy. Comedy may clear the mind in all sorts of ways and serve as a remedy for boredom or a too restricted view of life. For clearing the mind, however, of self-pity and fear of one's own fate, we need the imagined terrors of tragedy. The virtue of terror recognized as imaginary is that it does not compel one to act. Such pity and terror do not inhibit the exercise of reason. Tragedy gives us practice in facing our weakness and keeping our minds clear at the same time. It is both therapeutic and diverting.

NOTES

The assistance of Professor L. R. Shero has been of great value in preparing this article for publication.

1. *Chronique d'Égypte* 32 (1957) 84-100.
2. For *Dyscolus* I have developed this theme in my article, "Virtue Promoted in Menander's *Dyscolus*," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 152-161.
3. See the statement in my book *From Homer to Menander* (Berkeley 1951) 256.
4. Published by Fondation Hardt (Geneva 1960).
5. *From Homer to Menander*.
6. That is, "set ready like a meal prepared."

THE TEXTUAL TRADITION OF THE *CVLEX*

BY WENDELL CLAUSEN

“... tempora, quae iterum ipsum culicem quasi contriuere.”

— Bembo


AN ancient MS of the *Culex* lay neglected in a library somewhere in France during the dark and ignorant age that supervened on the ruin of the Western Empire; at the end of the eighth century or the beginning of the ninth it came to light, it was transcribed, and then allowed to disappear. From this single, corrupt source are derived, though none of them immediately, our MSS of the *Culex*:

- Γ Corsinianus 43 F 5 of the fourteenth century.
- V Vaticanus 2759 of the thirteenth century.
- S Stabulensis, now Parisinus 17177, of the tenth century. Verses 1-166, the initial letters of 249-289, and all but the first nine or ten letters of 372-414 are lacking; and very little of 167-248 can be read.
- F Fiechtianus, now Mellicensis cim. 2, of the tenth century. Verses 76-152 and 230-306 are lacking.
- C Cantabrigiensis KK V 34 of the tenth century.
- L Iuuenalis Ludi Libellus, which can be reconstructed from:
 - W Treuirensis 1086 of the late ninth or early tenth century.
 - B Bembinus, now Vaticanus 3252, of the late ninth or early tenth century.
 - E Parisinus 8093 of the tenth century.
 - A Parisinus 7927 of the late tenth or early eleventh century.
 - T Parisinus 8069 of the eleventh century.

ΓVB I collated in Rome in 1953; I possess photographs of ΓVSFCWBEAT.¹ Other MSS, mostly of the fifteenth century, are worthless except for the few emendations which they contain and may be disregarded here.

That ΓVSFCL are all descended from the same MS (Ω) is clear from the errors which they share; their relationship to one another is less easily determined. The first to study this problem in detail was Vollmer, whose solution to it has been generally accepted. Vollmer's main

achievement was to reconstruct, with great patience and acumen, the *Iuuenalis Ludi Libellus* and to discern its true character: it is a Carolingian "edition," inferior in integrity to the other MSS and much inferior to Γ , the latest and most obviously corrupt of them.² Here is Vollmer's stemma:



A digression is at once necessary to explain a feature of this stemma. Exc. stands for a medieval florilegium containing, along with many verses of other Latin poets, about 62 verses (three are incomplete) of the *Culex*. This florilegium is preserved in five MSS,³ ranging in date from the late twelfth to the fourteenth century, and seems to have been produced in the north of France. The excerptor, a poet of considerable facility, chose out from the *Culex* verses which he could combine and adapt to illustrate two themes: *De beatitudine pauperis uite* and *Quam feliciter et quiete uiuat in praesenti qui contentus est modicis*.⁴ This ingenious patchwork Vollmer thought the purest source of the text ("purissimus in Culice uerborum fons"): he praised its quality, regretted its brevity, and assigned it for no good reason to the eleventh century. More probably it was produced in the twelfth, the *aetas Ouidiana*; for it contains more of Ovid than of any other poet. This florilegium, either alone or together with some late and emended MSS (s), offers an obviously right reading in seven places.

64 *domus* Exc. s: *domos* Ω

68 *at* Exc. s: *a* Ω

71 *dulci* Exc. s: *dulcis* Ω

73 *et* Exc. s: om. Ω

83 *nec* Exc.: *non* Ω

155 *quos* Exc.: *qu(a)e* Ω

342 *decus* Exc.: *deus* Ω

The question is: are all or any of these readings emendations? All of them are in my judgment, mostly slight and easy. The insertion of *et* in 73 may be thought rather subtle, but the excerptor inserted *et*, wrongly it happened, in 92 and 225 also. Certainly these corrections were not beyond the powers of a versifier who could replace *pastor* with *letus* in 99, *et quamquam* with *hinc illi* in 150, *excelsisque super* with *excelsis supra* in 155, *ne quisquam* — if that is what he had before him — with *cur aliquis* in 340. In France during the twelfth century there were Latin poets capable of some elegance. The peculiar readings of Exc., then, are conjectures or willful alterations; and no part of the tradition.⁵

The chief objection to be made against Vollmer's stemma is this, that it cannot be reconciled with the evidence of the MSS.

If FV have a wrong reading and SFCL (where S and F are available) a right reading, then in terms of Vollmer's stemma the wrong reading stood in y and z, and hence in Ω, and the right reading is necessarily an emendation by the scribe of u. There are at least six places⁶ where Vollmer's stemma compels us to make this assumption:

19 *naides* FCL: *naiades* FV

240 *amni* CL: *amni* V: *annus* Γ

256 *auersatus* SCL: *aduersatus* FV

371 *rapidis* SFCL: *romanis* FV

380 *dimittes* FCL: *dimitteres* FV

400 *spartica* FCL: *parthica* V: *pastica* Γ

Can these right readings be the emendations of a ninth-century scribe?⁷ Not unless we suppose him to have been a scribe unlike others and indeed unlike himself, if we may judge of his character from the rest of his work: so attentive to meter (but elsewhere not much concerned about it) as to change *naiades* to *naides*; so careful of sense (but elsewhere tolerant of nonsense) as to change *aduersatus* to *auersatus*; so clever as to change *partica* to *spartica*, a word of his own inventing, for it occurs only here; and, finally, so perverse as to change *romanis*, which makes meter and a kind of sense, to *rapidis*, which makes neither.⁸

If we examine Vollmer's stemma so far as it concerns the relationship of SFCL, we are met with a similar difficulty. How, for example, is the reading of CL to be explained in 354?


capherei CL: *capheren* Γ: *capharei* V: *capherea* SF

Or, a more telling example, the reading of CL (and V, here contaminated) in 192?

dextra detraxit ab arbore truncum Γ
detraxit ab arbore dextra truncum SF
dextra truncum detraxit ab ore CLV

The reading of the archetype (Ω), preserved in Γ , was corrupted in two different ways. One scribe, misled by the likeness of *dextra* and *detraxit*, omitted *dextra*, then saw his error and wrote *dextra* above the verse; later somebody else inserted it, with a slight alteration for the sake of meter, between *arbore* and *truncum*. Another scribe, misled by the likeness of *ab* and *arb-*, omitted *arb-* and wrote *dextra detraxit ab ore truncum*; later somebody else — for the scribe would have corrected his mistake, had he noticed it, from his exemplar — rearranged the words for the sake of meter. It is important to recognize that the corruption in CL cannot be derived from the corruption (or rather the source of the corruption) in SF: both are corruptions of the archetypal reading, made independently of each other. But, in terms of Vollmer's stemma, a corruption common to S and F necessarily appeared in u and v, and a corruption common to C and L, a corruption of w therefore, must be the same as that in v or at least derivable from it.⁹

What is wanted is a stemma that will permit the readings of SFCL (or SCL or FCL or CL, if the evidence of F or S or both is lacking) where those of Γ V are different, and the readings of CL where those of SF are different, to be regarded as traditional. I offer the following stemma:



I do not think my stemma, or rather my modification of Vollmer's stemma, quite perfect. I shall set out the evidence for it, trying not to scant the evidence (for some there is) against it.

The main cleavage in the tradition is that which divides FV from SFCL. To account for this I posit two ninth-century hyparchetypes, α and β , α much less corrupt than β . The archetype (Ω) was probably an early ninth-century MS; but, since the evidence is so slight and ambiguous,¹⁰ it can have differed very little from the ancient MS of which it was a copy. The readings of α are represented by FV where FV have not been contaminated, the readings of β by SFCL or SCL or FCL or CL. I omit from the following list the erroneous readings of FV which I have already cited. For a reason to be given presently, the readings of FVW or VW may be treated simply as the readings of FV or V.

- 10 *poliantur* FVW: *spoliantur* FCL
- 13 *recinente* FVW: *recanente* FCL (so also in 72)
- 21 *fetura* FV: *secura* FCL
- 114 *futurum* FVW: *futuram* CL
- 128 *pheton* FV: *phoeton* CL
- 137 *addita* FV: *edita* CL
- 141 *ligantes* FV: *ligantis* CL
- 210 *ad que* VW: *ad quem* F: *atque* FCL
- 237 *tytios* F: *ticius* V: *titias* C: *tityas* L
- 244 *acerbans* V: *acerbam* F: *acerbas* SL: *acerba* C
- 254 *cadmeo* FV: *cat(h)meo* SCL
- 266 *illa* FV: *illam* SCL
- 308 *ducis* FV: *duos* SFCL
- 309 *uidere* FV: *uide* S: *uidi* FCL
- 310 *neces ignes* V: *ne te signes* F: *ne te (nece* F: *necte* SW) *signas* (*signis* C) SFCL
- 311 *ab* FV: *et* SFCL
- 312 *ida* FV: *et da* S: *daque* CL
- 334 *generamen* (*gener ante* F) *prolis* FV: *gener amplis* SFCL
- 340 *ne quisquam* V: *nec quicquam* F: *neque* SFCL
- 343 *argoa petens* (*appetens* F) FV: *argo repetens* (*petens* F) SFCL
- 352 *ac ruere* V: *aruere* F: *acuere* SFCL
- 355 *egaeque* FV: *ereaque* SFL: *nereaque* C
- 357 (cited below)
- 361 *oratia* FV: *oratio* SFCL
- 363 *mediis* FV: *medius* SFCL

- 370 *scipiadasque* V: *scipiatosque* Γ: *istarum piadasque* SFCL
 399 *pudibunda* ΓV: *rubicunda* FCL
ruborem ΓV: *-ta rorem* F: *per orbem* C: *terrorem* L

C and L, the least estimable MSS of the poem, are closely related; and Vollmer was no doubt right to derive them from the same source. Such differences as appear in them result mainly from the efforts of the scribes, and especially the scribe of C, to improve the text. It is more difficult to determine the relationship of S and F to each other and to C and L; for the evidence is inconclusive. Three corruptions (two of which, those in 192 and 354, I have already cited) indicate that S and F are copied from the same MSS:

- 307 *xant(h)ique* ΓCL: *x(h)anctique* SF: *sanxtique* V

But three others cast some doubt on the closeness of the relationship:

- 191 *exanimis* VS: *exanimi* Γ: *exanimus* FCL
 197 *tempora* ΓVS: *timpora* FCL
 309 *uidere* ΓV: *uide* S: *uidi* FCL

exanimus and *uidi* (*timpora* is so trivial as hardly to matter) may be casual changes made in F independently of S; or, possibly, readings introduced from δ into the source of F.¹¹ One other corruption, that in 357, ought to be noticed here, since it has some bearing on the relationship of SFCL:

- omnis in equoreo fluitat iam* (*fluit atia* Γ) *naufraga* (*naufrage* Γ) *luctu*
 (*fluctu* V²) ΓV
omnis in equoreo fluctuat naufragia luctu S
omnis fluctuat in aequoreo naufragia luctu F
fluctuat omnis in equoreo naufragia luctu CL

The scribe of β (I assume) carelessly read *fluitat* as *fluctuat* and *naufraga* as *naufragia*, and omitted *iam*. In this form the verse was copied into γ, and from γ into S; the scribes of F and δ made further changes of their own. This corruption, like those of 191, 197, and 309, can also be explained by Vollmer's stemma, perhaps even better than by my own; but others, as I have shown, cannot.

I turn now to the problem of contamination.

In some places V agrees with the other MSS in error against Γ.

- 192 (cited above)
 202 *Erebeis* Haupt: *erebois* Γ : *ereboeis* FCLV
 210 *quis inquit meritis* Heyne: *quid inquit meritis* Γ S(?): *inquit quid meritis* FCLV
 262 *preferre* Γ : *perferre* SCLV
 337 *Troia ruenti* Bembo: *troias uenti* Γ : *troia furenti* SFCLV
 346 *passim flexis* Housman: *parsim flexis* Γ : *pars inflexis* SFCLV
 351 *soles* Γ : *solis* SFCLV
 352 *laetans* Ellis: *letam* Γ : *l(a)etum* SFCLV
 366 *cui cessit lidithime* Γ : *legitime* (et add. S) *cessit cui* (*cui cessit* F) SFCLV
 376 *dicere* Γ : *discere* FCLV

In other places Γ agrees with the other MSS in error against V. Again, readings of VW may be counted as unique readings of V.

- 84 *transcendat* VW: *transcendit* CL Γ Exc.
 88 *herb(a)e* VW: *herbis* CL Γ
 93 *liget* VW: *licet* CL Γ
 119 *pernix remorantem* V: *pernigre morantem* CL Γ
 216 *uiden ut* Bembo: *uides ut* V: *uidi ut* (et Γ) SFCL Γ
 237 *tue . . . ire* V: *tuas . . . iras* CL Γ
 243 *aduerso* V: *auerso* CL Γ
 249 *uecordem* V: *tu cordam* SCL Γ
 colchida V: *conchida* SCL: *conduda* Γ
 252 *quo* V: *quod* SCL Γ
 268 *quid* V: *qui* SCL Γ
 274 *defossasque* VW: *nec fossasque* SCL Γ
 301 *sociate* V: *sociat de* SCL Γ

In these places we have to do, I am convinced, with contamination; and I cannot agree with Vollmer that the unique readings of V, unlike the unique readings of Γ , are necessarily conjectures. However debased, a MS may yet preserve relics of the tradition. Γ and V are late MSS: in the MSS that intervened between each of them and α (for neither can have been copied directly from α) the readings of α were gradually replaced with those of L.¹² Since more MSS are derived from L than from any other MS, we may infer that the text of L became a sort of vulgate;¹³ and bad coin drives out good. In the Pithœanus of Persius and Juvenal we can see what must have happened to the antecedents of Γ and V. The Pithœanus, a MS of the ninth century, preserves readings

not found in other MSS or found in only a very few of them. From the tenth century on these readings were gradually replaced with trivial readings taken from one or another of a large group of inferior MSS.¹⁴ Now if the Pithoeanus itself were lost but had been copied in the thirteenth or fourteenth century, what sort of MS would the copy be? (A medieval scribe, it should be remembered, was no paleographer; he would not strain his eyes to see what lay under an erasure or a correction.) It would be a MS rather like Γ or V (though not so interpolated as V), a MS offering some unique or rare readings along with many ordinary ones.

In some places W, in other respects a typical member of the L group, deserts its fellows to join V. I omit from the following list examples which I have already cited.

- 28 *qu(a)e* Γ FCL: *quo* VW
 35 *currere carmina* Γ FCL: *carmina currere* VW
 41 *lucens* Γ FCL: om. VW
 73 *inuidia* Γ FCL Exc.: *inuidi(a)e* VW
 92 *requie uictu* VW: *requiem uictu* Γ : *requiem uictus* CL
 97 *traducit* Γ VW Exc.: *traducis* CL
 124 *quas* Γ FCL: *quas erat* VW
 405 *que prius* Γ SFCL: om. VW

Of this occasional, irregular union there can be, as Vollmer saw, only one explanation: some readings were transferred from an antecedent of V to an antecedent of W, probably the exemplar of W. This antecedent of V was a ninth-century MS; for W is of the late ninth or early tenth century.

To this account of the tradition of the text I append a few notes on the text itself.

I

- 1-3 Lusimus, Octauī, gracili modulante Thalia
 atque ut araneoli tenuem formauimus orsum;
 lusimus: haec propter culicis sint carmina docta

Most editors before Leo (Berlin, 1891) understood *haec propter* as an anastrophe, *propter haec*. Leo demurred: "*haec propter* coniungere uereor, quoniam carmen ipsum est lusus ille, non carmen propter lusum, et culicis carmen num componere uoluerit dubito; . . . sed uiam doctus amicus mihi monstrauit, qui coniungendum esse uidit *propter culicis* ac dicere poetam: *haec docta carmina propter culices sint, culices in causa sint ut doctum carmen extet . . .*" This bad conjecture has enjoyed a measure of success: two editors¹⁵ besides Leo accept it, and in *ThLL* III.466.56 it stands without any indication that it is a conjecture. Leo and his learned friend were mistaken about the sense of verse 3. The poet, pretending to be the youthful Virgil, addresses Virgil's friend (as he imagines) Octavius:¹⁶ Virgil and Octavius, like Catullus¹⁷ and Calvus, had spent some leisure hours together composing graceful and elegant verses; now because of this experience Virgil hopes that the *Culex*, which he offers to Octavius, may be of a similar elegance. The adjectives *gracilis*, *tenuis*, and *doctus*, when applied to poetry, have much the same connotation. There seems to be only one other example of this anastrophe in Latin poetry, Lucan i.584; although editors of the *Culex* do not cite Lucan, or editors of Lucan the *Culex*. Perhaps Lucan remembered *haec propter* here—he had read the *Culex*; at any rate his sense of tone would have kept him from writing *quapropter*.¹⁸ *carmina* is a poetic plural,¹⁹ *culicis* a genitive of definition.²⁰ Whether *culicis* ought to be capitalized or not is a nice question, especially since it could not have occurred to the author of the *Culex*.

II

11-13 Latonae magnique Iouis decus, aurea proles,
Phoebus erit nostri princeps et carminis auctor
et recinente lyra fautor

recinente IVW: *recanente* FCL

There are only eight examples of the verb *recino* in Latin poetry, half of them in Horace.²¹ And here there seems to be a reminiscence of Horace, *Carm.* iii.28.11-12 *tu curua recines lyra/Latonam*.²² The force of the prefix can be felt in Horace's ode (for *nos cantabimus inuicem* precedes), but hardly in the *Culex*. A peculiar fondness for this prefix is a feature of our poet's style:²³ he employs it even when it is otiose or inappropriate.

III

- 62 si non Assyrio fuerint bis lota colore
 lota Γ Exc.: *lauta* FC (*uel lota* sscr. C²) LV

Salvatore, following Klotz,²⁴ prefers *lota* because it is vulgar; other editors prefer *lauta*. I agree that *lota* should be read, but for quite a different reason: in Latin of this period *lautus* is invariably an adjective.²⁵ Here are examples culled from three poets: Persius, iii.93 *loturo* (*lut-* P: *laut-* NW), v. 86 *lotus* (part.), vi.23 *lautus* (adj.); Lucan, i.600 *lotam* (part.), iv.376 *latae* (adj.); Juvenal, i.67 *lautum* (adj.), vi.429 *loto* (part.), vi.464 *lota* (part.), xi.1 *lautus* (adj.), xiv.13 *lauto* (adj.), xiv.257 *lauti* (adj.). Once the distinction between these two forms had been established, *lotus* would tend to lose its vulgar nuance.

IV

- 115-22 hic etiam uiridi ludentes Panes in herba
 et Satyri Dryadesque chorus egere puellae
 Naiadum coetu: tantum non† orridus† Hebrum
 restantem tenuit ripis siluasque canendo
 quantum te, pernix, remorantem, diua, chorea
 multa tuo laetae fundentes gaudia uultu,
 ipsa loci natura domum resonante susurro
 quis dabat et dulci fessas refouebat in umbra.
- 117 in post *Naiadum* add. Wakefield
 (*h*)*orridus* (*orridus* C) ΓCL: *horpheus* V
 et editorum plures

The sense of 115-17 is clear enough—here on the green grass Pans, Satyrs, and Dryads danced with Naiads; but how is *coetu* to be construed? as an ablative of accompaniment without preposition or modifier? Wakefield's conjecture, which no editor accepts, seems to me as necessary as it is simple. The corruption assumed is slight and common; the elision of a kind which the poet, on the whole chary of elision, permits himself;²⁶ the postposition of *in* perfectly idiomatic.²⁷

The author of the *Culex* was a bad poet but a good metrist; and, despite his editors, could not have written *Orpheus* in 117.²⁸ What he wrote, Heinsius, I think, guessed: *non tantum Oeagrius*. Proper names, especially uncommon ones, were liable to depravation; and after *Oeagrius* had been turned into (*h*)*orridus*, meter was restored by chang-

ing *non tantum* to *tantum non*. *tantum non . . . quantum* seems an awkward correlation; but editors, to judge from their silence, find nothing remarkable about it. The poet had in mind, it would appear, the cadence of a Virgilian hexameter, *Georg.* iv.524 *Oeagrius Hebrus*.

The syntax of 119–20 is not perspicuous. *chorea* is an ablative—not a nominative, as some editors would have it; the construction would be intolerably harsh—and balances *canendo* in the preceding verse, as *remorantem* balances *restantem*. *tenuerunt* is to be understood from *tenuit* in 118, and a subject for *tenuerunt* from *quis* in 122; a similar construction can be found in 151. The striking zeugma (“miro zeugmate” Leo) in 118 results from the poet’s wish to compare the effect produced on the Hebrus by Orpheus’ singing with the effect produced on Diana by the nymphs’ dancing. Four of the seven verbal forms in this passage bear the prefix *re*: in the first of these it works against the sense, in the second it is indifferent, in the third significant, in the fourth again indifferent. I have already commented on the poet’s fondness for this prefix.

V

- 127–8 at, quibus ignipedum curru proiectus equorum
ambustus Phaethon luctu mutauerat artus
- ignipedum* Heinsius: *insigni* Ω, edd.; *ignito* Maehly,
insueto Baehrens, *in signis* Bickel

The noun that needs no modifier has one, while the noun that has no modifier needs one: such is the difficulty in 127 as presented by the MSS. Heinsius’ *ignipedum* corrects the rhetorical imbalance: *Ov. Met.* v. 360 *curruque atrorum uectus equorum*, *Val. Flacc.* v. 183 *alipedum Iuno iuga sistit equorum*, *Stat. Theb.* vi.558 *alipedumque fugam praegressus equorum*. Only if *equorum* had a modifier would *insigni* be tolerable: *Verg. Georg.* iv.389 *iuncto bipedum curru metitur equorum*, *Ciris* 395 *glauco bipedum curru metitur equorum*, *Stat. Theb.* ii.724 *intemeratarum uolucer rapit axis equarum*. *ignipedum* is confirmed by *Ov. Met.* ii.392 (Phaethon) *ignipedum uires expertus equorum*—the author of the *Culex* knew the *Metamorphoses*²⁹—and by *Stat. Theb.* i.27 *ignipedum frenator equorum*. Probably the corruption was ancient and appeared in the capital MS from which our MSS are derived: if the letters PEDVM had been overlooked by a copyist or somehow obliterated, QVIBVSIGN-ICVRRV would remain; and *insigni* would suggest itself or be suggested by the recollection of *Aen.* vii.655 *insignem . . . currum* or possibly *Lucr.* vi.47 *insignem . . . currum*.

Sudhaus first stated the argument for reading *ignipedum*,³⁰ and what he wrote ought to have been convincing; since it was not, I have ventured to restate the argument with some elaboration.

VI

154-5 at circa passim fessae cubuere capellae
 excelsis subter dumis

excelsis subter Heyne: *excelsisque super* Ω

A few editors—Ellis, Giomini, Salvatore—keep the reading of the MSS; most accept Heyne's conjecture. Broekhusius had already proposed *excelsos subter dumos*, which may be what the poet wrote. *subter* with the ablative is, according to Kühner-Stegmann,³¹ "nur poetisch": so simple a formulation is misleading. *subter* is construed with the accusative in prose and occasionally with the ablative in poetry, but (a brief investigation seems to show) only in those places where the accusative would be metrically impossible. Lucretius has four examples of *subter*: i.2 *subter labentia signa* vi.785 *eas subter*, vi.851 *subter terras*, vi.857 *subter . . . terram*; Catullus one: 65.7 *Rhoeteo . . . subter litore*; Virgil five: Aen. iii.695 *subter mare*, viii.366 *subter fastigia*, viii.418 *quam subter*, ix.514 *subter densa testudine*, xii.532 *lora et iuga subter*; Propertius one: ii.34.67 *subter pineta Galaesi*; Ovid two: *Met.* v.502 *subter imas . . . cauernas*, *Fast.* iii.453 *subter sidera lapso*; the *Culex* two:³² 106 *subter uiridem . . . muscum*, and the one under discussion; Persius two: iii.41 *subter ceruices terruit*, iv.43 *ilia subter*; Valerius Flaccus one: iv.594 *subter iuga*; Statius eleven: *Theb.* i.713 *subter caua saxa*, ii.412-13 *subter inanis* / . . . *latebras*, ii.503 *quam subter*, iv.87 *subter latus ense*, iv.415 *subter confinia*, vii.357 *subter equos*, vii.444 *quem subter*, x.86 *subterque cauis graue rupibus antrum*, x.105-6 *umentia subter* / *antra*, x.318 *subter iuga fida rotasque*, xii.711 *subter moenia*; the *Peruig. Ven.* one: 82 *subter genesias*. Although poets employ the accusative where the ablative is possible, no poet to my knowledge, unless it be the author of the *Culex*, employs the ablative where the accusative is possible. The corruption of *excelsos subter dumos*, if that is what the poet wrote, is easily explained: *subter*, or rather *supter*, was mistaken for *super*,³³ whereupon the accusatives were changed to ablatives³⁴ and *-que* was attached to *excelsis* for the sake of the meter.³⁵

Editors ought not to cite *supra* from the Excerpta as if it were a vestige of the true reading. The arrangement of verses in the Excerpta is this: 100 154 148 149 146 147 150 151 152 153 157 155 156. In the context

which the compiler had made for himself *-que* was superfluous, but without it *super* was unmetrical; so he invented *supra*.

VII

243-6 quid, saxum procul aduerso qui monte reuoluit,
contempsisse dolor quem numina uincit acerbans
otia quaerentem frustra sibi? ite puellae,
ite, quibus taedas accendit tristis Erinyes

245 *sibi ite* Heinsius: *siblite* CL: *sub lite* Γ:
ceu rite (*rite* in spat. uac. V²)V

Heinsius' emendation, which only Salvatore accepts, is flawless. It differs by half a letter from the archetypal corruption, *siblite* CL; Γ is slightly, V grossly, interpolated. Hiatus after a strong pause at the bucolic diaeresis appears twice in Virgil, *Buc.* 8.11 and *Aen.* i.405; and since the author of the *Culex* nowhere else admits hiatus, it may be supposed he had one or both of these places in mind.³⁶ The epanalepsis is elegant, or so at least it seemed to an elegant poet, Statius *Theb.* iv. 692-3 *ite uolentes, / ite in operta soli*.

VIII

265-7 ecce Ithaci coniunx semper decus Icarotis
femineum concepta manet, manet et procul illa
turba ferox iuuenum

manet manet Clausen: *decus manet* Ω

To the stylistic parallels which I cited in support of my emendation in *AJP*, 76 (1955) 56, I would now add Ov. *Met.* i.642 *Naides ignorant, ignorat et Iuppiter ipse*.

IX

286-8 haec eadem potuit, Ditis, te uincere, coniunx,
Eurydicenque uiro ducendam reddere: non fas,
non erat in uitam diuae exorabile mortis.

inuita . . . (*Diua*) Sillig, *inuitae* Ladewig,
ire uiam Ellis *dirae* codd. recc., *durae* Ellis,
ius Baehrens

The elision in verse 288 is harsh for this poet, and his language, if all

of it is his, very obscure; still, sense of a kind can be extorted from it. Charmed by the magic of Orpheus' lyre Proserpina returned Eurydice to him, but she could not finally prevail on death to yield up a soul to life. *mortis* is taken with *fas* and *diuiae*, a dative, with *exorabile*: such, in brief, is Leo's interpretation. The poet was embarrassed, as bad poets will be, by a craving after elegance. He evidently decided to contrast *uitam*, which for emphasis he put before the main caesura, with *mortis*; and, that decision taken, he pieced out the rest of the verse as best he could. If emendation is needed, which I doubt, it is clear that *uitam* should not be touched.³⁷

Even great Latin poets sometimes allow rhetoric to get slightly the better of sense. I choose an example, one pertinent to this note, from Propertius, ii.12.5-6:

idem non frustra uentosas addidit alas,
fecit et humano corde uolare deum.

haut uano Nodell, *heu uano* Barber,
hunc uario Weidgen

The first artist to depict the god of love had marvelous skill; he equipped him with wings and made him fly in the human heart. Shackleton Bailey, reasonably, objects: "The vulgate in 6 could only mean that the artist painted love flying about inside the human heart. To say nothing of the pictorial difficulties, what becomes of the allegory? To fly within the human heart is not the same as to fly from one heart to another . . ." ³⁸ True, the sense may be vague, but the rhetoric is precise; and it is not scribes who set *humano* before the caesura of a verse that ends with *deum*.

X

Words Repeated

It has been noticed³⁹ more than once that the author of the *Culex* repeats himself; but the way in which he repeats himself is also remarkable. His imagination, being feeble, was easily dominated by words and phrases: in the space of a few verses he will repeat a word or several words two or three times; and he may use these words nowhere else.⁴⁰

To appreciate the character of these repetitions, which I merely list the reader should have a text of the poem open before him.

22 *cultus*

23 *cultrice*

For *cultrice* Scaliger proposed *tutrice*.

- 37 *memorabilis*
- 38 *lucens*
- 38 *mansura*
- 39 *maneant*
- 40 *memoretur* VFCL: *remoretur* Γ sicut coni. Baehrens
- 41 *lucens*

remoretur seems to make better sense than *memoretur*, but *memoretur* is guaranteed by the presence of *memorabilis* in 37.

- 47 *gramina*
- 48 *uagae*
- 49 *uagantes*
- 50 *gramina*
- 50 *morsu*
- 52 *carpuntur*
- 54 *carpente*
- 54 *morsu*
- 86 *colitur*
- 87 *colit*
- 89 *requies*
- 90 *curis*
- 91 *cura*
- 92 *requie*
- 106 *uiridem residebant*
- 109 *residere uirenti*
- 115 *uiridi*

For *residebant* Heinsius proposed *saliebat* (thus depriving the poet of a favorite prefix), Heyne *resonabant*.

- 149 *sonat*
- 150 *uox*
- 151 *uoces*
- 152 *sonitus*
- 198 *languore*
- 201 *languescere*
- 205 *requiem*
- 207 *languida*
- 207 *requierunt*

216 *ut flagrantia*

220 *ut* (Clausen: *et* Ω) . . . *flagrant*

See *AJP* 76 (1955) 54.

233 *in omnia*

238 *esca*

241 *escas*

242 *in omnia*

242 *reuolutus*

243 *reuoluit*

cura in 264 is derived from *cura* in 263, and *decus* in 266 from *decus* in 265; both words are corrupt.

266 *manet*

269 *manet*

303 *feritate*

311 *feritatis*

In 300 *feritas* V is certainly corrupt, although Vollmer accepts it; other MSS have *ferit ast*.

345 *unda*

347 *sideris*

349 *anxia*

349 *unda*

350 *sideribus*

351 *sidera*

353 *anxia*

354 *fluctus*

357 *fluctu*

358 *uirtutis*

359 *mediisque*

361 *uirtus*

363 *mediis*

364 *deuotum*

365 *corpore*

367 *uirtutis*

368 *deuota*

368 *corpora*

370 *deuota*

"*deuotum* occurred in 364 and *deuota* will occur in 370, so we can dispense with it here [368]." Housman, *CR* 16 (1902) 345.

373 *cogor*

377 *cogunt*

391 *conformare*

394 *cura*

395 *congestum*

396 *formatum*

397 *formans*

398 *conserit* Ω: *congerit* Heinsius

398 *curae*

398 *memor*

403 *cura*

406 *memor*

For *cura* in 403 Heinsius proposed *turba*, Leo (after Scaliger) *tura*.

Latin poets were rather insensitive to verbal repetition; but no Latin poet, not even Lucan, was quite so insensitive as the author of the *Culex*. In the *Bellum Ciuile*, a long and unfinished poem, I have noticed only one passage that might be compared, for ineptitude and slovenliness, with these passages in the *Culex*, ii.212-20:

212 *praecipites*

212 *haesere*

213 *aquae*

213 *amnis*

213 *aequor*

214 *unda*

214 *sanguinis*

215 *campumque*

216 *praecipitique*

217 *haerentis*

217 *aquas*

217 *amnem*

218 *campo*

219 *undas*

220 *sanguine*

220 *aequor*

Casual repetition of this sort must be distinguished from repetition for artistic effect, from that found (for example) in Virgil's fourth *Eclogue*.

A feature of that poem is the repetition of the adjective *magnus*: 5 *magnus*, 12 *magni*, 22 *magnos*, 36 *magnus*, 48 *magnos*, 49 *magnum*. *Sicelides Musae, paulo maiora canamus*: now the poet's theme is a higher one, the return of the world's great age (*magnus . . . saeculorum . . . ordo*); and the elevation of the opening verse is sustained, in part at least, by the recurring adjective.⁴¹ To such art the author of the *Culex* was a stranger.

NOTES

1. For photographs of F and W, I am indebted to the kindness of Mlle. J. Vielliard, Directrice of the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes in Paris.

2. *P. Virgilii Maronis Iuvenalis Ludi Libellus, Sitzungsber. der kön. bay. Akad. der Wiss., philos.-philol. u. hist. Kl.*, 11 (1908 — published 1909). Buechner, *RE* II *Reihe*, VIII.1.1089-90, summarizes Vollmer's opinions without comment. One representative of L, the Bembinus, long enjoyed a high repute: it was the oldest MS of the *Culex*, its owner had been an illustrious humanist, and better MSS were unknown. In 1908 Housman, *Trans. of the Cambr. Philol. Soc.*, VI 3, could still describe it as one of "the three main pillars on which the text should stand." In 1952 A. Salvatore, *Annali della Facoltà di Lett. e di Fil., Univ. di Napoli*, II 11-44, made a vain attempt to restore the Bembinus to its former pride of place.

3. See B. L. Ullman, *CP* 28 (1932) 1-5.

4. The text has been edited by Vollmer, *Poetae Latini Minores* I (Leipzig 1910) 5-8.

5. For a similar estimate of Exc. see E. K. Rand, *HSCP* 30 (1919) 125, n.2, and E. J. Kenney, *CQ* N S.12 (1962) 29-30.

6. Or seven, if 295 is counted: *grauet uos*] *grauet tuos* SBWE: *grauet uos* V: *grauet non* Γ (*tuos graue* in C and *tuos graue* in AT are corruptions of *grauet tuos*.)

7. The date of the scribe is delimited on the one side by the corruption in 334 — *gener amplis* SFCL for *generamen prolis* — which presupposes minuscule script, and on the other by the age of the Bembinus.

8. *rapidis*, since it is unmetrical and unintelligible, is nearer to the truth than *romanis*, which may be owing to a reminiscence of *Georg.* ii.148.

9. Vollmer (above, n.2) 41, assumes that two different scribes made the same error and two different correctors the same correction — surely an improbable coincidence.

10. I cannot find any certainly minuscule error common to the whole tradition. In 273 *obtentu* IVCL for *obtentu* S (an inadvertent "emendation" I suspect; *maesta* precedes) may result from the misreading of open *a* as *u*. A few conjectures, if true, would imply a minuscule archetype, Bembo's *serua* for *ferit* in 300, for example.

11. In 327, S agrees with CL against IVF; but the error in S could have been made independently of that in CL. In 210 the reading of S is uncertain.

12. Thus the corruption of V (*astrigerum*) in 15 is clearly derived from the corruption of L (*astrigeri*).

13. See Vollmer (above, n.2) 41.

14. These readings were not all interpolated at one time by a single hand (P²), as editors of Juvenal (myself included) state or imply.

15. C. Plésent (Paris 1910) and R. Giomini (Rome 1953); also W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom, Hermes, Einzelschr.* 16 (1960) 307.

16. But only with difficulty can he think of the deified Augustus as an adolescent; hence, in 25-6, *Octauī uenerande . . . sancte puer*.

17. 50. 1-5 Hesterno, Licini, die otiosi
multum lusimus in meis tabellis
ut conuenerat esse delicatos:
scribens uersiculos uterque nostrum
ludebat numero modo hoc modo illoc

18. B. Axelson, *Unpoetische Wörter* (Lund 1945) 80: "Auch *quapropter* gebraucht Lukrez gern, bei den anderen Dichtern sucht man es vergeblich."

19. Examples in *ThLL* II.473.71-8.

20. Examples in *ThLL* II.473. 59-61.

21. *Carm.* i.12.3, iii.27.1, iii.28.11, *Epist.* i.1.55; *Culex* 13, 72; *Laus Pisonis* 69; *Stat. Theb.* vi.923. It may be mere chance that Terentianus Maurus, in describing the meter of Horace's *Epodes*, writes (2916) *nunc unum recinens dato priori*.

22. Noticed in passing by R. S. Radford, *Philol.* 86 (1930-31) 116, along with some other possible reminiscences of Horace.

23. See Buechner, *RE*, II Reihe, VIII.1.1103. For this reason I accept Ellis' *resident* in 358; for this reason, too, I incline to think that *restat* should be kept in 241 (Heinsius' *exstat* is universally accepted): only the topmost part of Tantalus, and scarcely that, remains out of the water. If *restat* is kept, there will be four verbs with the prefix *re* in 240-43; see my comment on 118-22 at the end of note IV.

24. *Hermes* 61 (1926) 31: "Wir haben keinen Grund dem Culexdichter die plebejische Form abzusprechen."

25. Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. étym.*⁴, 345.

26. See Plésent, *Le Culex* (Paris 1910) 416.

27. See *ThLL* VII.804.76-805.5.

28. See Housman's note on Manilius i.350.

29. See E. Fraenkel, *JRS* 42 (1952) 8; Klotz (above, n.24) 41. The similarity of *Culex* 181 to *Met.* ii. 360 had been noticed by Plésent (above, n.15) 120, but he drew the wrong conclusion from it.

30. *Rhein. Mus.*, N.F. 68 (1913) 456-57. Since Sudhaus failed to mention that this childishly simple emendation — "Die Ergänzung *igni<pedum>* ist nun kinderleicht" — had already been made by Heinsius, Morel in his *supplementa* to Vollmer's edition (Leipzig 1930), p. ix, assigned it to Sudhaus.

31. *Lat. Gramm.* I. 572.

32. *subter* in verse 75 is an adverb.

33. *Lucr.* ii.1049 *superterque* Lachmann: *superque* OQV; v.626 *supter* Q: *super* O: *subter* O¹; vi.857 *supter* Pontanus: *super* OQ; *Peruig. Ven.* 82 *supter* Broekhusius: *super* codd.

34. A change perhaps suggested by verse 69 *super tenero . . . gramine*.

35. See Housman's note on Manilius iv.776 and pp. 133-34 of the same volume.

36. L. Mueller's objection, *De Re Metrica*², p. 371, is captious.

37. "non possunt autem apertiora esse de consilio scriptoris indicia quam quod in illo uersu mortis et uitae uocabula iuxta posita deprehendimus. haec igitur mordicus tenebimus." Leo. The sense of verse 376 — *ergo iam causam mortis, iam dicere uitae* — is also vague, for the same reason.

38. *Propertiana* (Cambridge 1956) 85.

39. For example, by Plésent (above, n.15) 320–21; and by Buechner (above, n.2) 83.

40. I count words as the same if they are derived from the same root. It very occasionally happens that a poet employs a word twice in a few verses and not again. There is a striking example of such a repetition in Bk. II of the *Aeneid*. The portentous snakes move sinuously (208 *sinuat*) across the quiet water, Laocoon and his sons die, and a strange fear insinuates itself (229 *insinuat*) into the hearts of the Trojans. Neither *sinuo* nor *insinuo* occurs elsewhere in the *Aeneid*. The madness which causes the Trojans to drag the monstrous horse up into their citadel has somehow to do (the reader feels) with the presence of the snakes. The connection here intimated is explicitly made in Bk. VII, 341ff: the fury Allecto drives Amata mad by plucking a serpentine lock from her head and hurling it at the unfortunate queen; the snake takes possession of Amata body and soul, and (as in Bk. II) fatal action ensues.

41. On the repetition *errent* (40), *erras* (52), *errabunda* (58), *errantem* (64) in the sixth *Eclogue* see J. P. Elder, *HSCP* 65 (1961) 119; and, for a discussion of repetitions in ancient and modern poetry, A. B. Cook, *CR* 16 (1902) 146–58, 256–67.

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE *AENEID**

BY WENDELL CLAUSEN

THE *Aeneid* is a literary epic: it refers to a literary tradition and was intended for a literary audience. Virgil uses Homer as he uses Apollonius of Rhodes, or Ennius, or Lucretius; but with this difference: Homer was for Virgil the archetypal poet, the grand original. When Homer sings *μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά*, he invokes the Muse to help him remember old tales of heroes and battles: when Virgil writes *Musa, mihi causas memora*, he makes a literary allusion. In a sense the *Aeneid* is a prolonged literary allusion to Homer; and Virgil expected his readers to be aware of this: our response to the *Aeneid* will depend in good part on our knowledge of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

But the *Aeneid* is above all else a Roman epic. I do not mean merely that Italian names and places are commemorated, or that Roman legends are assimilated to Greek heroic song; I mean rather that the poem is instinct with Roman sensibility. It is an expression, in my opinion the completest expression, of the meaning of Rome. In Trojan Aeneas we recognize a Roman as (when we read the *Oedipus Tyrannus*) we recognize an Athenian in Theban Oedipus. What sort of hero has Virgil chosen to create—or what sort of poem has he made? For the *Aeneid* can be understood most easily, I believe, if we consider the character of Aeneas. By character I mean, quite simply, the impression we get from the poem and call “Aeneas,” trying the while to remember that we have been reading a poem.

arma uirumque cano, Troiae qui primus ab oris
Italiam fato profugus . . .

We learn at the outset and are not allowed to forget thereafter that Aeneas is a fate-driven wanderer, pursuing his reluctant way from Troy

* I originally conceived this interpretation as a short lecture, and for several reasons I have not wished to enlarge it. I am aware, as every interpreter of the *Aeneid* must be, that much more might have been said or written about so long and intricate and beautiful a poem. I can only hope that the simplicity of an interpretation which neglects whole books will not seem to be altogether simple.

to Italy. Troy is his past—we feel this intensely as he tells Dido of Troy's destruction and his part in it—and Italy his future.

Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine laeso
quidue dolens regina deum tot uoluerit casus
insignem pietate uirum, tot adire labores
impulerit.

His signal *pietas*, his awareness of his laborious fate and his acceptance of it, impels Aeneas from the past into the future.

Because of the grave and recurrent emphasis on fate throughout the poem, Aeneas seems a curiously inert hero: he does not so much act as endure *per uarios casus, per tot discrimina rerum*. He first appears in the poem as he confronts a storm stirred up by the divine malice of Juno in the seas off Sicily. He groans, stretches out his hands to the stars, and speaks:

o terque quaterque beati,
quis ante ora patrum Troiae sub moenibus altis
contigit oppetere! o Danaum fortissime gentis
Tydide! mene Iliacis occumbere campis
non potuisse tuaque animam hanc effundere dextra,
saeuus ubi Aeacidae telo iacet Hector, ubi ingens
Sarpedon, ubi tot Simois correpta sub undis
scuta uirum galeasque et fortia corpora uoluit.

(i.94-101)

A strange speech for a hero, especially a hero sailing towards a new world: Aeneas thinks only of the past, of those who fell under Troy's high wall, and wishes he too had died there. Aeneas is more burdened by memory than any other ancient hero; he is unlike Achilles or the typical hero of Greek tragedy, largely careless of the past and only gradually coming to an understanding of the true present. Virgil's Aeneas is not Homer's, a commonplace hero save for his goddess mother. He does bear some resemblance to Odysseus,¹ a suffering voyager who remembers the past; but Aeneas is no adventurer, and has none of Odysseus' resilience or lightheartedness. Aeneas most resembles Hector and Sarpedon, and it can be no accident that their names occur in his opening speech; for they, almost alone of Homer's heroes, strike that note of melancholy resignation so characteristic of Virgil's Aeneas.

εὖ γὰρ ἐγὼ τόδε οἶδα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν·
ἔσσεται ἡμαρ ὅτ' ἄν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρὴ
καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμελίω Πριάμοιο.

(vi.447-9)

ὦ πέπον, εἰ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον περὶ τόνδε φυγόντε
 αἰεὶ δὴ μέλλοιμεν ἀγῆρω τ' ἀθανάτω τε
 ἔσσεσθ', οὔτε κεν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ πρώτοισι μαχοίμην
 οὔτε κε σὲ στέλλοιμι μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν
 νῦν δ' ἔμπης γὰρ κῆρες ἐφ' ἑστᾶσιν θανάτοιο
 μυρίαί, ἃς οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν βροτὸν οὐδ' ὑπαλύξαι,
 ἴομεν, ἥέ τω εὖχος ὀρέξομεν, ἥέ τις ἡμῖν.

(xii.322-8)

Aeneas is always aware of the fate that draws him irresistibly on towards Italy, but rarely happy about it. *Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem*. He expresses his personal disinclination most strongly to Dido when she reproaches him with his secret plan to leave her: he would have preferred, were he free, to go back and rebuild Troy; Italy he seeks against his will. *Italiam non sponte sequor*. Being an instrument of fate, Aeneas is almost devoid of passion or personality. The impression he makes on the reader can be illustrated by one of W. B. Yeats' favorite anecdotes, as reported by Ezra Pound in his *A B C of Reading*:² "A plain sailor man took a notion to study Latin, and his teacher tried him with Virgil; after many lessons he asked him something about the hero. Said the sailor: 'What hero?' Said the teacher: 'What hero! Why, Aeneas, the hero!' Said the sailor: 'Ach, a hero, him a hero? Bigob, I t'ought he waz a priest'." We may have our suspicions of Yeats's "plain sailor man," but the story does suggest an experience that most of us have had in reading the *Aeneid*. Aeneas' actions may be described as valiant, patriotic, devoted; but more and more he becomes the hero who acts in some other and higher interest, like a priest. For a contrast consider the figure of Achilles, proud, hot-headed, young, wildly jealous of his own fame and honor. Here is Achilles reviling Agamemnon, after Agamemnon has threatened to rob him of Briseis:

οἶνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων κραδίην δ' ἐλάφιοι,
 οὔτε ποτ' ἐς πόλεμον ἄμα λαῶ θωρηχθῆναι
 οὔτε λόχονδ' ἰέναι σὺν ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν
 τέτληκας θυμῷ.

(i.225-8)

Only Achilles, we feel, could have said that: it has the ring of personal passion.

Or consider the scene at the beginning of Book XIX, when Achilles receives the divine shield from his mother Thetis. The making of the shield was described at some length at the end of Book XVIII. With marvelous art Hephaestus wrought on it a panorama of human life:

scenes of marriage, wrangling in the market place, fighting around the city, ploughing, harvesting, vintage time, an attack of lions on a herd, singing and dancing, and, surrounding the whole, the river of Ocean. Thetis brings the divine gift to her son, and finds him still in the throes of his maniacal grief for Patroclus: she consoles him with a few words, and sets the glittering and clashing armor before him. Achilles looks at the scenes on the shield, but can think only of sating his personal vengeance and of the condition of his friend's body.

μη̄τερ ἐμή, τὰ μὲν ὄπλα θεὸς πόρεν οἷ' ἐπεικὲς
 ἔργ' ἔμην ἀθανάτων, μηδὲ βροτὸν ἄνδρα τελέσσαι.
 νῦν δ' ἦτοι μὲν ἐγὼ θωρήξομαι· ἀλλὰ μάλ' αἰνῶς
 δεῖδω μή μοι τόφρα Μενoitίου ἄλκιμον υἱὸν
 μυῖαι καδδῦσαι κατὰ χαλκοτύπους ὤτειλās
 εὐλās ἐγγείνωνται, ἀεικίσσωσι δὲ νεκρόν —
 ἐκ δ' αἰὼν πέφεται — κατὰ δὲ χροά πάντα σαπήη.

(xix.21-7)

Virgil alludes to this scene at the end of Book VIII, but the result is very different. For it is a paradox of Virgil's art that he is most himself, most Roman, when imitating Homer or some other Greek poet, as if he were then most conscious of his own individuality. (I should be willing to extend and elevate this remark into a general observation on the character of Latin literature.) Venus finds Aeneas in a secluded valley and presents him with the armor made by Vulcan. Aeneas silently — he is a strangely inarticulate hero — takes into his hands the helmet, the breastplate, the greaves, the spear, the fateful sword; and then cons the scenes of Roman history portrayed on the great shield, from Romulus and Remus to the battle of Actium. His silent survey of the Roman future ends with this heavy, expressive verse, the last of the book:

attollens umero famamque et fata nepotum.

Aeneas takes on himself the burden of his people's destiny as he shoulders the massive, figured shield.

If, then, Aeneas is in some sort the hero I have described — profoundly melancholy, burdened by fate, impersonal — how is it that a poem which recounts his fortunes should move us so deeply? Chiefly the answer must be that we respond to Virgil's beautiful and evocative poetry, to verses which, once heard, cannot quite be forgotten.

forsan et haec olim meminisse iuuabit.

en Priamus. sunt hic etiam sua praemia laudi;
 sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt.

non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.

ibant obscuri sola sub nocte per umbram.

sate sanguine diuum,
Tros Anchisiade, facilis descensus Auerno.

salue aeternum mihi, maxime Palla,
aeternumque uale.

But there is another reason why the *Aeneid* moves us: its larger structure enlists our sympathies on the side of loneliness, suffering, defeat. It is the paradox of the *Aeneid*, the surprise of its greatness, that a poem which celebrates the achievement of a national hero and the founding of Rome itself should be such a long history of defeat and loss. Aeneas finally wins (for such is his fate), but he wins at a terrible cost. He sees every human attachment broken, except that to his son, who is destined to succeed him and possess the fateful fields of Italy—a cold comfort. He is forced to abandon his native city; he loses his wife; his father dies; he deserts the woman who loves him. When he meets the shade of Dido in the underworld and desperately tries to explain, she disdains to speak and turns haughtily away as he cries out:

siste gradum teque aspectu me subtrahe nostro.

(vi.465)

She goes on to rejoin her husband Sychaeus in the shadowy grove, eluding him as a little later the shade of Anchises will elude him, when almost the same words are repeated:

stant sale Tyrrheno classes. da iungere dextram,
da, genitor, teque amplexu ne subtrahe nostro.
sic memorans largo fletu simul ora rigabat.
ter conatus ibi collo dare bracchia circum;
ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago,
par leuibus uentis uolucrique simillima somno.

(vi.697-702)

Ter conatus ibi . . . Where have we heard these words before? At the end of the second book (792-4), when Aeneas attempted to embrace the elusive image of his wife on the fatal night of Troy, when he reached out vainly for a human relationship that no longer existed.³

Troy, Creusa, Dido, Anchises—these were the sorrows of Aeneas before he reached Italy, but his experience there is no happier. He is forced into a war for which he has no will and witnesses the pitiful slaughter of his people. To survive he solicits help from the aged Arcadian prince Evander, whose only son Pallas follows Aeneas to the war

and in Aeneas' absence is killed by Turnus. As Aeneas gazes on the dead body of Pallas, he expresses a sense of failure and impotence, as if he had somehow betrayed his promise to Evander:

non haec Euandro de te promissa parenti
discedens dederam, cum me complexus euntem
mitteret in magnum imperium.

(xi.45-7)

And a little later:

hi nostri reditus expectatique triumphi?
haec mea magna fides?

(xi.54-5)

Aeneas weeps; and as the elaborate and stately funeral cortège forms, he raises two coverlets stiff with purple and gold to place over the body of Pallas:

tum geminas uestis auroque ostroque rigentis
extulit Aeneas, quas illi laeta laborum
ipsa suis quondam manibus Sidonia Dido
fecerat et tenui telas discreuerat auro.

(xi. 72-5)

At this poignant moment in the poem Virgil reminds the reader of Dido, in the old days, happy in her love for Aeneas.

All this labor (in the Virgilian sense) and anguish might have been made to seem more endurable were it consummated or justified somehow in a final triumph. But in the closing scenes of the poem, when Aeneas faces Turnus in a mortal duel, there is little suggestion of triumph, and certainly none of personal triumph. Quite the contrary: it is fated that Turnus shall fall. Turnus knows this and replies to Aeneas' ferocious taunts with something like resignation.

non me tua feruida terrent
dicta, ferox; di me terrent et Iuppiter hostis.

(xii.894-5)

Finally Turnus lies wounded at Aeneas' feet, and in a brief, noble speech asks for mercy. Aeneas hesitates and is about to relent when he sees, gleaming on Turnus' shoulder, the baldric Turnus had stripped from Pallas to wear as a trophy. Maddened by the sight, Aeneas raises his sword:

Pallas te hoc uolnere, Pallas
 immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit.
 hoc dicens ferrum aduerso sub pectore condit
 feruidus. ast illi soluuntur frigore membra
 uitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.

(xii.948-52)

The poem ends with an outburst of savage sorrow and a death. The reader is left with no sense of triumph, but rather with a poignant reminder of Pallas and an awareness that the final obstacle has now been overcome: the fateful fields of Italy have been possessed, the long history of monumental achievement and personal grief is complete.

What is the significance of this final scene? I should like to answer this question, indirectly, by discussing Book VI. I have kept back my comments on Book VI to the end deliberately; for it is in this book, the Janus-book looking to past and future, that Virgil's sense of the Roman fate finds its clearest expression. Aeneas descends into the underworld, with the golden bough as a passport, to confront his past and his future. He encounters the shades of those already dead — Palinurus, Deiphobus, Dido — and the shade of his father Anchises. This experience scarcely over, he notices a throng of souls settled by the river Lethe, like bees in a meadow on a serene summer's day; these are the souls, he learns, of those who shall be born again, among them the heroes-to-be of Rome. *Tua fata docebo*, Anchises tells him; and from the vantage of a low mound Aeneas watches his own posterity file before his eyes: Silvius, Procas, Capys, Numitor, Silvius Aeneas, Romulus, Augustus, Numa, Tullus, Ancus, Brutus, the Decii, the Drusi, Torquatus, Camillus, Caesar, Pompey, Mummius, Aemilius Paulus, Cato, Cossus, the Gracchi, the Scipios, the Fabii, Fabius Maximus, the elder Marcellus. It is a splendid pageant of human greatness, but a melancholy one:

infelix, utcumque ferent ea facta minores.

(vi.822)

With these words Anchises characterizes Brutus, founder and first consul of the Republic, who puts his seditious sons to death "for the sake of beautiful liberty," *pulchra pro libertate*: in the single adjective there is a world of regret.

Virgil's vision of Roman history is not propaganda, for he does not simply proclaim what Rome achieved; nor is it sentimental, for he does not simply dwell on what the achievement cost. Virgil values the achievement of Rome — there are those proud lines (vi.847-53) in which he renounces every claim for Rome save that to imperial grandeur — and

yet he remains aware of the inevitable suffering and loss: it is this perception of Roman history as a long Pyrrhic victory of the human spirit that makes Virgil his country's truest historian. It is a measure of Virgil's greatness, I think, that he withstood the temptation to sentimentality; for it is a temptation which those who write or talk about the *Aeneid* rarely withstand. "All had fought well and, according to their best lights, justly. [This is how one critic⁴ writes about the end of the *Aeneid*.] All bitterness and all passion was now laid at rest, and all could now join hands as comrades and together walk to meet the shining future." This is sentimental: at the end of the *Aeneid* there is no clasping of hands, no walking together towards the shining future. The light is hard and clear: Aeneas has killed Turnus, and on Turnus' shoulder gleams the baldric of Pallas.

Virgil faced a similar temptation, we may suppose, at the end of Book VI: the book might have ended — were Virgil not Virgil — with the praise of Augustus, which occurs earlier, and an optimistic view of the shining future. But the book ends rather with a somber and pathetic laudation of the younger Marcellus, Augustus' nephew and destined successor, who had excited such high hopes, but who was dead when these lines were written. In the underworld Aeneas catches sight of Marcellus, with the shadow of his early death already upon him, and asks who he is. Anchises answers, in the magnificent speech beginning:

o gnate, ingentem luctum ne quaere tuorum.
ostendent terris hunc tantum fata neque ultra
esse sinent.

(vi.868-70)

So closes the vision of Roman greatness, with the sorrowful memorial of Marcellus; and Aeneas leaves the underworld by a route that has always seemed very strange.

sunt geminae somni portae, quarum altera fertur
cornea, qua ueris facilis datur exitus umbris,
altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
sed falsa ad caelum mittunt insomnia manes.

(vi.893-6)

Aeneas is sped on his way by the gate of ivory, the gate of false dreams. Why? Several explanations have been offered. One critic has suggested that the gate of horn was closed to Aeneas because he was not a true shade. It was an ancient superstition, another has pointed out, that dreams before midnight were false, after midnight true; so that when

Virgil sends Aeneas out by the gate of false dreams, he implies only that the other gate was shut, that it was not yet midnight. This explanation may be true in part — the most distinguished modern commentator⁵ on this book has accepted it — but I have a sense, which I cannot quite put into words, that Virgil was not merely telling the time of night.

NOTES

1. Aeneas' first speech is modeled on that of Odysseus (*Od.* V. 299–312), but Virgil has made some significant changes. Odysseus' speech is not his first — he has already made a courtly answer to Calypso's request that he stay on her island (V. 215–24); he wishes he had died at Troy, in a moment of glory, so that he might have been buried with due honor; his concern is for himself alone, and only briefly retrospective.

2. (London 1934), p. 29.

3. And in the second book, when Venus eludes her son's embrace, we find these verses (407–9):

quid natum totiens, crudelis tu quoque, falsis
ludis imaginibus? cur dextrae iungere dextram
non datur ac ueras audire et reddere noces?

Thetis does not withhold herself from her son. (I owe this observation to A. M. Parry.)

4. Moses Hadas, *A History of Latin Literature* (New York 1952) 159.

5. Eduard Norden, whom see for details.

CAESAR'S FINAL AIMS

BY VICTOR EHRENBERG

THE murder of Caesar was an event which reverberated through the centuries, and judgments were greatly contrasted.¹ Dante put Brutus and Cassius into the deepest circle of Hell. Macchiavelli and the eighteenth century celebrated them as the great tyrannicides, the champions of liberty. Roman views contrasted equally.² At any rate, the event meant for Rome new chaos, new civil war. What does it mean to history? What I have said already shows that history has not finally judged. But the historian would very much like to know what would have happened if Caesar had not been killed at the age of fifty-six or fifty-seven. What were his plans for himself, for Rome, for the empire? We shall never know for certain; but in order to find out, or at least approach, the truth about Caesar, and at the same time to understand the conspirators, this is *the* crucial question. Many books and papers have been written on this question; ancient historians have reason to be grateful to Brutus and Cassius for having substantially contributed to their livelihood.

Nobody doubts that Caesar had a quasi-monarchical position when he died. The question really is whether he was satisfied with that or wanted more. There is also the additional question in what ways his position was expressed. The answers to these questions are made difficult chiefly by the fact that most of our evidence is of later date, when Caesar had become *Divus Iulius* to be followed by other *Divi* and emperors whose positions approached or reached that of the *Dominus et Deus*. After Mommsen's idealization of the great statesman as an almost messianic figure had lost its immediate impact, though not its brilliance, modern views can be divided into two extreme and contradictory beliefs; either Caesar held the Roman, and, as it were, Republican, autocracy of an *imperator* by way of a permanent dictatorship, or his was to be a divine kingdom (*deus et rex*), following the Hellenistic pattern. It is surprising to find that the division among scholars is largely along national lines. Most German and French historians believe in the "God and King" — even Professor Gelzer, who is fully aware of the clever politician Caesar;³ most British scholars deny the divinity as

well as the kingship. American scholars such as Professor Lily Ross Taylor⁴ and Mr. Collins⁵ are inclined to accept the position most decidedly expressed by Eduard Meyer,⁶ while the British point of view has recently been restated by Mr. Balsdon⁷ and Mr. Carson.⁸ In a category of his own is Professor Alföldi,⁹ who not only suggested a new chronology of the last two months of Caesar's life, but also argues that Caesar aimed at a renewal of the ancient Roman kingdom. Let me say at once that such labels as Hellenistic or Roman kingship, though they may sometimes be necessary, are not without danger. They may cover too much or too little; they can even distort the facts. I shall try to get down to the facts as far as we know them.

A few more remarks about our sources — at least the literary ones — without which even the coins remain in a vacuum, eloquent but ambiguous: the most important are of course the contemporary ones, that is, Cicero and his correspondents. There are a few relevant passages in Cicero, and, as Sir Frank Adcock says,¹⁰ "their fewness should teach us to be on our guard." That is certainly right, but at the same time they do say a great deal, and in view of this it remains astonishing that modern scholars disagree to such an extent. There is, however, universal agreement that Suetonius and Dio have preserved some first-class material, partly authentic utterances, partly evidence from the *acta senatus*. Mr. Balsdon, who warns us against using these sources, nevertheless does use them on several occasions without any additional evidence. One possible trap for the historian is that he may confuse senatorial decrees in Caesar's honor, proposed by his followers or by opponents acting as "agents provocateurs," with honors which Caesar himself either accepted or assumed; another is that he may follow the principle of *quod non est in actis non est in vita*. To give one example: On March 17, the senate made the famous self-contradictory decision to abolish dictatorship and to confirm all of Caesar's *acta*; none of his decrees was revoked. Balsdon thinks this decree shows that Caesar had done nothing to set himself up as a god and king. But does it? We shall see that the evidence on this issue simply could not be in the *acta*. Anyway, certain facts emerge from the contemporary sources, and we are justified in using at least some of the later corroborative material.

Something can be learned from Caesar's verdict on Sulla. In March 49, Caesar wrote to Oppius, his well-known political agent, with the intention that the letter should be shown to Cicero (*Att.* IX 7 C), that he did not aim at imitating Sulla, who was the only one to keep the fruits of victory for any length of time; what was to distinguish Caesar from

Sulla was *misericia et liberalitas*, in short the famous *clementia*. No proscriptions for him.

This was not merely propaganda; Caesar stuck to the principle to the end. What otherwise? Suetonius (77) has preserved Caesar's own words describing Sulla as an illiterate in politics, and the *res publica* as a mere name without substance. Sulla had been *dictator rei publicae constituendae* and had eventually resigned, leaving the restored *res publica* under the senate's weak leadership and at the mercy of political generals such as Pompey. Caesar, whose dictatorship, at least since Thapsus (46 B.C.), was perhaps *rei publicae constituendae*, made this title meaningless by becoming dictator first for ten years and then *in perpetuum*, the latter (according to the traditional chronology) before the Lupercalia of 44. Caesar thus destroyed the very nature of the *dictatura*, the time limit which was the Republican safeguard against one man's supreme power. Caesar started his dictatorships by trying to stick to constitutional legality, but that went overboard with the third and fourth dictatorships in 46 and 45. At the same moment when Caesar brought an ancient Roman tradition of extraordinary office to a culmination, its very nature as an office was destroyed. In a different sense he proved again that he was not a second Sulla, no illiterate in politics, not concerned with maintaining the empty form of the *res publica*.

Now Cicero. The relations between the two are in general well-known facts of history. What we want to see is the impact of the man Caesar, and of his position in his last years, on such an impressionable mind as Cicero's. In May 45, Cicero wrote to Atticus (XII 40) of his futile attempts to compose a *Symbouleutikos*, a book of theoretical advice and philosophical interpretation of a ruler's duties, after the examples set by Aristotle and by Theopompus, who wrote *Ad Alexandrum*. He cannot, as they did, write *honesta et grata Alexandro*. "*Sed quid simile?*" A fortnight later he makes it quite clear why the ruler Caesar was not an object for advisory approach. In the meantime Caesar had become *synnaos Quirini* (XII 45), and the intended new *domus regia* was to be the neighbor of Atticus on the Quirinalis. With bitter sarcasm Cicero writes that he prefers Caesar's statue with Quirinus rather than with Salus; with the deified Romulus, who according to one legend was murdered by senators, rather than with the deity of health and prosperity. Caesar belonged, in Cicero's view, to the same class as Alexander or Romulus, though he was much worse than either. Caesar's statue in the temple may not have implied divinity for him, nor Cleopatra's for her in the temple of Venus Genetrix, the goddess of the Iulian house; but both were certainly raised high above human level. For such a sober historian

as Gelzer (and others) these facts are the confirmation of established ruler-worship. Caesar was *parens patriae*, the originator, if only the re-originator, of the state, as had been Romulus, the first and the only deified king of Rome. Alexander, Cicero writes, did not become proud, cruel, and immoderate *postquam rex appellatus est*. How different with Caesar! How could he, after his *pompa* as the *contubernalis Quirini* have any pleasure in Cicero's moderate *epistulae*? Clearly, to Cicero, then, Caesar was in a position not essentially different from that of a king. This is not refuted by the fact that, when Cicero spoke for the king Deiotarus in the presence of Caesar and mentioned some slander against the latter because of the *statua inter reges posita*, he added with some irony: *nam de statua quis queritur, una praesertim, cum tam multas videat*? Moreover, the solemn procession in which Caesar's statue was carried to the temple gave him at least the appearance of a divine person.

Some scholars have argued that these facts do not provide any proof of a divine role because Augustus likewise accepted some of these honors, for example, the connection with Romulus-Quirinus and statues in various temples. Events one or two generations later do not necessarily mean the same as did earlier ones. In any case, Augustus by his very name had become more than an ordinary mortal, and though he restricted some attempts at giving him divine honors, there is evidence to show that even in the West he could be called a god. Comparisons between Caesar and Augustus are natural, and can be illuminating either way, from Caesar to Augustus or vice versa, but they can never give absolute certainty.

Things came even more into the open in July 45 when in the *pompa* of the *ludi Victoriae Caesaris* his statue was carried alongside and together with those of Victoria and other gods. When Brutus tried to persuade Cicero to come into Caesar's presence, he replied: *pompa deterret*. He sometimes calls Caesar *rex*. It is true that *regnum* and *regnare*, even *rex*, are general words and do not mean much, especially when they are used in an informal way of bitter half-joking resignation. "I know that he is a king, but there is no fight left in me" (*Att.* 13, 37). After the Ides of March Cicero writes to Matius, one of the most decent and selfless among Caesar's followers: *si Caesar rex fuerit — quod mihi quidem videtur* (*Fam.* 11, 27). To others, at that time, he speaks only of the *tyrannos*.

No doubt Cicero's own attitude wavered. He declared *non omnibus servire* ("I do not wish to attend to Caesar's creatures"), and yet he sometimes was keen enough not to lose contact. We have the famous letter in which he describes Caesar's visit to him in December 45 (*Att.* 13, 52): "*homines visi sumus* — we were quite human together. Still, you

would not say to Caesar: *amabo te*, I shall be your friend, come back to my house on your return journey. Oh no: *semel satis est*." Caesar himself realized that his treatment of men like Cicero, who had to wait in the antechamber for an audience, was bound to make enemies (*Att.* 14, 1). Cicero detested the whole corrupt court atmosphere of Caesar's surroundings (cf. *Fam.* 6, 19, 2), though even in that he was not quite consistent. Well known are his bitter jokes about the degradation of the highest Republican office when Caesar appointed a consul for the last few hours of the year, the consul under whom nobody ever had lunch and no crime was committed, and who never even slept during his whole consulship. Funny, isn't-it? Yes, but: *quae si videres lacrimas non teneres*.

We may think that none of the passages in Cicero's letters clearly says that Caesar was a deified king. But it is equally true that we cannot deny the fact that there was a great deal in his position that was at variance with Roman Republican traditions. The decisive point in my view is that the facts, though not the constitutional forms and names, gave Caesar a status far above a mere dictatorship, even one for life. As Cicero puts it when he speaks of Antony having abolished the *dictatura* (*Phil.* I 3): *quae iam vim regiae potestatis obsederat* — "which had already gained the strength of royal power." It is also significant both for Cicero and for Caesar, that in 45 the orator in his speech *pro rege Deiotaro*, facing Caesar and speaking in Caesar's house, the *regia* of the *pontifex maximus*, enumerated the *regiae laudes*: to be brave, just, severe, magnanimous, bountiful, beneficent, noble. He even maintained that *semper regium nomen in hac civitate sanctum fuit*, though that of the *reges socii et amici* was *sanctissimum*. Naturally, all this did not refer to a Roman king, but it shows a willingness (certainly not quite genuine and perhaps even with a touch of irony) to recognize the value of monarchy and the ideal of Greek monarchical theory. Caesar was a *rex*, though not by name, and we do realize that the nomenclature is by no means unimportant. It would not be good enough just to say: what's in a name anyway?

What about the god Caesar? The two decisive passages are *Philippics* II 110 (repeated in the following paragraph) and XIII 41.47 (cf. *Suet. Caes.* 76). The former is called by Sir Ronald Syme (who agrees on this point with Sir Frank Adcock) "a difficult passage,"¹¹ and in a note of two lines he adds: "It can hardly be proved that Caesar devised a comprehensive policy of ruler-worship." That is begging the question. Professor Vogt¹² has said essential things about the passage: *quem in honorem maiorem consecutus erat* (what higher honors had he reached) *quam uti haberet pulvinar, simulacrum, fastigium, flaminem?* We discuss

the four concepts. The *pulvinar* was a couch made of cushions, used in the *lectisternium*, a ritual feast of the gods whose statues or symbols were lying on those cushions and who were given a banquet (actually later eaten by the *epulones*). A special *lectisternium* on a special day was given in honor of Caesar. He must have been among the gods of the state. A *simulacrum* was a statue, normally that of a god to be worshipped. We remember Caesar's statue in the temple of Quirinus, and also the one carried in a *pompa circensis* at least on two occasions, always in the company of gods. A *fastigium* was a gable, pediment, usually, though not necessarily, of a sacred building. It may have meant the *regia* of the *pontifex maximus*, and thus Caesar's house. Calpurnia, on the night before the Ides of March, saw the pediment of Caesar's house crashing down, and understandably took it as a sign of danger. A coin of 44 (Sydenham 1076) shows a temple front, with a globe in the *tympanum fastigii*, the inner triangle of the gable. In any case, in the context in Cicero, the pediment must have had some connection with the worship of Caesar. Finally *flamen*: Cicero (II 110) continues: *est ergo flamen ut Iovi, ut Marti, ut Quirino, sic divo Iulio M. Antonius?* In XIII, Cicero repeats that Antony was Caesar's *flamen*, although after the murder he did not act as such. *Cuius flaminium cur reliquisti?* The answer is, of course, that an official divine worship of Caesar was impossible in the days after his death. Balsdon says¹³ that there had been no initiation of Antony to the office; but that would have happened only if Caesar had not been killed. Otherwise, Cicero's remarks would be completely senseless. Antony also avoided all reference to a deified Caesar in his speeches; he calls him *tantus vir* or *clarissimus civis*; but then he was in fear for his own life.

I am convinced that Cicero spoke as he did because he wanted to describe Caesar as a god. Here we may be entitled to consider some later evidence. Dio and even Plutarch 43, 45, 3 confirm Cicero's account. Dio (43, 45, 3) tells us that the statue in the temple of Quirinus had the inscription *deo invicto*, and that Caesar's statue was carried in the *pompa* with those of the other gods. So far he only confirms Cicero. When he adds that Caesar's statue was to be erected in all cities and in all temples in Rome, this will probably be an exaggeration; but there were so many unusual and, in fact, immoderate honors showered on Caesar — all decreed by the senate in 45 and 44, all accepted by Caesar, and all in the line of either royal or superhuman qualities — that Antony could reproach Cicero by saying it had been done in order to give a false picture of Caesar and to rouse misgivings (Cic. *Phil.* XIII). That, of course, was at a time when Antony endeavored to minimize the facts which were the

decisive causes of the conspiracy. As Cicero says: *tu, tu illum occidisti Lupercalibus*.

The famous scene to which Cicero refers is described in greater detail in *Philippics* II and elsewhere; it is known from many sources. "What is more shameful than the fact that that man is alive who would have placed the diadem on Caesar's head, while the man who refused it was, as everybody agrees, justly slain?" Caesar ordered the following to be written in the *fasti* on the occasion of the Lupercalia: *C. Caesari, dictatori perpetuo, M. Antonium consulem populi iussu regnum detulisse. Caesarem uti noluisse*. This asks for some comment. *Regnum*: clearly, here kingdom and cult meet again; the diadem which Caesar had refused was hung in the temple of Iuppiter, the only accepted king of Rome. But was it offered *populi iussu*? No *comitia* had decided on this, nor had the consul acted on the senate's advice. SPQR had no say in this, and we know from Cicero how little the people responded to the name of *rex*, how definitely they had applauded Caesar's refusal. Even the wording of the inscription seems to show that Caesar refused under public pressure.

Caesar dedicated the diadem to Iuppiter Capitolinus. This fact has been given a new aspect by the discovery of a unique coin by Professor Alföldi¹⁴ — *if* the coin is genuine and its interpretation accepted (see Plate I-a). CAESAR DICT. QUART.; mintmaster Mettius, i.e. early 44. In many coins of the same type we have the *lituus*, the augur's staff, the other way round (Plate I-b); in that case no alteration of an existing coin into the diadem was possible. Alföldi believes that the one isolated coin pictures the diadem hung up in the temple. If so, it would mean that this particular coin was issued immediately after the Ides of February, the date of the Lupercalia, and that DICT. PERP. thus dates even later than that. Strong doubts have been expressed about the whole argument. It is a matter for the numismatists to decide; but the outsider cannot suppress his doubts whether in an official issue the 'I' in DICT could be deleted by the symbol depicted. As far as I know, nothing similar ever happens on coins of the period. There were issues with the *lituus* the other way round (Plate I-c), but not with Mettius as the mintmaster. Coins of 63 B.C. with the head of the king Ancus Marcius (Plate I-d), looking like Caesar's elder brother, show the royal diadem, a clear anachronism under Hellenistic influence. The diadem must have been in late Republican times a somewhat natural symbol of kingship. Caesar refused it—what did he wear? We all know: a laurel wreath. But if one looks at most of Caesar's coins (Plates I-c, II-g), one sees a wreath of a very peculiar kind. This is a discovery by Professor

Kraft.¹⁵ Incidentally, the coin d shows the kind of *lituus* which could easily be turned into Alföldi's diadem. As to the wreath, we need only compare, for example, an Augustus coin (Plate I-e): twigs with natural leaves, sometimes fruits, bound together in the back with a bow. Caesar's wreath, on the other hand, is a stylized affair, closely fitted, less broad, and without any tie in the back, but protruding over the forehead. In this form it even survived in coins after his death (Plate II-f). It looks like metal work, and since we know that Caesar wore a golden wreath, the whole thing is clear enough; it is most surprising that for generations no one, whether numismatist or not, had noticed the difference; people only varied in calling it either a laurel wreath or a diadem. It is neither, and Kraft has shown analogies in Etruscan pictures. The triumphal costume which, we are told, Caesar normally wore in public, the purple toga, is also attributed to Etruscan origin. This was most probably the costume of the Etruscan kings, while the red shoes which also belong to Caesar's dress are supposed to derive from the early kings of Alba Longa. But it does not follow from these facts (as Kraft assumes) that this costume, including the golden wreath, was the dress of the old Roman kings. It may be assumed a priori to be unlikely, since the last Etruscan king in Rome was the hated representative of tyranny, quite apart from the general feelings about a Roman *rex*. We can be certain only that the Etruscan fashion of a festive golden crown was accepted by Caesar; he wore it even with the veil of the pontifex maximus.

What meaning do these facts have with respect to Caesar's position in the last period of his life? Worship and divinity seem to me beyond any reasonable doubt. Caesar's power and his honors were limitless, though not regal by title. Much was mere flattery and servility on the part of the senate; but Caesar could have refused if he wanted (as he did refuse a few honors, however reluctantly), and others were clearly *acta Caesaris*, or *acta senatus*, above all his *flamen* and most of the things mentioned by Cicero in *Philippics* II. Among the actual happenings, for example, were that the month Quintilis became Iulius, that the fifth day of the *ludi Romani* was dedicated to Caesar, that oaths were taken by his *genius*, the divine spirit living in Caesar, that he had in the senate an elevated golden seat, a real throne, that he was *praefectus morum* and — like Romulus — *parens patriae*. We need not add all the rumors and ideas which went even beyond what has been mentioned, among them, Dio's story that Caesar was to be buried, again like Romulus, inside the *pomerium*. Adcock says:¹⁶ "Caesar was killed because of what he was, not because of what he might be." That sounds convincing, though I doubt whether those *imponderabilia* could not be weighty facts; the

conspirators would hardly make a fine distinction between facts and possibilities when the possibilities included all their fears. In any event, they found enough reasons even to convince Brutus, and we can still recognize them.

One thing seems to speak against us. Did Caesar ever attempt to create a dynasty? His adoption of the young Octavius, whom by testament he made his private heir, does not mean that he saw in the boy of eighteen his successor as the ruler of Rome. Octavian, as we call him, knew nothing of Caesar's last will, though I do not accept the theory that the whole adoption was a later political maneuver by Octavian.¹⁷ It is surprising, on the other hand, to find that even such a great and realistic historian as Rostovtzeff¹⁸ took the adoption as "clear proof that Caesar regarded Octavian as his heir and inheritor of his position." There was nobody else however — certainly not Marc Antony — whom he might choose. He wanted a son, and in his last will provided for a possible posthumous son by Calpurnia. Cleopatra never had a decisive influence on Caesar; but was she the mother of his son? When she was in Rome in 45-44, she must have been in an advanced state of pregnancy; it would be curious if Caesar did not mind, unless the child born soon afterward, the unhappy Caesarion, was really his son (a fact denied by Balsdon). Anyway, he could never regard him as a possible successor. Caesar, at the age of fifty-seven, though not very healthy and quite aware of the danger of a conspiracy, did not think that his life was at its end. The stories about his playing with the idea of death look very much like tales told after the event. We may search for various psychological reasons; we may think that his intended form of rule was entirely personal — at any rate, he made no attempt to arrange for his succession.

Does that mean that he did not wish to be a king? Some scholars are too much inclined to assume that Caesar's monarchy, practically established except in name, must have been a copy of the Hellenistic type, *basileus* instead of *rex*. The decadent and powerless kings of the time, in spite of Cleopatra, did not provide very worthy models. Neither were Caesar's aims simply in the Roman tradition. How indeed could they be? Syme's statement¹⁹ that Caesar was a truer Roman than either Pompey or Augustus seems to me incomprehensible—unless Rome and greatness are regarded as identical. The absolute break with that tradition is all too obvious. Can we not assume, in fact must we not do so, that Caesar intended to create his own form of monarchy — neither Roman nor Hellenistic but Caesarean? He took from various traditions whatever symbols he found suitable, what circumstances seemed to demand, what might make a compromise possible. Moreover, Caesar

may not yet have shaped the ultimate form of his monarchy and thus have added to our difficulties. At all events, he did not leave it ready and finished for a possible successor.

There are other features to support our view. The *pompa*, for instance, which made such a devastating impression on Cicero, was clearly in the Roman tradition, a form of divine worship long practiced in Rome. Clearly, too, it was connected with the *pompa triumphalis* — nothing more Roman than that, whatever its origins. But Caesar's statue appeared next to that of Victoria, and we cannot help remembering that famous procession in which, at a Dionysiac festival, the second Ptolemy celebrated his ancestors, and Alexander and Ptolemy I appeared in the company of deities and divine personifications. Surely in Caesar's *pompa* different elements were combined. Or the globe which appears on some of Caesar's coins, as in fact it had already, since the seventies, in connection with the *genius populi Romani* or the *dea Roma*; now we are told (Dio 43. 14, 6; 21, 2) of a statue of Caesar with his feet on a globe; we remember that Demetrius Poliorcetes, the very personification of Hellenistic divine kingship, was represented the same way. More significantly still, Caesar was also the first Roman to put his own portrait on coins, as had been usual with Alexander and many Hellenistic kings, thus taking a place normally filled by a deity. If, politically, Caesar's position had not completely outgrown Roman dictatorship (though very little thereof was left), the religious side of his position was, to say the least, strongly influenced by Hellenistic ideas and institutions. From both these sources and, as we now know, from an Etruscan tradition as well, came the streams which joined in one concept, still growing, not yet completed, but there for everyone to see, the shape of Caesar's monarchy. He had his court and his ministers; Cicero complains of both more than once. In Caesar's own vision, politics and religion, Roman and non-Roman features, were one as the expression of his rulership.

The picture which we have in our minds of the last months of Caesar's life is shaped and overshadowed by our knowledge of what was to be the end. If I have concentrated on his personal position, this is, I believe, justifiable; in fact, it is the clue to almost everything. What he did and planned for Rome and the empire largely depended on his own power and authority. Still, in talking about Caesar's final aims, we must not forget the solid work that he was doing for the pacification of the empire and for the necessary, if dangerous, transformation of Roman society. In 46, in his speech *pro Marcello*, Cicero had urged Caesar to dedicate himself, after his many great military actions, to the work of peaceful reconstruction. No doubt Caesar did carry out a program of

political and social planning that was more urgent than anything else. But he also prepared for a war against Parthia and Dacia. Was that equally urgent? Ever since Carrhae, Parthia constituted a threat to the province of Syria, as was later confirmed by Antony's campaigns. There was also a wide-spread desire in Rome to take vengeance for Crassus' defeat and to display Roman strength in the East; that was ultimately confirmed by the emphasis laid on Augustus' peaceful but dignified settlement in 20 B.C. Further, in the northeast a Dacian realm had arisen, and the lasting threat to that frontier was intensified. Caesar acted as the great soldier and empire-builder he was when he decided on war; he may have thought that victory would solve other problems as well. Once again he would be acclaimed as *imperator*, the title prominent on his coins during those months, and thus receive a new sanction from the Roman people, who had just shown their dislike of the royal diadem.

I have mentioned Cicero's reactions; but he was not one of the conspirators, although his name was their catchword after the event: *Cicero et libertas!* The reaction of Brutus and Cassius is reflected in their coins. There is the famous one with the Phrygian cap and two daggers, and the legends either EID MAR or LIBERTAS. *Libertas* was a concept which could be understood in very different ways; we must not build on that word. But there is another coin of BRUTUS IMP; on its Reverse we see (Plate II-h) Victoria with an ear of corn, symbolizing peace and prosperity, tearing up a diadem and treading on a broken scepter, the two outstanding symbols of kingship. The scepter had appeared on most of Caesar's eastern coins; in Rome it had been a symbol only of deified Rome. It is obvious what feelings the conspirators had about Caesar's position. The coins, although *post eventum* and certainly propaganda, are nevertheless significant. After all, Brutus was the one man whose prestige made the conspiracy really possible, and not only because in the summer or autumn of 45 he had married Cato's daughter. He probably married her — against the wish of his mother, Caesar's former mistress — because of his innate "Catonism." The conspiracy was directed against the enemy of the Republic, the monarch Caesar. And yet, the same coins of Brutus showed on the obverse the head either of Neptune or of Brutus himself (Plate II-i, II-k). Is it a sign of the weakness in the Republican traditions that their champion followed Caesar's unique precedent?

Caesar had accepted certain symbols of divine rulership. He had also turned the *insignia* and the dress of the triumphator into distinctive features of his appearance. He could not intend eternally to celebrate a triumph — rather they became the outward signs of his kingship. If he

did use some *insignia* of Etruscan kingship, he did so not to renew that obsolete institution, but to find new symbols for his own monarchy. He was the *unus imperator in toto imperio* (Cic. *pro Lig.* 5), the *invictus* who was more than even a *dictator perpetuus*. The story of the Sibylline oracle which pronounced that only a king would conquer the Parthians may have been an invention or a mere rumor, though it may have been true that Caesar declared that he was not a king in Rome or Italy, but would go out to the war as the king of the provinces. Anyway, Caesar was the commander of all armed forces whatever they were; he was the real ruler of the empire, of the *orbis Romanus*. In an empire only recently delivered from internecine war, the head of the army was the head of the empire. The city-state of Rome, even in its extension over Italy, had shown itself incapable of ruling an empire. New forms of government had to be found. A beginning was made by Caesar's policy of founding colonies all over the empire and extending Roman citizenship on a generous scale. After having firmly established (or so he believed) the unity of Italy up to the Alps, he had begun to weld the empire together on a new basis. This does not mean that he no longer regarded Rome and Italy as the center, or that he was to become an Oriental sultan. The rumors about his intention to create a new capital in Alexandria or in Ilium, or that he intended to have several wives in order to be sure of begetting a son, were mere rumors and cannot be believed. Caesar did not imitate the Hellenistic divine kings, not even Alexander, but he did go far beyond the framework of Roman traditions. He had the vision of a united empire under the rule of Rome, and of a mixture of Italic and Greek populations. He tried — with the true insight of a genius and with equal carelessness for his own fate — to anticipate the development of the next two or three centuries. He may have shown in his last year a few signs of megalomaniac decline; but even if that were true, it was not the real Caesar. A deified ruler, not a Hellenistic or Roman king, but an imperial one — that was most likely his final aim. We reach the conclusion that Caesar approached a form of rule which was to materialize much later, in which Roman and Hellenistic elements were joined by Oriental features, and shaped into something new. He was to be the ruler of an empire, the first Roman emperor.

NOTES

1. This article was delivered as a lecture on October 16, 1962, at Harvard University on the invitation of its Department of Classics. I am grateful for the opportunity to publish it in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*. My



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PLATE I. Casts of coins of Caesar in the British Museum. Magnification 2:1.



PLATE II. Casts of coins of Caesar, Cassca, and Brutus in the British Museum.
Magnification 2:1.

thanks are also due to Mr. R. A. G. Carson, Keeper of Coins in the British Museum, for the casts used for the plate of coins.

2. Cf. the survey, and the attempt at an "impartial" verdict, by W. Schmitthenner, *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* (1962) 685.

3. M. Gelzer, *Caesar. Der Politiker und Staatsmann* (1960⁶). I ought to add, however, that E. Badian in his review of Gelzer's book (*Gnomon* 1961, 597) discovers "two Caesars . . . dwelling in his breast," the practical politician as well as the superman of Mommsen's stamp. To a certain degree, Gelzer, as his title indicates, would probably agree with this description.

4. Lily Ross Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (1931) 60, and *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (1949) 174.

5. John H. Collins, *Historia* IV (1955) 445.

6. Eduard Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius* (1922³) *passim*.

7. J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Historia* VII (1958) 80, an article written with the author's usual acumen and wit, but not quite convincing.

8. R. A. G. Carson, *Gnomon* 1956, 181 (review of Alföldi and Kraft — see notes 9 and 15).

9. Andreas Alföldi, *Studien über Caesars Monarchie* (1953); cf. *Schweizer Münzblätter* (1953) Heft 13. Professor Alföldi tells me that he is preparing a new work, based on a vast amount of numismatic evidence. Naturally, this will be expected with the greatest interest. So far, his theories have found little acclamation. Cf., e.g., Carson, *Greece and Rome* (1957) 46. D. Felber in: F. Altheim u. D. Felber, *Einzeluntersuchungen zur altitalischen Geschichte* (1961) 211.

10. F. E. Adcock, *Cambr. Ancient History* IX 718.

11. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (1939) 54, 4.

12. Joseph Vogt, "Zum Herrscherkult bei Julius Caesar," *Studies Presented to David M. Robinson* II (1953) 1138.

13. Balsdon (above, n.7) 84.

14. For Alföldi, see above, n.9.

15. K. Kraft, "Der goldene Kranz Caesars," *Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte* 1952/3 (publ. 1955).

16. Adcock (above, n.10) 724.

17. W. Schmitthenner, "Oktavian und das Testament Caesars," *Zetemata*, Heft 4 (1952). Even though I cannot quite accept Schmitthenner's conclusions, this is a most valuable and interesting thesis.

18. M. Rostovtzeff, *History of the Ancient World* II 147.

19. Syme (above, n.11) 54.

ELECTRA BY SOPHOCLES: THE DIALECTICAL DESIGN

BY THOMAS M. WOODARD

THE *Electra* has apparently offered critics fewer footholds than any other of the seven Sophoclean peaks. Less has been written about it,¹ and, one may well feel, less to the point. The play has entirely deserved its reputation as "the great enigma."²

What is the *Electra* about? Since the answer to this question must no doubt be as complex as the play's complex structure of meaning, we may hope to leave the play less puzzling than we find it by extending our appreciation of how it conveys meaning and how it is shaped. The present introductory essay will try to do this primarily in terms of character.

Since my title anticipates a "dialectical" interpretation, I may, without causing surprise, take as my point of departure a dichotomy in thought, one which has developed in recent decades within discussion of the play. For there are critics who feel that *Electra* should completely engage our attention, and there are those who consider *Orestes* more important. For the former side, *Electra* is deeply sympathetic and dominates the play, while *Orestes* is merely a symbol, with no dramatic force, and remains inessential.³ To the latter side, which has traditionally been more common, *Electra* is unappealing and hardly human, and *Orestes* poses certain problems around which the play as a whole turns.⁴

Perhaps we can do better than marshal new arguments on one side or the other. Might we not consider the possibility that the *Electra* evoked a similarly divided response in the original audience, that, in fact, Sophocles intended to present *two* focal characters, each engaging our attention in his own way, yet neither alone producing the total dramatic impact?⁵ If so, then I believe it can be shown, in addition, that, with *Orestes* and *Electra*, Sophocles created two characters embodying opposite traits, whether we consider their traits of personality, their dramatic effect on us, their mode of life, or their view of the world.⁶ And that he created two such contrasting characters in order to produce, at the outset, a fundamental duality, which, in the total design of the play, becomes transformed to harmony and resolution.

I intend to argue, along a variety of lines, that the *Electra* dramatizes certain large issues through the duality expressed by Orestes and Electra. Critics have recognized that Sophocles frequently presents characters paired, to vivify basic conflicts.⁷ Probably the most striking initial impression made by our play in the theater springs from such pairs. Scenes between Electra and Chrysothemis, Electra and Clytaemnestra, Electra and Orestes, make their effect through violent cleavage or joyous reunion. The pair formed by brother and sister is more fundamental than the others, however, for this reason: appearing both at the beginning and at the end of the play, it passes from an initial state of disjunction to a final state of resolution. In other words, the movement of the play from Prologue through Exodus parallels the situation relative to one another of Electra and Orestes. And, also, just as brother and sister, after the anguish of separation, unite, and go on in partnership to achieve vengeance, so we shall see that each of the essential characteristics which they embody appears initially as a pair of opposites, and, after playing itself out dialectically, reaches by the end some form of correlation or coordination. The "action" of the play, then, may be called "dialectical" in two senses: out of initial opposition we reach reconciliation; and, the personages and plot figure issues and universals which vie with one another in a complex dramatic debate.

As the first example of this technique of duality and dialectic, I shall try to show how Orestes and Electra embody two contrasting moral tempers and moral codes, rising from, but going beyond, their more strictly human personalities; and, then, what sort of unified resolution the play arrives at in moral terms.

The construction of the Prologue scene initiates the design. For it has one feature unique in the extant work of Sophocles: the scene is divided between characters who neither address one another nor occupy the stage together.⁸ Sophocles presents at the outset, to our eyes and minds, a basic contrast, implied by the separation of brother and sister, and by the startling difference between the feelings and thoughts which they each express.

Now the halving of the Prologue corresponds to a duality of a most obvious sort, that of the sexes. The stage is first occupied by three men, then by Electra, who is soon joined by the chorus of women. Sophocles had found this duality close at hand, in the rigorous social differentiation of men and women in fifth-century Athens. Women tended the home while able-bodied men controlled all public affairs as well as trades.⁹ The opening speeches of the Paedagogus and Orestes, and those of Electra, develop their characters from within this sharp, stylized anti-

thesis. We shall see that, to personalities "typical" of their respective sexes, Orestes and Electra add appropriate moral concerns and codes.

Both the Paedagogus and Orestes conclude their opening speeches with references to *erga* (lines 22 and 76), exhorting one another to set to work toward vengeance. Their term, however, had, by the fifth century, not only concrete application to any number of specifically male livelihoods, but also the general meaning of "job" and "industry." We gather that they both see vengeance as all in a day's work, as something that they as men are particularly suited for, and as a form of economic activity. And so both the Paedagogus and Orestes stress the notion of *kairos* (lines 22, 31, 39, and 75), which carries a commercial meaning, "profit," as does *ergon*, "interest." Orestes' injunction to the old retainer, to enter the house "when occasion leads you in," ὅταν σε καιρὸς εἰσάγῃ (line 39), keeps alive this sense of *kairos*, while, in addition, using a metaphor of importing. Thus we begin to see that the enterprise begun by the men draws part of its moral tone from mercantile ethics.¹⁰ Their avowed aim is *kerdos* (line 61) and wealth (line 72), and they are even willing to attain it by theft if necessary (*kleptein*, lines 37 and 56). The audience would be aware that "Orestes" was the name of a local celebrity, a highly successful robber and pickpocket.¹¹ The drift of Orestes' speech displays his readiness to use *dolos*, specifically by means of speech, to gain his ends. He has no hesitation about lying for profit (line 61). The oracle itself had correlated *doloi* with a hand-to-hand killing (line 37): deceitful means to a just end. Orestes proves himself full of craft by outlining a lie, or *mythos*, for the Paedagogus to tell. His whole scheme results in an eventual success that justifies the terms in which it was undertaken.

Orestes' language weaves a network of other allusions to the public life of an Athenian man. In a second personification of *kairos*, he calls it *ergou epistatēs* (line 76). In Athens this phrase would mean the "Overseer of Public Works," a person in charge of building major monuments.¹² Orestes sees himself engaged in the noble endeavor of restoring prosperity and power to his House (line 72). The means to this end he ennobles also by associating them with that most essentially masculine occupation, warfare.¹³ In this military venture, he acts as strategist, as commander, and as a rear-rank soldier (*epistatēs* bears these latter two meanings). And it is natural for him to picture himself in a closely related activity, competition at the games.¹⁴ The Paedagogus will tell a story of death in the games to prepare the way for an actual slaughter.

Orestes, in short, we might call an adventurer. He is an exile seeking to recover his patrimony, and not far from a wandering merchant or

soldier of fortune. His venture is just, we cannot doubt it: it is as just as commerce, as just as a prayer for success heeded by gods, and as just as battling to win back a homeland.

The "character" of Orestes develops immediately from a vigorous, confident young man to an image of the contemporary Athenian male in his role as worker, bread-winner, and man of affairs; and out of this image grows an ethic of the good, gainful end justifying any necessary, sanctioned means. By assimilating so many particularities, Orestes moves into universality. He becomes master of all trades, and the emblem of a moral code.

Orestes' mentality has usually perplexed critics, since he seems without any sensibility at all.¹⁵ He seeks his goal with complete assurance and no burning passion. We see him lucidly and dispassionately plotting a venture of life and death. The reason for these peculiarities of "personality" is now clear. Orestes symbolizes a mind that exists only in external action, and only for external action. His action is both rational and realistic. He wins our assent to his plan and to his motives. They are unimpeachable. As long as he is on stage, we acquiesce in the conventions of adventure and intrigue. We move in a conscienceless world of good faith, free from doubts or scruples. We feel all will turn out well, without much trouble. All, in fact, does turn out well in the end; but only after we have encountered Electra, and seen everything in Orestes' world turned outside in.

For, if Orestes is free-ranging, professional, athletic, and business-like, Electra is tied to the home, unambitious, poverty-stricken, and perhaps sex-ridden. She stayed behind when Orestes was taken abroad. Life for her means housework, bed and board, and family quarrels.¹⁶ She is miserable at home because she is forced to work like a slave.¹⁷ This is her "economic condition," by contrast to Orestes' aspirations. She has only scant food and rags for clothes, but refuses to seek to better her material situation. She does not see herself performing any public services or engaging in a public life at all. The palace walls bound her world.

Electra's life figures her involuted, tormented subjectivity. She grieves in her own bed at night. She locates the source of the family ills in lust. Her mentality is primarily emotional: there is her pity, her hate, and her misery.¹⁸

For Orestes and the Paedagogus, Agamemnon is the *Iliad* chief, the military man, the great king. For Electra, he is "father." She stresses that he died not abroad, but at home (*μὲν . . . δέ*, lines 95 and 97); not killed by the god of battle, but by her mother and her mother's lover

(lines 96–98). For Orestes, the murder of Agamemnon is an affair of state, and so is requital. For Electra, it is a domestic nightmare. She sees the event in images of blood (lines 89, 96, and 99). For her, in fact, in every way, blood holds sway, blood-ties predominate.¹⁹ She addresses her father directly, and calls for her brother, while Orestes addressed only the paternal House, and called for good luck and victory.

Orestes sees nobility in external effectiveness, not in either a hereditary station or an internal quality. He terms the Paedagogus, a mere servant, “noble,” *esthlos* (line 24), and *eugenēs* (line 25), in recognition of his good services, good counsel, and excellence in undertaking a fight. Orestes identifies virtue with the Homeric active *arete*. For Electra, *arete* is inner, and its only external sign, if it has one, is grief and isolation.²⁰ Orestes seeks palpable *kleos* and *timē* (lines 60 and 71). Electra has no such ambitions and no such hopes; she has accepted a heroism without recognition or reward. Orestes we see conspiring in a small group of men; his is the group life. Electra appears on stage first alone, then sets off from the community of women formed by the chorus. She lives confined to the solitude of individual nobility.

We first hear Electra’s voice ringing *inside the palace*. The Paedagogus stresses its location.²¹ Her shriek cuts off the calm deliberations of the men. When she comes forth through the doors we soon realize that she embodies the interior of that terrible dwelling toward which the Paedagogus had merely gestured. Orestes and his Tutor understand the situation only outside its doors. Electra knows only what is within. Electra’s first chant forces us into the domestic atmosphere in which she dwells, even when physically outdoors.²²

Electra’s woman’s life indoors symbolizes her essential sphere: the internal world of the emotions. She is a sensibility laid bare. The material universe lacks substance for her; she dissolves it in memory, lament, and yearning. While Orestes plans and acts, Electra suffers and endures.²³ Her turmoil of hatred, her participation in the guilty household of murderers, her mourning and “crazy grief,” everything reflects the merging and confounding of the macrocosm in her passionate microcosm.²⁴ She draws us into the domestic torment and tension as we respond to her inwardness, and into her inner torment and tension as we respond to the domestic. She holds us by the intensity of her suffering, while Orestes attracted us by the delights of freedom, adventure, and painless achievement.

Orestes demanded vengeance for the sake of his property and aggrandisement. Electra demands vengeance for its own sake. For Orestes, vengeance is an instrument with which to serve his own ends.

No distinction of means and ends makes sense to Electra. She craves vengeance with all the unplanning fury of loathing. She lives in moral immediacy; Orestes, in moral detachment. She cohabits with her father's restless spirit in Hades, and shares its obsession with retribution. With moral blandness, Orestes proves to us he has right on his side. But Electra's chthonian mentality and her piercing cries touch us more deeply than proof, and establish unassailably the justice of her moral absolutism.

If, now, we step back from the Prologue, we appreciate the remarkable scope of its dual impact. We have moved, in fact, from one dramatic world to another, from one kind of involvement with character to another, at the same time that words and spectacle have forced on us two contrasting worlds of moral signification. From the palpable duality of men and women and the particularities of the public and domestic worlds, we enter two opposing spheres of excellence and of heroism, grounded in a profound cleavage of external action and internal emotion.

The most striking feature of critical comment on our protagonist has been the degree of uneasiness that she has elicited. Some critics have found her totally unheroic; no critic has given her character full assent.²⁵ Along with this we notice that those scenes of the play dominated by Electra have always received terms like "grim," "bitter," and "harsh," and have seemed less noble than other Sophoclean *agones*. I wish to argue now that the reason for this critical ambivalence, and this tension in our response to Electra, is a conflict within Electra herself, a tension intrinsic to her "character." And that the purpose of Electra as protagonist is in fact to play out, in all its grimness, the cleavage that we found externalized, as it were, in the Prologue, in the separation of Electra from Orestes.

As a first instance of Electra's internal conflict, we realize that she is ambivalent toward her own sex. As a daughter at war with her mother (and, also, sister), she lives split between her own womanhood and a hatred of women. She must always look to men, specifically her brother and father, as emblems of justice and nobility, and for her own release from torments. The duality of the sexes reappears within Electra. Another of its results is the loss of the essential female functions: Electra bemoans her childlessness, and considers the nightingale and Niobe, both bereft of children, as her image of herself. Her name is a pun on her enforced spinsterhood.²⁶

As the play passes from Prologue through Parodos into the first Episode, we find ourselves more deeply entwined in Electra's world. First her stormy confrontation with her sister, then the bitter, remorseless,

fruitless altercation with her mother, show us Electra battling with the female side of her family, and open out to us a domestic world of evils in which, as Electra says, temperance and even self-respect are impossible.²⁷ When the Paedagogus enters with his false tale, he brings on stage a mentality alien to that of the mother and daughter who stand apart from him and from each other, reacting in such different ways to his news. But except for this scene, Electra remains in the company of women until Orestes' return. So that the two thirds of the play centering on Electra displays her isolation from that other conceptual hemisphere represented by her brother. We see her in bitterness, lucid hatred, despair, and determined desperation (to characterize in turn each of the four scenes of this part of the play) precisely because she embodies the fate of an internal world divorced from the external. This fate sets her in conflict not only with those around her but with herself. She is at once the slave in her own house and the embittered, unwilling spinster; at once an emblem of enforced separation from redeeming justice, and one of proud, noble, self-destructive obstinacy. In the compelling person of Electra the center of our play dramatizes isolated subjectivity *in extremis*, through a series of scenes which are equally portraits, debates, trials, and punishments. In each of these scenes, Electra experiences a new kind of pathos and finds a new kind of strength. By the time Orestes reappears, she has passed through fire, and emerges in her fully purified stance as heroine of mourning and defiance. But the process of her purification has effected a transformation: before Orestes appears Electra has come to recognize the necessity for physical action, the necessity to break out of her subjective world of sheer passion.

At the moment in the Prologue when the Paedagogus has to restrain Orestes' impulse to wait for the appearance of his sister, we feel our first twinge at the pathos of their separation. The succeeding scenes immerse us so completely in seclusion and separation that we almost lose our awareness that Orestes exists at all and is, in fact, at hand. But, as our participation in Electra's torment persists, we feel with increasing acuteness the absence of Orestes. In this way, Sophocles makes us long for the reunion of brother and sister and all they represent, makes us realize with increasing force the horror of a divorce between their two worlds. Thus, the central part of the play, Electra's part, achieves two dramatic goals: a filling out of the potentiality of Electra, of endurance and inwardness; heightening our anticipation of Orestes, of action and the outer world. And Sophocles reserved his most affecting scene for reunion.

The final quarter of the play shows Orestes and Electra together in

partnership, successfully attaining their common goal of vengeance. The scenes of partnership are written in such a way as to dramatize intricate co-operation: exchange of information; joint planning of the deed; specific complementary roles in each slaying; mutual exhortation; and a constant tone of comradeship. By the end of the play we have witnessed the creation of a harmonious team, made up of the two personages who were poles apart before. At the same time, we sense a co-ordination of each of the dualities which they represent. Electra's passion now urges and hastens the completion of vengeance; her strength in isolation serves as she stands guard, or deceives Aegisthus; and she can feign womanly obedience to throw him off the track.

These final scenes of the play present effective action more than they debate the issues conveyed by the characters of Orestes and Electra. But, by presenting coordination between the two of them, these scenes have the same impact for us as if they had stated propositions correlating action and emotion, outer and inner, community and solitude, physical potency and spiritual stamina. A man and a woman in partnership produce the triumph over evil; and a marriage is affirmed between the opposites they embody. Orestes and Electra join in our minds as on the stage, and form together a paradigm of the fully heroic, of full human excellence. This paradigm, created out of complementary opposites, is the total moral affirmation made by character in the play.

The *Electra* splits reality in two in order to dramatize the necessity for union. This grim study of divorce ends in reconciliation and victory. But what sort of union of Orestes and Electra do we reach? They work together, without losing their individual traits. The *Electra* ennobles antitheses; and produces a double image of excellence. But, is this double image a unified conception? And, if so, how may we express its unity?

I shall argue that the play's moral dialectic does result in a unified paradigm, and that we may give its double image a single name: Odysseus. For the two sets of virtues and moral affinities that appear in our play as Orestes and Electra are combined by the hero of the *Odyssey*.

If it seems, at first glance, an interpretative *deus ex machina* to find Odysseus hovering over the completed *Electra* as a unifying moral image, we must consider that "Odysseus" had served the Greeks for centuries as a religious emblem for a kind of *arete* and for certain characteristics of mind and habits of behavior. Odysseus was, by the fifth century, more an archetype than an epic figure, and more an epic figure than a man. Is it surprising that a play with the scope of implication of the *Electra* should draw part of its vitality from such a potent, traditional image of the heroic?²⁸

My remarks on Odysseus will not claim to interpret the *Odyssey* as much as to suggest how the epic and its hero might have looked to Sophocles. And if, as I believe, he discerned two trends within the essential integrity of Odysseus, he might well have taken that integrity as a paradigm for the affirmative endpoint in a moral dialectic.

As Professor Whitman has pointed out, the two most frequent epithets of Odysseus, *polumētis* and *polutlas*, imply his two central virtues.²⁹ Now these two kinds of excellence, one informing action with shrewdness and purpose,³⁰ the other implying the strength to hold out under varied trials and torments,³¹ correspond to the central cleavage between Orestes and Electra. Within Odysseus no tension exists between these characteristics, as we soon realize in the *Odyssey*.

πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,
πολλὰ δ' ὃ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν (I, 3-4)

Seeing cities and becoming acquainted with *mores* is set in correlation with suffering hardships or woes. The pair of lines expresses a basic distinction between action and suffering, but also conveys simultaneity. Again, if we take these lines together with the first two of the epic,

Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ
πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε (I, 1-2)

we see a contrast and coordination of sheer physical activity (lines 1 and 2) with activity as it impinges on the mind or sensibility (lines 3 and 4).³² And, indeed, within the first two lines there is a distinction of voice hinting that of action and suffering.³³

We may notice both within lines 1 and 2 and within lines 3 and 4 an association of land with purposive activity and sea with inflicted suffering. The first half of the *Odyssey* treats voyage, *nostos*, and endurance; the second half, vengeance on home ground. Here again is our basic distinction. Or, looking at the epic differently, the first half deals with adventures far and wide; the second half, with trials at home. The point remains the same: the *Odyssey* and Odysseus show major antitheses within them, yet in equilibrium, simultaneous, and, as it were, overlapping one another.

Homer's Odysseus shares all the dominant characteristics of Sophocles' Orestes. Both return from abroad, and seek to recover their home, property, and prerogatives. Both fight and kill, and show extensive talents along this line as along many others requiring bodily strength and skill. Odysseus also is skilled at trades, such as carpentry.³⁴ Like

Orestes, he will use any means of attaining his *kerdos*.³⁵ He seeks palpable rewards and *kleos*; and, like Orestes, is thievish.³⁶

Both Orestes and Odysseus lie with zest to further their own just ends. Both are masters of *dolos*. The *doloi* of both are tied up with *mythoi*. Both are masters of effective speech. Odysseus' skill at guileful lies (false accounts of himself), counsel (planning with Telemachus), and logical argument (to win favor or prove who he is), dominates especially the second half of the epic. His whole strategy in Books XIII–XXI turns on a disguise in which verbal concealment outweighs the donning of rags. He must pass himself off as something he is not, before getting down to arms: the sequence as well as the technique parallels that of our play, as first stated explicitly in the oracle, and then carried out in the plot.

Finally, we have a piece of external evidence implying that the two heroes were associated in Sophocles' mind. The Odysseus of his *Philocletes* seems a close relative of both Orestes and the Paedagogus.³⁷

The way has been prepared for us to show the moral resemblance of Odysseus to Electra by the remarks of Professor Whitman, who considers endurance the central virtue of each.³⁸ The bulk of our play forces us to participate as if retrospectively in the years of domestic bitterness, uncertainty, and grief that Electra has undergone, and to recognize the heroic stature of her resistance to compromise or to capitulation. Her behavior most resembles that of Odysseus disguised as a beggar, when he must endure taunts and footstools while biding his time in the great hall. Like Electra, he is reduced to humiliating and unjust rags by the inhumane usurpers in his house. Why do we find in the *Odyssey* the reiterated scenes of abuse directed against the beggar? We have the answer in the statement, repeated on more than one occasion, that Athena made the suitors abuse him in order that he might grieve still more.³⁹ Odysseus, in other words, must pass through a purgatorial fire before recovering his own. The repetitions of abuse wear on us, perhaps, as on the hero; they force us into an awareness of time passing. Time passes slowly in the second half of the epic, while in the first half it flies. The detail of Odysseus' self-abasement, waiting, and suffering gives virtually the same effect as the concreteness of Electra's tormented imagination, her grinding daily hatreds, and her waiting, always, for Orestes and vengeance. The drive of Odysseus in the first half of the epic is toward reaching Ithaca; but in the second half it is toward revenge. That the appetite for revenge is whetted by direct torment at the hands of the suitors is obvious; but the pattern is moral as well as psychological, and the hero gains a kind of purification of motive

through the preliminary suffering. Odysseus himself inflicts tests on others similar to the lengthy one he traverses. For we must understand his testing of the swineherd, Penelope, and, above all, his father, not only as evidence of his caution and wiliness, but as examples of the pattern of pathos in heightened tension of grief and loss preceding joyous release and reunion. Electra exemplifies this pattern, in her suffering and rejoicing in our play, and we might say it reflects her purely emotional response to life. Yet we also feel that her suffering finds its reward and that without the suffering she would have deserved no final triumph.

Our first glimpse of Odysseus in Book V shows him weeping; and shortly after he is near death in the sea. His name suggests suffering, and the *Vita Sophoclis* implies that our playwright was well aware of it.⁴⁰ Odysseus frequently characterizes himself in the same way, as when he reveals himself to Telemachus with the words

ἀλλ' ὅδ' ἐγὼ τοιόσδε, παθὼν κακά, πολλὰ δ' ἀληθείς
(XVI, 205)⁴¹

So we see that Odysseus holds complementary opposites in equilibrium.⁴² Truly, he moves in two worlds: as well that of open country and high sea (Books V–VI) as that of palace grounds and interior (Books VII–VIII); the rural (Books XIII–XVI) as well as the urban (Books XVII–XXIII). He moves among the living and the dead, the peasants and the gentry; he sleeps by the two olives, wild and cultivated.

While Odysseus juxtaposes opposites harmoniously in his undivided heroic self, Sophocles sees autonomy in each half of a duality, and, at the end of his play, shows opposites side by side, yet neither mingled nor reduced to one of them alone. The final relationship of Orestes and Electra is the balanced tension of opposites.

For the poet of the *Odyssey* an heroic vision found expression in one figure, Odysseus. Such a vision is less equivocal, as well as less dialectical, than that of Sophocles. It is also closer to the possible attainment of a single individual, and hence more directly exhortative. Electra is not, by herself, our moral paradigm.⁴³ She no more exemplifies both halves of the basic dualities when she has moved painfully toward integration in the second half of the play than she did at the beginning.

Thus, in several ways, Sophocles takes us beyond the more familiar vision of moral character in epic, into a cosmic vision of perfection. For he does not suggest that a single individual should strive to encompass both halves of human excellence or could reconcile fully the opposing claims of perfection. Only the universe or an ideal figure could do so.

The remarkable result of the *Electra*, on the moral plane, is to point to such a figure, Odysseus. But not only do the two characters through whom we come to glimpse this moral ideal remain autonomous, but they point toward other spheres, apart from the moral, as well.

Sophocles' achievement in characterization, on which we have reason to believe he prided himself,⁴⁴ in fact takes us far beyond the moral sphere, toward a vision of the world order. We shall find that, included within the "characters" of Orestes and Electra, shining above their temperaments, ways of life, and moral traits, are two distinct worlds of wider significance. For, it will be the main purpose of this essay to argue, Orestes and Electra serve as emblems for the worlds of *ergon* and *logos*, respectively, and we may understand the play only by appreciating these principles. In each scene, a "dialectic" manifests itself as a continuous, precise, implicit debate within the duality of *logos/ergon*. And, the play as a whole shows a progressive development of the duality, from initial opposition to final coordination.

The sharp transition in the Prologue scene from the opening male speakers to Electra draws a sharp distinction between a world of *ergon* and one of *logos*, a distinction thus grounded in concepts familiar, whether in antithesis or correlation, throughout Greek literature.⁴⁵ Our discussion of the Paedagogus and Orestes has already suggested a number of ways in which they inhabit the world of *ergon*, physical activity, externality, work. By observing in detail how they define it for us, we may prepare for further appreciation of Electra's lyric world of passion, inwardness, and talk.

The Paedagogus, or Tutor, begins the play putting the finishing touches on the education of Orestes, and preparing to turn over the reins of decision to his now mature pupil. He conveys to us, as well as to the younger men by his side, a vivid sense of the place and time at hand. With purposefulness and vigor, he presents the situation to Orestes as the consummation of his upbringing. Orestes has been trained to be one thing: the avenger of his father's murder. This we learn at the minor first climax of the Paedagogus' speech (line 14). He finishes on a second climax that more precisely defines Orestes' role: he has been trained to *do* one thing, avenge his father's murder (line 22).

The concreteness of this task corresponds to the Paedagogus' definiteness about place and time. The palace dominating the *decor* was the goal of their journey. The Paedagogus acts as cicerone for Orestes, pointing out on the painted backdrop⁴⁶ the sights that prove he has come home. And the time is right in Orestes' life: fresh maturity. The second, exhortative section of the speech begins with "Now, therefore," and the

old man notes the exact hour: the sun is just rising. No one is yet abroad. The emphasis on time culminates in the concept of the *kairos* or *akmē*: a moment of light, clarity, and incipient success, but a fragile moment, when the task cannot wait. The Paedagogus makes us feel, along with Orestes, its immediacy and urgency, when hesitation might be fatal.

At the *kairos*, then, the Paedagogus advises a specific procedure: first plan, then act.

Paed. Take counsel quickly on what to do! (line 16)

This is the right moment for men with business to discuss it: "Join together in planning!" ξυνάπτετον λόγοισιν (line 21). The sunlight evokes even the "voices" of the birds (line 18). Counsel must be taken in the privacy that will last so briefly; then it must be acted upon without delay.

Paed. Where we are it is no season for hesitation,
But high time for action. (lines 21-22)

The Paedagogus' exhortation and the gist of his teachings lie in this: the time and place are demonstrably at hand for entering upon deliberations involving discussion so as to produce an immediate, effective deed of vengeance.

Orestes accepts fully the Paedagogus' view of things, and proceeds in accord with his directive. Both the structure and drift of his speech grow from the outline offered by his tutor.⁴⁷ Both see the task at hand as analogous to a military problem.⁴⁸ Orestes' speech proposes strategy. And his conclusion reiterates the Paedagogus' formula linking *kairos* and *ergon*. This formula, we begin to surmise, expresses some essential characteristic which they share.

Orestes presents his set speech as those verbal deliberations urged by his adviser.

Therefore I will make plain my views
While you give a sharp ear to my words
And correct me if I miss the mark . . . (lines 29-31)

His exposition continues in terms emphasizing the give and take of opinion and information.⁴⁹ He even includes a quotation from Apollo. The goal of this process is clarity and knowledge which will further the accomplishment of the task.

Orestes' speech exemplifies the procedure of rational planning enjoined by his tutor, since it is tightly organized and to the point. After

the introductory formal encomium of the older man, he offers a piece of information basic to their project, the oracle. Apollo's words continue the military language, but by way of contrast: unlike Agamemnon at Troy, Orestes must fight with deception before he strikes the blow. So Orestes makes a definite proposal about what to do: the Paedagogus will enter the house to find out how matters stand, and will tell a false story. This proposal makes the *dolos* of the oracle (line 37) a *mythos* preceding the actual killing, and thereby repeats the pattern of thought which the Paedagogus stressed: *logoi* preparing for *erga*. And the same pattern occurs again in the sequence of hearing instruction, then acting on it (lines 38–39). Within his directive to the Paedagogus, Orestes again distinguishes activity and speech: “Find out what is being done”⁵⁰ and the *mythos*. After outlining the fable that the old man should tell, Orestes turns to what he and his peer will do meantime: certain ritual acts.

Orestes' set-speech pivots on the relationship of *logos* to *ergon*; it analyzes the nature of *logos*, but only within that relationship. In the course of the speech, two basic meanings of *logos* are contrasted: valid *logos* correlated with *ergon*; and spurious, opposed to *ergon*. For Orestes, *ergon* is the touchstone of *logos*. In roughly the first third of his speech (lines 23–40), he retains the linkage of the two as the Paedagogus had introduced it: *logoi* are a pre-requisite for effective action because they lead to clarity about the plan to follow. In this sense, also, *logoi* correspond to *erga*, as a true proposition or conception corresponds to the way things really are. In the next third (lines 42–58), *logoi* become an instrument of action, something used in the endeavor itself. At the same time, speech begins to connote falsity and pretense.⁵¹ Speech conceals the true state of affairs.⁵² In the final third of his speech (lines 59–76), Orestes extends this second sense of *logoi*, opposing them to *erga*, as spurious to genuine.

Or. Why should it grieve me, if I die in pretense
But in reality stay safe . . . (lines 59–60)⁵³

λόγῳ θανὼν | ἔργοισι σωθῶ

Again, he associates *logoi* with lies, misinformation, and concealment. *Erga*, on the other hand, bring *kleos* and *timē*, and victory over enemies (line 66). He links *ergon* and *kerdos*. Speech serves only to gain certain ends, and by gain it is justified (line 61). We react to his prayer (lines 67–72) within this context. It is, on one hand, the verbal portion of the necessary ritual; on the other, a means to his own *kerdos* (wealth, heritage, rule in his House).⁵⁴ His pat statement, “Now I have said these

things" (line 73), at the conclusion to the prayer, implies that it was merely a verbal means to a material end, but also that he has reached the end of his whole pronouncement. The three men prepare to leave the stage. Discussion has served its purpose. The rest is action.

The set-speech falls into two halves. The rhetorical division, *σὺ μὲν* (line 39) . . . *ἡμεῖς δὲ* (line 51) corresponds to *logos* (as inquiry and report) and *ergon* (as ritual, vengeance, and gain). The Paedagogus will act by *logoi*, perhaps befitting his age; the younger men, physically.

Orestes' speech as a whole is itself a *logos* corresponding to an *ergon* outside it, the physical action of the drama. For both the speech and the play begin with the Paedagogus; both continue with planning. The phrase, "Let that be the story," *ὁ μῦθος ἐστάρτω* (line 50), stands at the exact center of Orestes' speech proleptically; for the Paedagogus' *rheis* will occur at the exact center of the play.⁵⁵ Then Orestes alludes to his reappearance with the urn; then his "rebirth" to confound his enemies. And, finally, the speech ends, as the play, with the *ergon* of slaying and vengeance.

Through its atmosphere of intrigue and adventure, and by the sheer logic of its development, Orestes' exposition brings us again to a sense of impending action. The exchange between the Paedagogus and Orestes, then, after a voice moans off-stage, springs from the opposition of *logos* to *ergon* that comes into being when preparations are finished. "Should we wait and listen to the lament?" asks Orestes. "By no means," answers his instructor, "nothing should be set before the necessary actions that will lead us to victory in our task." The rejection here of *logoi* (in the form of cries, *gooi*), for the sake of *erga* (specifically, ritual acts) goes deep into their stance. For *ergon* shapes their world.

During the time required for their long walk off the stage, we reflect that their endeavor is already under way. The Paedagogus goes in one direction—to spy and lie—Orestes and Pylades, in the other—to perform the rituals. The end of their colloquy constituted the beginning of vengeance.

When Electra steps from the palace and begins her dirge, we are struck immediately by two things. First, the shift to lyrics, the free anapests of a chanted lamentation, breaks sharply with the preceding dialogue in iambics. Second, at the center of the stage we see a lone young woman, in place of three men of varying ages. As we may now appreciate, these two areas of contrast so striking in the Prologue signify two distinct worlds: the masculine world of *erga*, in which *logoi* are mere servants, and the feminine world of *logoi*, here laments, which

preclude physical effectiveness, but with another kind of power all their own.

The men conferred with one another, within an explicit context of communication. Electra soliloquizes, or rather addresses herself to the elements. She is not engaged in communication; we overhear her. She laments: reiterates the memories that haunt her, and dwells on her sufferings. The explicit context of her laments is lamentation itself. A typical one is in progress, and she asserts her intention to repeat the liturgy as long as she lives (lines 103-109). Threnody is Electra's occupation: her only mode of action, in the sense that Orestes recognized speech as a mode of action. But lamentation is not effectively instrumental, nor does Electra make that claim for it. Viewed as to results, lamentation is at most an exhortation to the spirits of the dead, as to the nether gods, and to the powers that would send Orestes. For Electra sees help and release for herself from suffering only through the intercession of a force apart from herself. Her threnody reaches its climax in a cry for her brother. Orestes is to Electra as he is to himself and the Paedagogus: the requisite avenger of Agamemnon's murder.

Whether or not mourning becomes Electra, it has become her life. She occupies herself only with the evocation of present ills and sorrows rooted in the past, and with the determination to abide and endure. The thrust toward the future, and the suspense built up in us, the effect of the schemes of the men, recede and vanish. Planning for action, objective and rational, has been replaced on stage by subjectivity, passion, and self-rending; confidence and vigor, by enervation and despair (lines 119-20). The intended ritual preliminaries of the younger men have yielded to a woman's perpetual ritual chant. Harmonious exchange of advice has been replaced by the echo of Electra's voice crying in public solitude, as she vows

With continual wailing, before paternal doors,
To utter a resounding cry for all to hear. (lines 108-9)

Electra vows that her grieving will never cease. In a sense, it is self-perpetuated. Yet it springs from a present perception of real things: images from the past and present inner torment. Through Electra's eyes we see the murder of Agamemnon, as well as the wretched life that she has led since. We come to share her sense of surrounding ills and evils. Electra compels our sympathy, while Orestes assumed our approval. In forcing us to enter her private world, Electra introduces us to an atmosphere that will dominate the play. Throughout, however, Orestes and the separate frame of his action-in-progress will qualify our response to

Electra by giving us a world that we must contrast with hers. Even at the conclusion of her threnody, we are reminded of the partiality of her vision. For the Orestes for whom she prays has already come; while she persists in words and cries, he has embarked on deeds. Yet our concern for the deed of vengeance has been suspended even as we hear Electra beseech it. For better or worse, we have become immersed in another world. Both *logoi* and *erga* have reversed their meanings. Electra suffers under *erga*, rather than producing them. Her *logoi* express suffering, rather than plot *erga*. Her power lies all in *logoi*, and we recall that *logos* is double-edged, half-valid and half-spurious.

The lengthy *kommos* between Electra and the Chorus may be justly praised as exposition, but there remains a question as to what exactly it exposes. For one thing, the Chorus accepts and supports Electra's moral position, her attitude toward the murder of Agamemnon and toward his murderers. In fact, justice is no more an *issue* in the Parodos than in the Prologue. The Chorus criticize Electra on only one ground, and we shall see that from this friendly criticism springs the whole interchange.

"Why do you continually lament?" the Chorus ask. "Why do you desire to suffer?" The questions and objections of the Chorus concerning Electra's verbal activity evoke the greater part of what she chants.⁵⁶ At first Electra offers no "reasons," that is, no statement of purpose in or cause for her lamentation. She knows well the Chorus's attitude, but she pleads only for sympathy and permission to continue bewailing her father (lines 131-33). She presents her position in terms of desire and passionate compulsion, with at least a hint of frenzy.⁵⁷ She links herself with the fabled nightingale and with the perpetually weeping Niobe. Indeed she instates these two as her divinities and as emblems of her own identity.⁵⁸ In this way, from the outset, Electra accepts the character which the Chorus ascribe to her; initially, she attempts no justification beyond the reiteration that this is the way she is.

As the Parodos progresses, however, Electra moves more deeply into the sources of her mode of life and toward a defense of its necessity. The Chorus object that she will only bring more grief on herself by her outbursts. Their language directs our attention not to the content of Electra's imprecations but to the verbal activity itself.

Cho. Take heed lest you speak too far (line 213)

Electra, they say, engages in shameful polemics and reproaches (lines 218-20). They charge her with self-engendered ruin, *atē* (line 215); and

this they link to rash vocal defiance of the powerful. Electra replies by accepting the charge, bluntly and explicitly:

El. I will not check
 These mad cries (*atas*)
 So long as I live. (lines 223-25)

Memory of the terrible *erga* (line 212), and the life that she must lead at present, *compel* her mourning and its concomitants, whatever they may be (line 221). Circumstances remaining the same, she will persist in rage, frenzy, and "countless threnodies" (line 232).

The Parodos achieves a remarkable dramatic result. Electra wins our closest sympathy and compellingly defends her stance; at the same time, she exhibits and avows shameful behavior, irrationality, and sheer, self-defeating stubbornness. Her lamentations and polemics embody both her noble strength and her desperate futility. She defends lament for its own sake; she grants that it is self-lacerating and self-degrading. Electra is, by a kind of necessary, heroic obstinacy, at war with herself, as well as with her environment. She must abuse her own "principles," under a more profound necessity, a higher moral law. In the same way, Electra is ambivalent toward her character as mourner. Lamentation and rebuke make up her *ethos*, and this is a habit-and-trait that she feels shameful, futile, and, in one sense, immoral. Her nobility, therefore, rests on an agonizing self-contradiction. She can fully affirm only the righting of a now doubly violated moral order; and this would require an act of vengeance. But she alone is able only to mourn and censure the moral disorder, thus further separating herself from the wholly valid. Put more simply, in her ambivalence toward her characteristic mode of life, Electra plays out the inherent duality of *logos*, split as it is between the valid and the invalid, between an effective activity and an unauthentic substitute for activity. Her *logoi* spring from *erga* that have impinged on her, that press her now, over which she has no control, against which her only sword is speech.

El. I am ashamed, ladies, if I seem to you
 To grieve too much with many threnodies.
 But violence forces me to do them. (lines 254-56)

Beginning her first set-speech in this vein, Electra assents to the whole drift of the Chorus in the Parodos. She is trapped in a woman's world of polemic and lament. Now our play, as its title would suggest, centers around Electra; and in entering her world of *logos*, we enter a series of scenes made up precisely of oratory, polemic, and lament. The issues

intrinsic to the distinction of *logos* and *ergon* are debated, implicitly and explicitly, in scenes that advance the physical action, the external plot, hardly at all. But, in the course of these scenes, Electra advances, still within the dilemmas of isolated *logos*, to a recognition of the necessity for external *ergon*. Even before this recognition, much pathos and harshness results from Electra's acceptance of the correlation of *logos* and *ergon*, as Orestes had voiced it in the Prologue.⁵⁹ She accepts the correlation, but cannot achieve it in her life. We shall find that, for this reason, each of the scenes in this part of the play exhibits Electra's ambivalence toward her own position, while intensifying our sense of her tormented world, a world crying for truth and for a decisive deed of vengeance.⁶⁰

The ostensible issue in the first encounter of the two sisters is how one should live, and what one should do, in evil circumstances. But these questions of action are turned into questions about what one should say, believe, and rely on, and the point of the scene virtually becomes Electra's oral forcefulness. The persuasive force of her arguments contains her moral supremacy, as it comes across to us in the theater: her directives as to what Chrysothemis should do (and not do) finally prevail. Electra boasts of active resistance, but we discover that her accomplishment remains wholly verbal. The ironical result of the scene is that only poor Chrysothemis must actually run a risk, in disobeying her mother and offering a substitute sacrifice to her father.

The scene falls into two parts: Electra's general defense of her aggressive lamentation, continuing her first set-speech; and her inquiry about the offerings and the dream, which leads to her alternate proposal.

In the first part, both sisters show much contempt for mere *logoi*, and both attempt to prove that the other lives by *logos* rather than by *ergon*. Chrysothemis' opening words challenge Electra's futile talk and futile passion (lines 328-31). Chrysothemis then charges that Electra only seems to be doing something, while really she harms no one, effects no result. She willingly grants that Electra's opinion about justice is correct; for she grounds her own stance in a realistic appraisal of the balance of power in the household.⁶¹ In short, she claims to argue from *ergon* (the way things are) and from a recognition of her own womanly weakness. Electra refuses to accept the argument, though she accepts most of its premises, and charges her sister with cowardice. She claims that *she* has been the one engaged in *erga* (line 350). Chrysothemis has hated their common enemies merely in speech, or "in pretence," while

"in reality," "in truth," living comfortably with them (*μὲν λόγῳ/ἔργῳ* δέ, lines 357-58).

To Electra's brilliant dialectical defense of her mode of life by contrast to her sister's (lines 341-68), Chrysothemis makes no reply whatsoever, but brushes the whole speech and all its arguments aside by saying to the Chorus: "I am quite used to her talk" (*τῶν τῆσδε μύθων*, line 373). And she simply turns to another topic, which proves to be the plan of Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus for silencing Electra's "great groans," *τῶν μακρῶν γόων* (line 375), a phrase suggesting *οἱ μακροὶ λόγοι*, "long or over-long speeches," which we shall hear more than once applied to Electra later in the play. The antithesis of this latter phrase in fact occurs a few moments later, when Electra asks for a report of Clytaemnestra's dream.

Chr. Do these night terrors make you hopeful?

El. If you told me the vision, then I might say.

Chr. But I know only very little to tell.

El. Then say *that*. A few words (*logoi*) have often
Overthrown or reestablished men.

Chr. The story is . . . (The *logos* is . . .) (lines 412-17)

These lines might be said to speak for themselves. Electra's gnomic pronouncement about the power of "a few words," *σμικροὶ λόγοι* (line 415), deserves amplification, however. These *logoi* are at once instrumental, instructive, and potent in themselves. Her defense of *logoi* as autonomous forces in human life coheres with her own reliance on the ritual *logoi* of lament, the competitive *logoi* of persuasion and self-defense, and the battling *logoi* of reproach and insult.

The debate ends with Chrysothemis persuaded to do as Electra bids.

Chr. I will do it. It is not reasonable for two people

To dispute what is just, but rather hasten to do it.

(lines 466-67)

She contrasts the fruitless *logoi* of dispute with daring action (*τὸ δρᾶν*, line 467, and *τῶν ἔργων*, line 468), and begs for silence, the necessary companion of a successful venture. We shall meet this corollary of the basic duality later. We may notice here that the colloquy between the sisters ends with the commencement of a deed, as at the exit of the three partners in the Prologue. The silence of the interlocutors thus has positive dramatic effect.

Clytaemnestra enters with attendants bearing ritual offerings such as Chrysothemis had carried in the previous Episode. In their first words

both mother and sister rebuke Electra for again being outside the palace talking.⁶²

Clyt. You have said so many things to many people about me,
How brutally and unjustly I rule, insulting you
and yours . . . (lines 520-22)

But while Chrysothemis immediately grants that Electra, not she, is on the side of justice, Clytaemnestra argues at length for the legitimacy of her slaying of Agamemnon. In both scenes Electra proves stronger; here she convicts her mother of criminal guilt. For it is a case of murder; or, rather, there are two murders, Iphigeneia and Agamemnon. Electra acts as prosecutor against her mother, and as lawyer for the defense of her father. The language of the interchange seats us in the law courts; and the whole scene ultimately turns not so much on questions of substantive justice as on an examination of the debating process and of the use of speech as a mode of action.

The language of both the set-speeches shows a reflexive awareness of the rhetoric of charge and countercharge. Both employ the technique of hypothetical objection and cogent reply.⁶³

Clyt. Now instruct me in this: on whose account
Did he sacrifice her? The Argives'? (lines 534-35)

El. And now I answer you. You say you killed father.
What speech could ever be more shameful,
Whether you did it justly or not? But I will say,
You did not kill justly . . . (lines 558-61)

Such language as this attunes us to the forensic skills displayed in the debate. Electra, for example, marks the divisions in her speech with explicit logic,⁶⁴ and confronts every point in Clytaemnestra's argument with a forceful counter-argument. Clytaemnestra's brief teems with irrelevancies and *argumenta ad hominem*, with spurious saws and forensic grace notes,⁶⁵ and closes by "poisoning the well," in an attempt to cut the ground out from under Electra before she begins. Electra's ironic, polite reply blunts this thrust,

El. If you permit me, I might speak truly
On behalf of both the dead man and my sister.

Clyt. Of course I permit it. If you always began your
speeches
To me this way you wouldn't be painful to listen to.
(lines 554-57)

We are reminded of the formalities and courtesies of debate, and of the court. In these terms we feel that Electra falls to Clytaemnestra's level. For, after meeting her mother's points about the case of Agamemnon with formally, if not substantively, correct rhetoric, Electra's tone changes. She moves into the area of innuendo and threatened violence to which Clytaemnestra descends only later. And Electra ends her set-speech with a sardonic slur on her mother's character (lines 608-9). This new tone serves as transition to the bitter and highly significant interchange following (lines 610-33). We are made conscious here, under a new guise, of the oft-heard charge, against Electra, of shameless speech. Electra herself accuses Clytaemnestra of an *αἰσχρὸς λόγος* (line 559), and similar charges fly back and forth throughout the scene.⁶⁶ As we attend to the debate, then, we react with a heightened awareness of shameful or shameless *logos*, closely related to the legally hybriatic *logos*. When Clytaemnestra accuses Electra of *hybris* (line 613), Electra admits the charge: not that she is breaking the law, but that she has said shameful things and that she feels shame.

El. You may be sure I do feel shame about these things,
Even if you don't think so . . . (lines 616-17)

The terms of this confession are the same that she has used before.⁶⁷ Their fuller development here serves not only as a climax in the scene, but as a crisis in the emergence of Electra's character. The point here, which springs directly from the set-speeches, their self-conscious use of rhetoric, and their tone of invective, is that talk and action are identical in Electra's stance, and that her verbal action is in part *aischron*, ugly, shameful.

"Doesn't it seem to you," Clytaemnestra asks the Chorus, "that she would do anything without feeling shame?" (lines 614-15). Clytaemnestra's question refers to a purely verbal form of *hybris*, and "do anything," *χωρεῖν ἐς πᾶν ἔργον* then means verbal action. Electra replies (in the lines just quoted) that she *is* ashamed of these "things," meaning her invectives, and that she realizes that she is doing unseasonable things.⁶⁸

El. Your hostility and your deeds
Compel me against my will to do these things.
For shameful deeds are taught by shameful deeds.
(lines 619-21)

She is forced to "do these things," *ταῦτα δρᾶν*, again referring to verbal actions.

Were we not attuned to the issue of *logos* and *ergon*, it would be hard to understand why the most violent exchange in this most violent scene uses such abstruse language.

El. Shameful deeds are taught by shameful deeds.

Clyt. O shameless creature, I and my words
And my deeds make you say much too much.

El. You say it, not I. For you do
The deed; and deeds find words for themselves.

Clyt. By Lady Artemis, you'll pay for this impudence,
When Aegisthus comes back . . . (lines 621-27)

Clytaemnestra's pairing of words and deeds, implying the sum total of behavior, contrasts with Electra's sole activity, talk. The phrase, "make you say too much," ἄγαν λέγειν ποεῖ, presents the central duality in miniature. Electra's paradoxical reply, "You say it," attempts to justify her talk by pleading the compulsion of deeds. "You do the deed," she says, σὺ γὰρ ποεῖς / τοῦργον, implying not only that Clytaemnestra is her antithesis (as *ergon* versus her *logos*), but that deeds or circumstances produce speech.⁶⁹

The confrontation of Electra and Clytaemnestra throws the harshest light thus far on both *logos* and *ergon*. Each emerges blackened. Insofar as the two speakers discuss *erga*, they are deeds of a violence and unquestionable inhumanity that "justice," on whichever side it lies, can hardly qualify. Blurred with these *erga* are verbal deeds, almost as ugly. In fact, what is said in the course of the scene exhibits types of *logoi* calculated to wound and besmirch, whether justly or not. The scene as a whole not only proves but presents *hybris* and *aikia*, vicious abuse; and dramatically this abuse takes the form of verbal insult, replacing physical violence.

Clytaemnestra unites the basest *erga* and the most corrupt *logoi*. As a final example of this, her prayer to Apollo confesses craven wariness and blasphemous intentions. It turns on concealment through silence, and fear of what might be said, specifically said by Electra. The prayer in an *aischros logos* through and through.

By comparison, Electra's peculiar form of nobility more than holds its own. Her arguments have power, and defeat Clytaemnestra. But Electra herself emerges from the battle of words rather sooty. She has once more presented herself bound up with *logoi* by contrast to *erga*, and has once more admitted how wretched this position is. She lacks the strength to do the deed that she most desires (lines 604-5). Her own *logoi* have taken on the character of *erga kaka*, and she is in this sense "well-skilled in action," τῶν ἔργων ἱδρὺς (line 608), where action means

abusive speech and *erga* are *aischra*, as she had labeled those of her mother:

El. You are doing the foulest of all acts
αἰσχίστα πάντων ἔργα δρώσα τυγχάνεις

(line 586)

Therefore, the dramatic effect of this scene intensifies our unresolved conflict about the virtue and nobility of Electra and of her world of *logos*. We must reject and accept the indictment of herself which she puts into her mother's mouth:

El. Publically proclaim me what you will: base,
 Foul-mouthed, or full of shamelessness. (lines 606-07)

She augments our conflicting response by giving a low connotation to all talk, all *logos*. She defines Agamemnon's crime against Artemis as boasting. She locates the source of Clytaemnestra's evil actions in *peithō* (line 562). When she reproaches Clytaemnestra for breaking out of the proprieties of debate (lines 628-29, quoted above), her mother capitulates to this just criticism, but can come right back with equal, though petulant, justice:

Clyt. Won't you let me make sacrifice in proper silence,
 Since I permitted you to say everything? (lines 630-31)

And Electra must capitulate in her turn:

El. I let you, I beg you, make sacrifice,
 And don't blame my lips, for I will say nothing more.
 (lines 632-33)

She is stung by Clytaemnestra's point. The accusation of talking too much clings.

"Deeds find words for themselves": τὰ δ' ἔργα τοὺς λόγους εὐρίσκειται (line 625). Electra's ultimate line of self-defense implies that words are subservient to deeds, as passive to active, or as effect to cause. Thus she expresses the ambiguous autonomy of *logos* and of her own character in the face of *erga*. The debate between mother and daughter quite literally consists of words sprung inevitably from foul deeds. The next scene presents words necessitated by a just enterprise. In a sense not intended by Electra, "deeds find words for themselves" implies that deeds require *logoi* as means, and hence that the deed afoot, Orestes', will call forth the *mythos* of the Paedagogus. Thus the proposition serves as a transition in the theater.

The Paedagogus' false account of Orestes' death (the longest extant set-speech in Sophocles) complements Clytaemnestra's self-convicting prayer, and, by eye-for-eye justice, gives her what she deserves. But the *mythos*, which we have been expecting since Orestes outlined its plot in the Prologue, also complements Electra's verbal virtuosity. Electra's character, with its essentially monochromatic reliance on verbal action, and its duality of pathos and power, leaps to accept the Paedagogus' story in its shattering ramifications. Her suffering is real, and affects us. But since her suffering has been bound up with her expression of it orally, here it is "unjust" but "deserved." In her character lies the spurious side of *logos*, as well as the valid. It is consonant with her character, then, to be taken in by a verbal stratagem, by verbal seeming. Clytaemnestra says that *she* will wait for the ashes, as proof of the story.⁷⁰ But Electra interrupts and pushes away the Chorus's suggestions about hope for Orestes' life.⁷¹ The succeeding scene will show Electra rejecting even concrete evidence on the question of the alleged death, and able in her turn to give a plausible explanation (*logos*) for Chrysothemis' discoveries. Electra shows a stubborn refusal to doubt the worst.

The Paedagogus' speech stands in the dead-center of the play. It is not without significance that both the plan of Orestes and the total action of the drama pivot on this unrivaled exhibition of verbal verisimilitude. For us as audience, the speech flows naturally as part of the original scheme. This scheme has become more meaningful to us in the interval, since we have learned its supreme value and necessity. The situation in the household, the indecent brutality of Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus, and their treatment of Electra, have been conveyed to us; as has the suffering, on one hand, and the frustrated hostility, on the other, of Electra. Electra has led us so far into her life and emotions that we desire vengeance as much as she does. And, we see Orestes, as she does, as the requisite agent of vengeance. The false story, in its effect on her, completes her pathos. Her bitter despair, however, has an impact on us as double-edged as her character throughout. The necessity in her suffering, as she hears the story, gives it a noble strength based on *erga*, which torment her from all sides, and on her resistance to them. But her reaction also exemplifies for us her separation from *erga*, the actual state of affairs and the deeds for which she so longs.⁷²

The Paedagogus' speech deploys the power in *logoi*, just as Electra had in her persuasive colloquy with Chrysothemis or her admirable prosecution of Clytaemnestra. And, in the Paedagogus' speech we see the double-nature of *logoi*, as we have seen it in Electra's behavior. The speech is instrumental, valid, justified, and effective, in the strategy of

revenge; it is deceiving, spurious, and grievous in its immediate effects. We marvel at the persuasiveness of a story which we know is false. We suffer with Electra; but we know that she will eventually rejoice.

The Paedagogus finishes his speech in this way:

So that's how it is, painful enough
As a story, but to those who saw it,
The greatest of all woes ever seen. (lines 761-63)

The implied contrast of *logos* to *erga* retains more than a tinge of ambiguity. Insofar as a story is less painful than the event, it is a solace to hear about it rather than see it. But insofar as a story has less validity than the event, what we have been hearing should be suspect.⁷³

Throughout the play thus far, Electra has stood rooted in her posture of lament, expostulation, and yearning for a vengeance that she knows herself powerless to attain alone. From her entrance through the despairing *kommos*, we have in fact seen no physical action on the part of Electra. Nor has there been any alteration in her essential behavior. She has waited for Orestes. The *rhesis* in which she learns, or supposes she learns, that she is hopelessly alone is her catastrophe. So in the following scene, the second confrontation with her sister, which we necessarily compare and contrast with the first, she determines at last to strike out on a new path. For the first time in the play, she makes a decision toward physical action. Orestes' death occasions her change of heart. She decides to relinquish passivity in the face of *erga* and to venture beyond the realm of words. Before, she had succeeded in persuading Chrysothemis to do something, however minimal, by way of rebellion; here, she fails to persuade, but vows she stands ready to act alone. She abandons the effort at persuasion. *She* will act, to win honor or a glorious death. But, at the end of the scene, Electra does not budge. Chrysothemis she sends away, then remains on stage during the second Stasimon. For, after all, we reflect, Orestes will come, has come, and Electra will never do the deed.

Orestes comes as the natural consequence, one might say, of Electra's full recognition of the necessity of action, just as the Paedagogus' arrival requited her preoccupation with words. As it is, Orestes' coming releases Electra not only from past ills but from her projected, and undoubtedly self-destructive, act of heroism. For, Electra's decision to make an attempt on the life of Aegisthus,⁷⁴ we are led to believe, would result in her own death instead, probably without glory. Electra had previously granted that she lacked the strength to do it, and this objection from strength Chrysothemis raises in their second colloquy as she

had in the first.⁷⁵ Our play does not commend ineffectual counter-attack, much less a merely intended counterattack.

There is important irony throughout the second meeting of the sisters. Electra defends the deed that she proposes by emphasizing the good repute, *logōn eukleia* (line 973), that will accrue. Again and again she argues from what others will say, quoting finally an imaginary eulogy at length (lines 977–83; cf. 970–71). Even *eusebeia* has become the “praise of piety” (line 968) for her.⁷⁶ These rather suspect forms of reputation, spun out into a fable with a happy ending, contrast with the *kleos*, accompanied by lands and rule, which Orestes seeks. The scene as a whole impresses us once again with the schism in Electra’s stance. Affirming an intention to act, she highlights her limited power. She would venture on deeds in pursuit of kind words.

The same schism lies behind the dispute over the tokens. Electra presents herself to Chrysothemis as tough-minded, as judging by the way things are rather than by private opinion. She accuses her sister of being deceived by words.

El. Alas! Who told you this story (*logos*)
That you believe in all too fully? (lines 883–84)

Chrysothemis argues that her “hypothesis” is warranted by clear evidence.

Chr. I saw clear signs for myself,
And do not believe another’s story. (lines 885–86)

The irony of Electra’s position is patent in this interchange. So it is also in her last exhibition of persuasive force, when she counters Chrysothemis’ self-conscious deduction from the tokens to Orestes’ presence (lines 907–15) with her own evidence, mere hearsay.

Chr. Alas! Who told you these things?
El. The man nearest when he died. (lines 926–27)

For us, the plausibility of her explanation of the tokens hardly belies its pathetic spuriousness. Chrysothemis had shown a merely logical skill; Electra’s moral and emotional force carries the day. This dispute, then, exposes the deceitfulness of *logoi* (words, arguments, reasons) when they are cast adrift from *erga* (acts, facts, things). Indeed, the whole scene throws a devastating light on Electra’s divided nature: the justice of her attitude and her decision; the misconceptions that she entertains and defends so well; her force and her folly. Chrysothemis argues from *erga* throughout the scene, albeit pettily; Electra talks *erga* and argues from *logoi*.

By now, through more than two thirds of the play, we have seen how their relationship to worlds of *logos* and of *ergon*, and to clearly affiliated principles, has defined the stance of each of the characters. The rich variations on a dialectic of *logos* and *ergon* have composed a coherent plane of meaning, close to the dramatic center of each scene. Orestes and Electra carry the duality in its fullest significance, so that, with the physical encounter of hero and heroine, the dialectical action takes a leap forward. Harmony within the antithesis struggles toward life.

Since Orestes and Electra are living emblems of the play's basic conceptual duality, in the "recognition" scene visible dramatic effects stand out, corresponding to their physical reunion. Orestes enters carrying an urn. This urn, like a third actor, dominates the stage until the final minute of the dialogue. It is the ostensible reason for the stranger's presence; Electra cries out at the sight of it, and, holding it in her arms, addresses it in a long and moving lament; finally, Orestes tries to recover it from her, and his explanation of who he is revolves around explaining what the urn is not. For the urn is a surrogate-Orestes, an Orestes by sham, a fiction posing as fact. All through the scene we have before our eyes the unrecognized Orestes and the presumed Orestes. What more touching and pathetic speech than that in which Electra endows the ashes with life, doubly mistaking them for her brother? Her passage from grief to joy, her passage to insight, must come through relinquishing the urn and all that it represents.

Or. Give up this urn then, so you may learn all.

(line 1205)

What Electra and we alike "recognize" in the process is the distinction between reality and supposition, between expectation and event, between true and false evidence.

In fact, this happens to Orestes as well as to Electra. During the only part of the scene not centered on the urn, Orestes examines with pity the figure that Electra has become (lines 1174-1204). At this moment, his well-considered determination falters, and he recognizes the inadequacy of his previous "reasonable" point of view. He suffers in seeing Electra's suffering, and alters his course of action. As he replaces concealment through silence with revelatory speech, Electra replaces her compelling though misdirected lamentation with joy. She realizes who the stranger is and what the urn is not. From this mutual shift results the intense sweetness of the climactic moments: Electra releases the urn (line 1217),⁷⁷ soon to take Orestes himself in her arms (line 1225). Orestes with one hand shows Electra the ring that proves what the urn

that he still holds in the other had only shammed. At the end of the dialogue, the urn recedes from the level of personage to that of mere object, and all our attention rests on the living pair.

Upon re-entering, Orestes exhibits the traits that marked him in the Prologue: confidence, calculation, detachment. But, in the course of the scene, he is forced to a new experience of suffering, and this in turn produces a new kind of behavior. At the conclusion of Electra's overpowering lament, he finds himself at a loss for words:

Or. Alas, alas, what shall I say? Perplexed,
Where go in speech? I no longer have the
strength to control my tongue. (lines 1174-75)

For the first time in the play he is bereft of his mastery of himself and of the situation; and Electra's grief has effected this. Through encountering Electra, Orestes becomes temporarily quite unlike the schemer of the Prologue. He feels pity now (lines 1199-1201); he confesses that previously he had failed to understand certain realities:

Or. How little I knew of my own troubles (*kakōn*).
(line 1185)

For the first time, he suffers under the force of evils from without. Thus he shares, at least momentarily, not only his sister's trait of compulsive speech, but also her relationship to *erga kaka*. At their moment of reunion, Orestes enters the world of Electra, just as she had already gone far toward entering his, in the scene preceding his entrance. For this reason, contrary to plan, Orestes tells the truth: *ψεῦδος οὐδὲν ὦν λέγω* (line 1220). He admits his former lie by stressing that the urn is "not Orestes, except tricked out in speech (*logōi*)" (line 1217). He desires now to align words and facts.

With considerable delicacy, the language of the opening speeches of this scene prefigures not only the reunion of Orestes and Electra as its end, but the harmony of *logos* and *ergon* at the end of the play. For the first nine speeches after Orestes' re-entrance imply a correlation of *logos* with *ergon*, rather than a bitter disjunction. In the first lines, *ὀρθά τ' εἰσηκούσαμεν* balances *ὀρθῶς θ' ὁδοιποροῦμεν* (lines 1098-99). Both what he has heard or learned, and what he has done physically, have brought Orestes to his goal. Line 1100 links together a wish and a search; line 1101, inquiry and the person and place sought. Line 1102 correlates the attainment of a goal and the guiding words. The question in lines 1103-4 and the response in line 1105 relate physical presence to a verbal announcement; similarly, lines 1106-7, physical movement and

a declaration. Lines 1108-9 express the correlation, so central to the whole scene, of evidence and report.

El. Alas, alas are you bringing certain proofs
of the rumors we heard before? (lines 1108-9)

Electra assumes here that the evidence and the report are both true. This beneficent assumption is proleptic; such a harmony will obtain only after she has learned that both are false. Orestes replies evasively, giving the impression of a congruence of presage and message; and of the truth of both rumor and report. But the true congruence — of repute and reality — will exist only after the sham of both has been unmasked.

The mutual recognition of brother and sister, and their experiences of self-recognition, achieve a fragile resolution of conflict in this scene. But it lasts only a moment. We then plunge back into tension between talk and the deed at hand which pulls apart the newly joined couple. We must begin, as it were, a new ascent, leading to a final reconciliation, both of the characters and within the action.

The seeming duet between Electra and Orestes (lines 1232-87) actually shows no harmonizing at all. For Orestes does not join in; he has no lyric lines, only the rational iambics of discourse. We see dramatized again, in fact, the contrast so striking in the Prologue, between Electra's threnody, here reversed to exaltation, and Orestes' controlled deliberations.⁷⁸ In this "duet" Orestes' constant effort is to terminate it. The reunion scene took place in a softened light, as though it floated above the nexus of harsh necessities in which the characters otherwise move. With a grim rigor, real circumstances reassert themselves at the commencement of what Electra would have an unburdening song of joy. We have forced on us again an awareness that a violent endeavor is in progress demanding secrecy, and that talk may give everything away and lead to disaster. Orestes therefore meets Electra's joyous outpouring with cold detachment. Again and again he tries to cut short a possibly compromising song. The contrast between brother and sister turns, more sharply than ever, on that between getting something done and expressing one's emotions. As though in order to heighten the contrast, both are unyielding and a bit unsympathetic. Electra's first lyrics are in a bombastic rhetoric (lines 1232-35): three different unnamed individuals are mentioned by three indefinite plural periphrases; she uses four verbs in a row to say one thing. Orestes' harsh, laconic reply temporarily stops her in her tracks.

Or. I'm here. But remain silent.

El. Why?

Or. Silence is better, so no one inside may hear.

(lines 1236-38)

Again, when she picks up a hint about her woes and characteristically but rather unrealistically laments that they will never end, Orestes cuts her short:

Or. I know all that. But when you may speak freely,

Then will be the time to remember these things (ergōn).

(lines 1251-52)

We are not now at a moment for free speech, much less "license of tongue," *παρησια*; ⁷⁹ and the implicit opposition of *logoi* and *erga* bolsters his point. Electra replies, in lyrics again, that the rest of time could justly be used to talk about her past ills. Orestes must remind her that this is the wrong time for talking too much, *μὴ' στί καιρὸς* (line 1259). To save free speech, in fact, there must be less talk at the critical moment. Orestes opposes that basic concept in the consultation of the Prologue, the *kairos*, to those *makroi logoi* that have been more than once applied to Electra. But she remains true to form by objecting that silence for talk is a bad trade, and continuing expansively with her song (lines 1260-62). At the end, Orestes' objections grow weaker. He interrupts her once more impatiently (line 1276), but finally promises, as she wishes him to, that he will not leave her. She is free to end the interlude by dwelling again on her past sorrow, her present joy, and her steadfastness throughout. If Orestes has acquiesced for a moment to Electra's emotion, as soon as we pass to dialogue he will restate his position, in a more compelling way. And Electra will yield to him.

In the "duet" and the scene following we feel in the dramatic setting the tension between talking and acting that appeared within Electra's character all along. Before, the ambiguities of speech were played out in isolation from deeds; now, with Orestes embodying the thrust toward action, Electra's position becomes less equivocal. The issues become overt and literal. Our sympathies are divided. Suspense about the impending killings and their danger we share with Orestes, and with him press for dispatch; delight and relief we feel with Electra, and her spontaneous emotions draw our own. But the iteration here of the explicit grounds of the tension heightens our desire for resolution.

The scene between the song and the short third Stasimon has been almost entirely neglected by critics. It serves as a vital transition to the so-called Exodos, which is the climax of the action. The transition involves a gradual alteration in the attitude of Electra; and also a few more,

final touches in the education of Orestes, supplied by the Paedagogus. The scene takes us closer to the means and the end represented by the Paedagogus, and more fully into his world of *ergon*.

At the beginning of the dialogue, Orestes puts his attitude toward Electra's melic interlude as vigorously and as bluntly as possible:

Or. Cease all superfluity of speech (line 1288)

In a coherent, concise statement, built around a $\mu\epsilon\nu$ (line 1288) . . . $\delta\epsilon$ (line 1293) opposition of *logos* to *ergon*, he requests Electra not to waste precious time with a recapitulation of the past. "For," he says, "talk (*logos*) would hinder the moment of opportunity (*kairos*)" (line 1292). In a gracious though round-about reply, Electra agrees to cooperate. And she gives him the facts that he needs to know. She expresses the desire to be a co-worker and a willingness to set aside personal gain for his sake and for the sake of the work at hand (lines 1304-6). Thus Electra explicitly recognizes the urgent requirements of the situation, though she still draws out her speech with digressions and iteration.⁸⁰

The Paedagogus' outburst, as he re-enters, puts more strongly what we feel increasingly: the crucial act can wait no longer. He denounces both brother and sister as senseless (lines 1326-30), because they could have been overheard inside if he had not been on guard (lines 1331-34). The conclusion of his speech sums up the dramatic moment as we experience it, and the necessity to put talk aside.

Paed. Now cease your long speeches
And your insatiate cries of joy,
Go in: in these circumstances, delay
Means ruin, but the time is right for success.
(lines 1335-38)

Hesitation, as though in ignorance of where they are (line 1330), he links to their continued "long speeches" (with which we are now familiar). Joy is out of place in the midst of the "greatest ills or evils" (lines 1329-30, 1338). These ills we can escape by having done with talk (lines 1335, 1338).

Electra sustains the underlying tension for the last time when she experiences her second recognition of the day. Her hopes and her need of masculine aid reach fulfillment, in fact doubly so. Orestes does not prevent the joyous outburst with which Electra eulogizes the Paedagogus, though he tersely and a bit peevishly says,

Or. Do not question me with more words. (line 1353)

Electra's new attitude appears as she reproaches the Paedagogus for his false account,

El. You killed me with lies (*logois*),
While knowing the sweetest truths (*erga*). (line 1360)

The last words uttered by the Paedagogus employ the concepts crucial to his first speech in the Prologue: *kairos* and *ergon*. From now to the end of the play, the Paedagogus will remain silent, because the action will move ahead on schedule. After Orestes transmits a final directive to his partner,

Or. We have no more need of long speeches,
But only of getting inside as quickly as possible,
(lines 1372-73)

the men perform the ritual reverences preparatory to the sanctified slaying, and leave the stage in silence. As her part in the venture, Electra offers a prayer to Apollo. It contains suggestions that this verbal ritual represents her best aid.⁸¹

Electra's concise prayer recalls Clytaemnestra's verbose one (lines 637-59).⁸² Both ask a favor, but, while Clytaemnestra's turns on the guilty opposition of speech and concealment, Electra's shows how words can serve as auxiliaries of action. In this transitional scene, Electra begins to share the men's view of speech as a verbal accompaniment to silent endeavor. In the concluding minutes of the play, she will turn her formidable verbal powers into instruments of vengeance: by reporting what happens; by deceiving Aegisthus; and by a crucial exhortation to action. These instruments contribute to the result, even though she lifts no sword and draws no blood.

At the outset, the final scene gives us two surprises: Electra leaves the stage for the first time since she entered in the Prologue; and, in the *kommos*, she has no lyrics, but leaves them all to the Chorus (lines 1398-1441). After Electra's prayer, she follows the men into the house. Here, dramatically, the new partnership between the two worlds of the drama clothes itself in movement, as Electra silently steps out of her previous costume into another. Her first words convey the change that has occurred:

El. Dear ladies, now in a moment the men
Will finish their work. Wait in silence. (lines 1398-99)

This directive to the Chorus repeats almost word for word Orestes' first objection to her joyous song (line 1236, quoted above). Her alliance

now is with *tourgon* and she realizes that it requires silence. The contrast between men and women remains (as suggested by line 1398), but Electra now aids the men's work effectively. She re-enters, she tells the Chorus, to serve as look-out: she is on stage to *do* something.⁸³ She retreats from the center of attention on stage for the first time since the Prologue. Her place is taken by Clytaemnestra's death-cries, which bespeak the effectiveness of Orestes. Electra encourages him to strike again, though probably not within his hearing. But when he returns, her encouragement is direct (line 1435). Thus, her last words in the *kommos* result from the development of her role as partner in the endeavor: she has become qualified to "take care of what is here" (line 1436). As the Chorus then suggests, she will do this through skillful deception in speech.

And so she does, in a masterpiece of *double entendre*, designed to tell the truth and deceive at the same time. Previously we have seen Electra in the reverse position, the victim of a lie. At other times she was unable to distinguish truth from falsity. Now that she knows how things stand, she employs her wit to keep us constantly aware that she knows, while lulling Aegisthus to ignorance of his danger. Their short interchange (lines 1442-65) displays Aegisthus' base, timorous craving for authority, which reveals itself mainly in his pre-emptory, nagging questions.⁸⁴

Aeg. Where might the strangers be? Tell me that.

El. Inside. They have reached a kind hostess.

(lines 1450-51)

Here Electra's verb, *κατήνυσαν*, means not only "they have reached the house," but "they have accomplished the murder" of their "hostess." In this way, Electra proves her talent for *dolos* of a sort even more highly refined than the men's. Similarly, in the next exchange,

Aeg. And did they genuinely report his death?

El. No, they have brought himself, not news alone.

(lines 1452-53)

Evidence and hearsay, truth and falsity, Electra plays on these ground-themes while sustaining perfect ambiguity. Irony thus emerges in more ways than one within the use of speech here. In harshly demanding answers, Aegisthus reveals his uneasiness and softness. He receives the tit-for-tat of base questions, lies. Speech overthrows the tyrant; but false speech, with a sword to back it up.

Clytaemnestra's body under the sheet plays the same part as Orestes' urn: both serve as pivots for a reversal from delusion to truth. Ambigui-

ties of gender, employed by Orestes, underline Aegisthus' error.⁸⁵ Then he learns, as Electra did, by seeing clear proof, the face of his wife (line 1475). Orestes accompanies the reversal with mocking rhetorical questions that parody those Aegisthus had asked in dead earnest.⁸⁶ "Alas, I understand your word. It is Orestes speaking to me" (lines 1479-80). Aegisthus recognizes Orestes by what he says. This transition from the dead mother to the living son, and from sight to speech, shifts our attention from what we see on the *ekkyklema* to what we hear. And thus we are prepared for the climax of the role of Electra, as she interrupts the desperate attempt of Aegisthus to stall for time with her last speech in the play:

Aeg. Just let me say a little bit.

El. Don't let him say any more!

By the gods, brother, do not prolong speeches.

What profit can delay bring, when a man

In the midst of trouble is about to die?

(lines 1482-86)

Her rejection of talk, of "long speeches," here, in favor of pressing ahead speedily toward the deed and *kerdos*, completes her evolution into an effective ally for Orestes in the vengeance.

Just as Electra alters in her relation to *logoi*, so she will no longer remain crushed by *erga*. Aegisthus' instant death will relieve her.

El. This alone can be a release

From all my former woes.

(lines 1489-90)

She realized all along the need to reverse her relation to *erga*; but the means at her disposal were inoperative, and she despaired of relief. It is available now, through a conjunction of Orestes' hand and her tongue. Her final words encourage her brother in the style of the Paedagogus (though Orestes needs little chiding), adding a bitter sense of intolerable *kaka* all her own. Only by full requital of the extreme *kaka* under which she has suffered can she find release; thus she demands the harshest treatment for Aegisthus' body (lines 1487-89).

Orestes pushes Aegisthus inside, the concluding exit-for-action of the drama, leaving us with his attitude toward requital. Illegal or foul deeds beget just deeds as punishment, even if these just deeds mean murder.⁸⁷ He is still firm in his faith that by the requisite *ergon* we can reduce to *panourgon* (line 1507). For this purpose, in silence Orestes and Aegisthus enter the palace; in silence Electra watches.

In this way the *Electra* plays out the dialectic of *logos* and *ergon*, as

they pass from sheer cleavage to final coordination. Within the character of Electra the same development occurs. Her temper remains constant, as does her reliance on *logoi*. But her stance shifts; gradually she aligns *logos* to *ergon*. With her use of verbal *dolos*, Electra reaches, in the last scene, the farthest remove from her attempt in the Prologue to make *logoi* replace *erga*. Her final attitude toward *logos* and *ergon* is equivalent, in fact, to that of Orestes in the Prologue.

The progress of dialectic in the *Electra* resembles the stringing of a great bow. The bitter struggle dominating most of the play finally yields to a fruitful tension. Male bow and female string, only together make achievement possible. Yet, within their taut resolution, each retains individuality and an essential autonomy. The final utterances of Orestes and Electra each show to the fullest their characteristic tempers: his legalistic, simplistic efficiency; her passionate, urgent absolutism. "Kill all wrongdoers"; "Throw him to the fitting buriers." And so, despite her evolving stance, Electra remains, in an important measure, the same throughout the play. In the lament over the urn, in the *kommoi* and the songs of joy, she retains the affinities dominant in her opening *threnos*. The dialectic of *logos* and *ergon* results in two potent principles operating in harmony. But we never lose the distinction between the two in a vision of their harmony. They join but do not blend.

Each scene of the *Electra* handles the dialectic plastically, moulding visual impact and dramatic structure around a specific, complex relationship of *logos* and *ergon*. Thus, the Prologue presents the two separated worlds, criticizes their separation, and yet reveals the magnetism of each. The Tokens scene shows the false opinions produced when *logos* (hearsay) casts out *ergon* (concrete evidence), and yet also the capacity of Electra's faith and stamina to withstand Chrysothemis' superficiality and frailty. Much of the play's suspense toward the end results from excessive talk checking the thrust toward vengeance; but with the partnership of Orestes and Electra, talk aids in the deed, and the Exodos stages an authentic correlation of the two principles.

Since the essential autonomy of his protagonist lasts throughout the play, Sophocles seems to assert another necessity over and above the practical and "realistic" necessity for the coordination of *logos* and *ergon*. This other, perhaps higher, necessity is that implied by spiritual *logos* in isolation from worldliness. The schism we have noticed within Electra and within her world dramatizes the contrast of a *logos* more profound than logic and a *logos* defined wholly in terms of external *ergon*. It is this latter *logos* alone that Orestes uses. Electra's *logos*, however, is primarily emotional, intuitive, and imaginative, rather than calculating,

rational, and analytic. The word *logos* never means "reason" in the play. On the contrary, we find that Electra's *logoi* (speeches, lyrics, faith) are more potent than the literal truth of *ergon*, arrived at rationally and realistically. Electra dominates the other characters and the drama as a whole because of an inner force, moral and emotional, because of her suffering, and because she commands a language moving beyond logic.⁸⁸ And so it is that we recognize Electra's nobility and strength most fully during the very moments in which she fails most pathetically to grasp *ergon* (facts, evidence, material reality). When she is in error about the tokens, deceived by the Paedagogus' lie, or deluded about the urn, she surges forth, deciding to act alone, enduring the torments of despair, lyrically overwhelming us with noble grief. In this way, each scene from the threnody of the Prologue on presents us with Electra's spiritual *logos* in tension with the demands of fact and deed.

The opening and closing of our play both show the world of *ergon* dominant; both present the men in control, and affirm their world dramatically as well as conceptually. The large center of the play criticizes the world of *logos*; its keystone is the great *rhesis* of the Paedagogus, at the exact middle. With this structure, the *Electra* asserts the practical and literal truth of *ergon*, but also, bursting out of this frame, the uncanny force of *logos*. In the center of the play, speeches, lyrics, and faith prove more powerful than *erga*, and even while Electra's *logoi* are gradually being aligned to the *ergon* of vengeance, she possesses insight above calculation and holds sway in a rhythmic world of meaningful pathos, ritual, and chant. We conclude that, in the *Electra*, Sophocles heals the breach between *ergon* and *logos* and within *logos* itself, and reconciles triumphantly the claims of actual and ideal.

NOTES

1. Less has been written about the *Electra*, at least in the period 1914-present covered by *L'Année philologique*.

2. C. H. Whitman, *Sophocles* (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1951) 152, "Sophocles' drama of *Electra* has always been the great enigma."

3. "Why . . . did [Sophocles] write a play about Orestes at all . . . The answer is he did not; he wrote a play about Electra . . ." Whitman, p. 154. "In a few lines Orestes is depicted . . . with no problem and no special dramatic interest . . ." ". . . he is . . . obviously more a symbol than a character" (p. 155). Cf. G. Méautis, *Sophocle* (Paris 1957) 227, "*L'Electre* . . . est une tragédie 'féminine,' dont le centre est une héroïne non un héros."

4. Cf. J. T. Sheppard, "*Electra*: a Defence of Sophocles," *CR* 61 (1927) 2-9; Sir C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944), chap. vi; F. J. H. Letters, *The Life and Work of Sophocles* (London 1953), chap. ix, and L. A. Post, "Sophocles, Strategy, and the *Electra*," *CW* 66 (1953) 150-53.

Sheppard saw the play as Orestes' misdirected pursuit of vengeance and the snaring of Electra in pathetic moral blindness. He commenced his subtle but highly rationalistic analysis with a now famous quibble about the oracle cited by Orestes. Apollo did not command the murder, Sheppard argued, but only proposed the means of bringing it off. The brother goes on from his sinful misinterpretation of the oracle to swallow up his sister in blasé depravity and confident despair. Sheppard's arguments received what should have been final refutation from Bowra, though they still claim some adherents, such as R. P. Winnington-Ingram, "The *Electra* of Sophocles: Prolegomena to an Interpretation," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, No. 183 (1954-55) 20-31. Bowra's chapter on the *Electra* is more a special study of the legal aspects of vengeance and matricide, and so on, than a full interpretation of the play. Perhaps for this reason it is still heavily weighted on the side of Orestes as the key figure. The most complete, direct reply to Sheppard may be formed by adding to Bowra's legal study Waldock's comments on the play's dramatic impact. Waldock's essay, in his *Sophocles the Dramatist* (Cambridge, England 1951), is a well-balanced though remarkably bland treatment of both Orestes and Electra.

Letters says that Electra dominates the play, but devotes many more pages to an examination of Orestes' guilt or, as it turns out, justification, than he does to the significance of Electra. Such disproportion has its source in Sheppard's challenge. In his moral views, as in his stress on Orestes, Letters follows Bowra.

5. The contrast between the kind of interpretation of the play which critics have arrived at depending on whether they have seen one or the other character predominant suggests, further, that the *Electra* may present us with two very different characters, different both humanly and in the principles they convey. Those critics mainly concerned with Orestes see the *Electra* as a problem play, a rather legalistic morality play, calculated to make us reflect on complex issues of justice. Those mainly concerned with Electra see the play as directly affecting, as strictly tragic, a presentation of passions.

6. Cf. Whitman, p. 169: "It may seem strange . . . that Orestes is in the play at all, that he can symbolize anything of Electra. But his very antithesis is what makes him so apt and accurate a symbol." And, p. 170: ". . . the play is subtly devised to show . . . two aspects of human supremacy, of which the dramatically interesting one is the one which is the most completely human. And that is Electra." Whitman, therefore, while noticing the essential difference of the two figures, sees one dependent on the other, considers one dramatically real, the other merely allegorical, and does not find intrinsic meaning in the duality itself, as I shall try to show there is. My comments will tend to establish that both Orestes and Electra have autonomous existence and autonomous significances, and yet that they are always complementary as well.

7. See T. B. L. Webster, *Introduction to Sophocles* (Oxford 1936) 88-89, for a diagram of the pairings in several plays.

8. This salient effect has been remarked upon by several critics, notably by H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* 3rd ed. (London 1961) 152, 172-73; and by Whitman, p. 170, who cites T. von Wilamowitz, *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles* (Berlin 1917) 166. These brief discussions are largely from the point of view of dramatic impact.

9. The *locus classicus* for the social differentiation of men and women in Greece is Herodotus, ii 35. Sophocles wrote a speech around the theme in *Oed. Col.*, 337ff, which has been traced to the influence of the passage in Herodotus.

For modern discussion of the fact, see A. Zimmern, *Greek Commonwealth* (New York: Modern Library, undated) 52-53. He cites Xenophon, *Oec.*, vii 3 and 30. Cf. C. Seltman, *Women in Antiquity* (London 1956) 110ff and H. D. F. Kitto, *The Greeks* (Penguin Books 1951) 219ff.

10. Cf. also the word *chreos*, line 74.

11. See Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1491, and B. B. Rogers' note *ad loc.* Also, Zimmern, p. 246.

12. See Zimmern, p. 265.

13. The simile, lines 25-28; cf. line 36. "Battle" is of course a common meaning of *ergon*.

14. Again, an *epistatēs* is a charioteer (so used later in the play, line 702).

15. See above, nn.3 and 6.

16. These are the only "wars" which she wages, lines 219-20.

17. Lines 189-90, and cf. *prospolōn* (line 78).

18. Lust: lines 97, 114, 272-74, 587.

Pity: lines 100 and 102.

Hate: lines 92, 93, and 104.

Misery: lines 77, 94, 119-20, etc.

19. Lines 95, 97, 101, 107, 108, 112, 115-16, 117, etc. Note also the numerous possessive adjectives with these nouns.

The Chorus shares Electra's immersion in ties of the family: see lines 121-22, 124-25, 129, 226, 154, 174, and 235.

20. Cf. her use of *eugenēs*, line 257; and the Chorus's praise of her, second Stasimon.

21. Lines 78-79. Cf. Lewis Campbell's note.

22. Even the Chorus will later question her about domestic matters, the same ones Orestes wants to find out about, see lines 310-14. Comments elsewhere on Electra's being outside thus carry symbolic weight: see lines 312-13, 328, 516-18.

23. J. T. Sheppard, in an article that has remained buried in the *Classical Quarterly* of 1918 while his misguided later efforts have received much attention (see above, n.3), showed the contrast established in the Prologue between action and suffering. This whole essay, even though its accounts of the later scenes of the play are thin and drift away from the text, represents an impressive early attempt to follow out some of the salient features of the language and its implications and to see what issues the characters embody. "The Tragedy of Electra," *CQ* 1918 80-88.

24. She endows the elements with knowledge (lines 89 and 93) of her mode of life and her feelings. They indeed serve as an extension of her consciousness.

25. It should be noticed that even those critics who see the play as an affirmative portrayal of Electra's moral or spiritual heroism (see above, n.3) admit reservations about her personality and the kind of dramatic effect she produces. Thus Méautis calls her "cette femme vieillie, déséquilibrée, névrosée presque . . ." (p. 250). Waldo rather naïvely writes, "We observe her with amazement, thinking: 'Perhaps life ought to be lived on this level . . .' and then we recoil from the picture of a world frequented by Electras" (p. 175). And even Whitman remarks that "Electra is not a very engaging character, in the sense that Deianeira is, nor has she the splendor of Antigone. Antigone is illuminated from within, and though a flame burns in Electra too, it is dark and lurid" (p. 164).

26. Cf. lines 492 and 962.

27. Lines 236, 254, 307-9, 616-20.

28. I use "archetype" (or "image") here in a nontechnical sense. My assumption is only that the central religious figures or heroes of a culture afford often implicit norms for behaviour and thought. These figures, therefore, lie back of much written within the culture, whether they appear explicitly or not. It is often safer and wiser for a writer not to treat such figures explicitly; for they may well have grown a bit stale and hence fail to convey full impact. (Consider how rarely Christ appears in modern European literature.)

Now Sophocles used Odysseus as a character in two of the plays which we have, and in several others of which we have fragments. As I remark below, his Odysseus looks more like Orestes than like Electra; and this might be objected against me. But my interpretation here is based on a distinction between the living image of the Homeric Odysseus, as the public received it freshly at festivals and recitals, and that other Odysseus, the cliché, the short-hand word for only a few of the traits that the hero exhibits in Homer. I suggest that Sophocles was well aware of both these images of Odysseus; that in *Ajax* and *Philoctetes* he was not offering a comment on Homer at all; and that, perhaps because he knew that his audience saw Odysseus increasingly as a mere cliché, he chose, in *Electra*, to leave only the informing touch of the hero on the play at all.

29. Whitman, p. 150. Cf. M. Parry, *L'Épithète traditionnelle dans Homère* (Paris 1928), charts on the frequency of the epithets.

30. Both *mētis* and *polumētis* are regularly connected in the *Odyssey* with *kerdos*, *dolos*, etc. For example, XIII, 293, 299, 311.

31. Both *tlēnai* and *polutlas* are connected with suffering (as XIII, 307); with patience and suffering (V, 362; XVI, 275); and with endurance (XX, 311).

32. Just as *πολλῶν δ'*, line 3, and *πολλά δ'*, line 4, frame one of the pairs, so *μάλα πολλὰ*, line 1, introduces the larger pairing of lines 1 and 2 with lines 3 and 4.

33. The first epithet of Odysseus in the epic, *polutropon*, suggests both the hard-driven man "of many wanderings," and the ingenious man "of many shifts."

34. So important in Books V and XXIII.

35. In fact, the word *kerdos*, with its plural, and the word *kerdaleos*, serve as a *double entendre* to suggest both Odysseus' gainfulness and his wiliness. For a perhaps intentional, ironic use of the *double entendre*, see VIII, 164.

36. For *kleos*, see IX, 20, etc. For thievishness, XIII, 291, 295. Athena's first word to Odysseus when she begins to speak in her own person (XIII, 291) is *kerdaleos*.

37. There also existed a play *Odysseus the False Messenger*, author unknown, cited by Aristotle, *Poet.* 1455a, a rather precise link with our Paedagogus. Odysseus has the idea of sending a false messenger in the *Philoctetes* as well.

38. Whitman, pp. 150-52.

39. XVIII, 346-48 equals XX, 284-86. Cf. XIII, 307-10 and XVI, 274ff.

40. Paragraph 20 of the *Vita* as printed by Pearson (O.C.T.).

41. Cf. XV, 341-45 and XIII, 89-92.

42. Cf. J. H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1955) 13.

43. This is also suggested by the critical reactions to her, mentioned above, n.25.

44. The famous passage, from Plutarch, *De Profectibus in Virtute* 7, in which

Sophocles speaks of his style as "most expressive of character, and best," is quoted and analyzed very persuasively by C. M. Bowra, "Sophocles on his own Development," *Problems in Greek Poetry* (Oxford 1953), chap. vii.

45. See A. M. Parry, Jr., *Λόγος and Ἔργον in Thucydides*, diss., Harvard University, 1957. The introductory chapter treats examples of the duality from Homer through the fifth century.

46. See T. B. L. Webster, *Greek Theater Production* (London 1956) 14. Cf. H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* (above, n.8) 134.

47. There are many verbal parallels between their speeches, such as *hodos* (lines 20 and 68), *logoi* (lines 21 and 30), *saphē* (lines 18, 23, 41), and the shining lights and stars (cf. lines 16-18 and line 66); also note the gods to whom they each refer.

48. The Paedagogus begins with the generalship of Agamemnon (lines 1-2); Orestes begins with a lengthy military simile (lines 26-28).

49. See lines 33, 35, and 40-41.

50. Line 40, where Jebb notes a pregnant sense of *isthi* implying activity leading to knowledge, rather than knowledge alone.

51. Two uses of the verb *aggelein* in close succession show this modulation from one sense of *logos* to the other. In line 41, *aggelein* is part of the process of instruction; it springs from knowledge; it gives an account of things as they are (line 40); it will lead to an effective plan of action. In line 47, *aggelein* involves a false account, the presentation of which is part of the project.

52. The notion of concealment is also conveyed by *kleptontes* (line 56) and *kekrummenon* (line 55).

53. See also lines 63-64.

54. And, of course, *erga* commonly imply equally concrete powers and possessions.

55. Line 755, midway through the 1510 line play, comes within the *rhesis*. Line 50 is 27 lines from the beginning of Orestes' speech and 26 lines from the end.

56. Such questions we have in Strophe 1, Antistrophe 1, Antistrophe 3; objections, in Antistrophe 1, Strophe 2, Antistrophe 2, Antistrophe 3, and the Epode.

57. Note *aluein*, line 135, and *atuzomena*, line 148.

58. Lines 107, 147-48, and 149-52; cf. line 242.

59. Throughout her first set-speech (lines 254-309), Electra associates Clytemnestra with *logos* in the sense of mere pretense and false repute, and with *logoi* as verbal abuse: see lines 287-88 and 299. In opposition, Electra speaks of herself *doing* things, even if these things are *threnoi* (lines 256-58). She credits herself with the *ergon* (line 296) of rescuing Orestes.

60. In her first set-speech, Electra cites an array of visual evidence of evils, using forms of the verb *horān*: lines 258, 260, 267, 268, and 271. We see the *kaka* that have made her what she is; and we see them through her eyes.

61. Thus the contrast of *logos* and *ergon* implicit in the two separate sentences composing lines 338-40.

62. Their language is similar: cf. lines 328-36 and 516-24.

63. See lines 525-27, 563-65, etc.

64. Lines 577-79, 585, and 591-92.

65. As lines 532-33, 542-45, and 548.

66. Lines 518, 519, 586, 607, 615, etc.

67. Lines 254ff and 307ff.

68. Which we contrast to the seasonable things in which Orestes is engaged. See Jebb's note on lines 616ff.

69. So also, in line 621, purely verbal *aischra pragmata* are produced by *aischrois* (sc. *pragmasi*), both physical and verbal.

70. Lines 675, 679, and 774.

71. So in the *kommos* (lines 823-70), both Strophes, and, on a related hope, the first Antistrophe. See Jebb's notes on lines 831 and 832.

72. In the latter way, the Paedagogus' speech is only the most effective in a series of reminders to us of the independent scheme of revenge simultaneous with Electra's trials. Electra has reminded us of this by her references to Orestes, one of which at least occurs in each scene without exception (see lines 117, 171-72, 303-7, 319, 321, 455-56, 601-2). In most of these cases she reproaches her brother for not coming; we are well aware that these reproaches are natural for her, but unjustified. Also, she usually speaks of him in terms that apply to her own temper, not his: "he says so (that he will come), but saying so, he does nothing he says" (line 319). Thus Electra convinces us of the partiality of her vision.

73. In the ensuing *kommos*, we need note only that, as so often before, her interlocutors take every opportunity to point out that Electra is speaking or lamenting (lines 829, 830, 853, and 856); and that Electra reaffirms her intention to continue steadfastly mourning, and considers any objection or offer of comfort as an insult (lines 835-36, the second Strophe entire, and lines 865-70).

74. She makes no mention of her mother. This omission indicates the limited scope of her decision to act, and perhaps something of its unrealistic evasion of the full, harsh necessities of vengeance. It may also suggest Electra's fundamental connection with the female sphere.

75. See lines 604-5, 997-98, and 1013-14.

76. In the second Stasimon, the Chorus sing of glory as "repute" or "good opinion" (lines 1088-89). And they see the voice of *Fama* descending to the dead to spur the coming of requital (lines 1066-69). But *eusebeia* (line 1097), the concluding word of the ode, retains its objective moral sense, linked to the "greatest laws," which Electra, on their view, defends.

77. Following Jebb's note.

78. Orestes has no lyrics anywhere in the play; and Electra has a greater proportion than any other protagonist in Sophocles.

79. Following Pearson's text. If we read, with Jebb and the best MSS., *parousia*, the essential turn of thought is the same, but it bears less critically on Electra.

80. Lines 1313-17, 1319-21. Cf. lines 1301-3 and 1318-19.

81. See lines 1377-78 and 1379-80.

82. For verbal parallels, cf. lines 655 and 1376, 1379; and the formulaic endings of each prayer.

83. Throughout this *kommos*, in a further, similar shift, Electra describes objectively rather than expressing a private reaction. She asks and answers simple questions of fact (lines 1400-1, 1402-3, 1406, 1424, 1426, 1430). In fact, she is less emotional in her comments than the Chorus (cf. her line 1406 with the Chorus's lines 1407-8 and her hemistich, line 1410).

84. Lines 1444, 1450 (2), 1452, and 1454.

85. Lines 1469, 1470, and 1471. Cf. lines 1452 and 1457.

86. Lines 1475 and 1477-78.

87. The punishment must literally fit the crime: Aegisthus will die on the very spot on which he killed Agamemnon (lines 1495-96), fulfilling the Paedagogus' insistence, at the outset, on the precisions of place.

88. Cf. Gorgias' *Helen*, *passim*, and C. P. Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the *Logos*," *HSCP* 66 (1962) 99-155.

C. MARCIUS CENSORINUS, LEGATUS CAESARIS

In Memoriam A. D. Nock

BY G. W. BOWERSOCK

AN inscription from Sinope in honor of C. Marcius Censorinus, consul in 8 B.C., was published in 1905 and subsequently neglected:

Γάϊον Μάρκιον
Κηνσωρίνον
πρεσβευτήν
Καίσαρος τὸν
κηδεμόνα τῆς
πόλεως ὁ δῆμος.¹

Of recent scholars only Magie has noticed this document,² but he suggested no date for Censorinus' legateship and gave him an incorrect praenomen. It would be worth knowing when Censorinus served at Sinope as *legatus Caesaris* (πρεσβευτῆς Καίσαρος) and what sort of legate he was.

The other available evidence concerning him must be examined first. Josephus (*AJ* 16.165) has preserved an edict of Augustus containing the following sentence: τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα τὸ δοθέν μοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐμῆς εὐσεβείας ἧς ἔχω πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὑπὲρ Γαΐου Μαρκίου Κηνσωρίνου καὶ τοῦτο τὸ διάταγμα κελεύω ἀνατεθῆναι ἐν ἐπισημοτάτῳ τόπῳ τῷ γεννηθέντι μοι ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς Ἀσίας ἐν ἀργύρῳ.

μαρκίου γοργίου *P* μαρκίου γαΐου *W* κῆνσωρίνου *M*

There are a few textual points. The Latin Josephus reads "per Gaium Marcium Censorinum mihi porrectam" — manifestly confusing ὑπό and ὑπέρ, but establishing the name which has been slightly corrupted in the Greek. With the Koinon of Asia ἐν ἀργύρῳ the text has certainly gone wrong; Scaliger's emendation ἐν Ἀγκύρῃ is attractive but impossible as history. The Latin Josephus omits the phrase altogether, and corruption (or an ignorant interpolator) may be postulated for the Greek. In any case, it can be seen that some people in Asia Minor had cause to take notice of Censorinus at the time of Augustus' edict. The date is missing in the Greek text (*AJ* 16.162), but it survives in the

Latin version: trib. pot. XI, *i.e.* 13/12 B.C. As Augustus is already pontifex maximus (*AJ* 16.162) the date can be narrowed down to 12. Hence, Censorinus will have been in the East in that year or in one of the years immediately preceding. It is not, of course, necessary for Censorinus still to be there at the precise time of Augustus' edict.

Inscriptions from Pergamum (*OGIS* 466), Miletus (*Milet* I. no. 255), and Mylasa (*SEG* II 549) reveal that Censorinus was at some point proconsul of Asia. Velleius (2. 102. 1) provides the final item: Censorinus died in the East soon after the death of M. Lollius. *Paulo post obisse Censorinum in iisdem provinciis graviter tulit civitas.*

Various possibilities present themselves. Mrs. K. M. T. Atkinson, used the testimony of Josephus to prove that Censorinus held his Asian proconsulship as a praetorian.³ This is unacceptable: the office is consular throughout, despite Mrs. Atkinson's proposal to make M. Vinicius (*cos.* 19 B.C.) into another praetorian proconsul.⁴ Further, it may be observed that Censorinus is not called ἀνθύπατος in the edict preserved by Josephus. It is more plausible to say that Censorinus was proconsul when he died in the East about A.D. 2/3. Thus, a decennium elapsed between his consulship and proconsulship at a time when the other consul of 8 B.C., C. Asinius Gallus, proceeded to a proconsulship of Asia after an interval of only two years (cf. *SIG*³ 780). But ten years are possible: Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Augur, consul in 14 B.C., did not reach the proconsulship of Asia until 1 B.C. (*SIG*³ 781).

The legateship of Censorinus at Sinope, in the senatorial province of Bithynia-Pontus, will have been a praetorian post. It would be natural to connect it with the evidence for his presence in the East in or before 12 B.C., inasmuch as there had been trouble in 14 B.C. precisely in the area where Censorinus served as legate. A rebellion had broken out in the Cimmerian Bosphorus under the leadership of a certain Scribonius. Agrippa, in the East with proconsular power, dispatched Polemo, the client king of Pontus, to quell the uprising; although Scribonius was dead when Polemo arrived, the Bosphoran people stoutly resisted. Finally, intending to conduct a campaign himself, Agrippa went to Sinope and by his very presence brought an end to the revolt. The story is preserved in Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGH* II.A.90. F 134) and Dio (54.24.6). If Censorinus' legateship at Sinope is assigned to 13 B.C., it will fit perfectly with the aftermath of the Bosphoran Rebellion. Perhaps Agrippa left him behind to keep order.

What sort of official was a *legatus Caesaris* who appears in a city of a senatorial province? He cannot be a proconsul's legate: such a man never has a title of the form *legatus Caesaris*, but is usually styled simply

legatus, legatus Asiae (e.g.), or *leg. pro pr. prov. Asiae*. Censorinus belongs to some class of imperial legates who are not governors of imperial provinces. These men are known as *legati Caesaris, legati Augusti*, or *legati Caesaris Augusti*; normally praetorian, though not quite always (quaestorian in *ILS* 931a and 945), they lack *pro pr.* in their titulature. Mommsen omitted these men from *Staatsrecht* II.³ 857; Dessau (*ILS* Index pars I, pp. 366–367) distinguished two classes of *legati Augusti*, apart from governors: one was described by the words *officio incerto* (*non enuntatio[sic]*) and the other mysteriously by *varii generis*.

Inscriptions recording imperial legates rarely reveal enough for certainty either about the place of their service or its character, but there is some evidence to suggest that sometimes, at least, the Emperor despatched these legates at times when crises may be suspected. Censorinus appears to have been sent on such a mission. Then there are three imperial legates who appear at Athens in the early Principate: Cn. Pullius Pollio, *Athena[s missus ab Imp. Caes.] August[o] legatus* (*ILS* 916, cf. *E-ŷ*² 198); C. Marius Marcellus, *πρε[σβευτήν] Καίσαρος Σε[βαστοῦ]* (*IG* III.² 4119); and the puzzling *[πρεσ]βευτήν αὐτοκρά[τορος Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ] καὶ Τιβερίου Καίσα[ρος]* of *E-ŷ*² 81a. Why these legates were in Athens cannot be ascertained; Rostovtzeff supposed that Pollio was sent to carry the Emperor's greetings and good wishes to the city of Athens,⁵ but that need not be so. Ehrenberg plausibly connected the unidentified legate with an Athenian revolt attested in late Christian sources for the end of the Augustan Age;⁶ certainly his titulature implies service in Athens precisely in A.D. 14. But, it should be admitted, he might be C. Poppaeus Sabinus, the imperial governor after Achaea ceased to be senatorial:⁷ *ἀντιστρατηγός* would be expected in the titulature, but it is not absolutely necessary (cf. *IG* IX. 2. 261 = *E-ŷ*² 321). However, should Sabinus prove to be the man on the third inscription, two imperial legates at Athens would still survive from the period when Achaea was senatorial, and they deserve notice. Augustan Athens was not free from tumult (cf. Dio 54.7.2–3; also Plut., *Reg. et Imp. Apophtheg.* 207 E, which I attempt to show elsewhere refers to 21 B.C.⁸). Special legates would be understandable.

In this context, Athenodorus the Tarsian should not be forgotten: Strabo (p. 674) discloses that Augustus sent him back to Tarsus to make constitutional adjustments because the city was being mismanaged by the poet Boëthus. For the purpose Athenodorus is said to have used an *ἐξουσία*, i.e. *imperium*, granted him by the Emperor. This sort of thing looks like an anticipation of the *correctores* of the second century.

A certain Celer from the reign of Tiberius may be adduced for comparison with Censorinus: *legatus missus . . . [c]um A. Plautio in Apulia . . . [ad servos to]rquendos* (ILS 961). Presumably he was sent to deal with a crisis in Italy, namely the slave revolt of A.D. 24 (Tac., *Ann.* 4.27.1). Inasmuch as A. Plautius held the consulship in A.D. 29, it may be conjectured that he was serving with *imperium* in Apulia as praetor and that Celer was his subordinate.⁹ Celer's position offers a clue to that of Censorinus — in the East with Agrippa when both were concerned with the Bosporean rebellion. From 19 B.C. Agrippa certainly possessed the same *imperium proconsulare maius* as Augustus (Dio 54. 12. 4 and *E-J*² 309–310 [cf. 313] for his exercise of it), if he had not already received it in 23.¹⁰ It is possible, therefore, that in 14/13 Censorinus, though officially legate of Augustus, was in fact Agrippa's subordinate. In view of the honors which the Koinon of Asia bestowed upon him, Censorinus' commission will not have bound him to a particular city or province, but rather simply to Agrippa, who was roving the East with his *imperium maius*.

NOTES

1. *AJA* 9 (1905) 309 = *AE* 1906.1.
2. *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (1950) II 1593.
3. *Historia* 7 (1958) 326.
4. *Rev. inter. des droits de l'ant.* 7 (1960) 258.
5. *Festschr. f. Hirschfeld* (1903) 304.
6. *Studies Pres. to D. M. Robinson* (1953) II 942.
7. Raubitschek, *Studies Pres. to D. M. Robinson* II 330.
8. *CQ* 57 = N.S. 14 (1964) 34 f.
9. Professor Syme suggested this to me.
10. Magie (above, n.2) II 1330 n.1.

GOD AND MAN IN PINDAR'S FIRST AND THIRD *OLYMPIAN* ODES

BY CHARLES PAUL SEGAL

PINDAR'S First and Third *Olympian* Odes were composed in honor of victories won by the two Sicilian dynasts, Hieron and Theron, probably in the same year, 476.¹ The myths of both odes relate early events concerning the Olympian festival, the founding itself in *O.3*, and the contest between Pelops and Oenomaus in *O.1*, the mythical prototype of the celebrated races in which the nobility of the Hellenic world so avidly participated. The two poems are explicitly linked, moreover, by a direct quotation at the end of *Olympian 3* (42) from the famous beginning of *Olympian 1*.² Although the borrowing does indicate that Pindar had in his mind the but recently composed *Olympian 1* when he wrote *Olympian 3*, it is hardly a necessary conclusion that he wished the two poems to be considered together. So taken, nevertheless, the two poems illuminate one another, reflecting two complementary attitudes toward the nature of heroic action and the basic problem which the odes continually redefine and explore: the relationship between the human and the divine,³ between man's acceptance of his mortality and his aspirations for immortality, between his acquiescent receptiveness of the world and his active self-assertion in it. This essay will be devoted to elucidating the significance of the myths and the structure of both odes. The Third *Olympian*, though rather neglected, foreshadows certain themes and attitudes which become important in subsequent poems; and it is hoped that its significance will emerge more fully from comparison with *Olympian 1*. The expansive richness of the Third *Olympian* and the concentrated tension of the First reflect Pindar's whole and balanced sensitivity to the ambiguities of man's position in the world, between life and death, in an environment both fostering and destructive.⁴ The Third *Olympian* can be seen as anticipating the free confidence in life and the enjoyment of an opening world which appear in brilliant, sensuous odes like *O.6* or *P.4*. In quieter, more somber works like *N. 10*, *N.8*, or *I.7*, the other side, represented in part by *O.1*, reasserts itself in a deeper fusion, though perhaps never a full resolution, of joy and pain, life and death.

I

Olympian 1 is a poem of superlatives. Beginning with the elemental substances of water, gold, fire, and the blinding sun in an empty sky (6), it ends with the insuperable good fortune of Hieron (104ff; 113-14: "The extreme achievement is raised to a peak for kings. Look no longer beyond.")⁵ and with Pindar's own wish to be "pre-eminent in poetic skill (*sophia*) everywhere among the Hellenes" (116). In this atmosphere of unmitigated superlatives the divine⁶ enters the human world suddenly and violently, obeying its own impulses, as incomprehensible to men as the eternal essence of water or gold; as unyielding, overpowering, and oblivious to mortal weakness as the dazzling sun. Like the sun—and water and gold, too—however, it is not deliberately cruel or hostile to man, but is the radiant source of his highest happiness as well as a potential destroyer of his existence. This balance is reflected in the two verbally parallel formulations, one positive, one negative, about man and God in lines 54 and 64 respectively: "But if the watchers of Olympus honored any mortal man (εἰ δὲ δῆ' ἄνδρα θνατὸν Ὀλύμπου σκοποὶ ἐτίμασαν), this was Tantalus" and "But if any man hopes to escape the notice of God in doing anything, he is mistaken" (εἰ δὲ θεὸν ἀνὴρ τις κτλ.). Tantalus, of course, is the perfect example of the man who cannot "digest" his exceptional good fortune and destroys himself through his folly (*ate*, 54ff), debasing the purity of the divine gift by his mean and banal use of it.

The moral task of the hero, Pelops, sent back to the "swift-doomed race of men" (66) but still radiant with his youthful beauty and the recollection of his past contact with the gods (67-78), is to accept the power (*kratos*, 78) and glory (*tima*, *kleos*) which the gods bestow, and without demeaning their divinity, to keep them within the limits of his mortality. He must be able to seek actively and to undertake the "danger" (*kindynos*, 81) of the heroic deed,⁷ but to recognize that the final achievement and fulfillment (*praxis*) rest with the god (τὸ δὲ πρᾶξιν φίλαν δίδοι, 85). He must know that his immortalizing deed stems from the very roots of his mortality (82-85). The hero's action and attainment thus do not flow spontaneously from his youthful bloom or divine lineage, indispensable though they may be to his ultimate success: they result also from his acceptance of and struggle with the fact of his death and from the inward power of soul that enables him to call up, out of hope and despair, "alone, in the dark, by the hoary sea" to the god who loved him once. It is from this tension between the awareness of mortality and the recognition of divine power that the heroic act arises.

The significance of Pelops in the ode depends precisely on this interplay of the intensity of his humanity, his full sense of death, and the almost desperate strength of his aspirations for a quasi-divine, lasting achievement.

The greatness of the First *Olympian* thus lies (at least in part) in Pindar's refusal to mitigate either of the two forces in tension and yet, without mitigating the unyielding purity, the terrible force, of the divine, to allow it to reach and expand the world of humanity. Poseidon enters this world violently, the "god of the glittering trident" (*Aglaotri-aina*), "conquered in his wits by desire" (*δαμέντα φρένας ἰμέρῳ*), snatching up (*ἑρπάσαι*) Pelops and carrying him on golden horses to Olympus (40-42). His appearance is a sudden invasion of the ordered banquet (*τὸν εὐνομώτατον ἔρانون*) set by Tantalus; yet far from being immoral or unjust, this deed of love is sanctioned by Ganymede's coming to Zeus for the same purpose (*τωῦτ' ἐπὶ χρέος*, 45). This sudden and violent yielding to passion is the way the divine acts and comes to men; this very *eros* represents the possibility of an immediate connection with the divine — though a connection beyond the control of man — through the bloom of beauty with its stirring power, such as Pelops' (67-68).⁸ At the end of the Tenth *Olympian*, too, the only other passage in the *Epinikia* where Pindar alludes to Ganymede, his beauty, through its power to attract the gods, "warded off . . . shameless death with (the aid of) the Cyprian-born goddess" (*O.10.105*).

This erotic violence, therefore, is not simply negative; and it can later be called upon to radiate back into the established and lasting institutions of men the glory and light which it brought them so suddenly.⁹ Thus the early love of Poseidon for Pelops brings to the hero a more lasting fulfillment in his marriage (*gamos*, 69, 80) and the continuation of his name in six heroic sons (89). The disturbance of the purely human order of "the most lawful banquet" (37ff) is compensated for in a higher form by the establishment of Pelops at the center of a divinely sanctioned rite; and hence the ritual term *haimakouriai* (90) emphasizes the divine nature of the institution of which he is made the center.¹⁰ The brilliance (*aglaia*) of the god's trident in snatching up Pelops to Olympus (40) is the source of the "brilliant (*aglaai*) sacrifices" in which he partakes forever in the established rite of the Olympic games (90-91).¹¹ Even the golden horses with which Poseidon carried off Pelops (41) lend their radiance to his victory when the god, in answer to his request, gives him "a golden chariot and horses tireless with wings" (87).¹² This divine *aglaia* and gold, once embodied in the lasting order of the ritual contest and festival, can then even be bestowed by the poet on the

contemporary victor (ἀγλαΐζεται δὲ καὶ μουσικᾶς ἐν ᾧῳῳῳ, of Hieron, 14). Pelops, the hero and the victor, has known how to express his aspirations toward the divine with reverence, respecting the sacredness and privacy of his bond with Poseidon and feeling in his request the unapproachable, almost sinister force of the god, "the heavy-rumbling god of the strong trident" (βαρύκτυπον Εὐτρίαιναν, 72-73).¹³ The somber isolation of the setting in which he seeks the divine gift is perhaps deliberately antithetical to Tantalus' profane distribution of the nectar and ambrosia to his drinking companions (6off). Tantalus has squandered what was given abundantly and voluntarily; Pelops has had to seek in solitude and despair, with a full and poignant sense of the worth of what he is seeking.

The risk, the *kindynos*, of which Pelops speaks in his prayer to Poseidon (81) is twofold: it includes not only the possible suddenness of death at the hands of Oenomaus (76-81), but also the total emptiness and futility of life, nameless, in the dark, "shareless in all beautiful things" when death comes finally in old age (82-84). The young hero, in the aloneness of his prayer, confronts simultaneously "danger" and "necessity," the possibility of failure and the mortal certitude of death. His solitude and darkness are the more poignant for the contrast with the brightness of the gods pervading the poem and his own youthful beauty (67-69). The success, in turn, of his heroic struggle with death, the fame of his victory which "shines from afar" (94), gains greater radiance by contrast with the darkness from which it emerged.¹⁴

It has been suggested that Pelops' passage through this dark isolation is like an initiation ceremony, especially with the false death of the hero, his disappearance (see ἄφαντος, 46) in the evil tale of the envious (46-51) and the final marriage and quasi-immortality of fame and worship.¹⁵ Be this as it may, an important pattern of loss and recovery appears in the alternation in the ode between darkness and light, isolation and festivity. There is a movement from the brightness of the sun and the gods to the darkness of Pelops' prayer (ἐν ὄρφνῃ, 71; ἐν σκότῳ, 83) back to the tempered, humanly receivable brightness of the hero (91, 93-94). There is a corresponding alternation of isolation and crowded festivity: the remoteness of the dazzling sun, alone because of its unapproachable light (6); the banquet of Tantalus (38); Pelops snatched into the divine world, alone (40); the meaner festivities of Tantalus when he profanes the divine gifts among his drinking companions (*sympotai*, 61); the determined isolation of Pelops in prayer (71); the thronging crowds at the πολυξενώματος βωμός at the festival of Olympia (93); and finally back to the isolation of superlative achievement (113-14).

The images of light and of solitude both carry a strong negative, sinister burden which the hero must face. Tantalus' misplaced festivity, his misuse of divine nectar and ambrosia for human feasting, in contrast to his previous "most lawful banquet" (37), results in his enforced separation, "wandering far from joyfulness of mind" (εὐφροσύνας ἀλάτται, 58). The antithesis of the brightness of the sun is the lonely darkness of old age (83). Even the youthful beauty of Pelops is shadowed by a grim suggestion of mortality in the phrase "when the down darkened his black chin" (μέλαν γένειον ἔρεφον, 68). The communication with the gods at banquets has sinister connotations, too, in the cannibalistic associations of the Pelops myth (46ff and the hint at the legend of Demeter devouring Pelops' shoulder, 26-27),¹⁶ in Pelops' being snatched from a banquet (40), in the use of the verb "digest" (καταπέψαι, 55) for Tantalus' folly and the perhaps similar ἔψοι (83) for the futility of old age. This ambiguity in the imagery reflects the ambiguity of the hero's position between divinity and humanity. He lives in a world which he must grasp fully, knowing the risks involved and ready to endure the destructive implications of meeting the divine.¹⁷

The acceptance of this position is difficult and painful. It leads Pelops to hazard the delicacy of his newly blooming beauty (66-69) against the harsh bronze and ruthless terms of Oenomaus that have already killed thirteen men (76-81). The *rite de passage* from nubile youth to adult man, from mortal to hero, requires a test of courage, not only on the field of battle or racing course, but in the dark solitude of mortality facing divinity (71ff), of old age staring at death (82ff). The thirteen dead suitors (79-80) represent a threat parallel to the futility of old age (82-84); theirs was a striving which, though active, resulted in a failure as empty as the passivity of age. They are a reminder of the grimness of failure through action, as Pelops' sudden vision of the old man is the image of failure through inaction. Pelops accepts both risks simultaneously. The *anagke* of 82 is thus doubly pressing. In either case his rich youth would be consumed in oblivion, for even the suitors, though they strove, are unnamed, only a number (and an unlucky one at that),¹⁸ their lurking presence at Olympia dimly felt even in later antiquity in the high mound sacred to them nearby, at which Pelops is said to have sacrificed each year to their shades (Pausanias 6.21.9-11).¹⁹

Yet Pelops' success is in part indicative of the essential benevolence and moral validity of the divine order. Pindar has recast the myth so as to transform the sinister elements, originally associated in part with the gods, into the darker aspects of human mortality itself; and in so doing he has also transfigured the gods. Pelops' "rebirth" from the darkness

and solitude of prayer (71) and from his contemplation of the empty darkness of old age (82-84) into the *aglaia* of his worship at Olympia (91) is the human equivalent and fulfillment of his earlier, mysterious rebirth from the "pure caldron" (26-27). In both cases, nevertheless, the "re-birth" is attended by the love of Poseidon (ἐράσσατο, 25; φιλία δῶρα Κυπρίας, 75). In the Clotho passage, however, it is a rebirth from the sinister divine forces lurking in the mythical background, the cannibalistic legend which Pindar hastily refutes, though deliberately pointing back to it in the motif of the caldron.²⁰ In this rebirth, the gods too are "reborn" as the fostering source of the grace which illuminates human life. And it is the possibility of their benevolence and "love" (*eros*) for man — anthropomorphic and physical though this latter is — which permits their transformation from destructive to restorative.

In the second, figurative "rebirth" (71-100), man is struggling no longer against the dim mystery of hostile and cruel divinities, but against the opaque limitations of his own nature. The first "rebirth" is necessary for and makes possible the second, for in the first passage the gods are transfigured, as they must be, from malevolence to benevolence, and it is only through their radiant aid that man can overcome the darkness which surrounds and constrains his mortality. The "purity" (*katharos*) of the caldron in 27, therefore, points ahead not only to Pelops' attainment (and perhaps to its "moral" basis in his prayer and attitude), but also the "purity" of the gods (see P.3.15) which makes it possible. The first rebirth is of significance for the nature of God, the second for that of man. In the first rebirth, ministered by Clotho (26), and in the first part of the poem generally, man is almost entirely passive; in the second, adult and alone, he acts fully and has learned to act not, as Tantalus did, independently of and in opposition to the intent of the gods, but in harmony with them, knowing the point at which he must call upon divine aid through the *eros* which once illuminated his life (25-27, 40-45).

The relationship between divine and human in the central, mythical portion of the poem (25-99) progresses in three main stages, closely interwoven but still clearly discernible. The first (25-51) is the untroubled favor of the gods for men. Here the gods are freed of the evil charges of cannibalism, though these still remain in the background. Here men receive the divine benefits out of pure beneficence and grace, without exertion; they are close to the gods without having had to win that closeness as Pelops is to do in the third stage. Yet the benefits they receive, lacking the moral foundation of choice and effort, are unstable, impermanent, and soon to be lost by mortal folly (*ate*). The second

stage (52-64) comprises the sin of Tantalus who uses the divine gifts for limited human ends and thus turns divine favor to punishment. The third (66-99) is the attempt of Pelops, sent back to the world of mortality, to regain the divine brilliance he knew once. In this stage the purification of the gods is complete, for all the sinister elements of the first part of the poem are transferred to the limitations of man himself, made responsible for his loss of immortality by his misuse of the divine gifts. This transference is symbolically completed in sending Pelops "back to the swift-doomed race of men" (66).

Throughout each of these stages runs a further alternation of darkness and light, of the "true" version of the Pelops myth (divine benevolence) and the cannibalistic story of his dismemberment. These contrasting juxtapositions underlie the whole structure of the poem. Thus the story of the ivory shoulder (25-27) is followed by the warning against false *mythoi* (28-29), that again by the passage on *charis* (30-34), followed in its turn by the warning to speak good of the gods and the reference to "guilt" or "responsibility" (*aitia*) 35. After this comes the bright narrative of Tantalus' closeness to the gods and Poseidon's love for Pelops (36-45); then the sinister myth of Pelops' "disappearance" (46-51), followed by the honor of the gods for Tantalus (54-55) and that in turn by his folly and punishment (55-65). These large contrasts in the central portion are succeeded once more by the story of Pelops (65ff) with its multiple interplay of both literal and figurative light and darkness, ending finally in the happiness and radiance of immortal *aglaia*. All of the darker parts pertain to man's clouding and debasing of the divine, either through the misinterpretation of myths or through the misuse of divine gifts. Only in Pelops is the divine understood rightly and received properly—with full knowledge of the human position—and hence his success.

This alternating structure, therefore, by relating human success and failure to the proper attitude to the gods, serves to clarify the transience and weakness (both moral and physical) of humanity vis à vis the divine. It also frees the divine of the evil attributed to it by the misunderstandings of men and indicates the human responsibility (see *aitia*, 35) for this evil. For the private man or poet to speak evil of the gods is the moral equivalent of Tantalus' demeaning of divine gifts: both bring remoteness from the gods and even destruction. Man's speech about the gods must reflect what is "seemly" or "fitting" (*eoikos*, 35) for his nature and his relation with them, just as he "must seek from the gods with mortal thoughts that which is seemly (*ta eoikota*: what is within the realm of likelihood, and hence fitting, for the human condition), knowing that

which is nearest to hand (and) of what destiny (*aisa*) we are" (P.3.59f). This "purification" of the gods through the demarcation and separation of the human is, as pointed out above, essential for Pelops' attainment of his *aglaia*. Thus his success is, on one level, the positive proof of divine benevolence, refuting the evil imputations of the "false" Pelops myth, just as Tantalus' punishment is the negative proof of this benevolence, clearing the gods of ingratitude or wilful malice; and on another level Pelops' glory at Olympia is symbolic of man's potential to attain an element of divine radiance through meeting fully the truth of his mortality and striving in the face of it, with risk, for a lasting achievement. To lessen the radiance, dangerous as it is, and the unattainable remoteness of the gods would also diminish the validity of what man can achieve by understanding and receiving the divine.

The tripartite structure of the myth corresponds to a basic pattern of human action and suffering, indeed to the structure of life itself: the movement from the innocence and untroubled joy of childhood (the birth of Pelops, the amicable relation between Tantalus and the gods), to the loss of innocence, the misuse of this freely given bliss in folly and sin with its resultant punishment (Tantalus in Hades, the expulsion of Pelops), and finally to the attempt of man, having accepted the bitterness of his mortality to regain in some form the radiance and happiness he once knew. It is a pattern of birth, death, and rebirth which is perhaps adumbrated in the initiation-like story of Pelops' birth²¹ and in the alternation from light to dark to light in the poem. It is a pattern underlying also the structure of tragedy, moving from acting to suffering to learning (*poiema*, *pathema*, *mathema*),²² and the Biblical story of Eden and the Fall of Man. Pindar has, in fact, carried the story of Pelops from his birth to his maturity and — through Pelops' own vision (82–84) — to old age, death, and his subsequent life in his descendants and fame. When Pelops is sent down from Olympus, he loses both his childhood and his immortality, unlike Ganymede, the youth who remains ever-young and ever-beautiful among the gods;²³ and it is part of Pelops' mortal condition that this is a loss which cannot be repaired. In his prayer he acknowledges and accepts his loss, the impossibility of remaining young or avoiding death, for although he achieves lasting fame and *aglaia*, these are not divine immortality, and his worship is the worship of a hero, not a god (so *haimakouriai*, 90, the blood-offerings proper to heroes or the dead).²⁴

Though the whole course of Pelops' life is implicit in the poem, it is presented, as usual in Pindar, through a few intensely vivid moments. Yet it is typical of Pindar and this stage in Greek thought generally that

there is little emphasis on the internal development, on the inward sense of "sin" and "learning" or remolding of character through suffering. Pindar is concerned rather with the basic facts of mortality, with man's position in the world defined externally and generically between the immutable essences of water, gold, and sun — the divine radiance — and the movement of human life to old age and death. The first part of the ode (1-51) is filled with the divine light; the following portion (51-99) assumes the more somber tonality of the human. Pindar's large generic concern with the basic and profoundly simple facts of human mortality appears in such phrases as "the swift-doomed race of men," in Pelops' compressed and powerful utterance on the "necessity" of death and the darkness of old age (82-84), and perhaps in the gnomic sentence rounding off the Pelops' myth (99-100): "The glory (present) ever day by day comes as the highest (achievement) for each of mortal men," a statement ostensibly optimistic, yet perhaps reflecting something of the rich ambiguity, the deep sadness and radiant joy, of the whole myth and, indeed, of Pindar's presentation of the whole human situation.²⁵ Thus it fitly marks the transition from the lasting glory and worship of the hero to the crowning of the contemporary victor, also radiant with the fame of his achievement (see 23, λάμπει δέ οἱ κλέος) but involved in time and change. Hence Pindar prefaces his statement of hope for Hieron's future victory with the phrase, "if he (Hieron's guardian divinity) fail not soon . . ." (108); and in his concluding prayer, he warns "Do not peer into the far beyond,"²⁶ referring perhaps to the life after death and the finitude, therefore, of the joy of the present, however intense.

It is typical also of Pindar's concern with the harshness and finality of death, unmitigated here by a spiritual rebirth through "learning" and "inner development" or by a redemption in an after-life, that the success which comes to Pelops comes only *in part* through his own effort, his acceptance of the risk (*kindynos*). It is truly realized (in the *praxis* of 85) through the spontaneous affinity between the divine brilliance and the beauty of Pelops, the violent and mysterious *eros* of the god (Poseidon, Zeus) for what is young, pure, and beautiful (Pelops, Ganymede). It may be that the glow of youthful beauty itself is felt as being in some way divine and hence attracting the divine to itself. The ivory shoulder perhaps itself symbolizes this insouciant flash and brilliance of youth, the firmness and radiance of young skin and flesh (cf. Solomon's Song, 7:4, "Thy neck is as a tower of ivory . . .") Yet this same ivory shoulder is also an ambivalent symbol, for not only does it attract the *eros* of the gods but behind all its brightness (*phaidimon*, 27)

lurks the myth of its origin which Pindar seeks to refute, the accidental eating of the shoulder by Demeter, the goddess who herself gives to men for their nourishment the substance of their mortal lives in a cycle of fertility and barrenness, death and rebirth.²⁷

The equivalent for mortals of this *eros* which emanates from the gods and snatches up its object violently is *charis*, the joy of attainment, "which devises all things sweet and gentle (τὰ μέλιχρα) for mortals" (30). This joy of success is associated with sweetness (as commonly in Pindar)²⁸ and excites the poet to sing, almost spontaneously, of the victory of Hieron (17ff), of which the victory of Pelops is the symbolic and mythical prototype.²⁹ The poet calls for his lyre amid the "sweetest thoughts" (γλυκυτάταις φροντίσιν, 19) that the *charis* of Hieron's victory suggests to his mind; and the sweetness of this moment enriches, through the poet, the past superlatives and *aglaia* of Hieron (see 12ff). This sweetness recurs immediately after Pelops' victory too, but now in a generic formulation, the "honeyed calm" (μελιτόεσσαν εὐδίαν) which the Olympic victor enjoys for the rest of his life (97-98). Then, turning immediately back to Hieron (100ff), the poet hopes to find "a still sweeter (γλυκυτέραν) path of words" for a future victory (109-110). In all these passages *charis* and its sweetness at the moment of success are embodied in the poetic song that completes and perpetuates the victory. Because the entire ode, however, is concerned with the establishment of the moral rightness of the poetic *mythoi* and their purification (e.g., 28-29, 52-53), the sweetness and *charis* of victory which excite the poet's song (17ff) and which the song in turn bestows (109-110) are given a moral foundation, and their meaning is expanded to include tacitly the victor's knowledge of the place of his achievement within the limitations and possibilities of human life. The myths of the poem are thus its moral substance, and against them emerges the meaning of the historical victory. This victory is thus placed in the range created between the honor given unsought by the gods to Tantalus and Pelops, the punishment of the former, and the ultimate success of the latter; between the vivid joy of the present (99-105) and the uncertain hope for the future (108ff, 114-15).³⁰

The significance of *charis* throughout the poem, lying between the hope and joy of achievement and the risk of failure that are central elements in the story of Pelops (66-99), flows from the gnomic statement which powerfully opens the second strophe, "*Charis* who creates all things sweet and gentle for mortals, bringing (to them) honor (*tima*), devised even for the unbelievable to be believable many a time, but days to come are wisest witnesses" (30-34). This description of *charis* follows

significantly the story of Poseidon's *eros* for Pelops, his removal from the "pure caldron," and his ivory shoulder (25-27) and the warning about the deception of false *mythoi* (28-29). It is followed, in its turn, not only by the ambivalent statement about "days to come," but also by another warning to speak well of the gods (35) and by the myth of Pelops' being snatched from the banquet (36ff). This fullest statement about *charis* thus comes at a point between the gods' offering of love (Poseidon), life, and beauty (Clotho) and man's distortion of the truth (27-28) and beauty of the gods (*ἀμφὶ δαιμόνων καλὰ*, 35). In this context *charis* demarcates the area of what is possible for mortals (hence *θνατοῖς* at the end of 30); it is the positive aspect of man's recognizing his mortal limitations, and has thus also a moral significance. In the story of Ixion in *P.2*, therefore, parallel in part to that of Tantalus in *O.1* (see esp. *P.2.25ff*), where these limits have been transgressed and the proper relation between God and man violated, the Charites are grimly absent, the offspring of Ixion's union with the deceptive cloud-image of Hera being *ἄνευ Χαρίτων* (42). *Charis* does appear there, however, in Apollo's love for Cinyras (*P.2.17*, also an erotic relationship as in *O.1.75ff*). Mortal man, though he may not enjoy the *eros* of Poseidon for Pelops nor be endowed with Pelops' beauty (25-26), may at least, by speaking well of the gods (27-28, 35), avoid the destruction which Tantalus' profanation brought upon him. The *tima* which *charis* brings (31), like the sweetness it brings to the Olympic victor, mediated through the poet (19, 98, 109), is thus the mortal analogue of the lasting *aglaia* or *kleos* of the hero (90ff); and in its intensity of joy and its connection with an active achievement under the good will of the gods (see 108ff) it is the antithesis of the static, hopeless enduring of punishment by Tantalus who "yearning always to cast from his head the stone wanders far from delight of mind" (*euphrosyne*, 58).

It is this *charis*, too, for which Pelops asks after his return to mortality (66). He can no longer expect the divine *eros* as it came to him in its full presence when he was taken "from the pure caldron" (25-26, 40ff). Thus he begins his prayer: "If the kindly gifts of Cypris, O Poseidon, are a source of joy and favor (*ἐς χάριν τέλλεται*, 75-76), fetter the bronze spear of Oenomaus."³¹ *Charis*, as *ta meilicha* in 30 imply, connotes a relation of gentleness wherein beauty, joy, and success become communicable to mortals in softer, milder ways than the sudden *eros* of Poseidon (so too Pelops' request for "a friendly fulfillment of action," *praxin philan*, 85; cf. *philia*, 75). *Charis* makes it possible for Pelops to call upon Poseidon in terms of a comprehensible human relationship and not in the absolute terms of man facing God, though Pelops must also

undergo the agony and isolation of this latter, absolute relationship in calling out for the god in the dark (71-73) before he can invoke the *charis* of his past love (75). *Charis* thus transfigures the divine brilliance into a beauty and joy which men can understand and receive, yet without destroying or debasing the nature of the divine, as did Tantalus, or exploding and dazzling the limited receptive powers of humanity, like the sun in the bare sky (5-6).

In this attempt to bring the divine into human life lies, in part, the risk, the *kindynos*, of Pelops (81). His daring and imagination stand in significant contrast to the grosser, unimaginative aspirations of Tantalus (60-64). Pindar is not explicit as to whether the purpose of Tantalus' theft was actually to make his mortal companions immortal; but if this was so, as later tradition suggests (e.g., Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius* 3.25.2), then his deed would be another, still more serious violation of *charis*, setting at naught the limits of mortal nature and the order of the universe. The gods do not take back their gift, but convert it into an immortality of suffering. Pelops is given a second chance at the relation between human and divine, but Tantalus enjoys neither the gods' eternal happiness nor man's final respite from pain in death.

The right relation to the divine implied in *charis* thus involves a balance between being sought and seeking, between the passive acceptance of what is given and active self-assertion. Pelops and Tantalus illustrate a true and false — or successful and unsuccessful — establishment of the balance. Pelops affirms it in his prayer to Poseidon (84-85): "But to *me* (ἐμοὶ μὲν) this contest will lie proposed; but do *you* (τὸν δέ) give (δίδοι) friendly fulfillment of action." Tantalus, however, converts the voluntary favor of the gods into a deed of robbery. Hence Pindar's suggestion that Tantalus actually stole (*klepsais*, 60), rather than received as a gift, "the nectar and ambrosia with which they (the gods) made him immortal" (63-64). He perverts the acceptance of a freely offered good — the source of *charis* — into a negative self-assertion for narrow ends, a misdirected "giving" (63) of his own. Thus by his theft he not only does not receive properly, but acts in violent contravention of the delicately balanced bond between God and man that constitutes *charis*.³² He is punished with eternally unsatisfied desires, and the stone above his head is itself the unremitting negation of the possibility of happiness.

Pindar perhaps adumbrates more clearly the two ways of acting in his use of the verb ἔλεν, "took (violently), seized," employed vividly and emphatically first of Tantalus' "taking" of "overweening disastrous folly (*ate*)" (56), and then of the successful outcome of Pelops' contest, when the hero "took the force (*bia*) of Oenomaus and the maiden (to be)

the sharer of his bed" (88). In both passages the usage of the verb is striking: in the first (at the end of a verse) with the semi-abstract *ate*; in the second (at the beginning of a verse) with a daring zeugma. The parallel shows the first taking, with evil intent, leading to a short-lived pleasure and eternal punishment and infamy, and the second, in accordance with the will of the gods, bringing lasting happiness and honor. The first is an act of assertive violence, analogous to the "stealing"; the second is a sanctioned and rightful "taking" that is almost a receiving. This balance between "taking" and "receiving" is present for Hieron too who enjoys the sweetness of *charis* (18-19) because his horse won, "setting forth his body unpricked by spur in the race-course" (δέμας ἀκέντητον ἐν δρόμοισι παρέχων, 20-21). The victory thus offers itself freely and spontaneously, through *charis*, to the victor, in the sense that his balanced capability to receive passively as well as to act makes it natural and almost inevitable that he should enjoy the victory.

The victory is thus not simply a result of physical strength, but depends immediately upon the prayer, wherein the hero establishes the right relation with the god and accepts the weakness of the human situation. In Pindar's heroic world the valorous youth seeking the god need not ask what a man must do to compensate for the "necessity" (82) of death and the brevity of life; he knows with determination, but he must ask the god for the force to accomplish his resolution. Moral strength and truthfulness are required of the hero to approach the god properly, keeping open the sensitive potentiality of *charis*; imagination and insight to see the risks and implications of both error and success. The test of the hero is, in part, to meet and use the active forces of the divine that lead him to victory, but yet to remain in inward control of these forces, to check them in accordance with the limits of his humanity. The Pindaric hero might be compared with the contemporary bronze Charioteer at Delphi — dedicated in fact by Hieron's brother — who stands calm and self-contained after the tension and effort of the race, holding back with his slender but powerful arms the still violently excited, straining, and heated horses.

The assertion of this moral strength to attain *charis*, and its whole moral foundation, are valid, moreover, not only for the mythical hero, but on other levels as well, as the central passage on *charis* (30ff) makes clear. The context, as already pointed out above, places it in contact with the divine *eros*, the poetic *logos*, and gnomic truths of human life. This last, the aphoristic treatment of *charis* here and the aphorisms which follow (33-35), relate it most immediately to the broad generic

facts of human existence: mortal weakness and uncertainty before the future ("Days to come are wisest witnesses," 33-34), a subject to which Pindar returns obliquely at the end of the poem (108, 114-15).

The exhortation to men to speak well of the gods (35) connects the poet's task with the more general subject of the righteous life for the ordinary man. Both are to avoid blasphemous utterance. The *charis* of the poet, moreover, is related also to that of the hero and the victor in that he too, through the truthfulness of his *mythoi*, is seeking to establish the right relation with the divine. The poetic "deed" for Pindar is to approach the gods lyrically, bringing their brilliance to men without debasing their nature. The poet too is faced with a negative and a positive possibility, the false and true stories about Tantalus and Pelops. His task is to detach the truth, ennobling heroic beauty and excellence (Poseidon's *eros* for Pelops and Pelops' victory over Oenomaus) and placing blame where it is due (the sin of Tantalus). He too faces a risk in singing of things "opposite to what was previously said" (*ἀντία προτέρων*, 36) and hopes for fame and success analogous to that of the victors (116).³³ In another poem (*N.7.20ff*) the sense of risk involved in false *mythoi* is strong enough for Pindar to attribute the death of Ajax to the inability of the mob to "see the truth" (24-26). He often speaks, moreover, of the risks involved in his boldness of language and his fear that he is stepping beyond the due limits of his art (e.g., *P.1.44*, *N.7.71-73*, *O.13.93-95*, *P.11.38-40*). In the First *Olympian*, however, the poet, like the hero, is concerned with communication with the divine, integrating it into the limited framework of mortality. He must "stand away" from the stories of the gods' gluttony (52) and establish the moral purity and veracity of the *mythoi* he must use (27-28). In the ambiguity of the phrase, *εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι* (108), furthermore, referred by the scholia both to the future uncertainty of the good fortune of Hieron and to the poetic Muse of Pindar, the poet is perhaps associating his own risk in approaching the divine with that of the victor and the hero who attempt to reach beyond the limits of their mortality.³⁴ The use of the words *βέλος* and *ἀλκῆ* (the latter recalling Pelops' *ἀναλκιν*, 81) in Pindar's personal statement in 111, "For me then the Muse is nourishing with strength of valor a most strong missile," further suggests his association of poetry with heroic action, both requiring truthfulness and valor.³⁵ His equation of his hoped-for poetic excellence (*sophia*) with the victory of the king in the last line of the ode, however, not only connects in a closer unity the quasi-heroic achievement of the poet with the moral task and attainment of the victor, but also asserts that the poet, like Pelops, has met the risk and succeeded.

Charis as the successful communication between God and man, man's propitious receiving of divine favor in accordance with his ability to act, is thus a strong unifying motif throughout the entire poem. Its multivalent moral significance is defined in the generic formulation of 30-32, in a context between mythic narration of gods and heroes (25-27) and gnostic truths about humanity (27-28, 33-35). Farnell is thus mistaken in regarding *charis* as "not wholly appropriate here,"³⁶ for it is relevant not only to the success of Pelops within the framework of the poem, but also to Pindar's attitude toward poetry and, indeed, to his view of the human situation generally and the possibility of human happiness, the broad themes that expand outward from the poem. The significance of *charis* thus arises from man's position between dangerous opposites — a position shared also by hero and poet — confronting the empty barrenness of old age and death (82-84), yet unable to endure divine brilliance when given (55ff). *Charis*, however, transmutes risk to fulfillment and falsehood to truth, bringing glory and attainment from the gods at the moment of *kindynos* when failure is as likely as success. In "devising the unbelievable to be believable many a time" (31-32) *charis* appears at the point of suspension when hope becomes reality and the future becomes vivid present. It is with the uncertain future, however, that Pindar ends the ode (108ff, 114-15), a reminder perhaps that the "unbelievable" does not always become "believable," that what *charis* does "many a time" (τὸ πολλάκις, 32) it does not do always, for the presence of *charis* is contingent not only upon the unpredictable good will or *eros* of the god, but also upon the acceptance of risk and the exertion of moral strength by hero, poet, and mortal.

Thus *charis*, like the story of Pelops itself and the significance of the Olympian victory wherein it is embodied, comes to reflect the intensity and poignancy of man's aspirations beyond his mortality. And, as Pelops moves from the gold and brilliance of Poseidon's love (25ff) to the darkness of his mortal fate (65ff), so the flashing joy in Hieron's victory in the first antistrophe (12ff) becomes both sadder and more intense after the recognition of the transience of human achievement following the Pelops myth ("the glory present ever day by day comes as highest to each of mortals," 99-100) and the overshadowings of the present "sweetness" (19, 109) by the uncertainty of the future (108). Thus the story of Pelops at the beginning of the ode, introduced in part by the optimism about *charis* in 30ff, becomes the vehicle for conveying the grimness of mortality at the end. He calls for *charis* now (75) out of the fullest sense of mortality, when the divine *eros* from which *charis* derives lies in the past and must be summoned from the darkness.

This darkness (71) after Pelops' dismissal from Olympus (66) not only contrasts with the light in the opening strophe of the poem, as pointed out above, but represents also the symbolical darkness, both metaphysical and psychological, of Pelops' recognition of his mortality which becomes explicit in 82-84. His calling upon this past *eros* for *charis* is even more poignant, for it emphasizes the change and movement in human life, wherein a vivid present becomes a dim past, in contrast with the permanence of the gods for whom the intense *eros* (25, 41) is an ever-present potential, always capable of realization with the same brilliant power. Pelops' loss is for himself irreparable, but Zeus in the next generation can summon another youth, Ganymede, "for the same task" (43-45).³⁷

The "hoary sea" too represents a power outside of the cycle of human flux and suffering, outside of the suffering of Pelops himself at this moment, unchanging and unyielding while the youth, with the bloom of his cheeks fresh upon him, foreplans his involvement in manly contests and mortal dangers. The sea perhaps refers back to the divine elementality of water in the first line of the poem with its remote, brilliant superlatives. Here, however, when the narrative has focused our interest on an individual person, its permanence, vastness, impenetrability, and indifference only set off the weakness and uncertainty of the youth beside it. The tragic implications of the contrast are further deepened by the Homeric echoes of the phrase *πολιᾶς ἄλός*, associated in the *Iliad* (e.g., 1.349-350) with the solitude and grief of Achilles, calling to his goddess-mother:³⁸

Weeping he sat apart from his companions, by the
shore of the hoary sea, looking out to the limitless
ocean
(θιν' ἔφ' ἄλός πολιῆς ὁρώων ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον).

The phrase and the situation recall also the lonely prayer of Telemachus in the *Odyssey* (2.260ff) seeking from the god the courage to venture over "the misty ocean" whereon lie his father and the proof of his heroic paternity.

The poignancy of Pelops' mortality set against the divine and elemental natural world, is enhanced too by the richness of the language of 67-69, the beginning of the narrative portion of Pelops' victory, just following his dismissal "back to the swift-doomed race of men" (65-66). The juxtaposition of words like *ἀθάνατοι* (65), *ταχύποστομον* (66), and *εὐάνθεμον* (67) is especially effective. The "well-flowering growth" (or "stature," *euanthemon phyan*), the down shadowing his cheeks

(where the light-dark alternation in the imagery of the poem perhaps gives a slightly sinister connotation to the "black" chin and the verb ἔρεφον, "cover," 68), and the following *gamos* (69) all suggest Pelops' full entrance into the cycle of human life, the process of growth, begetting offspring, dying, so that his *gamos* contrasts with the freer, unbound, non-mortal *eros* or *kypris* (75) of Poseidon.³⁹ This intensification of the sense of change and mortality in the introductory passage (65-69) makes all the more pressing Pelops' need for attainment, for life, marriage, deeds of heroic valor; hence the urgency and immediacy of his prayer.

Because of his past contact with the divine, however, he is able to reach a permanent brilliance (*aglaiai*, 91) and fame (*kleos*, 93-94) embodied in the recurring ritual at Olympia. His marriage will be fruitful with sons who are "leaders of the people" (λαγέται) and endowed with *aretai* (89). Two of his sons, however, will not leave a happy memory: Atreus and Thyestes. But Pindar is silent on this point and does not suggest any further alteration in Pelops' happiness.⁴⁰ He does, however, move at once from the confident brightness of this symbolic-narrative style (Pelops' victory) back to the broad realities of mortal life in the gnomic passage 97-100. Here the phrases λοιπὸν ἀμφὶ βίοντον (suggesting that some part of the victor's life is already past and the remainder is limited and precious) and τὸ δ' αἰεὶ παράμερον ἐσλόν imply a qualification even of the "honeyed calm" of an Olympian victory; and the note is struck for the modulation back to the uncertainties of mortal life in 106-11 and 114-16.

The polarity of God and man in the First *Olympian* thus reaches a poignancy, especially in the story of Pelops' contest (66-100), which reflects the intensity of Pindar's grasp of the basic human confrontation with death. Youthful beauty, the *eros* of the gods, success, fame, all illuminate the dark futility which human life can also be or become (82-84). This intensity of feeling remains with Pindar even in his latest odes:

Creatures of a day; what is one, what is one not? A dream of a shadow is man, but when the radiance (*aigla*) Zeus-given, comes, there is upon men a bright light and a gentle time of life (P.8.95-97).

The alternation of bright and dark, achievement and emptiness, truth and falsehood, love and violence, elemental eternity and changing humanity, is coincident and simultaneous with the alternation of God and man. Man is faced with the dazzling reality of the divine *eros*. To bring it into his life requires the heroic strength to accept first the deepest negative implications of mortality, to stand alone and in darkness by the unchanging, unpitied sea, yet at the same time not to forget his past

contact with the divine and the potentialities it symbolizes. Yet the very act of accepting mortality and the willingness to undergo risk in Pelops' prayer are the implicit grounds of its fulfillment.

Despite Pelops' victory and consequent fame, despite Hieron's wealth (10) and glory (23), still the elemental water, gold, and sun at the beginning of the poem remain unattainable. The hero can establish the lasting validity of his victory only by creating an intermediate ritual framework, the Olympian festival. Thus the poem moves from the absolute, divine force, the sun in the empty sky, to the hero-created ritual with its tempered brightness (*aglaia*) of lasting fame. This tempering of the divine is the theme of the Third *Olympian* too, but there the ritual is given more easily, without the agony of Pelops, from the willingness of a semi-divine hero to foster gently beauty for men. Human life there is thus presented as already partially enclosed in a benevolent, mitigating framework, whereas in the First *Olympian* the man-hero must himself create the ritual framework in an open and dangerous world. Hence though the First *Olympian* ends in triumph, it is a triumph gained only through the fullest acceptance of the negative implications of mortality. The joy and radiance of Pelops' fame do not cancel fully the darkness and suffering of his prayer.

II

It is possible to regard the Third *Olympian* too as containing a duality of forces which, on a different level and with a lessening of tension, corresponds to the interplay of man and God, darkness and light, in the First *Olympian*. The Third *Olympian* presents an antinomy between the violence and gentleness of the hero, the harshness and benignity of nature and the gods; but here the two sides are not in such dangerous oscillation as in the First *Olympian* and are more easily and more fully resolved into a favorable balance. The negative side of the powerful natural forces in the Third *Olympian* never emerges fully from the background. Instead, this potential violence — the sharpness of the rays of the sun (24), Artemis the "horse driving daughter of Leto" in the wild Arcadian valleys (26ff), the chase of the hind with the golden horns (29ff) — is tempered and turned to benevolence at the critical point. The myth itself has a relaxed "looseness" of movement: it begins with the wonder-filled journey to the magical Hyperborean land (14–16) and comes only at the end to the chase of the hind (28ff), the one explicit element of violence in the ode. The chase itself is interrupted by Heracles' astonishment at the Hyperborean trees and his "sweet

desire" (33) to transplant them to Olympia. Thus, though the "necessity from his father" (i.e., Zeus, 28) to capture the hind in accordance with Eurystheus' commands remains darkly in the background, it does not fetter or oppress the hero absolutely — as does the ever-present, driving "necessity" of mortality behind Pelops' deed. It leaves him free to respond sympathetically to the beauties of the world. Similarly, though the effort for the victory is perhaps implicit in the "contests" (ἀέθλων) of 15, the emphasis is not upon the isolated daring and spirit of challenge, as in the First *Olympian* (84–85). Rather it lies on the beauty of the olive crown, "the bluish-grey colored adornment of the olive tree" (γλανκόχροα κόσμον ἐλαίας, 13b), and on the fruitfulness of the growing tree, which then not only replaces the hunting of the hind as the object of Heracles' quest (28–34), but serves a protective, life-fostering purpose in sheltering the Olympian grove from the "sharp rays of the sun" (24).

Both the First and Third *Olympians*, then, are pervaded by the sense that man lives his life amid powers that both give and destroy life. In *O.1* the destructive possibilities, and hence the danger, predominate intensifying man's need to act and act rightly. In *O.3*, however, fertility and beneficence are more prominent, filling the human and heroic worlds with a softer, more easily attainable beauty.

The violence, bloodshed, and persistent overcoming of obstacles and hostilities usually associated with the mythical Heracles, therefore, are subdued in favor of a gentleness which plants trees and promotes rather than destroys life. Even in obtaining the trees from the Hyperboreans he acts not through force, but by "*persuading* by word (πείσας . . . λόγῳ) a people . . . serving Apollo" (16). This fructifying gentleness is all the more striking when compared with his foundation of the Olympian games amid battle and bloody strife in the Tenth *Olympian*, hinted at also in *O.2* (3–4), the ode written for the same victory as *O.3*.⁴¹ Yet elsewhere too in Pindar Heracles is associated with life and fertility. Thus the First *Nemean* begins with the richness of the Sicilian earth, given by Zeus to Persephone (14ff), mixes the birth of Heracles "when he came from the entrails of his mother into the wondrous glory of light, fleeing the birth pangs" with his infant prowess in strangling the snakes (35–47), and ends with his receiving of blooming (θαλεράν) Hebe, the embodiment of youth and fresh beauty, as his bride on Olympus. Even more strikingly, in the Sixth *Isthmian* he can sack Troy and slay "the tribes of the Meropes" (*I.6.27ff*); but also, wearing the lion skin as the symbol for his victorious contests (ἀέθλων) and his first kill (*I.6.48b*) he can pray Zeus for a son for Telamon (*I.6.42ff*). In the Third *Olympian*,

Pindar goes even further and makes Heracles' *aethlos* primarily an act of creation, fertilization, and protection.⁴² Hence he inverts the order of events in the myth and indeed invents new elements in order to begin and end with the Hyperboreans and the olive trees. With this intent, also, he subordinates the violent action of the chase and modifies even that, through Artemis' gracious receiving of Heracles (26-27), toward the benevolent attitude set in the whole poem. The myth itself ends with the significant verb *φύτεῦσαι*, "to plant" (34, cf. 18), containing also the root meaning of "growth."

In this treatment of Heracles, Pindar may here be drawing upon a deep layer of myth in which Heracles had fertility functions: the legend of his founding of the Olympian festival may be associated with this promotion of fertility, though it is not entirely certain that originally the purpose of this foundation was "to inaugurate the fertility of the year."⁴³ One foundation legend, however, records that it was the Idaean Heracles, in the service of the Great Mother of Crete (and hence associated with vegetation and growth) from whom the practice of crowning the victor has its origin (Pausanias 5.7.7).⁴⁴ His benevolent life-promoting aspect became well developed in his role as "avertor of evil" (*alexikakos*), which included agricultural functions, the warding off of the worm and the wolf.⁴⁵ At Hyettos in Boeotia he was worshiped as a god of healing.⁴⁶ From Homer onward, moreover, he has a double existence as both once-mortal hero (hence found in the lower world in *Odyssey* 11.601-3) and dweller in heaven, thus sharing both Olympian and "chthonian" elements.⁴⁷ By Pindar's time the gentle, fertilizing aspect of his divinity coexists with his capacity for deeds of violence and well-intentioned killing of giants and monsters (e.g., see *I.4.56-63*) and helps make more intelligible his role in the Third *Olympian*. An Attic coin with a representation going back to the early fifth century even shows the hero holding in one hand a club and in the other a cornucopia, and a votive relief from Pindar's Thebes shows the hero "peacefully receiving the horn of plenty from the hands of Hades-Plouton."⁴⁸

This aspect of his divinity may reflect a basic attitude toward the vital elements in the natural and human world common in both primitive and more complex agricultural societies, wherein martial force and fertility are complementary and coexistent powers, united in a single divine figure. Here the fruitfulness of the fields is still associated with the virile power of the warrior.⁴⁹ Thus the Roman Mars (Mavors) has closely fused functions as a god of fertility and of martial force. This pattern of the vital alternation of destructive violence with fructifying gentleness is deeply rooted in the entire Mediterranean world,⁵⁰

appearing, for example, in the myths of Persephone and Demeter as told in the Homeric Hymn (with the bestowing of immortal life upon Demophon through burning in the otherwise destructive fire, 239ff); appearing in Pindar's Zeus himself, who can support the sleeping eagle on his scepter as it is charmed by the golden lyre, but also blast pitilessly down to Tartarus the hundred-headed Typho (*P.1.1-20*); in Hora, "messenger of Aphrodite's endearments" who "raises one with gentle hands of necessity but another with other hands" (*N.8.1-3*); in the rhythmic movements of the black fields which can now give life to men, now withhold it (*N.6.8-11, N.11.37-43*).

The same complex of elements is perhaps present in Artemis (see below) and the Dioscuri in the ode. The Dioscuri (whose connection with the supervision of the Olympian festival may be a Pindaric innovation⁵¹) are helpful and useful divinities, the "saviors of mortal men" (Homeric Hymn 33.6ff) who bring "calm after storm" (*P.5.9-11*). But the horse with which they are associated is also the companion of the warrior, the participant in his active, violent deeds; its taming in Homer confers a martial distinction on the warrior ("horse-taming Trojans" and see the simile in *Iliad* 6.50ff, of Paris);⁵² and its heroic significance, as seen in *O.1*, continues in the races at Olympia. At the opening of the Third *Olympian* Pindar mollifies these forceful connotations of the horse in calling his hymn "the bloom of horses tireless of foot," thus canceling the active connotations of ἀκαμαντοπόδων (a word used as an epithet of thunder in *O.4.1*) with the quieter ἄωτον which belongs in the same realm of imagery as the trees and the planting (18, 34). The shading olive trees are in fact planted next to the racecourse (the hippodrome, 33-34).⁵³ Artemis too is "horse-driving" (ἵπποσάα, 26, an epithet unusual for her,⁵⁴ though perhaps not entirely out of keeping with her wild and active pursuits as goddess of the hunt; but the epithet is significantly applied at the moment when she has "received" the wandering hero, 27). When the word "well-horsed" (*euhippoi*) recurs in 39 as the epithet of the Dioscuri it is with a benevolent sense, at the Theoxenia when they are to give (διδόντων) glory to Theron because of his reverence. The warlike possibilities of the horses too are thus set into a context of festivity and benevolence.

Pindar's treatment of the mythical material of the ode pacifies the sinister, destructive elements through reconciliation and accord. This reconciliation is especially interesting in the figures of Artemis and Taygeta. Artemis is the ambivalent goddess of the wild, associated with wild trees and wild animals, but here more clearly as the protector of animals, the πότνια θηρῶν, than as their huntress and destroyer.⁵⁵ She

is the goddess who sends death, though often a gentle death, in Homer,⁵⁶ who "makes the tops of the lofty mountains to tremble" and frightens the wild beasts, but can also join with the Muses and Graces in "the lovely dance" in the "rich land of Delphi" (Hom. Hymn 27.7-20), who can blight the land or bring it fertility (Callimachus, Hymn 3.122-135).⁵⁷ It is the fertilizing, fostering role in which she appears here, interceding with the hunter for the hunted animal. She is associated also with the savage Northland as the cruel Istrian Artemis especially honored by the Amazons, or the Taurian Artemis worshiped by the Scythians (scholion 46a). This aspect of her divinity retreats into the background, for the North — the Ister River (Danube) and the Hyperboreans — is presented not as a frozen, hostile region (though the cold is mentioned, 31-32) but as the source of the wild olive for the games. Hence the epithet "shady" applied to the "springs" of the Ister suggests the mild, comforting function of the olive as the "shady plant" (14) which protects the grove from the sun (23-24). This aspect of the Ister and the North coincides, too, with the associations of Artemis with springs and watery places where vegetation abounds,⁵⁸ so that the fertilizing sides of both the Northland and the goddess reinforce one another.

The trees suggest too the life-giving powers of nature as embodied in Artemis as the goddess also of wild and uncultivated trees and, significantly as Artemis Orthia (see 30), worshiped as a tree- or fertility-goddess.⁵⁹ The tree in general has deep-seated associations in the Mediterranean world with the life-giving goddess of nature, in part as the tree of life, "whose fruits are cast into the ground for the renewal of life."⁶⁰ There is, in fact, a large body of evidence indicating that trees played an important part in ancient cults as symbols of fruitfulness;⁶¹ and Pindar, with his interest in local cults and his upbringing in Boeotia, rich in diverse, often very ancient cults, would certainly be steeped in awareness of the religious-symbolic significance of trees.⁶² It is perhaps of further significance that Pindar calls the tree *ἐλαία* (13b), i.e., the tame, not the wild olive, the symbol of civilization and, in Athens at least, of the gods' life-giving beneficence⁶³ (it is usually the wild olive, *kotinos*, which Heracles is said to bring back from the Hyperboreans — e.g., Pausanias 5.7.7).⁶⁴ In bringing back the olive trees from the North, Heracles is thus bringing a gentle fruitfulness to men, overcoming the risk of cold and frozen barrenness.⁶⁵

This risk of death and sterility, never emerging fully from the mythical background but still vaguely present in it, appears also in Heracles' hunting of "the golden horned doe (or hind) which once Taygeta, dedi-

cating, inscribed as sacred to (Artemis) Orthia" (29-30).⁶⁶ The myth is one of the hunter pursuing the helpless animal, man intruding into the wild freedom of nature (thus Heracles is "coming from the ridges and many-bending hollows of Arcadia," 27). Such a pursuit can be dangerous, for it is a potential violation of nature. The animal, moreover, is sacred to Artemis who, as goddess of the fertile woodland and mountains, is also laden with the destructive power of the wild. There are, indeed, myths of the violent deaths of hunters killed as they are led on in pursuit of an animal, a doe or a boar, which is sacred to the goddess, "or more correctly, the doe is the goddess, and there remains a trace of theriomorphism in these legends."⁶⁷ Instead of the destruction of the hunter by the goddess, however, the theme of the hunt here fades and is replaced by the goddess' kindly reception of him (27); Heracles brings back the olive tree, not the body of the hunted prey.⁶⁸

Implicit in the Taygeta-Artemis episode is also the contest between an active, assertive male power and a female element, associated with the vitality of the natural world, which is threatened with outrage. Not only is Heracles' pursuit of the hind a potential violation of nature which, through Artemis' intervention, is not realized, but the story of Taygeta reflects such a violation, for according to the scholiast (53c) "Artemis made her into a doe when Zeus wished to force her. Then when she became human again, she consecrated the doe to Artemis and dedicated it with golden horns . . ." The story is attested also on the throne at Amyclae, where Pausanias (3.18.10) describes a scene, of "those not unknown," in which "Poseidon and Zeus carry off Taygeta, daughter of Atlas, and her sister Alcyone." The myth itself may go deeper, the pre-Hellenic name and personage of Taygeta, her animal form and association with Artemis suggesting the contest of the active male Hellenic god with the quiet but mysterious primordial forces of nature and the wild.⁶⁹ The rape behind the Taygeta story, however, is again kept by Pindar in the background, behind the hero's benign meeting with Artemis: "The pre-Greek goddess turns into Artemis Orthia and establishes harmonious agreement with the Hellenes whom Heracles represents."⁷⁰

There is perhaps a parallel adumbration of another male-female contest in the phrase *ἀνάγκα πατρόςθεν*, "the necessity from his father" (29) which compels Heracles to capture the hind. The phrase refers to the story, told in the *Iliad* (19.95-133), of the deception of Zeus by Hera at the time of Heracles' birth, her trick giving Eurystheus power to command (*ἄγγελαις*, 28) the Zeus-born hero. It serves as a reminder of the enmity of Hera toward Heracles (elaborated in Pindar's First

Nemean) and the hostility generally lurking in the world. In the poem itself, however, this faint allusion to the hostility of Hera is canceled by the benevolence of the other female figure, Artemis; and the mistrust and deception between Hera and Zeus remain dim in the past before the benignity of the present.

Thus Heracles in his relationship with the female power, Hera, Artemis, the doe, does not re-enact the violence of Zeus toward Taygeta. Nature offers its fertility without harsh extortion, and Heracles is able to obtain the wild olives from the Hyperboreans by persuasion (16). This "persuasion" of the people who "serve Apollo" (16) contains perhaps another adumbration of conflict ending in gentle resolution, for in an early legend Heracles appears as opposing Apollo for the hind.⁷¹ The possibility of resolution by persuasion and conciliatory reception reflects perhaps a deeper fusion in Pindar's thought between the unchained fertility of the wild and the benign order of the Olympian gods.⁷² Artemis, the Hyperborean trees, the hind, thus contribute their rich, but ambivalent vitality to an ordered human festival celebrating the ruler of Olympus and the guardian of universal harmony.

The golden horns, too, apparently a fixed part of the Taygeta legend according to the scholiasts (53c-d) — horned does being rare, but possible in Greek mythology⁷³ — are of significance as the symbolic conduits of vitality through which man touches and takes into himself the vital, electrical powers of nature that course through the swift hind and are definitively embodied in its horns. The grasping of horns from earliest times was the way of drawing the animal vitality of nature into oneself; they serve as a "fountain of energy" through which this fertilizing force is channeled.⁷⁴ For Pindar, furthermore, the gold, as seen in the *First Olympian*, is the symbol for the blaze of glory which comes from the sublimity of the divine and enters human life suddenly (*O.1.41*) or is sought with danger (*O.1.87*).⁷⁵ This element of danger and unpredictable vitality is doubled here by the association of horns with the primordial energy of nature embodied in the animal consecrated to the goddess. Farnell has sought to give a ritual explanation of the golden horns:

The story may have arisen from a certain ritual, namely, the consecration and occasional sacrifice of stags to Artemis, the goddess of stags in Arcadia; the golden horns might be a reminiscence of the old sacrificial custom, handed down from Minoan-Mycenaean days, of wrapping gold leaf round the horns of the victim. The idea would arise that no one but a great hero like Heracles would dare to chase one of these sacrosanct animals: therefore he probably did.⁷⁶

But Pindar's hero, at the moment when he would grasp the horns and slay the doe, taking her free-flowing animal vitality into himself but also violating the untamed world of the virgin goddess, looks up and sees the olive trees: "Pursuing her he saw also that land beyond cold Boreas; then he stood in wonder at the trees" (31-32). He would seem to have forgotten the hind and brings back instead a gentler, less dangerous, less ambivalent form of the fertility of nature. The hero is not forced to the final confrontation with the unmitigated power of divine gold or with the brute might of the natural world. Instead, he is permitted as a valid achievement a deed which fosters life and shades the earth; and this deed is implicitly the prototype for the contests of men at Olympia.

The act of crowning the victor with the olive branch brings him too into contact with that same vitality, over which Artemis, as goddess both of wild animals and wild trees, presides. The victor's wearing of the life-giving olive branch, itself cut from the sacred tree planted by Heracles (Paus. 5.15.3), would be the human equivalent of the hero's grasping of the golden horns. He is crowned with olive through "the behests of Heracles" (11ff), who has thus brought to the individual victor the primal vitality of the earth and the wild, just as he has surrounded the sacred place for all future participants in the festival with the fruitful symbols of life.⁷⁷ And this transfer of vitality is accomplished gently, with the acquiescence of the divinity who most fully possesses these powers. Thus Pindar's fusion of the hunt of the goddess' sacred animal and the bringing back of the trees not only converts a more savage to a gentler form of vitality, but also intensifies the power and range of this vitality that the hero himself can confront and master: on his own level he can pursue (and attain) the golden-horned hind, but for men he brings back only the trees.

Not only are the hero's deeds benevolent, but also his impulses are gentle and life-giving. His wish to plant the trees about the Olympian racecourse is "a sweet desire" (*γλυκὺς ἔμπερος*), sweet not only because its intent is benevolent but because its fulfillment is made possible by the total gentleness of the divine order. This gentleness overrules the harshness and original intent of the hunt: the suddenness, the free and spontaneous character of his admiration for the trees, cancels the "necessity from his father," Zeus (29) that originally sent him forth. This severer, commanding aspect of Zeus, equivalent to the imperative *anagke* which drives Pelops to risk and action in the First *Olympian* (82), retreats behind the fostering presence of the god. The benevolent order of Zeus celebrated by the festival makes possible the "persuasion" (16) of the Hyperboreans, and his presence at various points throughout the

ode also provides a recurring assurance of this order and benevolence. It is for his grove ($\Delta\iota\omicron\varsigma \dots \alpha\lambda\sigma\epsilon\iota$, 17-18) that Heracles makes his request of the Hyperboreans; the altars are consecrated to him ($\pi\alpha\tau\rho\acute{\iota}$, 19); and it is "necessity" from him ($\pi\alpha\tau\rho\acute{\omicron}\theta\epsilon\nu$, 28) that has led Heracles to the Hyperboreans. From the conciliating effect of his presence flow also the friendliness of the Tyndarids at the beginning and end of the poem and the graciousness of Artemis.

Thus the purpose of the hero's request, his intent, and the connection with Zeus sanction the fruitfulness of the journey and its outcome.⁷⁸ Heracles seeks the gift in the spirit of benefaction. His purpose itself includes the propitious linking of man and God at a ritual celebration which is itself a mark of the favor of the gods for men⁷⁹ and is the symbolic analogue of Theron's present festival, the Theoxenia. The olive trees join men and gods under the symbol of growth and life, freeing the active strivings of men for excellence in the ritual contests under the good will of the gods, present in the "shady plant" (18) and the shade from the sun (24). Whereas in the First *Olympian* light is a major symbol of the divine, in the Third it is shade, the tempered mean between the blazing sun and Pelops' dark prayer in *Olympian* I.

That the Hyperboreans should be devoted to the service of Apollo (16) is also significant, for Pindar thus combines in the Northland the ordered intelligence of the arts and civilization which Apollo sponsors (see *P.* 5.63-69) and the august morality embodied in the god (see *P.* 9.42-49) with the primitive vital forces of nature symbolized by Artemis and the hind of the golden horns. Even at the frozen limits of the world the hero can find "a people serving Apollo." The Apollonian connections of the Hyperboreans reinforce the possibility of approaching them with persuasion (16) and thus releasing for the world of men the fertility and beauty which lie locked in that remote and shadowy (14) land.⁸⁰ The fertilizing power of the wild and the beneficent order of civilization are thus fused together, and their fusion makes possible the transference to men at Olympia of the symbolic trees that protect from the searing force of nature (24).

While the Hyperboreans reflect the communicability of the joy and vitality of nature to men, their land still contains an ambivalent duality like Artemis or the hind: it is cold (32), remote, mysterious, and hard to attain; yet it is also the region where the wild olive grows, where the magical hind takes refuge, and where Artemis receives the hero. Its significance lies between the objective duality of nature, now fruitful, now mysteriously barren, and the total enriching benevolence of the gods — through the hero — to men. It is associated elsewhere in Pindar

with the pure, untroubled joy which only those who are very close to gods can attain. In the Tenth *Pythian* (34-44) especially it is the land of ever-present music, dancing, and festive delight, free from disease, old age, toil, and Nemesis. Apollo rejoices there and "laughs seeing the upright wantonness (*ὑβριν ὀρθίων*) of beasts" (36). Nor would a mortal "with ships or going on foot find the wondrous road to the assembly of the Hyperboreans" (29-30); and Perseus attains it only through the special favor and guidance of Athena (45). Thus it is a world beyond mortality, unreachable, perfect, magical, opened only by the benevolence of a god. It is associated too with the primal fertility of the earth, for the two Hyperborean maidens on Delos are worshiped as promoters of fertility: they have sacred objects carried in a sheaf of wheat (Herodotus 4.33.1, 33.4-5); Delian maidens before marriage cut off a lock of hair, wind it on a spindle, and place it on their grave; and Delian children make a similar offering, winding their hair "about some green shoot" (*περὶ χλόην τινά*, 4.34.2).⁸¹ Interesting for the connection with the Third *Olympian*, too, is that a wild olive tree grows on their grave which lies in a sanctuary of Artemis (Herodotus 4.34.2). They thus bring to the Delians the life-giving fertility from the magic land, as Heracles brings it to men at Olympia, carried in the olive trees.

The Hyperboreans are also mythologically relevant because in some versions the hind pursued by Heracles finds refuge with the Hesperidae, who are sometimes localized among the Hyperboreans.⁸² (Taygeta, too, a daughter of Atlas, would be related to the Hesperidae.) The Hyperborean land, as a refuge for the pursued hind, would mythologically prefigure the spirit of reconciliation that takes place in the ode. The accessibility of a region otherwise remote and, even more, the fact that the hero can return from the magical land and persuade the inhabitants to give him the sheltering trees that grow there symbolize the perfect accord between God and man and the possibility of men's sharing, through the act of the hero, in the quasi-divine purity of joy and life possessed by the Hyperboreans. Heracles' journey does not repeat the familiar mythical pattern of the hero reaching a captivating enchanted realm, a potentially sinister land of suspended life from which return is difficult and in which his will, energy, sense of time and life are sapped⁸³ (like the Lotus-eaters or Calypso's or Circe's island for Odysseus). And yet the inaccessibility of the Hyperborean land (*P.10.27-30*) serves also as a reminder of the limits of mortality to which Pindar alludes explicitly at the end of the ode (44-45). It thus makes the more salient the act of divine benevolence by which man may enjoy the contact with the life-giving powers of that realm and the enrichment of his enclosed mortality.

The victory in the Third *Olympian*, therefore, opens man's spirit to the ambient beauty of his world. Hence Pindar's stress on growing and blooming (ἄωτον, 4, φύτευμα, 18, φυτεῦσαι, 34, ἔθαλλεν, 23), his description of the olive crown (13), his emphasis on the beauty of the full moon (19ff). He thus links the gentle loveliness of nature with the festival and the joy of victory, as if such victory brought a richer sense of the natural beauty of the world, sharpening man's senses to the fullness of life around him and bringing him to closer connection with that life. This vitality, beauty, graciousness, are here present as part of the structure of the world, communicated from Zeus to the wandering hero and brought through the Dioscuri and their festival to the "common" (18) race of men; and this communication is more pervasive and complex, yet gentler — perhaps then ultimately simpler — than Pelops' direct confrontation of Poseidon in *O.1*.

At the same time this beauty is soft and tempered. It is the "golden-charioted, month-dividing" full moon with its "whole eye of evening" (19-20) and not the glaring rays of the sun (24) that lights the festival. And this gold is not the elemental metal of *O.1*, shining like a blazing fire in the night, but the sensuous embodiment of the mellowed light of the summer moon, enriching the festive beauty of the sacred grove. The co-presence of full, golden moon and shaded sun marks another degree of accord between antithetical powers of nature, male and female, like that of Artemis and Heracles, green olive tree and cold Hyperborean springs. In the Eighth *Isthmian*, too, at the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, the mid-month moon is the symbolical time of mysterious and fruitful contact with the divine beauty and graciousness that bring to men the joy of immortal loves: "And in the month-dividing evenings she would loose the lovely girdle of her maidenhood in submissiveness to the hero" (48-49). Here the sea-goddess, wooed amid strife on Olympus and prophesied the mother of a dangerous offspring (see *I.8.36ff*), becomes mild and favoring to human life, bringing into it pleasure and brightness under the softer light of the moon.⁸⁴

The figure of "beautiful-haired Helen" in the opening line of *O.3* invokes this atmosphere of gentle beauty, flowing from the coherence and harmony between divine and human worlds.⁸⁵ Half-mortal herself, she is called upon with her divine brothers, the Dioscuri, who maintain this harmonious connection both at Olympia and the Theoxenia (35ff). The poem thus begins with the woman who embodies the accessibility of divine beauty to men and the accord between divine and human through which man can receive it. This beauty continues in "the bloom of horses tireless of foot" (3) and all of the glowing language of the proem

and in the richness of geographical description: the springs of the Ister (14), the "most sacred banks of the Alpheus" (22), the dell of Cronian Pelops (23), "the ridges and many-bending recesses of Arcadia" (27), "that land beyond Boreas cold with blasts of wind" (31-32).

In Pindar's narrative itself this geographical expansiveness is closely linked with the propitiousness of the gods, for it is when coming from those "many-bending recesses of Arcadia" in his remote wanderings that Heracles is received by Artemis (27). Gracious "receiving" by the gods throws open and enhances the beauty of the world, for the grove which is to be embellished with "the beautiful trees" (23) is also "the all-receiving (*pandokos*) grove of Zeus" (17-18). The theme of a benevolent receiving is present from the first line in the epithet "hospitable to strangers," "guest-loving" (*philoxenoi*) applied to the Dioscuri and is re-echoed in the allusion to Theron's Theoxenia (40) at which the ode was probably intended to be performed. The joyful Theoxenia thus fuses with the Olympian festival; Heracles joins the Dioscuri, "the godlike twin sons of deep-girdled Leda" (34-35, cf. "beautiful-haired Helen" in vs. 1); and the mood of kindly reception pervades the poem from beginning to end.

The Olympian festival, held amid the shade of trees carried from the remote Hyperborean land, thus celebrates the potential harmony between the wild, but life-charged, vitality of nature and the order of human civilization. In the horns of the hind, as in the "golden-charioted" full moon, the divine gold enters human life not as a dazzling, astral flash, but embodied in the familiar symbol of the life and fertility of the earth. Similarly, at the end of the ode the quotation about gold from the First *Olympian* is significantly modified. It is called "of possessions the most worthy of reverence" (*αἰδοιέστατος*, 42); and the adjective suggests a moral frame of reference comprehensible within the social framework of human life and involving perhaps a simpler, less dangerous "rightness of relation" to the gods than the erotically tinged *charis* of the First *Olympian* (75).⁸⁶ There is still a *charis* involved in the communication to men of the harmony between divine order and the primal vitality of the wild, but this *charis* comes in gentler, more intelligible ways, slowly and softly, in shade, traveling the lovely landscape of Arcadia with its many hollows, and not descending brilliantly and suddenly from the heavens.

In both poems the hero's task consists partly in knowing where to stop, knowing what are his limitations and where "the beyond" begins (*O.1.114*; *O.3.44*). In the Third *Olympian*, however, the warning is not so sharp nor so direct, being a simple third-person statement, "The

beyond is impassable for wise and unwise" (O.3.44-45), and Pindar simply denies flatly any intent of going "beyond": "I will not pursue it. I would be empty (of wit)" (O.3.45). In O.1, however, there is a sudden direct imperative: "Look no longer beyond" (114). In the Third *Olympian* too the risk in general is less, since fulfillment comes through the acceptance of what is given within the limits of mortality, whereas in the First *Olympian* to reach any significant or lasting attainment the man-hero must push beyond the mortal world, and its darkness, involving himself in the consequent danger of pushing too far or being blinded by the newness and radiance of what he finds.

In the Third *Olympian* it is the benevolence of the ritual which assures to men the fertilizing and revitalizing contact with the divine. Pindar emphasizes the sacredness and ritual purity attached to the Olympian festival in describing "the altars consecrated to his (Heracles') father," Zeus (19), in calling the contest "a sacred trial" (ἀγνὰν κρίσιν, 21)⁸⁷ and naming the banks of the Alpheus "most holy" (ζαθέοις, 22). The Olympian festival is here not primarily a time for contests of strength, but a point when the fertile powers of nature are conveyed to men through the gods, and simultaneously a time when the harsher aspect of these powers — and, by extension, of the gods themselves — are "shaded." In emphasizing the sacredness of the festival, Pindar stresses also the importance of the point of transference, the juncture of divine and human worlds.

The channeling of divine graciousness to men through a festal or ritual occasion also underlies, of course, the theme of the Theoxenia, which Pindar has closely intertwined with the Olympian festival,⁸⁸ in part by having Heracles give the supervision of the games to the Dioscuri, the gods who preside over the Theoxenia at Acragas (39-40).⁸⁹ The occasion of the banquet (39-40) suggests again the time of fruitfulness and enjoyment of the abundance of nature, a theme analogous then to the planting of olive trees, but with a local significance (the renewal of the life and vitality of the community through a common meal)⁹⁰ which complements the more general, "cosmopolitan" (see *pandokos*, 17) extensions of the Olympian festival and its myth. The banquet is conducted, moreover, with the proper moral disposition, the "reverent intent" (εὐσεβείῃ γνώμῃ, 41) of the Emmenidae, in marked contrast with the sinister tensions of the banquet of gods and men in the First *Olympian* (36-58).

The poet, too, in the Third *Olympian*, shares in this benign coherence of the world which leads him to celebrate both the victory and the festal banquet (38ff). It is the poem itself which makes present and visible,

which embodies and preserves for the future, the coherence of the world and the good will of the gods. Thus the first four lines, wherein the poet in the first person calls upon the Dioscuri and Helen, link the Theoxenia (vs. 1) with the Olympic victory (3), suggest the benevolent connection between God and man in the epithet *philoxenoi* (1), glorify Acragas with an implicit prayer for the life of the community (1-2), sing of the heroic achievement of victory ("horses tireless of foot," 3-4), and express generally the joy in the beauty that flows from this harmony and is present partly in the figure of "lovely-haired Helen" in the first line and partly in adjectives describing the poem itself, like *νεοσίγαλον* (4), *ἀγλαόκωμον* (6), *ποικιλόγαρυν* (8). The perception and communication of this coherence constitute an act of joy and beauty precisely because it is a source of immense vitality, as at the festival itself the fertile power of nature passes from the sacred olive trees to the victor's olive wreath (12-13).⁹¹ The Muse standing beside the poet at the beginning (4) is the initial sign, for him as poet, of the graciousness of the divine order and the openness of the beauty of the world, analogous on its own level to Artemis' receiving of Heracles and the presence of the Dioscuri and Heracles (34-35, 39-40) at the local Theoxenia.

The perception of this order and participation in its festal expression make the songs themselves "destined by God" (*θεόμοροι*, 10) and create in the poet a positive obligation to sing of them: "... Crowns yoked to the hair (of the victor) exact from me this God-made debt (of song)" (*τοῦτο θεόδματον χρέος*, 7). His "obligation" (*chreos*) derives from his closer connection with the gods and his greater sensitivity to the beauty of their manifestations and presences in the world. Hence this "obligation" is like the "necessity" of Heracles, emanating from a closeness of connection with the divine; but it is self-directing and free too, since it also derives from a greater receptivity to the beauty and vital energies of the world (like Heracles' wonder at the trees) and a greater will to convey them to men. The benevolent intent of the hero thus becomes analogous to that of the poet also, and Pindar reinforces this connection by using similar phrases to describe the impulse of Heracles to bring back the trees (*θυμὸς ὥρμα*, 25) and the poet's desire to honor the Emmenidae and Theron at the Theoxenia (*θυμὸς ὀτρύνει*, 38). Both by their activity fertilize and revitalize the specific community involved (Olympia and Acragas) and hence symbolically the whole world of men; and both in so doing realize in some part the divinely ordered coherence of the world.

Because of their connection with this order, moreover, both hero and poet have the right to speak to men and advise them about their

relationship to it. Thus, just as the hero establishes the ritual norms for the festival, giving commands for the honoring of victors (11-13) and entrusting the supervision to the Dioscuri (36-38), so the poet helps in giving moral norms to men; and it is on the basis of his sense of the harmonious beauty of the world, of the positive as well as the negative aspects of man's position in it, that he can warn about "the beyond" and refuse to "pursue it" (44-45). In his knowledge of the limitations of human achievement he is like the hero, who similarly knows the boundary between mortal and divine. Hence at the conclusion of the poem, in stating that Theron has reached the pillars of Heracles, he suggests that Heracles knew where to stop, knew his fullest limit of success, and so should Theron if he follows the poet's counsels.⁹² The continuation in the first person (45), however, suggests that Pindar is himself assuming the choice about proceeding further and the moral responsibility of the victor. As in the First *Olympian*, the poet associates himself with the risk of the victor; but here the risk is minimal, and the poet's concluding utterance is not entirely a negative warning, but a gentler attempt to turn man back into the positive life of the world. The poet does not encounter here the false *mythoi* of the First *Olympian* or face the danger of choosing and sustaining truth against falsehood. His task, rather, like that of the hero in the ode, is to communicate to men the beauty accessible to them in the world; and his advice at the end, though it has the moral function of restraining the victor within his proper limitations,⁹³ serves also the more positive purpose of sheltering man from "the beyond," as Heracles shelters the Olympian grove from the sun.

The poem expresses this coherent harmony, moreover, in its own structure, in the conscious linking of the mythical event and the institution of the Olympian festival itself with Theron's present victory and the celebration in Acragas, a linking which makes the present joy derive from the hero's primal act of benevolence and from the benignity of the gods to him. The sanction for the order and beauty of the world moves back gradually from the present situation to the mythic and symbolical realm and fuses with it. Thus the presence of the Muse beside the poet on the single occasion (*παρέστα* 4, aorist of single occurrence) is but one illustrative instance of the potential relationship of favor and beauty that can exist between God and man. This song for the present victory leads soon to the more general "God-destined songs which come to men" from Pisa (10), just as the crowns on the head of Theron (6) lead soon to the act of crowning that has occurred and will continue to occur at the festival from its foundation (11ff, where *ὅτι τιμῇ* emphasizes the

generic significance). This long tradition of crowning leads back, in turn, to the origin of the ritual in the past (cf. *προτέρως*, 11), the mythological event which brought life and shade to Olympia. Gradually, too, as the narrative unfolds and the imagery develops, the elements in the mythological event begin to take on a symbolical significance: the "shade" of the Ister's springs and the beauty of the olive trees (13-14) assume a deeper meaning in the "shady plant" which protects the Olympian grove from sun (24); and at the same time the olive branch as "a common crown of excellences for men" (18) extends this symbolically life-giving significance of the tree to the present victory-crown of Theron (6) and to the ever-repeated crowning of the victor by the Olympian judges (11-13). Heracles' entrusting of the Olympian festival to the Dioscuri (36) becomes the symbolic transfer of this benign vitality from the mythical world to the human world, on both the individual and generic levels (the present celebration of Theron and the recurrent Olympian festivals respectively). Thus when the festal situation described at the beginning of the ode and especially before the myth (19-22) returns at Theron's Theoxenia, it is with a new and broader sense of the beauty of the world and the favor of the gods, made closer and more accessible to men through the symbolical significance of the hero's journey, reception, and planting of trees.⁹⁴

Pindar makes this connection between myth and reality more explicit still at the junction of the myth and the concluding festive scene (34ff). Here he welds the two parts closely together, bringing the past up into the present with the vivid words "*And now into this festival he (Heracles) comes propitiously*" (34); he uses the same word for this "coming" of Heracles (*νίσσεται*, 34) that he used earlier of the songs coming from Pisa (10); and, as noted above, he suggests an association between his own impulses in singing the ode (38) and those of the hero in transplanting the trees (25). The factual reality of the present is thus united with the mythological past. The single instance becomes permeated by and almost interchangeable with the timeless symbolical significance of the mythical deed to such an extent that the various strands cannot be separated without destroying the poem. The symbolical significance of the olive crown, the victory, the festal banquet, as they fuse with the en-framing myth—the transplanting of the trees, the pursuit of the golden-horned hind to the Hyperborean land, the reception by Artemis, the consecration of the altars to Zeus at the full moon—gives the poem its sensuous imagistic unity and states the possibility of making receivable and tangible what was hitherto remote and unformed.

The communication of this beauty to men is the task of the poet as

well as of the hero. The deed of victory celebrated by the poet is not an isolated act, but set in a ritual context as a point of potential contact with the beauty and benignity of the divine order. It is for this reason that the poet feels his victory-song as a "God-made debt" (7).

It has already been seen how at each point in the ode the active implications of the victory are softened by juxtaposition with the ritual circumstance and through that with the broader vitalizing beauty of nature. This balancing appears, for example, in the victory-crown and the olive-branch (11-13, 18-20); the beauty of the grove at full moon and the "pure trial of great contests" (19-24); the Dioscuri's double connection with the supervision of the games and the propitious celebration of the Theoxenia (37-41).⁹⁵ In the larger structure of the ode, too, there is an alternation of pure narrative with festive moments of ritual. The poem presents the following pattern: 9-13b *festival* at Olympia — 14-18 *narrative* of Heracles' founding — 19-23 the first Olympic *festival* — 23-34 the central *narrative* (the myth of the hind and Hyperborean journey) — 34-41 the *festival* (ἐορτάν, 34) of the Theoxenia — possibly further restless wandering and *movement* in the concluding allusion to the "pillars of Heracles" (43-45). This structural balance of tale and festival not only encloses each part of the action in a ritual celebration, but creates also an alternation of kinetic and static, movement and rest, that brings each part of the action to a gradual completeness at a point of fruitful and beneficent contact between man and God.⁹⁶ The gradual passage back from the present, festive moment to the heroic, mythical act only expands the fullness of success and enriches the favoring context of the victory, whereas in the First *Olympian* the movement backward in time and the association of the victor (or the poet) with the hero of the myth bring sinister overtones and suggestions of danger.

The harmonious coherence of the world in the Third *Olympian*, the unity between the heroic-mythological, generic-ritual, and present-individual elements is reinforced by the circularity and lucidity of the form. The ode begins with the theme of *philoxenia* and the invocation to the Dioscuri (1), and ends with their presence at Theron's Theoxenia (34-41). The planting of the Hyperborean trees surrounds the action of the myth (13-16, 31-34), enclosing it in a framework of verdant fertility and thus underlining the fusion of gentleness and force conveyed in the imagery and the myth itself. The joy of victory and sense of the favoring connection between man and God pass from the moment of the present festival in the first strophic system to the mythical establishment of that festival by Heracles in the second, and back to a present festival, the Theoxenia, in the third. This third festival, the

sharing of a banquet with gods who in their *philoxenia* wish mortals well, thus subsumes with even greater confidence and tangible immediacy the joy of contact between man and God in the first two ritual instances.

The poem is articulated, moreover, in terms of journeys: the songs coming from Pisa (10), presumably to Theron at Acragas, Heracles traveling from Olympia to the Hyperboreans (25) and his wanderings through Arcadia (27), his coming with the Dioscuri to the Theoxenia at Acragas (34), the coming of the Dioscuri themselves on many occasions to the Theoxenia (40), and finally the concluding statement that Theron has reached the pillars of Heracles (43-45) beyond which is "impassable." These journeys help clarify the movements back and forth between present reality, mythological past, and continuous ritual. The journey too is a significant means of unifying narration, for it implies an expansive contact with the world (especially in the journeys through Arcadia to the Ister and Hyperboreans, 14, 27, 31-32)⁹⁷ and is also a mode of acting in the world without violating it, a form of contact with its beauty without disturbing any of its elements. As the major form of action here, the journey is typical of the greater quietness and gentleness of narrative, as compared with the First *Olympian*; and it permits the elimination of death from the hunt and hence from the whole poem.

Pindar ends the ode also with the image of a wandering, but this time a dangerous one, no longer in the fixed limits of the world, but into the "beyond" which is "impassable (*abaton*) for wise and unwise." He introduces here another journey of Heracles, dangerous like that to the Hyperboreans, but also stopped within the limits of possibility. In thus halting at a supreme point of attainment, but still within the realm of what may be fittingly attained, he re-establishes in a more secure context the elemental superlatives, water and gold, which he has deliberately recalled here (42) from the recent First *Olympian*. At the same time, as noted above, he gives gold the morally qualifying and humanizing modifier "most to be revered" (*aidoiestatos*, 42). Pindar suggests, therefore, that in the more open world presented in the Third *Olympian* the victor may go to the extreme of success (*πρὸς ἐσχάτιόν*, 43), but without the proximity of the potentially hostile forces of the First *Olympian*.

In both odes, nevertheless, man's achievement and vitality spring from contact with mysterious, sometimes dangerous, divinities and powers; the sources of his most intense energies and his fullest grasping of the world lie in remote and inaccessible places, to be sought in darkness

and danger or by a difficult journey. Thus in the Third *Olympian* there are still potentially dangerous primal energies contained in the cold Hyperborean land, the northern Artemis, the golden-horned hind, the searing rays of the sun, the "necessity" from Zeus; but their destructive violence is tempered and incorporated into human civilization through the God-sanctioned, hero-established ritual. The imagery of the ode, too, fuses Pindar's conventional images — gold, the sun, the "bloom" of the richness of attainment — with deep primeval symbols of the life-charged energies of nature: horns, the hind, trees. Human life exists, then, in a place of shelter between the fruitfulness and the wildness of nature, between the valley of Olympia, no longer exposed and treeless, and the mysterious recesses and ridges of Arcadia; the Hyperborean land exists too, but beyond man's ordinary scope. Through the hero's intervention, however, men can touch and tap the life-giving current of nature's vitality without exposure to its destructive powers. The man-hero of the First *Olympian* lacks this intervention: he must face the divine in solitude and undergo the risk of annihilation. The desire which snatches him up is sudden and powerful, and it acts with violence (ἀρπάσαι, 40), with little of the "sweetness" of desire with which Heracles admires the northern trees (*O.*3.33). Tantalus' banquet is not a simple, joyous communication with divine vitality, like Theron's Theoxenia, but a time of tension, with evil myths of cannibalism in the background and perhaps, in the untold legend of the Pelopids Atreus and Thyestes, dimly in the future.

The gods of the First *Olympian* are not actually hostile, but embody an objective moral order which maintains the boundary between mortal and divine. The gods' dismissal of Pelops is not necessarily an act of anger or cruelty, but simply a necessary expulsion from their realm of an imperfect, or of a less perfect, being; yet for the hero this resumption of mortality has tragic overtones. Both man and hero in the Third *Olympian*, however, by the acceptance of the world and by the absence of a self-assertion apart from the mortal rhythms of life, can invite the beneficent help of the gods without risk. Effort is still required, but it is an effort of expansiveness and receptivity to beauty, not the intense, agonized concentration of Pelops. The contests of *O.*3 thus lose some of their crucial importance as a means to attaining the brightness of beauty and overcoming mortality. They are seen, rather, as the adornment of the already established and ritually celebrated beauty of the world. In this open, accepted world it is possible to make the journey to the Hyperboreans and return, to touch the magical springs of life (now "shaded," 14) without disaster, to hunt the hind without violating the

realm of the goddess. The hero can come to know the full beauty of the world without losing his "innocence," without involving himself in death by killing the hind. Thus, in one sense, the Third *Olympian* represents the stage of Pelops and Tantalus before their "fall," while they still enjoy the unmarred fullness of their *olbos* in easy contact with the gods and untroubled by mortality. In another sense, the Third *Olympian* begins at the point where the First ends, the enclosure of man's relation to the vitality of the world in a protective ritual which channels the divine brilliance into humanly receivable form.

The gods do not actively seek to aid mortals, nor do they act out of any sense of selfless, overflowing love (Poseidon's *eros* in *O.1* is far from being that, though Pindar may have been no less serious about its symbolical significance than Plato about the final *eros* of the *Symposium* or *Phaedrus*). Pindar's gods in both the odes retain something of the mystery and ambiguity of elemental powers. Yet at the same time they are the moral governors of the universe and the givers of all fulfillment of action, *praxis* (*O.1.85*) or *telos*, for men.⁹⁸ They give this *telos* when it is in accordance with the moral order which they maintain. They foster and sustain whatever is in accordance with that order and chastize what is not. Hence the antithesis of the First *Pythian*: the beauty of the lyre and softness of the eagle on the side of order and beauty, Apollo and the Muses (1-2); the roaring explosions and blazing lava-streams of Aetna for "all that Zeus loves not" (13ff).

The First *Olympian* presents men in a universe where there is a continual straining tension between these two aspects of reality, between the right receiving and understanding of the world's beauty, and falsehood about the gods, between *charis* and *ate*, Pelops and Tantalus. To speak ill of the gods is not only to invite punishment, but is a total misunderstanding of the potentials of the world, a blasphemy against its moral order, and a denial of the possibility of beauty, achievement, deep and lasting joy—of any of the goods of which the gods give the *telos*. Hence it is *ἀκέρδεια* (*O.1.53*), "profitlessness," a word Pindar uses only here, a foredooming of the ability of human life to reach and create beauty by contact with the *charis* from the gods. This *charis* is itself the sign of the gods' presence in the world and the source of its beauty. Thus blasphemy of the gods involves one of the most limiting of human weaknesses, envy (*phthonos*, *O.1.47*). Yet the gods are initially well-disposed to mortals, or at least certain mortals of exceptional gifts, as is exemplified in their honoring (*ἐτίμασαν*, 55) of Tantalus, a particular instance of the honor (*tima*, 31) which *charis* in general brings.

Although the easier accessibility of beauty in *O.3* appears as part of a

greater divine benevolence, actually the quality of the divine remains constant, and it is the difficulty of men which is lessened. The resolution of tensions in *O.3* merely makes more apparent the potential graciousness of the gods, present equally, nevertheless, in the honoring of Tantalus in the First *Olympian*. To be able to see the gods rightly is to know the fullness of this beauty, though it is also to know the limitations of human life, the remoteness of the Hyperborean land and all that lies beyond the pillars of Heracles.

Both odes are then concerned with "the beyond" for men and with the balance between justified aspirations that may rightly expand human life and the presumptuous infringement of mortal limitation and the order of the cosmos. The Third *Olympian* develops the positive side: the "extreme" (43) may be reached without danger. Hence its tone and imagery are sensuous and rooted in the primal symbols of the vitality of the earth. The First *Olympian* develops the negative side of the human position in the world: the inaccessibility of the elemental and eternal powers of water, fire, sun, the divine. Its levels of subterranean imagery are not the primordial, life-filled powers of the natural world, but the perhaps equally primeval, yet more sinister themes of dismemberment, cannibalism, dark and mysterious initiation ceremonies. When man is reborn it is from darkness and suffering into a dangerous world of brazen spears and swift chariots where death is the penalty of the loser.

In the Third *Olympian* the symbol of the victory is unambiguously the symbol of life, the olive tree, whereas even the festivity of Pelops' marriage is darkened by the pressing knowledge of death. The First *Olympian*, with its strident immediacy of the need for achievement, its uncompromising disparity between God and man, is a darker picture, framing human life between the glaring sun in an empty sky and the indifferent "hoary" sea, and presenting without mitigation the precipitous finitude of mortality and the intense reality of the danger of death and old age "shareless in all beautiful things." It is complemented by the vitality and expansive beauty of the world in the Third *Olympian*, where the hero's action, sanctioned in turn by the divine benevolence, opens for men a gentler receptiveness to this beauty. When the world is not always so open, however, man confronts, like Pelops, the necessity of his mortality and the task of undertaking the lonely, dangerous quest for meaning and beauty.

The two odes thus reflect separate, but closely complementary sides of Pindar's genius: a deeply feeling awareness of human struggling and limitation in the face of death, and a rich sensitivity to the beauty of the

world. The gentleness of the Third *Olympian* is, perhaps, explicable in part by the long and amicable relations of Pindar with the Emmenidae of Acragas, dating from his earliest poems, *P.12* and *P.6*.⁹⁹ In the Second *Olympian*, written probably shortly after the Third and for the same victory, this gentleness deepens into a profound solace where sensuous beauty and the poignancy of death combine in the transcendental vision of the after-life (61–80). Pindar had also written a poem of solace for Hieron, the Third *Pythian*, perhaps a few years after *O.2* and *O.3*,¹⁰⁰ but it, too, like the First *Olympian*, is concerned with deception, *ate* (24), the dangerous purity of the god (see *σπέρμα θεοῦ καθαρόν*, 15) and lacks the gentleness and free, receptive openness to natural beauty of the Third, and the Second, *Olympian*.

III

The Third *Olympian* is, in addition to its own clear beauty, of importance also for what it adumbrates for the future in Pindar's work. In the great odes of the 460's — *Olympians* 6, 9, 13, 7¹⁰¹ — he is to achieve a high poetic fusion of the sensuous expansiveness of the Third *Olympian* with the probing moral force of the First. The established harmonious moral order of the gods, so powerfully and vividly asserted in the great *Pythian* odes of the 470's — *P.1*, 2, 3, 9 — makes possible, as it were, the confidence in the beauty and richness of the world in these poems and the broadening of geographical horizons, the enlarging of the whole narrative scale in the epic-proportioned Fourth *Pythian* (462 B.C.).¹⁰² In these odes, too, the gods foster whatever is beautiful and civilized in human life, and their presence illumines the world with color and beauty. So in the story of Iamus in *O.6* — the son of "the golden-haired one," Apollo (41), grandson of Poseidon and "violet-haired" Euadna — born amid crimson, silver, and "the yellow and purple beams of violets" (30–40, 55). Here too the link between man and God is, as in the First *Olympian*, an erotic connection, but with far less sinister implications and a gentler, more beneficent interplay of light and dark throughout the ode. Iamus, too, prays in the night "in the middle of the Alpheus" to Poseidon and Apollo (57ff); but his prayer, following directly his rich-omened birth, is more confident of his future attainment and of his closeness to the gods.¹⁰³ It is short and answered directly by the god: "Rise up, my son, to go hither to the place common to all, behind my voice" (62–63). Pindar then dwells on the fulfillment of the prayer, not the tensions of the hero's danger and mortality, as in *O.1*. Iamus invokes, moreover, not only the "heavy-rumbling god of the

strong trident" (*O.1.72-73*) to be met alone in the night, but simultaneously (59) calls upon "the bow-bearing guardian of God-built Delos," his father, Apollo. The combination is perhaps significant, for Poseidon, though benevolent, often gives his aid after suffering, as in the "calm out of storm" of *I.7* (37ff) or, indeed, the two anchors that are "good to hang out in a stormy night" at the end of this ode, whereas Pindar's Apollo is usually closer and more unambiguously propitious.¹⁰⁴ It is thus significantly "the paternal voice," Apollo's, which answers him (62). Iamus, like Pelops, also calls upon the gods "when he received the sweet-joyed fruit of golden-crowned Hebe" (57-58); but here the gold of success, not the shadowing down and uncertainty of Pelops, is already upon him; and the bloom of his youth only intensifies the sensuous richness and the polychromatic luxuriance of the rest of the ode.

In these poems the gods become not only the source of the radiant beauty of the world, but the bestowers of a direct benevolence, the beings who protect and promote life. This concept is incipient in Heracles' blessing of Telamon's future son in *I.6* and, as shown above, is the central theme of the Third *Olympian*. The gods now, however, no longer designate such action to the hero, but take it upon themselves: Zeus saves Deucalion and Pyrrha, and thus the whole human race, by drawing off the flood in *O.9*;¹⁰⁵ Athena helps Bellerophon with the "mild drug" in *O.13*; she bestows the gift of the arts upon the Rhodians in *O.7* even though they forgot the fire for their sacrifice.¹⁰⁶ This development is most fully foreshadowed in Heracles' fertilizing act in the Third *Olympian*. The theme of the fertility of nature and the ambivalence of its power appears in the prayer to the sun after an eclipse in *Paeon 9* (frag. 44 Bowra);¹⁰⁷ and the rhythm of alternating fertility and barrenness becomes in two of the later poems (*N.6.9*, *N.11.39*) part of a deeper perception of the place of human life and suffering in the organic pattern of nature.¹⁰⁸ The theme of the hero fostering and fertilizing human life has its deepened counterpart too, fused with the poignant recognition of the pain of mortality and separation, in the Tenth *Nemean* where the god-hero, Polydeuces, relinquishes a part of his immortality on behalf of his dying brother; the god (or demigod) now takes upon himself a share in human death.¹⁰⁹ None of these themes can or should necessarily be traced back directly to the Third *Olympian*; but that ode, with its redefinition of the hero's act in terms of promoting life and tempering the harshness of the natural world for men, and with its freer openness to the beauty of the world, gives some indication of the organic growth of Pindar's sensitivity. His gods and heroes come to act

less by violence and physical strength and more in accordance with a fuller and gentler knowledge of human suffering.

Olympians 1 and 3 together combine in complementary fashion themes later to be fused and deepened but representing a basic recurrent polarity in Pindar's perception of the world: the awareness of the fullness of life in the latter poem and of the dark reality and pressing immediacy of death in the former. Though Pindar's poetic expression undergoes a sensuous expansion in the 460's, he does not let his heightened responsiveness to the sensuous beauty of the world blunt or obscure his knowledge of the pain involved in the human situation. Nor, on the other hand, in his latest poems, do the pain of disappointment and the acceptance of mortality destroy the sense of the beauty of life and the possibility of joy, ephemeral though it may be (*I.7.40*). The two sides, life and death, joy and suffering, are always present in Pindar, in varying proportions, from the contrast of the *aglaia* of the young victor with the "black-walled house of Persephone" where his dead father dwells in the early *O.14*¹¹⁰ to the alternation of darkness and color in *O.6* or the juxtaposition of mortal ephemerality, man as "a shadow's dream," with "the Zeus-given radiance" in *P.8* (95-97). As with the blooming youth of Pelops at the moment of his trial with death, the awareness of pain and mortality intensifies the sense of the richness and possibility of life, and vice versa. By the later *N.8* this interaction of beauty and suffering is both more somber and more profound: that a poem gripped by the bitterness of strife, disappointment, betrayal, and death in the myth of Ajax (22-34) can be illuminated by the invocation to "Lady Hora, messenger of the ambrosial endearments of Aphrodite" and the lovely image of the dew-freshened vine reaching "toward the liquid air" (38-42) bespeaks a mastered sense of the tragedy and joy of life. In the late poems, generally, this balance is finer and the knowledge of the two sides is more complex, more deeply felt, and more closely centered upon basic human relationships and needs; "the simple roads of life,"¹¹¹ the "uses of friends," the joy of trust, in the Eighth *Nemean* (35-36, 42-44), the ties of fraternal love in the Tenth: "Honor flees for a man bereft of friends; but there are few men of trust for mortals amid toil to take a share in suffering" (*N.10.78-79*). The beauty which in the Third *Olympian* was found in the expanding world of nature and in the First in the dangerous but radiant contact with the divine is now found in trust and the sharing of suffering between man and man.¹¹² Here the pain and mortality become an essential part of the "joy," the *terpsis* which is possible for man (see *N.8.43*), and this "joy," in turn, is not destroyed by the pain, the *penthos* of *N.10* (77) and *I.7* (37), but renders

the suffering and the loss themselves beautiful instead of harsh. The ability of man to hold within himself the balance between joy and loss brings a deeper, transfiguring beauty that stands above the transience of mortal pleasure and pain. It is a beauty of fullness rather than resignation, of patiently won understanding and cherishing of all that human life can hold rather than a force and bitter dismissal of it. It is reflected well by the personal lines in the Seventh *Isthmian*, written when the poet had reached perhaps his sixty-fifth year. Pindar speaks here of a kinsman of the victor killed in war, "breathing out his well-flowering time of life," and then turns to himself:

I suffered grief not to be told; but now
the Earth-shaker granted to me calm weather
out of storm. I shall sing, fitting my hair
with crowns. But let not the envy of the
immortals disturb whatever ephemeral joy
pursuing I proceed into old age and the fated
time of life. For we die all alike; but (only)
the *daimon* (of our luck) is unequal . . . (37-43)¹¹³

The juxtaposition of victory and old age, of life and death, of God and man, is no longer so discordant and threatening as in the First *Olympian*, but is part of a tranquil and gentle fulfillment of man in his human situation, knowing the rootedness of his life in change, and accepting its passing away, "calm" as his life proceeds to its "fated time," and thus now beautiful himself in and through his mortality.

NOTES

I wish to acknowledge my gratitude and indebtedness to Professor John H. Finley of Harvard University, whose teaching and writing have shown me much in Pindar.

1. On the dating of *O.1* and *O.3* see L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* (London 1930-32) II 3-4, 12, 24 (to be cited henceforth simply as "Farnell"). Citations, line, and fragment numbers conform to the Oxford Text of C. M. Bowra, *Pindari Carmina*, ed. 2 (Oxford 1937). Scholia are cited according to A. B. Drachmann, *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina* (Leipzig 1903-27).

2. Farnell *ad loc.* (II 29) cites two further examples of Pindar's quoting himself (*O.8.66* and *P.8.81*; *N.6.9* and *N.11.39*) but in neither of these cases is the connection so clear and immediate as in the First and Third *Olympians*. The two odes have been coupled also in a work inaccessible to me: Hugo Jurenka, *Pindars erste und dritte olympische Ode* (Vienna 1894), but apparently primarily for textual criticism, so far as can be judged from the discussion by Bornemann in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* 92 (1897) 222-24.

3. See generally John H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus*, Martin Classical

Lectures XIV (Cambridge, Mass. 1955) 175: "... The common trait of the odes is the effort to grasp the bright chain that binds men to gods or, better, the radiance that descends from gods to men, touching events with the divine completeness."

4. Judgments as to the poetic worth of *O.1* have varied. Farnell, while qualifying Lucian's praise of it as "the most beautiful of all lyrics," still admitted it to the rank of "one of the masterpieces of ancient song" (I 9, see I 7). Wilamowitz, on the other hand, declared "dass *O.1*, von dem unvergesslichen Eingang abgesehen, zwar für seine Sinnesart und die Auffassung seines Berufes überaus wichtig ist, aber als Poesie im Ganzen nicht in die erste Reihe seiner Lieder gehört"; *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 237. A recent critic has, unjustly, I think, put a low estimate generally on Pindar's poetic greatness, finding "a lack of complete communication": H. Musurillo, *Symbol and Myth in Ancient Poetry* (New York 1961) 57-58.

5. See the scholion *ad loc.* (181, Drachmann I 56): "The final achievement and fullness (τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ τὸ πλήρες), which there is no exceeding for men to find, is raised on high (ὑψοῦται) and exists for kings." See also F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880) 98: "Mit dem Preis des *ariston* hat es (*O.1*) begonnen, mit dem Lob des *eschaton* schliesst es."

6. To speak of "the divine" in Pindar is, of course, to introduce a concept which he did not have, for his poems live in a world of *theoi* rather than *to theion*: see G. F. Else, "God and Gods in Early Greek Thought," *TAPA* 80 (1949) 24-36. For his use of *theos* (more pantheistic than monotheistic) see Farnell's "Excursus on Pindar's Religion," II 464, 466.

7. For the acceptance of danger (*kindynos*) as necessary for the heroic achievement in Pindar see *O.6.9-11*: "Honorless are excellences without risk (*akindynoi aretai*) either among men (i.e., on land) or in hollow ships"; so also in *P.4.185-86* Hera inspires in the heroes a longing for the Argo so that "none, left behind, might remain by his mother coddling his dangerless span of life." See also *P.4.207*, *O.5.16-17*.

8. The passage about Ganymede (*O.1.44-5*) provides clear evidence about Pindar's attitude to the love affair. As shocked commentators have noted, Pindar does not even question its morality, and in the framework of the poem this *eros* is of a strong positive value. See Farnell, I 8-9: "Nor does Pindar's attempt in this poem to reform the religious mythology of his people strike the modern reader as happy: in his eagerness to clear the Gods from the imputation of cannibalism, he invents a myth still more repulsive to our taste." In the same vein is Wilamowitz' comment (above, n.4) 236; after alluding to the Boeotian attitude toward homosexual love in Plato's *Symposium* (182b) he continues: "Dass Pindar die Götter mit einer solchen Erfindung entlasten will, beleuchtet wohl am grellsten die Wahrheit, dass die frommste Gesinnung und das strengste Gefühl für die Reinheit des Gottesbegriffes und der Sittlichkeit mit einer Ansicht über das was sittlich und schicklich ist verbunden sein kann, die andere Denkart und Sitte schaudern macht."

9. Thus Finley (above, n.3) 35 speaks of the symbolic connection of the gods with any brilliant success; and it is especially at the moment of victory when man and god meet, "when the gods' timelessness touches time and change" (40).

10. According to the scholion *ad loc.* (Drachmann I 48) *haimakouriai* is a Boeotian word used of the rituals for the dead.

11. For the importance of *aglaia* in Pindar see G. Norwood, *Pindar*, Sather

Classical Lectures XIX (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945) 67, who describes it as "‘radiance’ — almost what we mean by ‘halo’."

12. For Pindar's association of gold with the radiance cast on human life by the gods, see Finley (above, n.3) *passim*, esp. 53 with reference to *O.1*: "... The glint of gold characteristically marks for Pindar those moments when the divine transcendence touches this world."

13. It has been maintained with great probability by J. T. Kakridis, "Des Pelops und Iamos Gebet bei Pindar," *Hermes* 63 (1938) 415ff that, contrary to the view of Carl Robert, Pelops' prayer is Pindar's invention, and is a deliberate departure from the existing version of the betrayal of Oenomaus by Myrtilus (first found in Pherecydes, *FGrHist* 3F 37) and thus a part of Pindar's substitution of the love-motif for the earlier myth of the eating of Pelops (see esp. pp. 419-421). Less certain is Kakridis' further suggestion, however (424ff), that the prayer at night represents, perhaps as an unconscious recollection, the working of magic against Oenomaus, the binding of his chariot (see *O.1.76*) by a *defixio*. He notes the parallel with the prayer in *O.6*, and suggests that a hint of magic-working is present there too in the motif of the prayer in the middle of the river (*O.6.58*).

14. Norwood (above, n.11) 92-93 speaks of the recurrent "blend of austerity and loveliness," darkness and light, in Pindar, and remarks on *O.1.81ff*: "Heroic action in prospect also, as in the past, gains splendour from the background of dark death" (p. 93).

15. For the comparison with the initiation ceremony, and other Pindaric parallels, see Jacqueline Duchemin, *Pindare, poète et prophète* (Paris 1955) 172, 188ff. Less happy perhaps is her interpretation of Pelops as a Pythagorean symbol (pp. 160-61).

16. In the allusion to the myth of Demeter's eating of Pelops' shoulder (Themis in other versions: see the scholia *ad loc.*, 40a, 40c, 40d, Drachmann I 29-30). The mixture of destruction and restoration is perhaps the more suggestive because Demeter is the goddess of fertility, the source of that which is eaten healthfully and wholesomely (unlike Tantalus' feast) and also perhaps because she is connected with the alternating cycle of death and rebirth, grief and joy (as in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter) which is relevant to Pelops' "rebirth" with the ivory shoulder. See Farnell's interpretation (II 6) of lines 26-27 as "referring merely to the purification of the new-born babe in the bath, from which he was received by Klotho as one of the usual birth goddesses: the ivory shoulder is then intended by Pindar as a birth-mark"; but it is perhaps possible to speak also of a figurative "rebirth" from the darkness of his prayer (71) and of the old age which he contemplated (82-84) to the brightness of his fame (*kleos*) at Olympia (93; see *λάμπει . . . κλέος*, 23) and the *aglaia* with which his worship is surrounded (91).

17. Finley (above, n.3) 51 speaks of "the main truth of Pelops' life" as the knowledge "that we are neither in a godless world nor can be gods, but occupy a middle ground in which, whatever the rancorous may say or however confusing the present may be, courage can receive that validation by the gods which is success and glory."

18. The number thirteen seems to have been as unlucky for the classical Greeks as for us, occurring with sinister overtones perhaps as early as Homer (e.g. *Iliad* 5.387, 10.495-6, 560-61; in *Od.* 9.195, the fateful landing on the Cyclops' island, Odysseus makes the thirteenth of the party). The thirteenth

of Gamelion was, according to Argive tradition, the date of Agamemnon's murder (see Jebb on Soph. *El.* 280ff). See A. B. Keith, s.v. "Numbers (Aryan)" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (1917) IX 409, 413; H. J. Rose, s.v. "Numbers (Sacred)" in *OCD* (1949) 614, citing Otto Weinreich, *Triskaidkadische Studien* (Giessen 1916). Thirteen seems to have had also a negative significance in the ritual calendar, deriving perhaps from the intercalated month of the lunar year; see A. Bouché-Leclercq, *L'Astrologie grecque* (Paris 1899) 460, n.1: "Dans le calendrier athénien le 13 était un jour de mauvais augure: on n'y rencontre que des cérémonies appartenant aux cultes chthoniens . . . La peur du nombre 13 viendrait plutôt du treizième mois des calendriers lunisolaires, mois vide de fêtes religieuses et comme délaissé par les dieux, abandonné par conséquent aux génies malfaisants." The choice of 13 suitors may therefore be of significance for Pindar here, for the number does not seem fixed in the tradition. Pausanias 6.21.10-11, citing Hesiod's *Megalai Eoiai* (frag. 147 Rzach) gives 16 and adds two more from another source; two of the scholia (127b, 127d) give 13, but two other scholia (127c, 127e) give 15 and 6 respectively; and the names on the lists themselves are widely divergent (e.g., only eight of the thirteen recorded in schol. 127b appear in Pausanias' list). Pindar may thus deliberately have chosen the number thirteen from a fluid tradition, perhaps following the authority of Hesiod and Epimenides if the scholion (127b, followed by Farnell II 9) is correct, but perhaps influenced also by the sinister associations of the number.

19. For the mound of the suitors and Pelops' sacrifices, see also J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, part III, "The Dying God," ed. 3 (London 1911) 104.

20. J. T. Kakridis, "Die Pelopssage bei Pindar," *Philologus* 85 (1929-30) 475ff rightly sees the "pure caldron" as referring to the older, sinister myth, which Pindar replaces, but does not completely let slip from the audience's memory: "Dann will er diese Liebe des Gottes begründen, wobei er aber Züge aus der alten Sage bewahrt . . ." (477). He also construes the *ἐπεὶ* of 26 causally so that Poseidon does not fall in love with a new-born babe (see also Wilamowitz, above, n.4, 234-235). For the double reference of the caldron see also Mezger (above, n.5) 90.

21. For Pelops' birth and false death as suggestive of an initiation ceremony, see Duchemin, above, n.15.

22. For "doing, suffering, and learning" ("Purpose, Passion, Perception") in the structure of tragedy see Francis Fergusson, *The Idea of a Theatre* (Princeton 1949) *passim*.

23. Kakridis (above, n.20) 463ff interestingly demonstrates the importance of the mythical parallel of Ganymede for Pelops in *O.*1, showing that Pindar took many elements in the Pelops story from the account of Ganymede in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite 200-217. Especially relevant here, however, is the observation that such a removal to the gods usually means immortality (so for Cephalus, Clitus, Tithonus originally, even Odysseus with Calypso, 472); and hence his dismissal back to the mortal world is an irrevocable loss of immortality: "Dass er wieder sterblich werden soll, wird besonders hervorgehoben. Das ewige Himmelsleben ist ihm verschlossen" (473). He cites also the association between Ganymede and immortality in *O.*10.104.

24. For the distinction between the worship of gods and that of heroes, see A. D. Nock, "The Cult of Heroes," *HThR* 37 (1944) 141-73, esp. 148: "When the sacrifice is a holocaust, the victims dark, not light, and the time

night rather than day, then the cult in question is usually directed to heroes or to deities of the earth or underworld, but we cannot make even this proposition universal." For the worship of Pelops as a hero see also p. 143, citing Pausanias 5.13.2-3; also the scholion on *haimakouriai* (90) cited above, n. 10, referring to the *enagismoι* proper to heroes and the dead, for which see Nock, 161-62. Frazer (above, n. 19) 104 describes the sacrifice of black rams at the cult of Pelops and the young men flagellating themselves "till the blood dripped from their backs on the ground — a sight well-pleasing to the grim bloodthirsty ghost lurking unseen below" — a picture quite different from the αἱμακουρίαὶς ἀγλααῖσι of Pelops in Pindar (90-91).

25. B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes*, ed. 2 (London 1908) 137, considers 99-100 "a bit of cheerful philosophy"; but αἰεὶ παράμερον, like the ἀμέραι ἐπὶλοιποὶ in 33, has doubtless strong connotations of the changeability and transience of human good fortune, especially as Pindar so uses the closely related ἐπάμερος with great effect in contexts emphasizing human weakness: *N*.6.6, *I*.7.40, *P*.8.95 (all, to be sure, later odes); see generally H. Fraenkel, "Ephemeris als Kennwort für die menschliche Natur," *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich 1955) 23ff. Mezger's translation (above, n. 5) 95 misses this sense by neglecting the position of αἰεὶ and mistranslating ἔρχεται: "das Glück, welches Tag für Tag immer dauert." Farnell (I 6) catches more of the ambiguity: "And the blessing that ever befallerth day by day, cometh as the highest bliss for each mortal man."

26. Farnell's translation; commenting on lines 114-115 (II 11) he refers the "Look no longer beyond" to "the world after death" and interprets the τοῦτον χρόνον in 115 as capable of meaning only "the time of this mortal life," though it might perhaps more easily refer to the immediate joy of the time of the victory and the celebration for which the ode was composed.

27. For the story of Demeter eating the ivory shoulder, see the scholia, *ad loc.* (40aff, Drachmann I 30). See also above, n. 16.

28. For the association of *charis* and the image of sweetness see, e.g., *O*.10.93-94, 97; *I*.6.50; *O*.14.5-7. This last passage is closely parallel to *O*.1.30-31 in its gnomic formulation and the linking of *charis* with success in action: the *Charites* are "the stewards of all deeds in heaven" (*O*.14.9-10); and further (5-7): "With you are accomplished the pleasant (*ta terpna*) and the sweet (*ta glykea*) for mortals, if a man is wise, beautiful, brilliant" (*sophos, kalos, aglaos*). See also *O*.9.28 and *O*.6.76 and Farnell *ad loc.* (II 46): "Here, as often, 'charis' personifies for Pindar the joy and brightness of victory in the games." See also Finley (above, n. 3) 78-79, 132.

29. There are undoubted verbal parallels in the ode linking Hieron and Pelops (aside from the general similarity of equestrian victories at Olympia), e.g., cf. κράτει δὲ προσέμειξε δεσπότην of Hieron (22) with κράτει δὲ πέλασσον and ἀγλααῖσι μέμικται (91) of Pelops; λάμπει δὲ οἱ κλέος (23) of Hieron with τὸ δὲ κλέος | τηλόθεν δέδορκε, κ.τ.λ. (93-4) of Pelops; ἀγλαῖζεται (14) of Hieron with ἀγλααῖσι (91) of Pelops. See also Mezger (above, n. 5) 96-97, who, however, somewhat exaggerates the connection.

30. The contingency of the future, in contrast with the vividness of the present (e.g., 100ff of the honoring of Hieron) is emphasized by the optative in 108, εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι.

31. There are different interpretations of ἐς χάριν τέλλεται. Farnell (I 5) translates "inure to any gratitude," J. Rumpel, *Lexicon Pindaricum* (Leipzig 1883)

s.v. *χάρις* (2a) translates *charis* here by *favor*, "Gunst," "Gefälligkeit" (pp. 482-483), and the whole phrase (s.v. *τέλλω*, 2) by *gaudio sunt* (p. 437). A. Puech, *Pindare* (Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," Paris 1922) I 30, translates rather weakly "ont quelque charme." Both interpretations "gratitude" and "joy" for *charis* are suggested by the scholia, and perhaps Pindar intended both meanings here.

32. For *charis* as the thrill of beneficent connection with the gods entering and expanding human life, see *I.6.50*, ἀδεῖα δ' ἔνδον νιν ἔκνιξεν χάρις, said of Heracles at the moment when Zeus sends an eagle in confirmation of his prayer for Telamon's future son, Ajax.

33. Finley (above, n.3) 50 speaks of the aim of the poet in *O.1* as being chiefly "to uncover the hidden through inspired insight and to reveal truths which the future will confirm, though they are concealed by the uncertainties of any present as well as by common rancor."

34. See the scholia *ad loc.*, 174a-174f (Drachmann I 54-55). The first scholion (174a) refers the expression to Pindar, but indicates its ambiguity in his defense of his interpretation "For it would not be fitting to say concerning the man being hymned, 'If good fortune fails you not,' but it is more tolerable to receive it if we construe it of Pindar." The alternative interpretation, however, referring to the ἐπίτροπος δαίμων of Hieron (106), is explicitly given in schol. 174f.

35. The image of an arrow for poetry occurs frequently in Pindar; see e.g. *O.2.83f*, 89f, and Mezger (above, n.5) 94, on *O.1.112*.

36. So Farnell II 6, who continues, ". . . for *charis* had not much to do with the story of the chopping-up of Pelops."

37. For the chronological relation between Pelops and Ganymede, see Kakridis (above, n.20) 467ff, who also suggests that Pelops may have served as the gods' cup-bearer on Olympus (pp. 465-66) since Pindar seems to draw upon the Ganymede legend for Pelops too, and hence Pelops' dismissal is correlated directly with the mention of Ganymede's coming "for the same task." His hypothesis, though well argued, is not thoroughly convincing; and though the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite may have been in part Pindar's "source" for the account of Pelops on Olympus in 35-45, it does not follow that he intended his audience to think of wine-pouring as the "task" of Pelops and Ganymede. Modern critics (see above, n.8) have tended to deplore or explain away what Pindar explicitly intended (see 25, 41, 75) as an essential element in the poem.

38. The parallel with the Homeric phrase is also noted by Kakridis, *Hermes* 63.425 (above, n.13), but he does not pursue the connection further. Pindar uses the phrase *πολιᾶς ἁλός* twice more, in *P.2.68* and *I.4.62*; see also *O.7.61-62*. For sinister associations of *πολιᾶς* see also *P.3.48*, of wounds inflicted *πολιᾷ χαλκῷ*.

39. Gildersleeve (above, n.25) 135 emphasizes the importance of *gamos* in 69ff: "Note that this triad is welded together, and moves very fast, with stress on *gamon* (v. 69, 80)."

40. The alternation of fortune dominates the myths of the Tantalids, as it does the story of their progenitor. In the only other passage in the *Epinikia* where Pindar mentions Tantalus, it is also to indicate an alternation of suffering with happiness, of darkness with light. This passage comes in the Eighth *Isthmian*, written shortly after Plataea, when Pindar's feelings were indeed a mixture of joy and pain: "We shall make public something sweet even after toil, since some god has turned aside from us the stone above the head of Tantalus . . ."

(9-11). The parallel between *O.1* and *I.8* has been noted by Josef Mesk, "Tantalos bei Pindar," *Charisteria A. Rzach* (Reichenberg 1930) 146, who suggests that the image of *I.8* was in the poet's mind when he composed *O.1*.

41. For other founding legends of Olympia and associations of the founding with war and strife (including the wrestling of Zeus with Cronos, Pausanias 5.7.10, 8.2.2) see Pausanias 5.7.9, 5.8.3ff, and generally E. N. Gardiner, *Olympia* (Oxford 1925) 54ff; J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias' Description of Greece* (London 1898) III 484-485, on 5.7.9.

42. Thus Finley (above, n.3) 119 speaks of Heracles as protecting the human world from the "harsh light" of divinity, and remarks, "As an earthly institution the games are shielded from the glare of full divinity."

43. For Heracles as a divinity of fertility and his connection with the Olympic games, see Gertrude R. Levy, *The Gate of Horn* (London 1948) 280 with nn.1-2. For the connection of the foundation of the Olympian contests with fertility ritual see also Frazer (above, n.19) 103-105; F. M. Cornford in Jane Harrison, *Themis* (Cambridge 1912) ch. 7. Also G. R. Levy, "The Oriental Origin of Heracles," *JHS* 54 (1934) 41-43, who cites an interesting passage from Iamblichus, *Vit. Pythag.* 155, naming "Zeus as the director of nurture, Herakles as the dynamic principle of growth and the Dioskouroi as the harmony of all the ingredients" (p. 45). This passage not only connects Heracles with growth and fertility, but associates him with the Dioscuri, as, of course, does Pindar in *O.3*. Duchemin also (above, n.15) 178 suggests this role of Heracles in *O.3* as "l'antique génie de la nature" or (with less likelihood) as the Pythagorean symbol of the forces of nature.

44. In the next sentence Pausanias states that Heracles brought the wild olive from the Hyperboreans, but he may not be referring to the same Heracles. See in general L. Weniger, *Altgriechischer Baumkultus* ("Das Erbe der Alten," N. F. II, Leipzig 1919) 33-34. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality* (Oxford 1921) 125ff, doubts that this association of Heracles with the Idaean Dactyls and the Great Mother goes back beyond Onomacritus, the contemporary of Peisistratus, but these associations would still be present for Pindar in the early fifth century, by which time Heracles certainly had functions associated with fertility: see also pp. 102-103, and his note b, p. 102, qualifying the view of Heracles put forth by Jane Harrison, *Themis* (preceding note) ch. 9.

45. For Heracles as *alexikakos* see Farnell, *Hero Cults* (preceding note) 151; also M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* ("Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft," ed. 2, Munich 1955) I 544 with n.4. Nilsson notes also (I 153-54) a Lindian ritual of slaying two plow-oxen to Heracles *βουθόλvas* with curses as part of an agrarian ritual. See also Farnell, 156ff.

46. For Heracles as a god of healing, see Pausanias 9.24.3; Nilsson (preceding note) I 202.

47. For the double position of Heracles see also Pindar *N.3.22* which speaks of him as *ἥρως θεός*; also Herodotus 2.44, and generally Nock (above, n.24) 142ff; Nilsson (above, n.45) I 186; Levy, "Oriental Origin" (above, n.43) 41-42.

48. See Farnell, *Hero Cults* (above, n.44) 152. Relevant here too is the initiation of Heracles into the Eleusinian Mysteries in the fifth century and the story of his underworld journeys, including the rescuing of Alcestis from the land of the dead. See Farnell, 125ff, 152-153; Levy, "Oriental Origin" (above, n.43) 48.

49. For the association of force and fertility in the ancient Indo-Iranian world, see G. R. Levy, *The Sword from the Rock* (London 1953) 16, 93, and *passim*. The book begins from the dagger-god at Yasilikaya who combines the powers of storm god with god of fertility.

50. The alternation of force and fertility is traced in ancient Near Eastern myths by Theodor H. Gaster, *Thespis* (New York 1950). He points out in the *Psalms*, for instance, the juxtaposition of prayers to God as a violent storm-god with prayers to a gentle vegetation-god (cf. *Ps.* 65: 6-9, 10-14; 68: 8-11, and generally pp. 77-78, 90-91, and ch. 5, *passim*). In Greek mythology compare, for example, the close succession of the monstrous, reptilian Phorkys and Keto in Hesiod's *Theogony* (333ff) with rivers of Tethys and Okeanos, who, with children like Peitho, "care for men with Lord Apollo" (347ff).

51. Although, as Farnell noted (II 29, on O.3.36), the Dioscuri, and especially Castor as a "noted horseman," had an altar at Olympia (Paus. 5.15.5) and "won victories when Heracles instituted the games," "there is nothing to justify Pindar's statement that the Dioskouroi had the supervision of the Olympian festival."

52. For the association of the Dioscuri with horses, see generally Farnell, *Hero Cults* (above, n.44) 177, 184, 213ff. For the beneficent functions, see his ch. 8, *passim*.

53. See Mezger (above, n.5) 176 who notes the recurrence of ἵππων in the same place in the strophe in 4 and 34, thus recalling to memory the horses, "als deren herrlichste Frucht im Eingang das olympische Kranzlied bezeichnet worden war."

54. Farnell (II 28) and Gildersleeve (above n.25) 159, however, note some connection between Artemis and horses in *P.2.9*. Homer (*Il.* 6. 205) calls her χροστήριος (cited by Gildersleeve *ad loc.* and Mezger, above, n.5, 173). Farnell, however, remarks (II 28) "It is hard to explain why Pindar chooses this epithet . . . Her association with horses is very slight"; and he cites his *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford 1896) II 450. In a hymn to the Aeginetan Aphaea, however, who has attributes similar to those of Artemis, Pindar sings of "deep-girdled Leto and the driver of swift she-horses" (frag. 80 Bowra).

55. For Artemis as the protective goddess of wild animals, especially the boar and deer, see Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (above, n.54) II 431ff, esp. 433. Also Levy, *Gate of Horn* (above, n.43) 274-75; Nilsson (above, n.45) I 483-86 and *passim*. For this aspect of Artemis in Pindar, see frag. 61 (Bowra) of the *Dithyrambs*, on which Duchemin (above, n.15) 99 remarks, "Plus qu'à la traditionnelle Artémis, fille de Létô et sœur d'Apollon, nous songerions ici à l'antique divinité, à la *potnia therôn* régnant sur les fauves, que les Crétois ont si souvent représentée." For Artemis as a goddess of birth see Plato, *Theaet.* 149b, Eur. *Hipp.* 166.

56. For Artemis in Homer see Nilsson (above, n.45) I 482 with n.3.

57. For the ambiguity of Artemis as the goddess of the wild see *ibid.* 498. Nilsson continues: "Der primitive Mensch ist zwar mit der freien Natur wohlvertraut, doch ist sie ihm mit ihren zerklüfteten Bergen, dichten Wäldern, nassen Sümpfen und mit den wilden Tieren, denen er auf seinen Jagdzügen begegnet, zugleich auch unheimlich."

58. For Artemis and springs see *ibid.* 492-93.

59. For the worship of Artemis Orthia as "eine Fruchtbarkeits- oder Baumgöttin" see *ibid.* 487-90, esp. 489.

60. Levy, *Gate of Horn* (above, n.43) 120, and cf. figs. 59–91, p. 118 (and *passim*) for the tree as the body of the goddess, its fruits her life-giving breasts, like Artemis of Ephesus. According to Nilsson, however, (above, n.45) I 497, there seems to be no trace of the many-breasted Artemis at Ephesus until the fourth century B.C. For the association of Artemis with trees see Farnell, *Cults* (above, n.54) II 429; Nilsson I 483ff, 492ff. He notes also a tree-cult of Artemis Kedreatis at Caphyae (I 210).

61. For tree cults in antiquity see *ibid.* 209–12, and esp. 211–12: “Jedenfalls hat es einen Baumkult in alten Griechenland gegeben; ich möchte sogar vermuten, dass es unter der Landbevölkerung viel allgemeiner und stärker verbreitet war, als die Zeugnisse uns vermuten lassen.” See also generally Weniger (above, n.44).

62. For the association of the tree in Pindar with fertility and life, note his image of the δένδρεον οἶνας in N.8.40ff, an ode beginning with an invocation to Hora and full of images of plant growth and fertility (e.g., 7, 9, 17a), in powerful contrast to the underlying sense of death in the myth (23ff) and the personal prayer (esp. 36, 38).

63. Nilsson (above, n.45) I 210 speaks of the Athenian olive in the Erechtheion as “ein sprechendes Beispiel des Lebensbaumes.” It is associated with the life of the community as a sign of the primal gift of civilization by the gods to men: see I 442. For the religious significance of the olive tree generally, see A. S. Pease, “Ölbaum,” *RE* 34 (1937) 2020–22.

64. The *kotinos* (wild olive) and *elaia* are usually, though not always, distinguished. Pausanias says it was the *kotinos* which Heracles brought back (5.7.7), but elsewhere (5.15.3) says that the *kotinos* from which the crowns came was called the *elaia kallistephanos* (see also below, n.91). Herodotus (5.82.2) speaks of the ἡμέρη ἐλαίη, as if *elaia* in itself could mean “wild olive.” Still the distinction is fairly well kept, and one would expect Pindar to be conscious of it in a poem where the tree is the central element in the myth. See also references below, n.91. Pease (preceding note) 2019 offers an attractively simple naturalistic explanation for the *kallistephanos* being sometimes the wild and not the domestic olive: “Wie kam es nun, dass Herakles oder die Eleer aus einem Ableger der *elaia* einen *kotinos* Baum heranwachsen sahen? Sicherlich wegen des Rückschlags der Kulturform gegen die Wildform, sobald man Kerne in die Erde steckt . . .”

65. The importance of the olive tree in the ode is emphasized by Mezger (above, n.5) 176. Gildersleeve (above, n.25) 156, hints at the beneficent associations of the olive tree, but moralizes its meaning too tritely: “The olive was a free gift of God. So is this victory of Theron. It might be dangerous to press the details. Yet it is not unGreek to say that the beauty of life is found of those who walk in the path of duty.”

66. It is perhaps noteworthy that Taygeta appears as Artemis’ favorite mountain in Callimachus, Hymn 3.188. The Dioscuri are also said to have been born “under the peaks of Taygeta” (Hom. Hymns 17.3, 33.4).

67. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung* (1906; reprint, Darmstadt 1957) 226–27, referring to the myth of Saron, a hunter who meets such an end: see Pausanias 2.30.7; A. B. Cook, *Zeus* (Cambridge 1914–25) II.1, pp. 413–14; Carl Robert, *Die griechische Heldensage* in L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie* II.2 (Berlin 1921) 451, n.4.

68. On the reconciliation of the hunter in the ode, see Wilamowitz (above, n.4) 239: “Weil eine Göttin gejagt wird, endet die Jagd in dem Göttergarten,

aber immer ist Versöhnung das Ende: der Held, der es vermocht hat, so weit zu gelangen, findet Aufnahme bei den Göttern."

Hunted stags or hinds, often with emphasis on the horns which bear a cross, appear with a transformed significance in Christian legends of saints. See E. C. Brewer, *A Dictionary of Miracles* (Philadelphia 1893) s.v. "Stag, hind"; note esp. the stories of Sts. Sorus (p. 128), Felix de Valois (323), Giles (360), Godrich (360), Hubert (282) and Placidus or Eustace (283). Hunting is important in all but the first two of these; and the last two are especially interesting in this connection, for the hunted animal, which has led its pursuer apart from his companions, turns upon him and converts him, God speaking in and through the animal ("Placidus, why persecutest thou Me?"): a "receiving" of Christ through faith replaces Heracles' reception by the goddess of the wild.

69. On Taygeta see Farnell II 27: "We may at least suppose that Pindar gives us real folklore of Arcadia or Lacedaemon in his narrative about Taügeta, she is no fictitious 'eponym' of the mountain, but a real personage in an old stratum of local myth . . . and her name is probably that of an old pre-Hellenic divinity, perhaps Artemis or one akin to her." He mentions, too, with reservations, an earlier suggestion of his (see also Robert, above, n.67, 451) that "the mysterious hind might be an animal-form of the goddess herself." This, however, is regarded as dubious by Gruppe, s.v. "Herakles," *RE* Supplbd. 3 (1918) 1038.

Also in the background may be the transfer of Olympia itself, with its olive trees and oracles, from an aboriginal earth goddess to Zeus, as in the legend of Delphi (see the prologue of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*). Excavations have confirmed the literary evidence for an early cult (probably) of Ge or Gaia: see W. Dörpfeld, *Alt-Olympia* (Berlin 1935) I 29ff, 75, and esp. 64. Weniger (above, n.44) 36ff suggests that Zeus then took over the wild olive previously sacred to Ge.

70. Wilamowitz (above, n.4) 239.

71. For the tradition of Heracles opposing Apollo for the Hind, see A. Furtwängler s.v. "Herakles" in Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* I.2 (1886-90) col. 2200.

72. This fusion of order and vitality is found too in the Dithyrambic fragments (e.g., frags. 61, 63 Bowra), where Pindar could present an orgiastic rite on Olympus (frag. 63). He could feel the full excitement of the ecstatic dithyramb (see Archilochus frag. 77D) without jeopardizing his reverence for the order and clarity of the Olympians. See especially Finley (above, n.3) 134ff; he remarks that "Pindar would not have grasped Nietzsche's sharp differentiation of Apolline order from Dionysiac excitement . . ." (134) and that Pindar does not feel a dichotomy "between a purely intelligible order and a purely chaotic vitality," but for him "the world as profusion and vitality is in accord with the world as order" (135). See also Farnell I 328-30 (on frag. 61) and his "Excursus on Pindar's Religion," I 459.

73. The scholion 52a (Drachmann I 120) discusses the problem of a doe with horns, citing Anacreon frag. 51. Further parallels are given by Aelian, *Nat. Animal.* 7.39, including Euripides frags. 857 and 740 (Nauck). Note also that in Soph. *Electra* (568ff) it is Agamemnon's slaying of a horned stag (κεράστην ἔλαφον) that incurs Artemis' anger; his fatal act is man's violation of the quiet powers of earth and nature and their goddess (even more so in Aesch. *Ag.* 135ff) which Pindar's half-divine Heracles is spared. See also Cook (above, n.67) II 465-66 and W. Ridgeway, *The Early Age of Greece* (Cambridge 1901) I

360-63, who discuss the connection of the doe with the Hyperborean land. On the hind generally, see Gruppe (above, n.69) 1037ff; Robert (above, n.67) 448ff.

74. For horns as a "fountain of energy," see Levy, *Gate of Horn* (above, n.43) 67; and 74 *passim*. Horns are well known as a symbol of fertility and strength, from palaeolithic times on: see also Cook, (above, n.67) I 506ff. For the grasping of horns (as in the Minoan bull-leaping) to draw from a "reservoir of a yet more dynamic ebullition of energy" see Levy, 229; also Cook, I 499-500: the "fertilizing force" of the bull "is gathered up and culminates in its horns, bovine horns being sometimes a synonym of strength. Any one who grasps the bull's horns *ipso facto* obtains a share in its peculiar power." Artemis, the prominently horned stag (or hind), and possibly the Hyperborean land seem to be associated together on a crater from Melos of the mid seventh century B.C. (Athens, National Museum, number 911). Here is depicted a chariot with winged horses drawing Apollo and two maidens, plausibly conjectured to be the Hyperborean maidens. In front of the chariot, to the right, stands Artemis, wearing a quiver and holding an arrow in her left hand. With her right she grasps, by its horns, a stag (or hind).

75. For gold in Pindar see above, n.12.

76. Farnell II 28; see also Gruppe (above, n.69) 1038.

77. For the significance of crowning with olive at Olympia, see Weniger (above, n.44) 38-39 (but he probably exaggerates the crowned victor's sanctity, p. 38: "Dadurch wurde der Bekränzte zum Eigentume des Gottes . . ."). See also 39: "Auch dieses Kranzeslaub entstammte im letzten Sinne der Erdgöttin. Wenn der glückliche Preisträger nach eben erlangtem Siege mit Bändern geschmückt von den Zuschauern mit Blättern beworfen wurde, so geschah das, weil das Laub eine Gotteskraft enthielt." If the wild olive tree at Olympia was first associated with the goddess Earth there and then transferred to Zeus, as Weniger suggests (pp. 36ff), this original transfer may underlie the role of Artemis in Pindar's myth of Heracles bringing the tree from the Hyperboreans. Heracles hunts her sacred animal and is received by her in the land from which he brings back the trees, also sacred to her. His transplanting the trees would be parallel to Zeus' taking over the wild olive from Ge at Olympia. In both cases the vital forces of nature and the earth, associated with aboriginal female powers, are enclosed in a Hellenic ritual where male gods predominate. The establishment of Zeus' primacy at Olympia would thus be the predecessor and prototype of Heracles' act, which itself derives from Zeus (17, 28). Pindar is usually emphatic about the domination of Zeus at Olympia: see O.2.12; O.13.24-25; N.1.13-14. For the association between Zeus and Heracles at Olympia see the opening lines of O.2 (3-4): "Pisa is of Zeus, but Heracles established the Olympian festival as the spoils of war."

78. Thus Mezger (above, n.5) 172-73 cites with approval Gurlitt's view that *σκιαρὸν . . . ἀρετῶν* (18) contains "die wirksamen Gründe der Ueberredung."

79. For the gods' beneficent gifts to man in connection with the establishment of rites in Pindar see generally Duchemin (above, n.15) 177-78: "Les célébrations cérémonielles sont toujours, aux yeux des Grecs, un bienfait divin. Qu'il s'agisse en effet de faire don aux hommes à la fois du blé nourricier et des mystères d'outre-tombe, ou d'instituer les Jeux sacrés d'Olympie ou de Pythô; il s'agit toujours pour les dieux de faire participer l'humanité à l'un des bienfaits primordiaux dont ils sont les maîtres: la vie sur la terre ou la survie après la mort . . ." For Pindar's belief in the benevolence of the gods for the righteous

see also Farnell's "Excursus on Pindar's Religion," II 471: in general, Erich Thummer, *Die Religiosität Pindars* ("Commentationes Aenipontanae" XIII, Innsbruck 1957) 19, 40-41 (discussing frag. 130 Bowra) and 11-54 for a survey of previous literature.

80. In O.8.47, also, Apollo is perhaps connected with the Hyperborean land; after building the walls of Troy with Poseidon "he hurried driving to Xanthus and the well-horsed Amazons and to the Ister." See Farnell II 64, *ad loc.* In the Ninth *Pythian* it is also Apollo and persuasion (39) which "unlock" the potential richness and fruitfulness of the nymph Cyrene's beauty: "Hidden are wise Persuasions's keys to sacred love-delights." See Finley (above, n.3) 107ff, who would interpret the god's meeting with the woman (symbolizing "privacy, earth, stillness, potentiality") as the transformation of dim, unformed potentiality into the clarity of actualization, applicable to poetry also as "the transformation of secret darkness into known and visible light" (p. 108). In discussing *P.* 9 he suggests three stages: "silent inwardness, change won through consent, and emergence into history"; it is in the second stage, "the crucial act of turning, . . . that the god is most felt" (p. 110). If this scheme were applied to O.3 the Hyperborean land would be the equivalent of the women of O.6 or *P.*9, full of potential, yet remote, still, and dark (the Hyperborean land is, in fact, associated with women, or the female element, through Artemis and the Hind and also in the worship of the Hyperborean women at Delos: see the following note). The journey of Heracles, bringing "change won through consent" (his reception by Artemis), would be the divine transforming element; and the "result" would be the planted and blooming trees at Olympia, where the once mysterious fertile power is realized as a beneficent and favoring source of life for men, embodied in the ordered norms of the ritual (the crowning) and placed within the well-defined, carefully marked-out limits of the sacred grove.

81. For the worship of the Hyperborean maidens on Delos (which may go back in some form to the Middle Cycladic period) see Nilsson (above, n.45) I 380-81; also 492ff. See also M. Mayer, s.v. "Hyperboreer" in Roscher's *Lexikon* (above, n.71) I.2, 2811-12; also Callimachus, Hymn 4, 278-99.

82. For the hind taking refuge with the Hesperidae in the Hyperborean land, see Furtwängler in Roscher's *Lexikon* (above, n.71) 2200; also Gruppe (above, n.69) 1038; Robert (above, n.67) 451, who suggests in fact that the pursuit of the hind is an older version of the search for the apples of the Hesperidae.

83. Robert (above, n.67) 451 with n.5, cites as a parallel to the story of the hind and the Hyperborean land a widespread fairy tale "in which a king's son hunting is led by a hind into a fairy land where he remains for a hundred years while he imagines that he spent only three days."

84. In I.8, however, it is the goddess who will suffer pain as a result of her contact with mortality: see 39-41. For the evening moon as marking the propitious time at the Olympian festival see also O.10.73-75: ἐν δ' ἔσπερον | ἔφλεξεν εὐώπιδος | σελάνας ἐρατὸν φάος. See also the somewhat similar language in N.6.36-38, of the time of victory at the Pythian games. Finley (above, n.3) 119 speaks of the celebration "in the summer moonlight" of O.3 as expressing the "tempered legacy" of water and gold, "the gentle act of creating shade and crowns and the stern act of instituting games."

85. In Helen, too, might be present not only the associations of beauty, but also, perhaps, of fruitfulness; she is connected with trees and vegetation (she is associated, e.g., with a plane-tree at Sparta: see Theocritus 18.39ff). See

generally Nilsson (above, n.45) I 315: "In Helena lebt wahrscheinlich die mit dem Baumkult verbundene minoische Vegetationsgöttin fort"; also I 211 with n.2, I 475-77.

86. Finley (above, n.3) 55 also notes the significant absence of the sun from the quotation in O.3 of the poem of O.1.

87. Farnell *ad loc.*, II 26, emphasizes the religious significance of ἀγνός here, denying that it can mean simply "uncorrupt" or "unbribed": "there is no example of the word in a purely secular sense; it always has a religious *nuance* even in the sense of 'chaste'." His referring of it to "the sacrosanct character of the judges," however, is perhaps still too limiting.

88. Thus Mezger (above, n.5) 176 remarks that the ode seems to serve simultaneously as a "Siegeslied" for Olympia and a "Cultuslied" for the Theoxenia. So, too, Gildersleeve (above, n.25) 154: "The Third *Olympian*, then, combines the epinikian ode with the Theoxenian hymn."

89. Farnell II 24 remarks that the Theoxenia probably fuses the ideas of one god entertaining other gods or the gods entertaining the people or the people entertaining the gods; he notes, however, that "the epithet *philoxenois* suggests that the Tundaridai were regarded as hosts"; and this is the view taken in his note in the translation, I 19: it is the festival "at which the Twin-Brethren were supposed to entertain the other deities and the people of Akragas — at Theron's expense." See also the scholion to N.7.68a "There occurs in Delphi a banquet (*xenia*) for heroes to which the god invites the heroes." See also Farnell, *Hero Cults* (above, n.44) 228.

90. For the Theoxenia as a communal meal to renew the life and vitality of the community and its natural surroundings (the "topocosm"), see Gaster (above, n.50) 30. See also Nilsson, *Griechische Feste* (above, n.67) 160ff. The Olympian festival also may have had originally some significance as renewing an eight-year cycle of fertility (hence every ninth year), which would perhaps facilitate the connection with the Theoxenia and the myth of the planting of trees. See Frazer, *Golden Bough* (above, n.19) 89ff, 103-105; but *contra* Gardiner (above, n.41) 64ff, 73-76.

91. For this olive tree (the *kallistephanos*) see the scholion O.3.60 (Drachmann I 122), also ps.-Aristotle, *Mirab. Auscult.* 51, and in general Frazer's *Pausanias* (above, n.41) III 573 (on 5.15.3).

92. For the pillars of Heracles as a symbol of the highest achievement see N.3.20-21, N.4.69, I.4.11-12 (the language of this last perhaps a recollection of O.3). Farnell II 256-57 notes that O.3 may contain the first reference to them in European literature.

93. The moral function of the poet is perhaps also hinted at in the phrase ὕμνον ὀρθώσας at the beginning (3), which could refer not only to the *nomos orthios* ("loud-ringing strain") raising a monument (Farnell, *ad loc.* II 25), but also to making a song morally "right." Characteristically, however, it is probably the first two meanings, the sense of joy and vital energy, which predominate here. Gildersleeve (above, n.25) 156 would take the word in its narrowest sense as "simply 'raising', without any side-notion of column (O.7.86) or statue (I.1.46)."

94. For the movement from present to past to present in the ode see Mezger (above, n.5) 176: "Mit grosser Kunst ist der Mythos ähnlich wie P.3 und O.7 so erzählt, dass auf drei Stufen immer tiefer in die Vergangenheit zurückgegangen wird, um zuletzt rasch wieder an den Ausgangspunkt zurückzukehren."

95. Note, too, the grammatical coordination of "crown of excellence" and "shady plant" in 18 and the setting of the Dioscuri's part at the Olympian games (37-38) between the prayer for the propitiousness of Heracles (34) and the celebration of the Theoxenia (38-41).

96. This movement and oscillation in the ode well fit H. Fraenkel's description of archaic poetry as "eher Geschehnis und Vorgang als ruhende Gestalt" (*Gnomon* 6 [1930] 19).

97. It is not altogether certain in Pindar's narrative whether one or two journeys to the Hyperboreans are intended. Most commentators say two, assuming that the first took place in the chase of the hind, and later Heracles, remembering the landscape and the trees, returned there when establishing the Olympian festival. So Farnell II 27, Mezger (above, n.5) 174, Gildersleeve (above, n.25) 159, Kakridis (above, n.20) 475-76, and Puech (above, n.31) I 50-51. That only one journey is meant is maintained by Mayer (above, n.81) 2816. Yet, with one journey, line 25 is difficult to explain: why should Heracles' "spirit" urge him forth to the land of the Ister just when he was in the midst of founding the Olympian festival — unless he had seen the trees there before (26ff). On the other hand Disen's translation of the passage (cited by Kakridis, above) which supposed two journeys makes havoc of Pindar's tenses. The verbs governed by *ἐνθα* (δέξατο, 27) and *εὔτε* (έντε, 28b) would thus refer to a time prior to the action of the founding itself, which, however, is also told in the aorist tense (except possibly for *αἶται*, 17, with the variant *αἶρεῖ* in some manuscripts; but the imperfect is supported by *ἐθαλλεν* in 23). The interpretation of *δέξατο* as a pluperfect, "also Ölbaum-Gewinnung und Hindin-Athlon zu trennen," is, in fact, accepted by Schwenn, s.v. "Pindaros," *RE* 40 (1950) 1643. The difference in time-levels is not very striking, and Pindar seems to have fused in some degree the two journeys, that for the hind and that for the trees, the milder, life-giving act replacing the violent and destructive one. The possibility of the two events being fused loosely into a single journey is perhaps supported by the parallel with Perseus' Hyperborean visit in the Tenth *Pythian*: the visit is described first (*παρ' οἷς ποτε Περσεὺς ἐδαίσατο*, 31) and later is repeated with the addition of Athena's guidance (45), but a single visit is obviously meant and is also part of the same action as the slaying of the Gorgons and the revenge on Polydectes. See Farnell, II 218-19 on *P.10.46*: "... If Perseus had slain the Gorgon and settled with Poludektes, why does he go wandering to the Hyperboreans after his task was finished? Evidently he found them, as he found the Hesperides, when he was wandering round the compass to find the Gorgons."

98. For the gods as the directors of the *telos* see, *inter alia*, *O.13.104-105*: *ἐν θεῶν γε μὰν τέλος*; *N.10.29* (to Zeus): *πάν δὲ τέλος ἐν τὴν ἔργων*; also *P.10.10-11*, 49-50; *P.9.44*; *P.1.41*; *O.8.13-14*.

See in general Farnell's "Excursus on Pindar's Religion," II 470; Thummer (above, n.79) 109, who remarks on the benevolent role of the gods in human life as follows: "Wo Tyche, Daimon, Potmos, Moira, dort ist die helfende und führende Hand Gottes im Spiel. Wo Gott, dort sind auch die 'rettende Zeit' und das Telos." For the god's concern with maintaining the moral order and harmonious peace in the universe, see, e.g., the speech of Themis in *I.8*, esp. 47ff:

"Nor let the daughter of Nereus twice put into our hands the petals of strifes . . ." thus speaking the goddess addressed the children of Cronos; and

they nodded with their immortal lids." Here they yield neither to *eros* nor *eris* (30, 32), though Norwood (above, n.11) views the poem as presenting "a blend of the moral-government idea with a conception of deities no less absorbed than men in their personal concerns." Pindar's gods do not wantonly or cruelly destroy a mortal, though their punishment for his sin can often afflict the innocent like a forest fire (*P.3.35-37*, though even here Apollo rescues Asclepius to be a healer of mankind, 40ff). Pelops in *O.1* might be regarded as such an innocent bystander. Yet the gods even attempt sometimes to recall men from their own headlong folly, like Zeus' unheeded warnings to the Seven to "spare the path" (*N.9.19-22*).

The whole question of Pindar's religious feelings and their depth has been taken up again recently by Thummer who presents a thorough (but somewhat undigested) survey of relevant Pindaric passages as well as divergent modern views. It is clear that a systematic theology should hardly be expected of him, but Thummer exaggerates somewhat the implications of Nilsson's hesitation "ob Pindar eine tiefe religiöse Natur war" (above, n.45) I 749, which Thummer takes as one pole of the modern attitude to Pindar's religious feeling. Yet Nilsson himself does admit Pindar's deep-rootedness in the traditional religion and the loftiness of his conception of the gods; see, e.g., I 748: "Pindar gehört zu den wirklich adeligen Männern, die nicht auf die angeborenen Vorrechte pochten, sondern einen edlen Sinn verlangten . . . Dies ist auch der Grund seiner bekannten Ummodelung der Mythen. Die Kritik des Xenophanes war ihm wohl kaum bekannt, dagegen verlangte die Adelsethik Anstand und Würde, und was man in dieser Beziehung von den Menschen forderte, musste man um so mehr von den erhabenen Göttern fordern." For a balanced view see again Farnell's "Excursus," esp. II 468, 470ff.

99. On Pindar's relations with the Emmenidae see Gildersleeve (above, n.25) 125-27, Puech (above, n.31) I 34, Farnell I 247-51 (on *I.2*), Finley (above, n.3) 59-60.

100. On the date of *P.3* see Farnell II 135-36 who places it in 476, the same year as *O.2* and *O.3*; but see Finley (above, n.3) 90-91: "But not surely before *P.1* of 470." Schwenn (above, n.97) 1653 dates it in 474/73. For images of violence in connection with Hieron, see Finley 81ff.

101. In dating these odes, I follow for the most part the chronology of Farnell. See also the chronological table and discussions by Schwenn (above, n.97) 1613-14, 1625ff; also Thummer (above, n.79) 55 with n.1.

102. For the sensuous richness also of *P.4*, see, e.g., the description of the dolphins in 17, the simile of "the height of crimson-flowered spring" in 64, the description of Jason in 80-92, and his prayer at the setting out of the *Argo* in 93-98, the "crimson-purple wings" of Boreas' sons in 182-3.

103. For an interesting comparison between the prayers of *O.1* and *O.6* see Kakridis *Hermes* 63.429 (above, n.13). The parallel between the two passages is noted also by Mesk (above, n.40) 146.

104. For the ambiguity of Poseidon as granting prayers for calm after suffering see also *I.4.21ff*, after a passage on the losses in war of the family of the victor: "The mover of the earth who inhabits Onchestus and the sea-bridge before the walls of Corinth . . . raises from the bed the ancient glory of illustrious deeds" (Norwood, above, n.11, 172ff, unconvincingly rejects *I.3/4* as spurious). See also *I.1.32-40*. For the closeness of Apollo to men in Pindar see Finley (above, n.3) 32.

105. For the benevolence of Zeus' drawing off the flood (O.9.49ff) and Pindar's deliberate modification of the traditional story (in which Zeus sends the flood) see Duchemin (above, n.15) 119-120. So too in O.9.57-66 Zeus lies with Protogeneia, daughter of Opus, not entirely for his own pleasure (see *ἐκαλος*, 58), but to save a noble line from dying out.

106. This divine favor despite the neglect of mortals in O.7 is paralleled in P.4 by the eventual giving of Cyrene to the Battidae even though their early ancestor, Euphemus, and his companions, the Argonauts, neglected the god-given clod of earth (cf. *τῶν δ' ἐλάβοντο φρένες*, P.4.41, with the "cloud of forgetfulness" in O.7.45 and the *phrenes*, 47).

107. The second part of *Paean* 9 (34ff) provides the life-giving balance to the destructive force of the sun in the first part: it tells of the local cult of the fountain-nymph Melia, with which a "sacred marriage" was connected (see 41-43): see Farnell, I 317-19. The eclipse is dated to 463 B.C.

108. On the connection of human life with the alternation of fallow and fertile in N.6 and N.11, see Finley (above, n.3) 73ff, esp. 75: "The effect of the law [of vicissitude] is double. It binds man's life to the sleep and darkness of Earth, yet lifts it to periodic bloom and brilliance."

109. Norwood (above, n.11) 71, with n.96, p. 231, argues that the choice of Polydeuces in N.10 is the more moving because he believes he is a mortal until Zeus tells him "You are my son . . ." (8off). This fact, if true, would heighten the dramatic effect, but not change Polydeuces' position as a divine hero taking upon himself a portion of his brother's mortality.

110. For an attempt to date O.14 later, however (to 464 instead of the usually accepted 488), see W. Theiler, "Die Zwei Zeitstufen in Pindars Stil und Vers," *Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrter Gesellschaft* 17 (1941) 271-72.

111. For the theme of simplicity in Pindar's later poetry see also *Paean* 4 (frag. 38 Bowra), esp. 46-48.

112. For the greater emphasis upon the basic relations between men, especially the relations of kinship, in Pindar's late poems see Theiler (above, n.110) 267 with n.1. He remarks, "Gegenüber der Meinung, das Leben erfülle sich in Sportsieg und Fest, tritt die Frage innerer Seelenordnung in den Vordergrund, Vorboten einer neuen Zeit, in der neue Mächte das Athletenideal zurückdrängen, das schon Pindar mehr wie einen huschenden Glanz denn als vollgewissen Besitz zu empfinden beginnt." On altruism and humane feelings in Pindar Norwood (above, n.11) 230, n.89, cites P.3.47ff (Asclepius) and N.1.62-68 (Heracles); but this serving of humanity as a whole is quite different from the deep personal feelings of N.10. Closer perhaps is the weeping of Aeson on seeing his son in P.4.120-123.

113. This translation of I.7.39-40 follows Farnell *ad loc.* II 375, in omitting the period after *φθόνος* in 39b and construing the *ὅ τι τερπνόν* clause as object of *θρασσέτω*. On such expressions of the personal experiencing of old age in Pindar's late poems, see Theiler (above, n.110) 271-72.

THE RELATION OF THE *APOLOGY OF SOCRATES*
TO GORGIAS' *DEFENSE OF PALAMEDES* AND
PLATO'S CRITIQUE OF GORGIANIC RHETORIC

BY JAMES A. COULTER

Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὔδειν, οἱ πρὸ τῶν
ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον . . .

(*Phaedrus* 267a)

ῥήτορος δὲ (ἀρετῇ) τὰληθῇ λέγειν.

(*Apology* 18a)

I

THE existence of clear verbal parallels discernible in Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* and Plato's *Apology of Socrates* raises a problem which has occasioned only little scholarly notice.¹ What is more important, it has received no really satisfactory interpretation. True, a number of scholars have recognized the imprint, both in matters of phrasing and rhetorical *topoi*, of Gorgias' *Palamedes* on the *Apology of Socrates*.² Yet, in spite of the curious implications of this presumed Platonic debt to Gorgias (curious at least in the light of Plato's attitude toward Gorgias and his rhetoric), only three scholars, Joseph Morr, Anton-Hermann Chroust, and Guido Calogero, have sought an explanation for these similarities, which are, I submit, far too precise, and, what is more important, far too pointed, in their implications to be reasonably accounted for by reference to the conventions of dicanic oratory.

In a succinct and important study, Joseph Morr³ pointed to the verbal echoes in Plato, and concluded that they are conscious allusions to the Gorgianic work; by reminding the reader, Morr argued, of an earlier account of a wise man unjustly condemned, Plato endeavored to set Socrates against the larger backdrop of myth, and to enlarge thereby the meaning of his death. Essentially the same view was held by A. H. Chroust in a later study;⁴ this scholar made a special contribution by suggesting that the conception of Palamedes as the archetype of the dishonored philosopher was already current and accessible to Plato.⁵ For Calogero⁶ the parallels suggested that Gorgias was a philosophical

mentor of Socrates, and the source of the famous doctrine, *nemo sua sponte peccat*.

A Platonic adaptation of the *Palamedes*, if it can be demonstrated, necessarily involves certain larger implications, which I shall consider at the conclusion of the present study. To this extent, Morr and Chroust were right when they sought some sort of general explanation for the similarities they had observed in the two texts. Nevertheless, Calogero, although his conclusions seem to me unacceptable, was, methodologically at least, on more secure ground when he attempted to relate the parallel elements in the two works to some problem with which the two men had, or could have had, a common intellectual concern. It is this method which I propose to follow. For I shall try to show that the *Apology* embodies a rejection *in detail* of the particular assumptions upon which the *Palamedes* was built. In fact, the polemic relationship between the two works is so intimate that one may justly call the *Apology*, at least on one level of its complex meaning, an *Anti-Palamedes*.

Now, the proposition that the *Apology* represents, at least on one level of its meaning, an effort to subject one of the works of a leading Sophist to a fundamental critique by means of an adaptation with polemic intention is not in itself surprising in view of what we are otherwise familiar with in Plato's literary treatment of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors.⁷ Moreover, the work we are discussing, apart from the notion of formal imitation, is marked by clear contrasts which Plato has Socrates draw between his own activities and those of the Sophists and rhetors.

The passage which most explicitly focuses this antithesis is 19d-20c, where Socrates unambiguously distinguishes himself from those teachers who make a claim to wisdom, and who impart this commodity for a fee. There is an ironic implication throughout that the claims to wisdom of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias are more than a little naïve and unfounded. In another passage (31d-e) Socrates declares that he purposely avoided an active role in politics because such participation would have involved a serious compromise of his beliefs; the necessary implication is that those who are active in politics continue successful and unscathed only because they gratify the whims of the *demos*. Among these, the rhetors are certainly to be numbered. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the rhetors are not the only ones alluded to here, since the Sophists⁸ also took an active part in Greek political life.

So unambiguous a position on the part of Socrates toward the activities of the Sophists and rhetors, and what we otherwise know of

Plato's estimation of the value of Gorgianic rhetoric, of which the *Palamedes*, as I shall show, is a major exposition, suggest the necessity of rejecting out of hand any hypothesis that Plato used the *Palamedes* for the purpose of imparting dignity and significance to Socrates' death. So sympathetic a use of the Gorgianic work would in fact imply a kind of approbation — a notion which we cannot accept without also assuming a striking lack either of consistency or integrity in Plato's philosophical position. Morr was perhaps aware of this disquieting implication of his thesis, since he took pains to emphasize what is perhaps the only favorable explicit estimate (*Meno* 76c) of Gorgias' intellectual accomplishments in the Platonic corpus — a complimentary account of a theory of color which the Leontine philosopher had worked out.⁹

Nevertheless, despite the fair assumption of the inappropriateness of a sympathetic Platonic reworking of the *Palamedes*, it is still true that the *Apology of Socrates* contains a good number of passages which exhibit surprising and apparently more than accidental similarities to passages in the *Palamedes*. It must first be noted, however, that many of the examples recorded by the scholars whom I mention above are far from convincing, since they can easily be explained by the fact that the two defenses are quite similar in their general character. Among other things, both are delivered by defendants with a reputation for wisdom in reply to accusations which are, in part, attributable to envy. Accordingly, we should not be surprised if we read that both men are called σοφοί (*Pal.* 25 and *Ap.* 18b) and εὐεργέται (*Pal.* 30 and *Ap.* 36c), or that the accusation arises from φθόνος (*Pal.* 3 and *Ap.* 28a). How else, one asks, could Plato have expressed these notions? Such criticisms aside, there are still a number of verbal correspondences so striking, whether considered separately or, more impressively, as a group, that no student of the *Apology* can, in my opinion, afford to ignore them unless he is also willing to forgo the understanding of an important dimension of the work's meaning. Before discussing what I consider to be the significance of these verbal similarities, however, I should like first to catalogue the passages in the two works which seem to me most important in this respect. Furthermore, in order to emphasize the contextual importance which these passages appear often to have, I shall incorporate them into a short analysis of the *Palamedes* and give, in each case, the parallel passage from the *Apology* for the purpose of comparison.

The structure of the *Palamedes* is fortunately straightforward and perspicuous and may easily be represented in summary outline:

I. *Prologue* (1-5) The question here is not death, since all men must die; my honor is at stake. If Odysseus made this charge on the basis either of conjecture or sure knowledge, he is to be commended; but if it was prompted by evil or villainy, he is the most wicked of men. However, I *know* that I didn't commit this crime, and am thus certain that Odysseus is not relying on sure knowledge. He is therefore relying on conjecture, and I shall endeavor to show you that such a conjecture is unreasonable.

II. *Refutation* (6-27)

A. *Argument* (6-21)

1. (6-12) Granted that I did *want* to communicate with the enemy, it would have been *impossible*.

2. (13-21) Granted that it was *possible* to communicate with the enemy, why should I have *wanted* to?

(15) Some will say money prompted me. But this is not applicable to me, since I am not a slave to pleasure and do not need a large fortune.

ὥς δ' ἀληθῆ λέγω, μάρτυρα πιστόν παρέξομαι τὸν
παροιχόμενον βίον

With this Gomperz¹⁰ compares

ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα
ὥς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τῇ πενίᾳ (Ap. 31c)

(20) You can't think that I planned to go over to the barbarian side after my betrayal of the Greeks. What kind of life should I have there?

(21) For a man who has lost his reputation for honesty and trustworthiness (*πίστις*) cannot live a happy life.

βίος δὲ οὐ βιωτὸς πίστεως ἐστερημένω.

Gomperz¹¹ compares

ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ . . . (Ap. 38a)

B. *Interrogation of the Plaintiff* (22-27) The plaintiff is irresponsible. His accusation is self-contradictory.

(26) You accuse me, in effect, of being both wise and foolish at the same time.

οὐκοῦν δι' ἀμφοτέρα ἂν εἴης ψευδής.

Gomperz¹² compares,

ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδῃ. (Ap. 25e)

III. *Address to the Judges* (28–36) Is it likely that a man such as I could have committed a crime of this nature? I have always tried to help you. I have, in fact, been your benefactor. In other respects, too, I deserve not to suffer at your hands.

(32) οὐθ' ὑπὸ νεωτέρων οὐθ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρων

Morr¹³ compares,

εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος (Ap. 33a)

Chroust¹⁴ also compares,

καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ (Ap. 30a)

and

καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους (ibid.)

(Ibid.) I have not harmed the aged, and have helped the young.

τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσιν οὐ φθονερός, τῶν δυστυχούντων οἰκτίρμων

Morr¹⁵ compares,

καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, . . (Ap. 33b)

(34) I will not use the customary methods which are designed to arouse pity. You must consider the facts.

ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ . . . , μηδὲ τὸν ὀλίγον χρόνον τοῦ πολλοῦ
σοφώτερον ἡγεῖσθαι κριτήν, μηδὲ τὴν διαβολὴν κτλ.

With this Gomperz¹⁶ compares,

ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ
ἔσχετε ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. (Ap. 19a)

(36) If you kill me unjustly your crime will become known to all.

καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν φανεράν ᾧ πᾶσιν ὑμεῖς ἔξετε τῆς ἀδικίας, . . .

Gomperz¹⁷ compares,

ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν . . . ὥς Σωκράτῃ ἀπεκτόνατε, . . .
(Ap. 38c)

IV. *Conclusion* (37) This is my defense. A summary is appropriate only when one is addressing inferior judges. For you, the first men of Greece, this is not needed.

It will be noted first of all that the verbal correspondences in the section devoted to an Address to the Judges are much less striking than

those found in the Refutation. Nevertheless, I have decided to include them for two reasons. First, it is precisely this section which contains the most impressive parallels in the matters of arrangement and *topoi* of argument. Accordingly, although the verbal allusions in Plato listed for this section might have little independent significance, the fact that most occur in a section which is in another respect so reminiscent of the corresponding portion of the *Palamedes* will perhaps justify their inclusion. Secondly, the contrast between young and old, rich and poor, which is found in *Palamedes* 32 and paralleled in the *Apology*, is certainly a commonplace. It is striking, however, that both of these antitheses, in the same order and in equally close conjunction, occur in the two works. This consideration is, I think, much less suggestive of the merely accidental.

It should first be pointed out that previous examinations of the verbal parallels in the *Apology* and the *Palamedes* have been little more than lists such as we have above in which similarities in diction in the two works are confronted. However, the real impressiveness of these similarities has been overlooked because of a failure to examine their relevance to the total meaning of the two works. After a brief discussion of such comparative lists, scholars have drawn the general conclusion that the *Palamedes* was in some way used by Plato in the composition of his *Apology*.¹⁸ But it is surely not enough merely to list verbal similarities, and then straightway offer some hypothesis to explain them. For despite those cases in which passages are strikingly parallel with regard to both diction and special context, the hypothesis of Platonic borrowing cannot easily be confirmed to the satisfaction of a critic of this view. A reasonable and convincing proof must first be given that the *Apology* represents more than a conglomerate of quotations from the *Palamedes*, and that there was in fact some very good motive for imitating the work of Gorgias.

II

In the matter of the general outline of the two speeches some remarks should be made. First, if one analyzes these two works, using the traditional terminology for the divisions of the dicanic speech, one is struck by the fact that each work contains a combination of several features which makes it unusual in the body of conventional courtroom oratory, and that, further, this same combination of features is common to both.¹⁹ What impresses one first is the absence of the normal sequence, *prooimion* — (*prothesis*) — *diegesis* — *pistis* — *epilogos*. In these two

works, after a short *prooimion*, and in the case of Socrates' defense, a *prothesis* necessitated by the dual nature of the accusation, each speaker immediately embarks on his *pistis*, or refutation. In both the *diegesis* of the usual sort is absent.²⁰ Moreover, the refutation is handled by each speaker in a distinctly similar manner. Palamedes first shows that according to all considerations of probability an accusation of the nature that Odysseus has brought against him is impossible to conceive of; then, in his interrogation of Odysseus, he points out, while casting doubt on Odysseus' honesty, that the indictment contains two elements which are mutually inconsistent. Socrates, in like manner, presents a defense which is bipartite in its structure. In the first portion, Socrates informs the jury of the innocent nature of his pursuits, and draws reasonable inferences about the origins of the widespread prejudices which were the ultimate basis for the accusations of the plaintiff; in the second part, a refutation of the plaintiff, Socrates demonstrates to Meletus and to the jury that the two parts of the accusation,²¹ considered logically, cancel each other out, and that Meletus knows this as well as anyone. From a formal point of view, then, each defense has been conceived along similar lines. The difference of *method* discernible in the first portion of the *pistis* is a matter of importance which cannot, however, be discussed now.

The *pistis* is in each case followed by a long and earnest address in which the defendant urges the jury to consider the moral implications of its actions — to consider, in fact, the face they will make in the world for having sentenced to death a wise man and benefactor of their society. In the *Palamedes* the statement that the Greeks will gain an evil name for having voted for the defendant's condemnation occurs before the vote; in the *Apology*, such an unhappy outcome for the good name of the Athenians is the necessary implication of Socrates' frank estimate of the valuable service he has rendered Athens under the inspiration of the god Apollo, although the explicit declaration of this unfortunate prospect cannot occur until the final section of the speech. A further element in the section following the *pistis* which links the two works is the high moral tone with which the defendant rejects the humiliating role of suppliant.²² Both Palamedes and Socrates rise to the level of a man who is haled into court unjustly and refuses to see the jury in whose hands he is placed belittle themselves by dispensing mercy in such mean circumstances; both assume remarkable responsibility for the scruples of their potential persecutors.

These observations, however, give us a hint of similarities which exist only in the broad outlines of the two speeches. A closer examination of

detail will suggest further and more precise relationships. Striking similarities in detail may be discerned in the *erotesis*, or interrogation of the plaintiff; in the *Palamedes* this is contained in sections 22–26, in the *Apology*, 24b–28a. An *erotesis* incorporated into the text, although rare, is nevertheless found in three of the Attic orators.²³ But the interrogations contained in the speeches of Plato and Gorgias are different from these other examples both in their length and in their elaboration. And what is more important, in addition to their special character in contrast to these examples, they also exhibit clear similarities to each other, especially in their use of rhetorical *topoi*.

Both defendants employ an extremely clever *topos* to undermine the claims of the plaintiff to serious consideration: there is the possibility, they suggest, that any accusation which contains so many contradictory elements is the work of a man not entirely to be taken seriously. Palamedes exclaims (25), "How can we have confidence in a man who discussing the same subject with the same man on the same occasion yet makes statements which contradict each other?" Socrates, in a characteristic manner, makes the wry suggestion that Meletus in making an accusation which is so illogical is "really joking with a straight face" (*Ap.* 24c).

There is another *topos* of argument employed by both defendants, in which the conclusions, phrased in a way which would be extraordinarily similar in any case, are in the face of the identical contexts strongly suggestive of conscious borrowing on the part of one of our authors. In the *Palamedes* (25–26), the speaker sums up the accusation and makes his refutation in the following manner: I stand accused, he says, of having tried to betray my fatherland in a manner which necessarily involved a good deal of cleverness (*sophia*). In the terms of your accusation, I may therefore be described as a clever traitor. But, treason is folly (*moria*), so that you are accusing me of possessing two qualities which cannot coexist in the same person, *viz.*, cleverness and folly. Therefore, since this combination of qualities is impossible, I either acted in accordance with this cleverness which you attribute to me, and did not attempt to betray Hellas; or, I did attempt treason; but then I could not possess the cleverness which you represent to the jurors. "Therefore, because of either statement (i.e., if either is true) you are proved to be a liar (i.e., in your accusation that I am a clever traitor)." The Greek of the last sentence is,

οὐκοῦν δι' ἀμφοτέρω ἀν' εἷς ψευδής.

In precisely the same manner Socrates endeavors to disprove the

accusation that he corrupted the Athenian youth with full knowledge of his actions. After an identical line of argument he concludes (25e): "Either I did not corrupt knowingly; or, if I did, it was done without my desire."

ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδῃ.

III

Further, in the self-portraits which we find in these two works there are three *topoi* which both speakers use in common in their efforts to characterize their lives as altruistic and, above all, innocent. Both defendants first of all emphasize the fact that they are men of wisdom (or, at least in the case of Socrates, so reputed by their contemporaries); secondly, that their wisdom has enabled them to bestow great benefits on society; and, lastly, that their material possessions are rather less ample than most of their fellows.

If we consider first the claims of Palamedes and Socrates to the roles of wise man and benefactor, we observe that, although the *topoi* are identical, as was the case in the sections previously discussed, there is now a clear difference in the manner in which these *topoi* are employed by each speaker. We find that Socrates' characterization of the wisdom which he allows that he possesses, and of the benefits which this wisdom has permitted him to bestow on society, involves more modest pretensions than is the case with Palamedes.

The defendant in Gorgias' speech, in a characteristic argument from probability, points to the absurdity of assuming that he had attempted the betrayal of Greece (or done anything else for that matter) for the sake of gaining honor and esteem. Why should he have? "For I was honored by the most honorable men for the most honorable pursuits — by you, for wisdom." (16). There is no hint here, as there is with Socrates, that there is a disparity between the sense in which he is deemed wise by the multitude and the sense in which he personally accepts this designation. Palamedes' reputation is securely anchored to the popular conception of the wise man as clever and inventive, and it is to this conception that he frankly appeals in the final section (30) of the speech where he recalls the many contributions which he has made to the material and intellectual advances of Greek society.

In contrast to this rather ample catalogue which constitutes the substance of Palamedes' claims to σοφία and εὐεργεσία, Socrates advances

the suggestion that he may indeed have a right to that sort of modest wisdom which befits an ordinary mortal, but certainly to nothing more (20d; cf. also 23b). Like Palamedes, Socrates declares that this wisdom has enabled him to bestow important benefits on society. But, unlike Palamedes, who details the many *positive* achievements which have made him illustrious (achievements which we may be sure would have left the Platonic Socrates quite unimpressed), Socrates takes great pains to point out that the good services which he has done the Athenian state are the product of a negative criticism which is merely a necessary preliminary to genuine wisdom. Socrates repeatedly says that his wisdom consists merely in the fact that he knows that this wisdom is worth nothing, or practically nothing. His chief benefit to Athenian society, viewed in this light, is to have shown to those of its members who have a pre-eminent claim to wisdom that they are really ignorant of those important matters which they profess.

We may now proceed to an examination of the third *topos* which both Socrates and Palamedes employ to fill out the picture they present to the jury of the wise and abstinent man — the *topos* of meager means, of *penia*. Both Palamedes and Socrates see in the modest circumstances of their lives a means of disproving some part of the accusation against which they are defending themselves. For Palamedes, who again bases his argument on considerations of probability, any suggestion that he initiated a plot to betray the Greeks to the barbarians because of a desire for wealth is clearly absurd. He reminds the jury that his means, although moderate, have always been quite sufficient for his desires, which are also moderate. Furthermore, he has never sought fame and public esteem from a display of wealth. "My life is my witness!"

ὥς δ' ἀληθῆ λέγω, μάρτυρα πιστὸν παρέξομαι τὸν
παροιχόμενον βίον

(15)

Socrates likewise makes use of his humble means to disprove an implication which the popular conception of him as a Sophist would necessarily involve. The Sophists receive payment for their instruction; Socrates denies emphatically that this has ever been true in his case. Even Meletus has not dared to utilize this element in his slanderous indictment.

ἵκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα
ὥς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

(31c)

Apart from the unimportant matter of word-order, the phrases are virtually identical. The only difference is the substitution, in two cases,

of synonymous, or equivalent, phrases (i.e. *ικανόν* for *πιστόν*, and the specific *τὴν πενίαν* for *τὸν παροικχόμενον βίον*).

These substitutions are not without significance. We ought first, however, to observe that, as in the case of the handling of the *topoi* of *sophia* and *euergesia*, an important point of difference can be discerned in the treatment of this *topos* too. The crucial distinction in Palamedes' account is focused in the word *μέτρια*; he is not rich, to be sure, nor has he ever needed wealth to satisfy his modest desires; but he is not, on the other hand, poverty-stricken for

χρήματα μὲν μέτρια κέκτημαι. (15)

With Socrates the case is quite different. In the first section of the *Apology* he also refers to the well-known fact of his poverty; in that instance, however, to show that because of his service to the god he had not only neglected to tend to affairs of the state, a fact for which he had been bitterly reproached; he had also failed to take any care of private matters, to such an extent, indeed, that the only apt description for the state of his life was *πενία μυρία* (23c).

At this point I suggest that the similarities we have observed are to be accounted for by the assumption that they are the result of a conscious reworking of the *Palamedes* by Plato. But what is Plato's purpose here? Why, indeed, would Plato rework Palamedes' assertion in order to emphasize the differences between Socrates' profession of absolute poverty and Palamedes' rather tepid protestations? The explanation, I submit, lies in the words which make up the last portion of Socrates' statement. "I live in incredible poverty," he says "*because of my service to the god.*" With Palamedes, it should be observed, the three *topoi* we have been discussing are used merely as fodder for arguments from probability. In the case of Socrates however, his great poverty, his reputation for wisdom, and his activities as benefactor of Athens, are all viewed primarily as the consequences of the special role to which the oracle of the god of Delphi has led him. "My poverty is great," Socrates is saying, "because I have neglected my own and the city's affairs in order to carry out the god's command in the sense that I understand it. I am the wisest of men because I know that human wisdom, when compared to that of the god's, is worth nothing. I am a benefactor of Athens because in my examinations of her leading citizens — an examination prompted by the god's oracle — I have uncovered their ignorance so that they are now in a position to begin to acquire real wisdom."

IV

In a courtroom defense the essential problem is the refutation of the plaintiff's accusation. In view of this, it is not surprising that the differences which were implied in the treatment of *topoi* in the two speeches should find their clearest expression in the point of view from which each defendant considers the difficulties of his defense. It should be made clear from the start, however, that the manner of refutation which we find in Plato's *Apology* is by no means a mere technical variation of the rhetorical procedures employed in the *Defense of Palamedes*. Rather, as I shall attempt to show, it is a conscious and thoroughgoing criticism of the philosophical outlook which is implied (or which to Plato seemed to be implied) by the rhetorical methods which Palamedes uses in his defense against the charges of Odysseus. But what is this outlook?

I ought perhaps to begin by observing that in the composition of the *Palamedes* only those elements of the myth which have set the trial in motion are alluded to by Gorgias, whereas details which are found in other versions of the story are omitted. Indeed, only two facts are introduced: that Odysseus has charged Palamedes with having attempted to betray his fellow Greeks to the Trojans, and that for this allegation Odysseus has offered no proof whatsoever. This latter state of affairs is effectively underscored by the omission of any reference to the letter, allegedly from Priam, which Odysseus planted in Palamedes' tent.²⁴ Because of this, Palamedes, in his examination of Odysseus' charge, is forced to offer conjecture in his search for possible explanations for Odysseus' behavior (3). Either Odysseus *knows* (ἐπιστάμενος) that I am guilty of treason, or he has *surmised* (δοξάζων) it from good evidence. In either case, his accusation can be construed as evidence of patriotism. The other alternative is that he does not have certain knowledge of my betrayal, and that he has no good reason to conjecture such an action on my part. If this alternative is true, the plaintiff has concocted the accusation from motives of envy and villainy. It should be noted that at the very beginning of the defense the familiar and important distinction between *doxa* and *aletheia* is introduced.²⁵ This must be emphasized, because, as we shall see, it is precisely in the application of these concepts to the dicanic context that the heart of the difference between Gorgias and Plato lies.

In the fourth chapter of the *Palamedes*, the defendant makes the first of several statements concerning the difficulties and perplexities which must originate from an accusation of the kind which Odysseus

has so recklessly instituted. Palamedes' words are important, and should be quoted in full: "Where shall I begin my discussion of these matters? What shall I say first? To what point in my defence shall I turn? For an accusation unsupported by proof causes in me a state of manifest perplexity, and because of this perplexity I must necessarily be at a loss with regard to my defense, unless I learn something from the truth itself and the present necessity, teachers more dangerous than resourceful (i.e. more likely to lead me on a *perilous* course than to provide me with the *means* to safety)."

"The truth itself" means here, of course, "the facts of the matter." But what is "the present necessity"? This surely means the "demands of the present situation," or "the necessity of defending myself at this place and at this time."²⁶ Compare here the passage (32) where Palamedes apologizes to the jury for indulging in self-praise: "To be sure, it is not my place to praise myself. *But* the present situation has compelled me to do even this (ὁ δὲ παρὼν καιρὸς ἡνάγκασε καὶ ταῦτα), to defend myself in every way possible now that I stand accused."

More important, however: Why are these two "teachers" more likely to involve Palamedes in danger than to provide him the means with which to extricate himself? And why is it only these two that he mentions? To take the first question, and the phrase αὐτῇ ἢ ἀλήθεια, let us recall the passage in Chapter 33 where Palamedes disclaims all intention of persuading the jurors with tears and lamentations to vote for his acquittal. He adds that he will tell them exactly how it happened (διδάξαντα τᾷ ἀληθείᾳ) — "a procedure in accord with what is most manifestly just." This profession does not mean, however, that in Palamedes' opinion a straightforward narration of the truth will insure an acquittal. For Palamedes is still anxious, and the next two chapters are full of exhortations to the members of the jury. They are urged not to pay more heed to words than to facts, nor to give greater weight to the charges than to the refutation, nor to consider a short space of time a "wiser judge" than a long period of deliberation, nor, finally, to think the accusation more to be believed than their own experience of the matter. In terms of the Gorgianic formulation, the jury should pay more heed to *aletheia* than to *doxa*, especially since by voting for Palamedes' condemnation they will involve themselves in the irreparable ignominy of having executed an innocent man. The point is made even clearer further on (35), when Palamedes advises the jury to prolong their deliberation, and to form a verdict in accordance with the truth of the matter (μετὰ δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν κρίσιν ποιήσατε).

And so, although Palamedes considers a truthful narration of events

the most just procedure in a courtroom defense, he is not for that reason deluded about the uncertainty which attends its use. He has clear awareness of the power of *doxa* in human affairs, and for this reason he anxiously urges the jury to give lengthy consideration to the question before them. It is in this sense, I submit, that "the truth itself" is a "teacher more dangerous than resourceful." As Palamedes says (35), "If it were possible that the facts of this case could become clear and palpable to my audience through my words alone, the verdict would be easy to arrive at (εὐπορος) from what has been said" (with εὐπορος cf. πόριμος of 4, which was used as the opposite term to ἐπικίνδυνος). A clear presentation of the facts of the matter, however, does *not* insure belief, and so it is one source of Palamedes' apprehension.

We may now inquire why ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη is a risky and difficult "teacher" in Palamedes' perplexity. The text does not offer as full a development of this theme as is the case in the discussion of the dangers implicit in the use of *aletheia*. We may nevertheless form some tentative conclusions in this matter on the strength of several hints in Gorgias' exposition. First, however, there is the common-sense observation that any defendant must of necessity consider as perilous a situation in which he is constrained to defend his life in a short space of time before a body of men who have nothing to base their verdict on save the conflicting claims of the plaintiff and the defendant. To repeat here the more despairing aspects of Palamedes' discussion of the role of αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια in a defense of one's life: there is always the risk that *doxa* may prevail, unless enough care and circumspection are observed, since the defendant is dealing with a highly volatile part of the human mind. And if, as Palamedes says, he cannot rely on words alone to communicate the true facts of the matter (cf. 35), the consequence is that the defendant is faced, if he is to save his life, with the necessity of producing an *impression* of the truth which will lead to his acquittal. It is a reflection of this necessity, and of the procedures consequent upon it that ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη is to be understood. The term is intended by Gorgias to mirror the compulsion laid upon the defendant to rely on techniques of proof designed to create the impression of truth. And let us remember that arguments based on probability, so abundant in this work (*vid.* 9, εἰκός, where this technique is given its name), are a major species of this type of proof. That this is the sense of the term in the context of the *Palamedes* is made clear, I think, by a passage already quoted above. Palamedes apologizes for having to praise himself with such frankness (32). He has been compelled, however, by the present situation (ὁ δὲ παρὼν καιρὸς ἡνάγκασε). It is clear why he has chosen

this particular line of proof. It is intended, with its long catalogue of benefits bestowed upon the Greeks, to make it seem impossible that he could have committed the crime of which he had been accused. His self-praise is to serve, he says, as a sign (σημείον, 31), which would point to the impossibility of his guilt.

There is, thus, some reason to believe that the two terms, ἀντὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια and ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη, represent a special application to a didactic context of the antithesis *aletheia-doxa*. *Ananke*, then, is the special constraint imposed upon the man who must defend his life, and who has not the sure means of representing in objectively convincing terms the fact that the plaintiff's accusation is untrue. Such a man must therefore foster in his listener's mind the subjective impression (*doxa*) that the claim that he makes is true. This is the reason why Palamedes calls ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη a "teacher more dangerous than resourceful."

In summary, a defendant unjustly accused and on trial for his life must take two things into consideration: his personal and certain *knowledge* that he is innocent of the charge, and the *necessity* of convincing the jury that this is so. Now, although Palamedes states that *aletheia* is more conducive to belief than *doxa*, he is at the same time aware that it is not always possible to make the truth of the matter immediately obvious to his listeners. Accordingly, there must be a second "teacher" to direct him in his perplexity, and this "teacher" is the ineluctable necessity of persuading the jury of his innocence, even if this must be done by means of arguments based on *doxa*. And so, although Palamedes concedes the absolute superiority of truth (or, at least concedes that it will prevail in due time), he nevertheless grasps the fact that in this contest for his life he is compelled to recognize the unique demands (cf. ἀνήκεστα, 34) of his situation. For, unlike Socrates, Palamedes believes that it lies within the power of the jury to do him real and irreparable harm (cf. 2). Both teachers, then, are dangerous. But why does Palamedes turn to no others but these two? The answer is clearly that there can be no others, for *doxa* and *aletheia*, of which they are but the special manifestations, are, for Gorgias, the only two modes of comprehension available to man.

With regard to the defense, we may say, moreover, that the "teacher" who exercises the more potent influence on Palamedes is ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη. A clear indication of this fact is that Palamedes, for the most part, has not chosen to wait and see if the jury will give their verdict long and thoughtful consideration, and make their decision "in accordance with the truth." He has instead devoted the greater part of his defense to the aim of engendering in the minds of his listeners the

impression that on all grounds of *probability* it is utterly unlikely that he would have been able in the first place to effect a betrayal; and, granted that he had been able, that he would conceivably have wished to do so. There is, moreover, reflected in the diction of the *Palamedes* a sense of pervasive anxiety. Always mindful of the fact that the one outcome involves an "irreparable" act, Palamedes emphasizes repeatedly the difficulties and uncertainties of the mechanism of persuasion and belief. Indeed, in the ten chapters of the speech where *πείθω* and words of the same root (*πιστός*, etc.) are found, these words occur twenty-three times.²⁷ Despite a clear apprehension of these difficulties, however, Palamedes is nevertheless compelled to employ, as the chief instrument of his defense, arguments based on probability. For although Palamedes may concede that under certain conditions truth has a greater power than opinion to engender persuasion, he nevertheless shows us by the style of his defense that in the exigencies of the moment the demands of "present necessity" must be the more deferred to.

V

This, if I am correct, is the philosophical position which forms the basis of Gorgianic rhetoric. Plato, in his *Gorgias*, as we know, subjected rhetorical doctrines which he attributed to Gorgias to a detailed criticism. In the following section I shall attempt to show how, in its essential features, the elements of this criticism answer to those which we have found in our analysis of the rhetorical outlook of the *Palamedes*. By thus pointing out an identity with the main features of Gorgianic rhetoric as set forth in the *Palamedes*, I hope to establish beyond reasonable doubt Plato's familiarity with the concrete features of this rhetoric. Although this familiarity may seem an obvious fact, I have chosen to investigate it in order to strengthen the probabilities of my hypothesis that there exists between the *Apology* and *Palamedes* a conscious connection, already suggested by the verbal parallels we have examined above. Moreover, by emphasizing the existence of this *explicit* critique of the rhetoric of Gorgias, I hope to proceed more securely to an exposition of my thesis that the *Apology* is, in one of its aspects, an *implicit* critique of this same rhetoric.

Before turning to the *Gorgias*, however, let us look in passing at the *Phaedrus*, since it contains a passage which is relevant to the present discussion. The long, ironic catalogue (265d-268e) in which Socrates gives the reader a sketch of the "accomplishments" of the students of *techne rhetorike* contains an account (267a) of the theories of Gorgias

and Tisias in which are found the lines quoted at the beginning of this study. Socrates says, "And shall we pass over Tisias and Gorgias who considered that the probable was more to be esteemed than the true?" (οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὥς τιμητέα μᾶλλον). In the light of our analysis of Gorgias' point of view, as evidenced in the *Palamedes*, this observation is seen to be in large measure correct. Of course, if it is taken in its strict sense, without further qualification, it contains something of a misrepresentation. For we have seen how Palamedes, although he tends in the exigencies of the courtroom to prefer arguments from probability, nevertheless freely grants the primacy of truth in producing persuasion (24). Accordingly, Plato's remark should have been modified by some indication that this preference of Gorgias obtained only in certain conditions. To be just, however, Socrates is talking about theories of rhetoric which were for the most part devised for use in dicanic oratory. Nevertheless, the remark, scornful in character, and just correct enough, should probably be viewed either as a distortion or as the expression of a misunderstanding natural enough in view of the antagonism which Plato felt for this kind of rhetoric.

Let us, however, turn to the *Gorgias* and the more cogent evidence which it contains. The passage which is relevant here is a dialogue of Socrates with Gorgias (454c-461b), containing an elaborate analysis of the art of persuasion, in which Plato introduces philosophical distinctions of great importance for his criticism of Sophistic rhetoric.

In the first section (454c-454e) of this lengthy analysis, Socrates sets up a distinction which is the foundation for his later rejection of Gorgianic persuasion on the grounds that it involves an inferior faculty of the mind. At the very beginning of their discussion, Socrates has Gorgias concede that "to have learned something" (μεμαθηκέναι) and "to have believed something" (πεπιστευκέναι) are two entirely different matters; or, to put in substantival rather than verbal terms, *mathesis* is different from *pistis*. (This distinction implies another, that of *episteme* vs. *doxa*, an implication realized in the case of the latter term shortly afterward.) An important addition to this distinction is made when both speakers agree that, whereas *pistis* may be either true or false, *episteme* is never anything but true. At this point the notion of persuasion is introduced with the observation that it is proper to describe both those who have learned and those who have believed as "persons who have been persuaded." Socrates brings this portion of the argument to a close with an attempt at a formulation which will summarize the conclusions which have been agreed upon up to that point. "Let us posit two forms of rhetoric: one imparts belief which has no

basis in certain knowledge; the other imparts knowledge." Socrates then asks Gorgias pointedly to what form of persuasion a rhetoric ought to be assigned which deals with questions of right and wrong in large public gatherings such as, among other things, *law courts*. Gorgias obliges Socrates by indicating that it is a species of that kind of persuasion which produces belief that is without sure knowledge. After this important feature of Gorgianic rhetoric has been agreed upon, the remainder of the discussion is devoted to an examination of the implications of this agreement. In 455a these two εἶδη of persuasion receive their definitive nomenclature: one is called *πειθὼ πιστευτική*, the other *πειθὼ διδασκαλική*. Put in another way, the business of the rhetorically trained speaker is not to instruct members of law courts, or other public gatherings, on matters of right and wrong; he need only implant a certain belief about these matters. He must be *πειστικός*, not *διδασκαλικός*.²⁸

I should here like to argue that the two forms of persuasion enunciated by Socrates in this discussion bear a very close resemblance to the methods of those two "teachers" whose guidance forms the basis of the rhetorical outlook of the *Palamedes*. That Palamedes in those sections where he relies heavily on arguments from probability is following the procedures of *πειθὼ πιστευτική* is obvious. It may seem at first sight, however, an unjustifiable procedure to connect *πειθὼ διδασκαλική*, which in the *Gorgias* is defined as the form of persuasion which *instructs* law courts and large assemblies on questions of right and wrong, with *αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια*, which simply means in the *Palamedes* "the facts of this particular case." Several considerations, however, may make this connection more likely. First of all, it seems that by large assemblies Plato does chiefly intend the law courts. The law court, at any rate, is the only example of a large assembly singled out for explicit mention (454e and 455a). But this is puzzling, and one may legitimately ask what the function is of instruction on questions of right and wrong in the courtroom, where strictly speaking it is only a matter of determining the responsibility of the defendant for a specific act. Plato, however, surely does not recognize any distinction between the theoretical and the concrete in the sphere of ethics, since for Plato the defendant, although on trial for a specific act, ought nevertheless ideally to lay before the court for judgment, not merely the facts relating to the case, but also his entire moral nature. That this is so we may conclude from two passages in the *Gorgias*. In the first (522c-e), Socrates remarks that the innocent man needs no defense but a life lived with justice. In the other (480a-d), Socrates lays the paradox before Polus that the

best use to which rhetoric can be put is not to enable the guilty man to obtain an acquittal, but to help him persuade the jury that he stands in need of punishment. From the Platonic point of view, then, the narration of the actual facts of the case and the instruction of the jury on matters of right and wrong are only two ways of describing the same fact, since no examination of an individual act can in any case be separated from ethical considerations of a more general nature. The Greek of Plato's *πειθὼ διδασκαλική* makes the transition from the concrete to the general, natural enough in any case to Plato, all the easier, since *διδάσκειν* means both "to teach" and "to inform about some specific event." Lastly, and perhaps most important, Plato's two forms of persuasion and the two "teachers" of Gorgias correspond in one further important respect, since the two terms reflect in each case Plato's and Gorgias' estimation of the role of *doxa* and *aletheia* in the contest of the law courts.

The abundant use, moreover, of arguments from probability goes a long way in creating the impression that *πειθὼ πιστευτική* is the form of persuasion which is more favored by Gorgias. (*Pistis* is an important concept in the *Palamedes*, but a full discussion of its meaning in the work, as well as the important place it occupies in Plato's critique of Gorgias, must be reserved for our discussion of the *Apology of Socrates*.) Nevertheless, the bald admission by Gorgias that his rhetoric favors the techniques of *πειθὼ πιστευτική* and not *πειθὼ διδασκαλική*, does somewhat simplify the complex nature of Gorgias' position. For it seems unlikely that the historical Gorgias would have assented to this conclusion, since it did involve an oversimplification of the position we find in the *Palamedes*, and a consequent misrepresentation of his attitude toward the use of "the truth itself." He did not, in the words of Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, esteem the probable above the true, or *pistis* above *episteme*; at least not in the unqualified sense of Plato's statement. Plato does, however, introduce one consideration which corresponds to Gorgias' *ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη*, and which serves, as does this factor in the work of Gorgias, to mitigate the general omission of a rhetoric which instructs, and the almost complete dependence on the form of persuasion which strives to create a certain *pistis*. In 455a Socrates observes that the rhetor must be *πειστικὸς μόνον*. "For he would not, I suppose, be able in so short a time to instruct (*διδάξαι*) so large a group of people on such important matters (*viz.* right and wrong)."

Despite some simplification, then, the major points of the Gorgianic position are enunciated in the dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias.²⁹ The two "teachers" which serve Palamedes in his perplexity, *ἀντή*

ἡ ἀλήθεια and ἡ παρούσα ἀνάγκη, find their parallels in the two forms of Platonic persuasion, for it is αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια which the defendant seeks to communicate in his use of *πειθὼ διδασκαλική*, and it is ἡ παρούσα ἀνάγκη which compels him to employ *πειθὼ πιστευτική*. Moreover, the very two terms (i.e. *διδάσκω* and *πιστεύω*) which are chosen by Plato to differentiate the two classes of persuasion are reminiscent of the terms employed by Gorgias to describe the procedures which each "teacher" enjoins upon the defendant. In the matter of *πειθὼ διδασκαλική*, we have already quoted the passage (33) where Palamedes states that he will act in accordance with what is most manifestly just by "teaching the truth of the matter" (*διδάξαντα τὰληθές*). So far as *πειθὼ πιστευτική* is concerned, in the long passage (6-21) devoted to the use of arguments from probability, a form of this persuasion which present necessity compels the defendant to use, it has been pointed out that terms such as *πιστός*, , *πιθανός*, are extraordinarily frequent. Moreover, as I have argued, there is implied in Gorgias' phrase, ἡ παρούσα ἀνάγκη, the awareness that the special circumstances of mass persuasion *necessitate* the use of a special kind of rhetoric, and this awareness finds its echo in Plato (455a).

It should be noted, moreover, that Plato, although aware of this mitigating factor, is far from condoning Gorgias' position, as the remainder of this portion of the dialogue makes clear. For, in Plato's eyes, Gorgias is vulnerable on two major counts. First, he has chosen to induce agreement by fostering a subjective opinion that a given notion is true, rather than by convincing the listener of its truth by the slow and dangerous methods of rational instruction. Secondly, although Gorgias (at least the Gorgias of the dialogues) did not disagree that his method was in fact, to create a certain *doxa* in matters involving questions of right and wrong, he nevertheless did maintain, by implication that he possessed the knowledge necessary to discriminate between what was truly right or wrong.

This latter fact emerges quite clearly from Gorgias' reply to a series of questions which Socrates has put to him in an effort to understand the role which a *knowledge of right and wrong* plays in the art of rhetoric (459c-460a). Socrates asks Gorgias whether or not he will be able to impart a knowledge of right and wrong to a student who has come to him for instruction in rhetoric, even though this student does not possess a clear understanding of this subject, so crucial in the court rooms and assemblies. Gorgias' answer is straightforward: "Well, Socrates, I suppose so. If he happens not to know this, he will learn this too from me" (460a). The word which Gorgias uses here is *μαθήσεται*:

the student will gain *mathesis* from me (*episteme* and *aletheia* are equivalent terms; cf. respectively 454d and 459e).

What Plato thinks of this claim of Gorgias is apparent from the long exposition of the thesis that *rhetorike* (in the Gorgianic sense) occupies an analogous place in the realm of the intellect (*psyche*) to that which cooking holds in those activities concerned with the care of the body. The chief point of this analogy is, of course, that rhetoric is no more able to treat the moral questions which arise in the debates of the court room or assembly than is cooking able to heal physical ills. In both cases the real problems are not understood. Moreover, Plato is not here assailing Gorgias merely for any methodological faults which his rhetoric may happen to contain. We have, rather, a clear attack on the presumption of competence in matters of ethics.

VI

To turn now to Plato's *Apology*: Socrates finds himself in a situation identical to that of Palamedes and, like him, experiences serious perplexity in the face of the necessity of refuting his accusers.³⁰ Despite this common awareness of present exigency, the consequences, as they are manifested in the spirit of Socrates' defense, are profoundly different. It is the manner of this defense, and the point of view which determines it, that I shall now consider.

As Socrates recognizes, the crucial feature in his defense is the need to give the correct version of the slanderous stories which had centered around his name for many years past. These slanders consisted principally in the suggestion that Socrates was a combination of impious natural philosopher and amoral Sophist. The need to explain the true nature of his activities which had been so prejudicially construed is therefore *primary*, since Meletus is introducing charges which are merely a special expression of the prejudices then current in Athens (19a-b). To give a true and convincing account of his strange behaviour is, in other words, the crux of his defense.

Despite a clear awareness of the importance of this task, which occupies the first portion of the defense (18e-24b), Socrates proceeds in a simple and straightforward fashion. For, unlike Palamedes, to whom the presentation of "the truth of the matter" seems both an inadequate and dangerous procedure, Socrates puts his trust in a simple narration of the incidents which had given rise to the popular image of him as a corrupter of youth and an atheist. He even does this in the face of the possibility that his words may be construed as flippant, and thus

prejudice his case (20d). The words which he uses in this section to describe his procedure in presenting the case to the jury are those we associate with calm narration, not anxious persuasion (cf. ἀποδείξαι, 20d; διδάξειν, 21b). At the conclusion (24a) of this account he declares: "This is the truth, men of Athens, and in speaking to you I have concealed no matter either great or small, nor have I held anything back." We should also note here that the word πείθω, which is the *vox propria* of πειθὼ πιστευτική, is *not once employed* in this section, although it would have been natural to do so. To put the matter in terms which Palamedes might have used, Socrates is but little influenced by the demands of ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη.

In contrast to Socrates, the plaintiffs are represented as being eager to implant the *pistis* of Socrates' guilt in the minds of the jury by whatever means possible. "The plaintiffs have spoken very *persuasively*," Socrates says, "although nothing of what they have said is *true*" (17a).³¹ In his cross-examination of Meletus, Socrates seeks to discredit the points of Meletus' indictment, and at the end of each argument he taunts Meletus with the suggestion that he has failed to *persuade* anybody (ταῦτα ἐγὼ οὐ σοι πείθομαι, 25e; ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, 26e; ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν . . . οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστίν. 27e). But not only does Meletus try to implant a false *pistis* in others — he is himself a victim of false *pistis*, since he has enough confidence in the power of the Athenian prejudice about Socrates to base his case on it (19a-b). Indeed, this activity of false persuasion is shown to extend far back into the past (18b-d; where note the characteristic πείθω).

Against this dark background of untruth and false opinion Plato sets the figure of Socrates, the embodiment of truth. This may perhaps seem an unwarranted overinterpretation of a situation in which it is a matter of course for the defendant to represent his own statements as true, and those of the opponent as false. Indeed, the affectation of an innocence which is horrified in the face of the unscrupulous allegations of the plaintiff is a natural *topos*. However, a *topos* employed at some point or other in a speech is one thing; another thing is the Socratic defense, whose *whole tendency* is characterized by a calm awareness of innocence, and a disinclination to employ in the account of his mission any methods but those of rational persuasion and simple narration of the truth. Needless to say, it is irrelevant from the point of view of this discussion whether or not we consider the several items of this account, such as, for example, the story of the oracle, literally true. What is important here is Plato's ethopoetic intent. The story of Chaerphon's visit to Delphi and the direct dependence of the Socratic mission on

this oracle may or may not be true. The veracity of the account does not matter, however, for what we have in the *Apology*, apart from any question of the objective truth of these statements, is a clear striving for a portrait of a man who intends to let the truth speak for itself, and who is determined, for the most part, to avoid arguments based on probability (cf. however, 31c, where Socrates does use the fact of his poverty to convince his auditors of the truth of his assertions). Socrates' behavior in the section of the speech concerned with the *antitimesis* (35e-38b) is a clear indication of this attitude. For who else but a man portrayed as entirely confident of his innocence could make a claim to lifelong support in the prytaneum? And who else but a man portrayed as totally indifferent to the outcome of his trial could risk the reaction which such a claim would surely involve? To explain why he could act this way we must turn to the oracle of the god of Delphi.

In any impasse created by two contradictory claims a solution can be effected by the introduction of an objective and truthful witness. Meletus (like Odysseus in the *Palamedes*) does not do this, a failure which puts him, as plaintiff, in a bad light. Socrates, however, in order to prove the truth of his version of the story, invokes a "worthy" witness, Apollo, the god of Truth (20e).³²

That Socrates should call upon the god of Delphi is appropriate, since he has in Plato's portrayal spent his life in the service of this divinity. At the god's behest³³ he has devoted his energies to propagating the modest but important truth that human wisdom, as compared to the god's, is worth nothing, or almost nothing (23a). His first action as an agent of this truth, it should be noted, was to examine the opinions of those citizens who had a reputation for wisdom (τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, 21b). (Plato here makes full use of the ambiguous δοκεῖν, which can also mean "with a false reputation for wisdom.") At the very beginning, then, of Socrates' account of the real nature of the activities which had gained him so evil a name, the antithesis of *doxa* and *aletheia* clearly emerges. And it is this antithesis which occupies a central place in Plato's conception of the benefits which Socrates has bestowed upon Athens.

Socrates' execution of the god's commands is described in many ways. It is called an *examination* (ἐξέτασις, 22e) of Athenian society. Because the god has ordered (cf. n.30) Socrates to devote his life to propagating the truth, Athens has been granted a *great boon* (30e-31a). In questioning those who are reputed to be wise, and proving them to be the opposite, Socrates is an *ally* of Apollo (23b). Apollo is a *general* whose commands Socrates must follow (28d, 33c). Furthermore, to

disobey the commands of the god is to choose ignominy, and to this any form of danger, even death, should be preferred (28b, d-e). There is the hint, moreover, that the dangers which might prompt one to desert the god's service are not to be estimated as true dangers by his servants. When Socrates tells the jury that he will not appeal to their emotions, he says (34c), ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὥς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. The same true estimation of the power of earthly dangers is evident in the passage where Socrates declares that he will not change his ways even if he is to die many more times (30b-c).

The reason for these statements is, of course, quite clear: a man who has served the god justly and well is under his protection. As Socrates says, a good man cannot be harmed by the wicked. It is no wonder, then, that Plato makes Socrates say (35d), "I believe in the gods, men of Athens, in a way that none of my accusers does."

Now that the terms in which Plato conceives of Socrates' service to the god have been outlined, we are in a better position to analyze the nature of Socratic "persuasion." First of all, the reasons for Socrates' attitude toward "present necessity" as a factor to be considered in his defense now became explicable. It is clear that Socrates does not hesitate to base his defense on αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, and to employ the methods of πειθῶ διδασκαλική for the reason that his actions, the truth concerning which he endeavors to set before the jury, have always been in accord with the command which Plato's Socrates came to see as the latent point of the celebrated oracle. The consequence of this is that what he tells the jury about his conduct is not only true in the sense of the Gorgianic formulation αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια; *it is also true in a transcendental sense because Socrates' mission, as it is represented by Plato, is the direct consequence of the oracle of Apollo, the god of Truth.* This, I submit, is the reason why Socrates, in his defense, is not governed by his perplexity, and, unlike Palamedes, does not consider αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια a guide more fraught with danger than safety. The truth which he presents in his defense cannot, in fact, be refuted by the plaintiff, or, indeed, be brought into question by the decision of any earthly court. Socrates does not have to fear the outcome. As he says, "Let the trial turn out in a way pleasing to the god" (19a).

It is no matter for wonder, then, that Socrates should feel a fundamental indifference to the outcome of his trial since the truth of his assertion has been borne witness to by the very god of Truth. Unconcerned with the immediate consequences of his words, Socrates relates the history of his activities with no care for how strange the explanation

may appear to the jury. He is aware, however, that this truth will probably not gain immediate credence (19a). His estimation of the power of *doxa* is therefore in this respect similar to Palamedes'; but unlike Palamedes he is not constrained to seek aid from the other guide to which Palamedes must apply in his perplexity. Such are the lineaments of the Socrates drawn for us in the *Apology of Socrates*.

As I have observed, the attitude of Socrates towards his defense is reflected in his choice of words to describe this procedure. One consequence of his rigid preference for terms which are in harmony with the tone of rational instruction in accordance with the truth was that terms associated with the activity of *πειθῶ πιστευτική* were scrupulously avoided. This obtained, however, only so long as fundamentally ambiguous words such as *πείθω* were still undefined with respect to their sphere of operation. But, we should note that as soon as it has been made clear that Socrates' efforts to disabuse the Athenians of their illusions was a form of persuasion sanctioned by the god, there is no hesitation in introducing terms such as *πείθω* to describe such a pursuit (cf. 30a, 31a-b). Before this time its use might have been misunderstood. Now, however, there could be no question of its being anything but a form of *πειθῶ διδασκαλική*. We may also compare the passage (35c) in which Socrates describes his intention to persuade, but only after it is indicated to what form of persuasion he is referring (*διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν*). The meaning is made even clearer in this passage, since what he intends is in unmistakable contrast to the techniques of emotional pleading.

Apart from this piece of evidence, there are other indications of a quite cogent nature. Early in this study we pointed to several instances in the two works of similarities in phrasing which were all the more striking because they were employed in similar contexts. I shall now turn to what, in my opinion, is the most impressive of the verbal parallels which scholars have discovered in the two works. Palamedes, under the stress of the moment, turned to arguments from probability, as was proper for a man who had little confidence in the power of truth to effect immediate persuasion, and who had no transcendental refuge. The function of the probable is, of course, to create, in the absence of any objective evidence, the impression (*doxa*) of the truth. What is involved here is *pistis* in the double sense of that word. The arguments which Palamedes uses must have *pistis* in the sense that they must have an *aura of credibility* powerful enough to persuade — to produce, in other words, that *subjective impression, or conviction, of truth* which the Greeks also called *pistis*.

The diction of the *Palamedes* gives clear evidence (cf. n.27) of the constraint under which the defendant labors. We may say, without exaggeration, that the *Palamedes* is haunted by the problem which *pistis* brings in its train in a world where truth often comes to light only after it has become useless. In the passage (20) in which Palamedes describes the miseries of exile (on which 37c-d of the *Apology* is perhaps modeled), he raises the hypothetical consideration that since he could not return to the Greeks after his act of treason, he would have to live among the barbarians. But how could he, he says (21), since they more than anyone would know of his treason: "I should not be in a position to be trusted by the barbarians" (οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παρὰ τοῖς βερβάροις πιστῶς ἂν διεκείμην). In the same passage he says that when a man has lost his *pistis*, he will never regain it. Prompted by these considerations he exclaims (21), "Life is not worth living for a man who is without *pistis*!"

βίος δὲ οὐ βιωτὸς πίστεως ἐστερημένῳ

The similarity to Socrates' famous dictum is striking and obvious, and, as I have indicated earlier, several scholars have noted it. But what has *not* been noted up to now, in the absence of a comparative analysis of the *Palamedes* and the *Apology of Socrates* is that the Socratic maxim has not only been modeled on Palamedes' despairing utterance; *it is also a challenge and an emendation*. It expresses the awareness of Socrates that he has spent his life in the service of the god of Truth precisely in the same manner that Palamedes' exclamation gives voice to a perplexity which arises from his insight that truth is of so little effect in human life. For Palamedes, if truth is really so tardy in its effects, and if, in addition, a man is deprived of the ability to create an impression of truth in others, *then life is clearly not worth living*.

To turn to Socrates, when he says, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ (38a), he means that a life spent without examining himself and others *in the service of the god* is not worth living. That ἐξετάζω means precisely this is clear from two other passages (28e and 29e, especially the latter). Socrates has been a soldier in the army of the god of Delphi, and since he has never deserted the ranks, or disobeyed the god's commands, his life has never lost that divine sanction which makes its truth irrefutable. For Socrates standing on the bedrock of certainty, a loss of *pistis* is not to be reckoned a serious matter. And it is this certainty which gives to his speech its tone of confident objectivity and distinguishes it so effectively from the despair of the *Palamedes*.

We may recall here the climax of the dialogue between Socrates and

Callicles (*Gorgias* 522c-e), where Socrates is taunted by Callicles because of the admission that he would be powerless to defend himself before a court on an unjust charge, even though this failure might entail the worst consequences. Callicles asks whether such a man is well off. Socrates replies:

Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often acknowledged he should have — if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. *And if anyone could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death* (italics mine). For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong (tr. Jowett).

VII

With these considerations in mind, I should like to turn to the final portion of the *Apology*. In the valedictory address of Socrates (38c-42a), the first section is addressed to the members of the jury who had voted for his condemnation, the other to those who had voted for his acquittal. By now the implication will be clear that the *Apology* in an entire stratum of meaning has little or no relation to an actual courtroom speech delivered by Socrates on the day of his trial.³⁴ It seems most improbable that Socrates should have improvised or written a speech which presents a coherent portrait of himself as an exemplar of an anti-Sophistic rhetoric, and then, *in addition*, have reinforced this portrait by clear verbal reminiscences of a Sophistic work to whose hero he considered himself an antipode.

In accordance with this position, I suggest here that the last section of the speech is best interpreted not as a record of Socrates' final remarks to the jury, but, rather, as the words of Plato directed to an audience of some years later, for whom the death of Socrates was still a living issue.³⁵ In the portion of the speech where Socrates prophesies the emergence of a new generation who will subject Greek society to even more severe criticisms than he has done, it is hard not to see a prophecy of Plato made after the fact, since it so accurately describes the appearance of the Socratic schools in the first decade after Socrates' death.

This cannot be proved. But in the second part of this section — that devoted to an address to those who had voted for Socrates' acquittal — there are grounds for thinking that we can detect the voice of Plato, and not Socrates, in these remarks (39e-42a). The words were addressed to those who had confidence in the innocence of Socrates, despite the fact that he had been judged guilty. And although this confidence was unshaken, his followers surely remembered his condemnation with great bitterness. As we have seen, Socrates, in Plato's conception was beyond the harm of evil and unjust men such as Meletus and the other accusers, because his life and his activities had been sanctioned by the god of Delphi. It is this consoling truth which Plato wishes to reveal to those who believed in Socrates' innocence, but who had been aggrieved by the manner of his death. "Since you are my friends, I wish to reveal to you the meaning of what has just now happened to me" (40a).

Toward the end of the speech, in Socrates' description of the other world, there is the celebrated passage (41a-c) in which he looks forward to the possibility of conversing with the famous heroes of the Greek past. Among these there would be some who, like himself, had been unjustly condemned to death; he mentions Palamedes and Ajax. Scholars who have observed the verbal allusions to Gorgias' *Palamedes* have not failed to note that the appearance of Palamedes is no accident.³⁶ This seems quite reasonable; but, beyond any question, the intention of the passage has been completely misinterpreted by its commentators. The accepted interpretation³⁷ is that Socrates will be happy to meet Palamedes, because he will find in him a sympathetic fellow-sufferer.

But in the light of our exposition of the great contradictions that exist between the *Apology* and the *Palamedes* such an interpretation seems most unlikely. The suspicion, moreover, that this is not so is confirmed to a large degree by an examination of the diction of the passage. Socrates says that conversing with people like Palamedes will be a marvelous pastime (*διατριβή*). The advocates of the "sympathetic" hypothesis will be somewhat taken aback if they recall at this point that *διατριβή* or *διατρίβειν* has been the characteristic³⁸ designation for Socrates' divinely appointed mission of refuting pretenders to wisdom. Moreover, that it is this connotation of the word which is intended here is suggested several lines further on in the same passage where Socrates says that he will continue "to examine and to investigate" — *ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα*. (The significance of *ἐξετάζω* has been discussed; for *ἐρευνῶ*, cf. 23b *ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν*.) Socrates will

discover even in the after-world who is wise, and who is not, all their pretensions to the contrary.

But perhaps this does not apply to Palamedes? I suggest that the phrasing of Socrates' afterthought to his remark concerning Palamedes clearly indicates that it does. He says that he is going to set his experiences (*pathe*) against Palamedes'. "It would not be unpleasant" (*οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἶναι*). Let us recall here the passage (33c) in which Socrates is trying to account for the fact that young people like to associate with him and to hear him refute those who think they are wise but are not so. The young people like this, *ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδὲς*. It seems most unlikely that a complex of words which have gained such unmistakable force in the course of the *Apology* can suggest anything else but that Palamedes, along with the others catalogued here, is a pretender to wisdom whom it will be a pleasure for Socrates to refute.

The connotation of this diction, therefore, and the fact that Socrates in the lineaments of his portrait is conceived of as an antipode to Palamedes, both make it likely that we should *not* interpret, as has usually been done, *ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἑμᾶυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων* as meaning "comparing my misfortunes (in mutual sympathy) with theirs." Our conclusions all tend to an interpretation something like the following (interpretation, not literal translation; these words are in themselves simple and without overtone): "I set my life, and my death (*πάθη*), and what they both mean, as a direct challenge to (*ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι*), and refutation of, the validity of the philosophical position which is at the basis of Palamedes' defense of his life." It should be noted that this interpretation of *ἀντιπαραβάλλω* is in agreement with the meaning of this word in its only other occurrence. In *Hippias Major* 369c it is used of two *logoi*, and means there to set one argument against another."

VIII

In this study I have sought to investigate only one level of meaning in Plato's *Apology*. For in this work Plato gives us a deeply complex estimate of Socrates' stature as a man and as a philosopher. I have attempted, more exactly, to elucidate the relationship between this work and Gorgias' *Palamedes*, and to suggest that, when once this is done, a new dimension of the *Apology* is revealed. For in this new dimension we perceive Socrates as the philosophical orator who employs a form of persuasion which rests on truth rather than illusion. Why Plato chose to introduce into the *Apology* this aspect of his total

conception of Socrates it is hard to say with certainty. For one thing, since he had already chosen, for whatever reason, to draw a portrait of Socrates on the day of his trial, there was surely no more appropriate moment than this to show what rhetoric could become in the hands of a man who had devoted himself to the problems of philosophy rather than to the gratification of the ignorant mob. Moreover, at the time of the composition of the *Apology* (surely the decade 399–389 B.C. is a fair span), rhetoric had just emerged from its infancy. The 390's saw the production of the mature works of orators like Lysias and Andocides, and Isocrates was just publishing his first efforts in forensic oratory. For such a time rhetoric was an important matter (as it was always to remain in the Greek world), and it is not surprising that Plato should have engaged in the exchange of ideas which must certainly have characterized this period.

Surely, however, these solutions are in themselves inadequate, and it is in another direction that we must seek an explanation for the tone of earnest passion which is manifest in the *Apology*. It will be remembered that earlier in this study I attempted to demonstrate that Plato, in the *Gorgias*, attributes to Gorgias a system of rhetoric very much like the one set forth in the *Defense of Palamedes*. A natural assumption, strengthened by the presence of verbal parallels in the two speeches we have been discussing, is that the *Palamedes* was one of the sources of Plato's knowledge of Gorgias' rhetorical theories, although it is of course quite possible that such ideas were communicated in some other way. Now the *Gorgias*, as we know, is concerned with rhetoric, a fact which provides a link between it and the *Apology*, on the one hand, and between both these Platonic works and the *Palamedes* on the other. In this case, then, the behavior of Socrates in the *Apology* would be, on one level at any rate, an illustration of the rhetorical counter-position implied by Socrates' criticisms in the *Gorgias*; and both together would answer to the *Palamedes*, which, as should be clear by now, is a mixture of concrete forensic situation and theoretical formulation.

The *Gorgias*, however, as is well known, is concerned with more than rhetoric. It is also Plato's classic statement of the two alternative ways of life, the philosophical and the wordly. To this theme rhetoric is, of course, related, for it is precisely this which provides the worldly man with the means to power. In this context, then, Plato's critique of Gorgianic rhetoric, which, as I have suggested, is embedded in the fabric of the *Apology*, is seen to be more than a mere technical disagreement. For Plato, in the *Gorgias*, moves on, after his discussion of rhetoric, to a confrontation of the two ways of life as they are incarnated

in the figures of Callicles and Socrates. So too in the *Apology*, which is in one of its aspects a critique of an immoral system of rhetoric, we are shown a man who, by his service to the god and to philosophy, has transcended all need to employ a rhetoric which aims at imparting the semblance rather than the substance of truth.

If this conclusion is true, the connection between the *Gorgias* and the *Apology* is a most intimate one, and one may justly call the former a kind of program for the latter. A corollary to this, in the matter of dating the *Apology*, is that, although we cannot certainly date either the *Apology* or the *Gorgias*, we should probably not date them very far apart. For in both we perceive, if I am correct, the same attitude toward the rhetorical position of Gorgias and in both the same search for a philosophically inspired counter-position to the rhetoric of illusion, or, more important, to the moral world from which it springs. For Plato, Socrates' firm belief in the transcendental rightness of the philosophical life provided the ground from which a new kind of rhetoric could grow, a rhetoric which would not have to take into account the shifting nature of human opinion and the changing relationships of political power.

In conclusion I should like to observe that the manner in which Plato discredited a rhetorical theory whose basis and implications he found unacceptable is a stroke worthy of genius. For by modeling the *Apology of Socrates* on the *Palamedes* of Gorgias he brought it about that the reader who was struck by the formal similarities discernible in the *Apology of Socrates* was also likely to be struck by the profoundly contradictory views of which this work was the expression. If it had been done in another way, the issue might have been ignored by those against whom Plato especially directed the *Apology*. But as it was, Greek readers, who could not fail to observe this source of the portrait of Plato's master, could not for this very reason ignore the differences which were so impressively in evidence.

NOTES

The present study is the first chapter, in a much revised form, of my doctoral dissertation, which was written under the direction of Eric A. Havelock. To this scholar I owe a debt of gratitude, both for his help in the initial stages of my research and for his careful reading of this final version. The study has also been read beneficially by Prof. J. H. Finley of Harvard, and by my colleagues at Columbia, William M. Calder III and Charles H. Kahn.

1. I include here a bibliography, chronologically arranged, of all the works known to me in which there is some discussion of this problem.

W. von Christ and W. Schmid, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*⁸ (Munich 1912) I 675.

H. Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik* (Leipzig & Berlin 1912) 9-11.

J. Morr, "Die Entstehung der Platonischen Apologie," *Schriften der Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Reichenberg*, Heft 5 (1929) 29-34.

W. Schmid and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur* 1.3 (Munich 1940) 74.

K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* ³ (Oxford 1953) 363.

A. H. Chroust, *Socrates, Man and Myth* (London 1957) 216-218.

Guido Calogero, "Gorgias and the Socratic Principle *Nemo Sua Sponte Peccat*," *JHS* 77 (1957) 12-17.

Of these, Chroust, Schmid, and Freeman merely observe that the Platonic *Apology* was influenced by Gorgias' work, without, however, instancing verbal similarities. Gomperz draws up an elaborate list of correspondences, but only in order to establish the priority (and so, he argues, the authenticity) of the *Palamedes*. Morr and Calogero, too, catalogue the similarities, but, in addition, attempt a serious interpretation of the evidence, reaching conclusions which I cannot, however, accept. Chroust also seeks to account for the similarities, but he does not engage in a careful examination of the text of the two works.

2. Since we can date neither the *Palamedes* nor the *Apology* with absolute certainty, the possibility exists that the situation is the reverse of that which has been universally assumed. But Schmid (above, n.1) 74, argues strongly for the influence of the *Palamedes* on Antiphon. This means, of course, that the speech cannot be dated later than 411. Eduard Schwartz, too, detects this influence (see *De Thrasymacho Chalcedonio*, Progr. Rostock [1892] 7-13 = *Gesammelte Schriften* 2 [Berlin 1956] 119-129).

3. Morr (above, n.1) 34.

4. Chroust (above, n.1) 216-218.

5. Chroust (above, n.1) 218-220. See also *hypothesis* of Isocrates *Busiris* in Isocrates *Orationes* ², ed. F. Blass (Leipzig 1907) II lvii. The author of this hypothesis refers to a tradition that Euripides, in his *Palamedes*, castigated the Athenians for their execution of Socrates, using Palamedes as a mask for the philosopher from a fear of censure. This story is of course impossible on chronological grounds, but it may be based on an authentic tradition. Antisthenes, too, Dümmler argues ("Zum Herakles des Antisthenes," *Philologus* 50 [1890] 295) drew upon this conception in his *Archelaus*.

6. Calogero's study is the most important examination of this problem and demands careful attention. The foundation of Calogero's thesis is an analysis of the techniques of argumentation employed in the *Helen* and the *Palamedes*. From this analysis Calogero concludes that Gorgias had already worked out the ethical point of view which is implied in the Socratic formulation *nemo sua sponte peccat* and which later antiquity attributed to Socrates himself (Calogero, [above, n.1] 12-14). Socrates, however, although taking over this doctrine, sought at the same time to avoid certain immoral consequences to which this theory could lead if it were combined with persuasion indifferently used; his "remedy" was persuasion under the discipline of *dialogos* (p. 16). The many reminiscences in the Platonic *Apology* of the *Palamedes* are evidence for this debt, for Socrates, on the day of his trial, was still under the spell of Gorgias' ethical discovery and therefore worked many allusions to the *Palamedes* into the text of his defense (p. 15). Furthermore, Plato in his *Gorgias* introduces Gorgias into the dialogue, since once he had resolved to portray the philosophical position of his master Socrates, he could not rightly omit a discussion

of "the master of Socrates himself" (pp. 16-17). Lastly, certain indications in Xenophon support the thesis that there was an intimate connection between Socrates and Gorgias (pp. 15-16).

The foundations of Calogero's position is his analysis of the techniques of argument employed in the *Helen* and the *Palamedes*. In this, I think, Calogero has almost certainly overinterpreted the evidence. In the *Palamedes*, all that Gorgias has Palamedes say (and what is, after all, common sense) is that no one incurs all sorts of dangers and risks the possibility of ignominy without the prospect of some considerable advantage. As there were no conceivable advantages for Palamedes, his treachery is therefore unthinkable. That there should be a reward sufficient to offset dangers incurred is a notion easily understandable, even, as Palamedes says (16), to a man of moderate sense. How foolish, then, to deny this understanding to a man of Palamedes' wisdom. (It is therefore perverse to identify, as Calogero does (p. 14), *προϊκα* (*Pal.* 13) with *ἐκῶν* of the Socratic formulation; *προϊκα* clearly means here "without profit".) With regard to the *Helen*, it is true that Gorgias attempts to show that Helen did what was wrong because she had been compelled by *logos* to believe that it was right. Yet it seems to me important to keep in mind the chief emphasis of the work. The *Helen* is clearly more a boastful description of the power of rhetoric than a serious analysis of moral behavior. It is of course possible that Socrates was deeply impressed by the moral implications of the *Helen*, even if these now seem to us secondary.

There are other considerations which make such a reconstruction unlikely. For even if we grant that Calogero's interpretation of the sense of these two works of Gorgias is entirely correct, there are certain chronological difficulties in the view that Gorgias is the source of Socrates' central ethical doctrine. Gorgias, as we know, came to Athens in 427. This consideration would force one to the remarkable conclusion that it was only at some time after 427, rather late in Socrates' life and at a point when he was already internationally known, that he began for the first time to expound the doctrine which was to be associated so intimately with his name and to bring into being that form of enquiry which later writers deemed so characteristically Socratic. This late date for so important a development seems to me most improbable; although, of course, it is not impossible. The evidence, however, of the *Clouds* (423), if evidence it is, suggests that already at a time when Socrates could not have long been acquainted with Gorgias, he was known, and well known, for his interest in dialectic.

Moreover, it is one thing to say that Socrates' defense should show some traces of Gorgias' ethical thought if Socrates had truly been a pupil of the Sophist. But can one believe that Socrates himself worked into his speech such an elaborate web of verbal allusion and adaptation of *topoi* of argument? This surely implies an act of homage and respect far beyond what one may deem likely. It is odd, too, that Plato in composing the *Gorgias*, the very work which was intended to point to Socrates' debt to Gorgias, should nowhere have portrayed the Sophist as possessing the slightest familiarity with the doctrine which we are to believe is his own discovery. Moreover, and this seems to me conclusive, the clear sense of the whole portion of the dialogue in which Gorgias most prominently figures is that he possesses absolutely no worthwhile knowledge on the subject of right and wrong (*vid.* especially 462b-466a). If Calogero is correct, the *Gorgias* is an extraordinarily perverse bow to "the master of Socrates himself."

Lastly, the evidence of Xenophon is too vague to stand by itself. At any rate, the passage in the Xenophontine *Apology* (26) might only mean that Xenophon had read Plato's *Apology* and added, as his own piece of elaboration, the observation that even in his own time there were many ὕμνοι devoted to the unjust condemnation of Palamedes. Xenophon, moreover, is surely no reliable source for verbatim records of Socrates' remarks on the day of his trial.

7. Different aspects of this question will be touched upon throughout the whole of this study. Two classic works, however, which discuss in great detail and often rather audaciously the matter of Plato's literary satire are F. Dümmler, *Antisthenika* (Berlin 1882) and G. Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden im Vierten Jahrhundert*, I (Breslau 1881); II (Breslau 1884).

8. On the political activities of the Sophists, see Schmid-Stählin (above, n.1) 41 (Sophists in general and Prodicus); 49 (Hippias); 57 (Gorgias). For rhetors and Sophists as panderers to popular whim, see *Gorgias*, 463e-446a. This passage also illustrates how similar to one another these two activities seemed to Plato to be.

9. Morr (above, n.1) n.129.

10. Gomperz (above, n.1) 10. Platonic quotation throughout are from Burnett's Oxford Text. Quotations from the *Palamedes* are from Diels, *Frag d Vors* 7, vol. II.

11. Gomperz (above, n.1) 10.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Morr (above, n.1) 32.

14. Chroust (above, n.1) 217.

15. Morr (above, n.1) 32.

16. Gomperz (above, n.1) 9.

17. *Ibid.* 10.

18. Calogero (above, n.1) is an exception, since he seeks an explanation which takes into account the specific content of the borrowings and not the mere fact of their existence. In this he is unique among the scholars who have studied this problem. See, however, above, n.6.

19. See Schmid-Stählin (above, n.1) 74 for similarities in the section devoted to an address to the judges. Schmid does not observe that the similarities in *topoi* extend to the interrogation also. With Schmid's 1.a in his tabular analysis of the *Palamedes* cf. *Ap.* 24 c-d, 27a; with 2.a cf. 26a.

20. For discussion of early theories of rhetorical *dispositio*, see P. Hamberger, *Die Lehre von der Disposition in der alten τέχνη ρητορική* (Paderborn 1914). Compare Antiphon 1 for a similar deviation from the sequence of *prooimion-diegesis-pistis*.

21. I.e., that Socrates (1) corrupts the young and (2) corrupts them intentionally.

22. Cf. also Isoc. 15.321.

23. Cf. Dem. 46.10; Lysias 12.25 and 22.5; Andocides 1.14.

24. Although we have only late *testimonia* for its presence in the *Palamedes* story, this detail may well go back to the fifth century. See *Scholia in Euripidem*, ed. E. Schwartz (Berlin 1887) I *Orestes* 432. The same detail is contained in Hyginus' version (Hyg. 105).

25. See especially *Palamedes* 3, 22, and 24; *Helen* 8-14.

26. Cf. Antiphon 6.25 for this phrase in a similar context.

27. See 8, 9, 11, 14, 21, 22, 24, 25, 34, 36 for use of πείθω and words of the same root (πιστός, etc.).

28. Here we should observe that although *πειθω* is strictly applicable to both forms of persuasion, this term is nevertheless generally associated, unless it is otherwise indicated, with *πειθῶ πιστευτική*, whereas *διδάσκω* is the *vox propria* for the activity of *πειθῶ διδασκαλική*.

29. For parallel elements in the *Helen* and the *Gorgias*, see E. R. Dodds, *Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) on 452e1-8, 456b6, and 456c6. Dodds does not, however, observe the more pervasive parallels, a fact attributable to his skepticism concerning the philosophical positions frequently, and to be sure rather dubiously, assigned to Gorgias (*ibid.* 7-9). Nevertheless, although it may be true that there is no thoroughgoing exposition of a nihilistic philosophy in the works of Gorgias, it does not follow that the author of the *Helen* and the *Palamedes* can justly be accused of a "dazzling insincerity" (*ibid.* 8). For a more sensible position, see R. S. Bluck, *Meno* (Cambridge 1961) on 70b4.

30. See 18d (cf. *ἀνάγκη*), 19a, 24a, 37 a-b.

31. If Riddell had conducted a more careful analysis of the thought of the *Apology*, he might not have been led to the obvious, but wrong, conclusion that the prologue was merely a farrago of rhetorical clichés (*The Apology of Plato*, ed. J. Riddell [Oxford 1877] xxi).

32. Not only is Apollo considered so, popularly, because of his oracular function (cf. also *Ap.* 21b), but for Plato a god who is *ψευδής* is inconceivable (cf. *Rep.* 2.382e).

33. Hackforth (R. Hackforth, *The Composition of Plato's Apology* [Cambridge 1933] 88-104) sees a problem in reconciling the two stages in Socrates' attitude toward the oracle. Socrates is first, as Hackforth observes, a critic of the oracle; he is then its servant. Is this really so difficult to understand? Must one spend all the time in the discussion of it that Hackforth does? I think not, for Plato gives us a most natural and convincing account of the evolution of Socrates' understanding of the real meaning of the oracle. The turning point occurs when Socrates realizes that the god did not intend him specifically; he was chosen rather to be a *paradeigma* (*Ap.* 23a). After this realization, the interpretation of the oracle as a command, and not a riddle, became inevitable.

34. The notion has been advanced by two scholars that *in fact* no coherent defense was made by Socrates on the day of his trial. For these two interesting discussions, see H. Gomperz, "Sokrates Haltung vor seinen Richtern," *WS* 54 (1936) 32-43, and W. Oldfather, "Socrates in Court," *CW* 31 (1938) 203-11.

35. It seems most reasonable to view the *Apology* in the context of the renewed debate on the influence of Socrates which scholars have connected with Polycrates' *Kategoria* (ca. 395-390 B.C.). It is also likely that besides the *Apology* we should understand the *Gorgias*, Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Apologia*, and Aeschines' *Alcibiades* as like efforts to defend Socrates against the criticism of the restored democracy. For a discussion of Polycrates' work, its probable date, and effects, see P. Treves, "Polykrates," *RE* 42 (1952) 1729-50. For sceptical position of the relation of *Kategoria* to *Gorgias*, see Dodds (above, n.29) 28-29.

36. Morr and Calogero have observed this; see Morr (above, n.1) 34 and Calogero (above, n.1) 15.

37. See, e.g., J. Burnet *ad loc.* (Plato, *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, and *Crito*, ed. J. Burnet [Oxford 1924]) for failure to observe the importance of Palamedes' appearance in what is perhaps the best of the commentaries on the *Apology*.

38. See 29c, 33e, 37d.

IMPERIAL BUREAUCRATS IN THE ROMAN PROVINCES

BY RAMSAY MACMULLEN

FROM Roman provincial society, flattened by the storms of the third century, a new growth, a new aristocracy, arose, destined to flourish in later times and already prominent under Diocletian. What made it different from the older aristocracy was its dependence on power and prestige borrowed from the central government and applied to private ambitions on a local level. Its topmost branches could be seen spreading through Rome and the senate, through the emperor's court and the various centers of military and civilian authority in the provinces. Consuls, counts, and councilors passed without check from one office to another. Their families were often united by marriage. They found positions for their kin, and for themselves built villas of extraordinary splendor, supported by income derived from properties scattered the length and breadth of the empire. Such were the men at the top.¹ Yet their importance should not wholly obscure a somewhat lower level of the administration which, besides supporting many a more exalted career,² had an interest of its own. It is with this level and with its social history that the present paper is concerned.

For men of lower or middle-class families, advancement by service to the state lay most commonly through the army. Inscriptions record veterans of the early Empire to whom places and honors were opened in municipal senates;³ papyrological evidence gives a more detailed picture of soldiers, sometimes mere privates, buying land or owning prosperous estates or engaged in various business ventures.⁴ They steadily improved their position from Severan times on, and stood forth among the chief holders of power in the fourth century. Evidence is abundant, ranging from Libanius' 47th *Oration* on the various officers under the local counts and dukes down to the complaint registered in P. Princeton 119 under Constantine by a descendant of Theon, a man whose fortunes had been founded partly by grant, partly by purchase, apparently on his retirement from the service, and whose greedy relatives included a former member of the emperor's bodyguard (*protector*) and a promoted officer (*beneficiarius*). On a father's army career,

even a career not especially distinguished, could be built a position of much influence and wealth. But there is no need to expand on material described at greater length elsewhere.⁵

Civilian officials of third- and fourth-century emperors generally enjoyed the same opportunities and prestige as did the military. From their number should be excluded some whose titles falsely suggest a profitable employment: army tax collectors, accountants, aides, and procurators,⁶ perhaps even the state's lawyers⁷ and assistants to provincial governors.⁸ These posts in fact brought nothing but trouble and expense. So Constantius punished certain bishops by forcing them to fulfill their obligations to the governor's office (Soc., *Hist. eccl.* 2.41). The earliest trace of this sort of obligatory appointment that I find is in P. Oxy 2123 (247/8), where two village officials offer the name of a third man according to the orders and for the staff, *eis hyperesian*, of overseers of crown lands in Egypt (*katholikos* and *epitropos*). These were the jobs that a man avoided if he could; but they are the exceptions. A truer picture appears in a letter of 288. It is from a general supervisor of imperial estates:

To the *strategoi* of the Seven Nomes and Arsinoite nome, greetings. From the accounts themselves it is clear that many people wishing to swallow up the fiscal estates have usurped titles like "administrators," "secretaries," or "superintendents," being of no use to the fiscus but swallowing up its surplus. For this reason it has become necessary to send you instructions to see to the selection, on the responsibility of the several councils, of a single trustworthy superintendent over each estate, and to put an end to the other titles, the superintendent being able to choose two or at most three others as assistants to his superintendence. In this way useless expense will be stopped and the fiscal estates will receive the proper attention. You will see to it, of course, that the men chosen as assistants to these superintendents are in a position to stand the test.⁹

The value of this papyrus lies in showing how alarmingly, and how early, the bureaucracy had increased. Applicants for its privileges simply could not be controlled. A century later it attained its well-known proportions. No one has recently attempted an exact count of all imperial officials, and since the number of *agentes in rebus* or of imperial secretaries fluctuated violently in the late Empire,¹⁰ it is clearly impossible to strike an average for any given year. Further complications arise in trying to guess at the size of office staffs not explicitly numbered in our sources — for example, that of the urban prefect with 15 lawyers (*advocati* — but how many secretaries?),¹¹ of the prefect of the corn supply to Rome or of the public post, and of

many other branches of government. There remain, however, a few texts which do yield a useful total. They show 600 in the office of the Count of the East,¹² 300–400 under the vicars,¹³ 50–100 under each governor,¹⁴ 834 under the Count of the Sacred Largesses,¹⁵ and 300 under the Count of the Private Estates.¹⁶ Multiplied by the approximations: 4 praetorian prefects, 14 vicars, 115 governors; the whole comes to over 16,000. Yet no one can read the *Codes* or puzzle over the many individual offices and functions mentioned only once in inscriptions and papyri, or collect the remarks of Lactantius on the bureaucracy, or of the writers of the *Augustan History*, or of Eusebius and Libanius, without wishing to add very considerably to this figure. Such an addition is especially indicated by the dozens of laws limiting the numbers not only of regular members but of the supernumeraries.¹⁷ It was money that drew them all in, whether they received the salaries of those who stood in the full splendor of appointment or whether, as supernumeraries in the half-light — unpaid, patient, and rapacious — they enjoyed only the opportunities to extract fees and bribes; and to both regulars and supernumeraries the state also extended protection from various taxes and liturgies.¹⁸ As a result, people of really high position outside the government competed to get in and, being admitted, left gaps in municipal senates which could hardly be filled. Here again, Libanius and the *Codes* tell a very full story.¹⁹

There were two kinds of officials in each province, those who served the governors and those detached from some central office. The latter included several *palatini* from the Sacred Largesses, several more of the secret service, and higher office clerks from the Master of the Soldiers, the prefect of the city corn supply, the urban prefect, and the overseer of crown estates.²⁰ In all the provinces together there were thus at least two or three thousand representatives of the central bureaus, probably many more, since the opportunities were evidently much more attractive in the provinces than in the several capital cities. Central bureaucrats were consequently reminded not to leave on private tax-collecting expeditions, not to acquire vacant crown lands in the provinces, not to return repeatedly to the same province, and not to extend their visits without authorization by six months, a year, four years, or more.²¹

As for the local officials, they too abused their powers to oppress the humbler citizen by forming a close connection with the powerful men on the spot. To prevent such a connection, palatine officials were kept separate from provincial offices under a system of frequent rotation, while governors, on the other hand, were forced to recruit their advisers

from men outside the province.²² Despite all these careful arrangements, the crimes of both types of official are well attested.

An official's authority was supported by a combination of social and economic importance. It is obvious from what we know of Libanius' circle that a local appointment as advocate or secretary was not to be despised by sons of municipal senators or even by the sons of imperial officials.²³ This is the evidence for fourth-century Syria. But there are also interesting inscriptions from Africa. One shows veterans, Roman citizens, and municipal magistrates in the third century making up an aristocracy which is defined by inclusion in the governor's council. Another, of Julian's reign, lists the names of decurions, clergy, and, in all, 77 African representatives of the vicar, governor, prefect of the corn supply to Rome, and overseer of crown estates. Where imperial and municipal officials appear together, decurions may head the list; but it is significant that those among them with imperial honors (*virī clarissimi*) lead their colleagues; that most, perhaps all, had sons in imperial service; and that in the strict order of entrance to the governor, decurions come sixth, after senators, counts, bureau chiefs, *palatini*, and provincial priests.²⁴ Such details confirm the more general mention of "those men who are powerful throughout the provinces because of the honors that they have already attained, and the decurions who must be next to the aforesaid men in the dignity of their rank and in the honor of their services."²⁵ City senators might have their formal levees; officials had their more splendid evening parties where a governor, a secret agent, an apparitor of the praetorian prefect, a tribune, and others of their kind met together.²⁶

The later Empire was a period much given to advertisement. In this way, as in so many others, it anticipates the Middle Ages. A mediaeval police chief hired four trumpeters to go before him;²⁷ he did no more than Theophanes, *scholasticus* and legal expert attached to some high official (apparently the prefect of Egypt) under Constantine, who journeyed from Egypt to Syria and back again on an elaborately detailed expense account, and who records his disbursements to his herald.²⁸ Even so lowly a servant as this last might borrow luster from his employment, boast his title *apo prekonon*, and retire to a house in the swankest part of town.²⁹ Officials were proverbial for their pomp and pride, and a bishop could be rebuked because "he clothes himself with worldly honors, wishing to be called *ducenarius*, and struts in the market place reading and dictating letters as he walks in public, and attended by a bodyguard, some preceding, some following, and that too in numbers."³⁰ He would be distinguished by his

clothes; for as soldiers' uniforms grew showier — shining white, purple, green, of fur or of silver thread³¹ — civilian officials, imitating the military, displayed themselves weighed down with jewelry, in tunics of gold thread or embroidered with palms, in "a chlamys of Canusium, a Latakian dalmatic [tunic], a British garment, and one [trimmed with] seal skin."³² That same Theophanes mentioned above took with him on his trip 6 *sticharia*, 6 *dalmatica*, 3 *idiochromoi*, 2 *maphortia*, 2 *birroi*, 1 chlamys, 3 wraps, 1 turban, and several towels (the names for the articles of clothing are not worth explaining, where they can be explained); not to mention the sandals, leggings, jewelry, and other items bought en route, and a more than adequate supply of linen, bedding, tapestries, lamps, cups, spices, foods, and wines.³³

The luxury appearing in their wardrobes appeared also in the houses of government officials. The size of Theophanes' establishment can be guessed only from the large number of his domestic servants.³⁴ There are, however, roughly contemporary records from Hermopolis listing taxpayers in different parts of the city, block by block. After the names of the more important people are given their occupations, among which most belong to government service, military or civilian: 10 *a brevius*, 10 *primipilarii*, 4 *officiales*, 4 *veterani*, 4 *beneficiarii*, 3 *speculatores*, 2 *ab actis*, 2 *scribarii*, 2 *milites*, 2 *actuarii*, an *ostiarius*, *principalis*, *episcopus*, *rhetor*, *curator*, *ducenarius*, *augur*, *gymnasiarchus*, *praeco*, *commentariensis*, *procurator*, and others of the same type.³⁵ While there is a surprising number of government officials in the town, significant in itself, and while their houses appear scattered throughout, the chief value of the list lies in showing how the western quarter of Hermopolis contained a particular concentration of the really rich, including doctors, priests, municipal magistrates, professors, and goldsmiths, among whom the largest group wore, or had worn, some kind of uniform. They formed the aristocracy; theirs were the great houses. And the same picture emerges, where there is any evidence at all, in the cities of provinces other than Egypt.³⁶

No doubt their salaries, fees, and bribes do much to explain the ability of such men as these to buy their way into the upper ranks of provincial society. They were well placed to profit from the distress of the times. But another way lay through so-called caducous property, left without heirs or forfeit to the fisc. Everybody knows how oppressive taxes were, how prevalent were flight from obligations to the state, long arrears in payment, the disappearance of whole families from plague, invasion, or brigandage, in the third and fourth centuries. Anybody who reads the *Codes* can see the lengthening roll of crimes for which the

penalty was confiscation, or, in the literary sources, the pretenders whose supporters lost their property to the state. But nobody seems to have asked what happened to the houses that the state thus acquired. Farm lands could be distributed by enforced gift (*epibole*, *merismos aporon*, and so forth), on which the recipient had to pay taxes willy-nilly. To realize the value of urban properties, however, was far more difficult, and the result can be seen in still another tax list of houses in Oxyrhynchus. If one studies the list — if one could somehow walk through the ancient emptied streets — whole sections of the town appear as the victims of disaster, marked "Property of the Sacred Fiscus," "Formerly the property of NN, now fiscal," or simply "Vacant," row after row.³⁷ These could be granted to officials who might thus acquire, and rent out, several houses at once.³⁸ Julian delivered a general indictment in Gaul against those who "presumed on their influence to seize what belonged to others, or those who enjoyed a public position and whose estates were being increased by the calamities of the state."³⁹ Palatine officials might be singled out for criticism,⁴⁰ but obviously those who themselves administered state properties were in the best position of all, and could be found wresting an inheritance from two small children and ignoring court orders to restore it; inventing such titles as "secretary" for themselves and for their agents "to swallow up the fiscal estates," or leasing such estates to themselves; they are accused of embezzlement, yet rise above or upon these embezzlements to become owners of herds, or of houses in the better parts of town, or lenders of sums up to 300 talents.⁴¹

The favor of men of high social position, rich, and entwined in the influence and friendships of imperial service, was naturally much sought after, often by their equals in a tone of simple courtesy, often by their inferiors with unctuous uncertainty and small gifts: "If it should please your goodness," "I ask you in your kindness," and "I sent you through Ammonius a dish of quails, two jars of black fish sauce, and a dish of sweet cakes,"⁴² These were the perquisites of *patrocinium*, of patronage, such as was exercised more and more frequently by men of all kinds and positions, resembling each other only in power, whether imperial, military, civilian, municipal, rural, or ecclesiastic. St. Jerome sums up the whole trend in a neglected fragment, his *Life of Malchus* 2, when he speaks of a little Syrian village which, "after being in the jurisdiction of many lords or patrons, fell to the possession of a bishop." In so very widespread a phenomenon, provincial bureaucrats played a part, though by no means so prominent a one as a count's or a Roman senator's. Yet a *palatinus* could rule a

town, or a lawyer on the treasury staff, or an official in the department of crown estates.⁴³ Thus they occasionally attained all that life — late Roman life — could grant.

Of these men and of this period Camille Jullian has a sensible judgment:

Let us not say that we are dealing here with minor details and nameless people. The vitality, the stability of the empire were largely derived from bureaus, more deeply rooted in the soil than the divinity of the Augustus. It is they who explain the continued balance and traditions, throughout long crises. Thanks to them, in the following century, power in Gaul passed without violent tremors from the emperors to the barbarian kings. One must compare their role to that of the bureaus of the Ancien Régime which the Revolution and its ministries inherited.⁴⁴

Even beyond this link between the fourth and fifth centuries, even beyond this administrative continuity, minor bureaucrats provided a link of another sort, between the upper central government and provincial society. The two things most emphasized in this article, the great numbers of officials and their conspicuous presence in the larger houses and senate meetings of municipal aristocracies as in the land registers and villages of rural life, brought the customs of the capital down to a lower level. Thus, for instance, the inflated government language of Constantinople began to infect the private correspondence of a village scribe.⁴⁵ The transmission of customs may not always have been civilizing but it was important. Indeed, the importance of government officials far exceeded their number. For despite what one would gather from modern scholars and from such remarks as that of Lactantius in *de mort. persecut.* 7 that "there began to be fewer men who paid taxes than there were who received salaries . . . many governors and a multitude of underlings oppressed each province and almost each city," their number was large only by ancient standards. We may count 16,000 for sure in the fourth century, and perhaps as many again to take care of the corn supply to Rome and Constantinople, the various mints, the state monopolies, and other services. Yet in our own day, even in countries not notoriously overgoverned, we are used to finding perhaps 2½ per cent of the population engaged in the state civil service. The same percentage applied to Rome would yield between 1¼ and 1½ million officials.⁴⁶ What appears as an almost inexplicable exaggeration in Lactantius must be explained by the greatly increased use of local magistrates and soldiers in administration. Beyond this we should remember that ancient history was made — or so contemporaries

imagined — by a very small urbanized minority, among whom bureaucrats appeared prominently.

These bureaucrats falling between the two extremes of the hierarchy — the highest, about which much has already been written, and the lowest, about which we can know nothing — deserve attention for their own sake. But their importance indicates a wider truth. The world they lived in was threatened by a general collapse, and upon this threat the strength of the preserver of order was founded. The greater the threat, the greater the prestige and authority of strong central government. On this prestige in turn even a modest civil servant could draw inexhaustibly, to assert his weight in society.

NOTES

1. There are many works on the late imperial nobility: E. R. H. Hardy, *Large Estates of Byzantine Egypt* (1931); O. Seeck, *Die Briefe des Libanius* (1906), part III; P. Petit, *Libanius et la vie municipale à Antioche* (1955), esp. pt. 5 chap. iii; L. Harmand, *Un aspect social et politique du monde romain. Le patronat* (1957); J. A. McGeachy, *Quintus Aurelius Symmachus* (1942); K. F. Stroheker, *Der senatorische Adel im spätantiken Gallien* (1948); and S. Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire* (1898, 1921), to mention the chief ones. The sources are relatively good, esp. for Italy, Syria, Gaul, and Egypt: the *Codes*, papyri (few of the fifth century), and such writers as Symmachus, Libanius, Ammianus, and Ausonius. The last-named offers a clear view into the great rural estates of the highest nobility. See also Stroheker 18f, and in his prosopographical list nos. 52, 137, 160, 174, 210, 250, 318, 369, and 386, where he gathers extremely interesting material. On nepotism, see the various works just cited; also H. Marrou, *St. Augustin* (1958) 90; J. Keil, "Die Familie der Prätorianerpräfekten Anthemius," *Anz. oesterr. Akad. Wissen.* 79 (1942) 185f; and Amm. Marcel. 26.6.1; 26.10.1; 26.10.7; 30.5.11.

2. For the rise of some of the great careers from the middle ranks of the civil service see Stroheker (above, n.1) 11f, esp. 14 n.40.

3. G. Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni* (1953) chap. ix.

4. PSI 704; 928; P. Mich. 185; 203; 427-428; 492; P. Oslo 139; P. Oxy. 1472; BGU 26; 227; 282; 447; 462; 888; P. Lon. 142; 198; 604; 906; P. Hamb. 5.

5. See chaps. iv-v of my *Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire* (1963); F. de Zulueta, "De patrociniis vicorum," *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History I* (1909) sect. II, pp. 1ff; L. Harmand, above, n.1, and *Libanius: Discours sur les patronages* (1955).

6. On the unpopular duties of *primipilares* and *primipilarii*, see *Cod. Theod.* 8.4.6, 13, and 16; 12.1.11. The office must derive its name from the tax "of the primipilus" attested in papyri from early in Constantine's reign (*P. Cair. Isidor.* 59-61) and later in the *Codes* (*Cod. Just.* 12.58.8; *Cod. Theod.* 1.6.8). For other liturgies, see *Cod. Theod.* 8.4.23, *mancipatus et susceptiones* as penalties; 1.32.5, *procuratores metallorum*; 1.6.11.3, *apparitores* in the *vigiles*; and *peraequatores*, 6.10.1 and Seeck 167. To the *officia* of governors, praetorian prefects,

and military and treasury officials, lowly helpers were assigned as *annonarii*, *actuarii*, and *numerarii*, in the salaried ranks (*Cod. Theod.* 8.1.3 and 10) but subject to examination under torture (8.1.3-9). After a few years they were freed from office in order to render an account of their term (8.1.4 and 8).

7. The position of *advocati* and *scholastici* is not clear. They were attached to various imperial offices (*Cod. Theod.* 2.10.1; 10.15.1) by *necessitas* (12.1.46), assigned to cases as need arose (10.15.4), but received certain fees, perhaps also salaries; yet 8.10.2, on *scholastici* receiving, or grabbing, salaries, and Libanius, *Ep.* 207, on the impoverished lawyer forced to live off "what was given from the emperor for subsistence" are ambiguous, and *Cod. Just.* 2.7.15 (472) is too late. Mommsen argued against their being regularly paid (*EE* 5 [1884] 638).

8. A post with the governor was sometimes sought out (*Cod. Theod.* 1.12.4, of 393), but might be detailed to tax-collecting (12.6.5-7) instead of the customary *curiales*, and could thus fall under ruinous responsibilities.

9. P. Oxy. 58, not mentioned in the commentary of B. R. Rees (*JEA* 40 [1954] 90) on another text of about 300, which likewise joins the *rationalis* and *procurator*. The parallel text contains the nomination of two men to the service of the ἐμβολή, which may also be meant in P. Oxy. 58.

10. The *agentes in rebus* seem to have numbered only 17 in 360 and were later spectacularly increased (R. Grosse, *Römische Militärgeschichte* [1920] 105-6). On the number of imperial secretaries, Petit 361 n.4. I have seen no attempt to reach a total for the bureaucracy since that of L. Bouchard, *Étude sur l'administration des finances de l'Empire romain* (1872) 49f, who by different calculations arrives at the figure 11,334. A. E. R. Boak, *RE* s.v. "Officium" (1937) 2051-52, gathered the relevant texts, but even in his *Manpower Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire* (1955) 101, he refused to offer an approximation of the number in the civil service.

11. *Cod. Just.* 2.7.16. There were 100 *advocati* attached to a governor in about 396 (12.57.9) and 64 or 150 to a praetorian prefect (2.7.16; 2.7.8 and 17).

12. *Cod. Theod.* 1.13.1 (394), the *comes Orientis* being the equivalent of a praetorian prefect, but with perhaps a slightly larger office than that of others of the same rank. For their office staffs, E. Stein, *Untersuchungen über das Officium der Prätorianerpräfektur*² (1962) 18 and 75, accepts a total of 400.

13. *Cod. Theod.* 1.15.5 (365) and 1.12.6 (398); *Cod. Just.* 1.27.13 (534). See also 1.15.12-13. I agree with the suspicions of C. Pharr, *The Theodosian Code* (1952) 27 n.38, about the figure 200 for the vicariate of Asia; but cf. Boak, *RE* s.v. "Officium" col. 2052.

14. *Cod. Theod.* 1.12.6; *Cod. Just.* 1.27.13 and 12.57.9.

15. Three constitutions conflict: *Cod. Theod.* 6.30.15 (399) giving 224 officials plus 610 supernumeraries for the Eastern palatine service (for *palatini*, by the date of the text, meaning the *largitiones*, see *RE* s.v. "Palatini" [1943, Ensslin] col. 2539f); 6.30.16, giving a limit of 546 under the *comes sacrarum largitionum*; 6.30.17, a limit of 546 plus an unspecified number of supernumeraries. *Cod. Theod.* 6.30.7 should have given the whole list of officials. The countable part of the text is lost, and its restoration from *Cod. Just.* 12.23.7 (384) presents further problems and no solutions. In the light of the Count's heavy duties, I agree with Stein (above, n.12) 18 in accepting the largest of the alternative figures.

16. *Cod. Theod.* 6.30.16. (399).

17. The laws cited in nn.11-16 above were called forth by the constant

pressure to crowd into imperial offices; and there was an equal pressure to advance from half-rank to full rank. See the account of a rhetorician "half a soldier," that is, *supernumerarius*, whose influential friends in Antioch aided his campaign to reach a higher station (Seeck, above, n.1, 182).

18. On exemptions, see among the earlier attested *Cod. Theod.* 6.35.1 (313/4); 12.1.5 (317); 6.35.3 (319), extending freedom from curial *munera* to *palatini* and other more privileged bureaucrats; later, 6.26.1 (362); 6.27.2 (363); 6.35 passim, with more particulars on privileges, now extended to higher-ranking provincial staff members and to secret agents (*agentes in rebus, silentiarii*). But provincial underlings seem not to have gained tax exemptions, and exemptions from liturgies only through service, sometimes of many years (*Cod. Theod.* 8.4.11, referring to what had been granted as early as Diocletian's reign; 8.4.1 [324]; 7.1.6 [368]).

19. R. Pack, "Am. Marcel. and the curia of Antioch," *CP* 48 (1953) 81-83, on decurions who had escaped to the *sacrae largitiones*, the mint, the army, or the governor's staff. Some of the laws vainly forbidding such escapes are *Cod. Theod.* 1.12.4; 7.21.2; 8.7.6. But even the young nobles, including many of Libanius' pupils, aspired to a post on a provincial or palatine staff (Petit [above, n.1] 398f; Seeck [above, n.1] 156, 164, and 182, where Libanius' pupils join the government, or 78 and 96, where his pupils are sons of government officials).

20. From the Sacred Largesses, *Cod. Theod.* 12.6.6 (365); 8.1.12 (382); etc., with Ensslin's discussion in *RE* s.v. "Palatini" col. 2544f; from the *agentes in rebus* as supervisors of the public post and as chiefs of bureaus, 6.29.2. (356/7); 6.28.6 (399), etc., and in the *Not. Dig. Or.* 21.5; 22.3; and passim; from the *magister militum*, 1.7.3 (398); from the urban prefect, no doubt connected with the *annona civica*, 1.6.8 (382, referring to a practice of Constantine); from the *praefectus annonae*, L. Leschi, "L'alburn municipale de Timgad," *REA* 50 (1948) 85; from the controller of crown estates, *Cod. Theod.* 6.30.2 (379).

21. *Cod. Theod.* 1.5.13; 1.10.8; 7.12.2-3; 8.8.6; 10.3.6.

22. "Palatini shall indeed know that they shall have nothing in common with the provincials" (*Cod. Theod.* 1.10.8), and provincial officials shall never aspire to imperial service (8.4.4. [349]; 8.7.16 and 19), whereas governors must accept their *consilarii*, *domestici*, and *cancellarii* either from outside the province or according to official rosters (1.34.1 and 3).

23. Above, n.1 (the general sources, for such higher ranks as *notarii*, even *primicerii* or *secundicerii notariorum*, *tribuni*, *proximi libellorum* or *assessores [paredroi]* — all really influential men in the empire as a whole) and n.19, on Libanius' friends and students.

24. R. Etienne on the first inscription, from Volubilis, *Latomus* 14 (1955) 250f; on the others, from Timgad in the 360's, Leschi (above, n.20) 76-89. Many laws of the period show the close relation that existed between *curiae* and *officia*, e.g., *Cod. Theod.* 8.7.17, though a decurion's first obligations lay with his own proper station, e.g., 12.1.5 (317), 10 (325), etc.

25. *Cod. Theod.* 8.11.1 (364); cf. the letter of the sons of a *scholasticus*, assuring their father that it was "to him that we owe the exceptionally high reputation that we enjoy in [Alexandria]" (P. Ryl. 624 [317-324]).

26. Amm. Marcel. 15.37.10, at Sirmium. It was a sort of tribute to their importance that several of the guests were suspected of high treason, and the party was broken up by their arrest.

27. J. Huizinga, *Waning of the Middle Ages* (1924) 44.

28. P. Ryl. 644, *brekōni* = *praeconi*, and the commentary to the whole archive in P. Ryl. IV 104f; cf. a passage which the editors might have cited, Amm. Marcel. 28.2.13, describing a group of brigands imitating the staff of a *rationalis*, *clamante praecone civitatem ingressi*.

29. P. Flor. 71 (fourth century) line 680. See below, n.35, on this papyrus as a whole.

30. Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 7.30.8, quoting a writer of Aurelian's time. The reference to the many attendants could be confirmed for the Roman aristocracy in general by countless passages; specifically for bureaucrats, in Amm. Marcel. 18.5.3 and 28.2.13, and in Theophanes' payments for food (*kibaria* = *cibaria*) to his 'boys' (*paidioi*), P. Ryl. 629, in many entries.

31. Jerome, *Ep.* 60.9, in *palatii militia sub chlamyde et candenti lino*; SHA *Aurelian* 13.3; *Probus* 4.5; Veget. 4.37; Herodian 4.7.3, "cloaks embroidered with silver thread"; Sidon. Apollinaris 1.2.4: *pellitorum turba satellitum*.

32. On the jewelry, see some references in my article, "The Emperor's Largesses," *Latomus* 21 (1962) 161-62; on clothing, Amm. Marcel. 22.4.9, *ambitiose vestitus* like a *rationalis*, and 26.6.15, *tunica auro distincta, ut regius minister*; Ausonius, *Grat. actio ad Gratianum* 11.51f, on a consul's toga; and the quotation from the Thorigny inscription of 238, H. G. Pflaum, *Le Marbre de Thorigny* (1948) 9f.

33. P. Ryl. 627. The editors may well accuse him of being "something of a dandy."

34. P. Ryl. 640-649 contain his private accounts which (p. 151) "give an idea of the standard of living of a prosperous member of the *haute bourgeoisie* of the period. Theophanes' domestic staff is numerous and in some respects his economy anticipates that of the great houses of Byzantine Egypt."

35. P. Flor. 71 and P. Giess. 117, both of the 340's. I give the Latin equivalents as more familiar, though some of the titles are ambiguous. *Ducenarii* and *principales* may be civilian or military, imperial or municipal; so also *primipilarii* (above, n.7), though here they are certainly soldiers retired from the rank of *primipilus*. *Ostiarii* were ushers, of more importance than their name suggests. See A. von Domaszewski, *Germania* 1 (1917) 174-75. One man, Anysius, *apo hegemonikon* on the prefect's staff, may be a correspondent of Theophanes (P. Giess. 117 and P. Ryl. 625). Others (not necessarily officials; e.g., P. Giess. 117 sect. XXV 524f) owned properties in as many as four locations. There is no adequate commentary to either text, and this is not the place to attempt one, but there are some informative parallels within the town of Alabastrine in the third century, where taxpayers whose occupations are given include a *regionarius*, as I judge (see the title in inscriptions, *JRS* 2 [1912] 82 and 35 [1945] 25), several *dekaprotoi*, veterans, and *tabularii*, and a *beneficiarius praefecti Aegypti* (P. Lon. 1157). In the fourth century it contained several soldiers, a *magistratus*, and officials of the *dux* (P. Lon. 1105).

36. In Africa, Y. Allais, *Djemila* (1938) 49; in Antioch, Amm. Marcel. 18.4.3: a *praepositus cubiculi* trying to force the purchase of a house belonging to the *magister equitum*; in Bithynia, Eunapius, *Vit. sophist.* 464: a house and estate "of regal splendor" for a retired official.

37. P. Oslo III (235); P. Lips. 101 (fourth/fifth century): *tou hierōtatou tameiou, nuni tou tameiou, ousia tamiakē proteron Ammoniou, aoikētos*. The last word is very common throughout the list, marking (P. Oslo vol. 3 p. 144) roughly one out of every two houses. Former owners include an oil merchant, a

drover, and many municipal senators and gymnasiarchs (col. A1 line 9; col. C1 lines 128, 131, 188, 190, 215, 259, and 288-289).

38. P. Oxy. 2284 (258); PSI 771 (322); P. Lips. 17 (377).

39. Amm. Marcel. 18.1.1.

40. Amm. Marcel. 31.14.3.

41. P. Thead. 15 (280/1); P. Oxy. (288; translated above); 1716 (333); 2267 (360); P. Strass. 8 (271/6); P. Flor. 71 line 791; *Cod. Theod.* 10.3.6 (401). But other officials, of the prefect's staff, for instance, also figure in the same roles, as house-, land-, or herd-owners, lenders, and so on. See PSI 469 (334); 1077 (354); 1078 (356); P. Thead. 8 (306); P. Lips. 20-21 (381/2); P. Lon. 153 (fourth century); P. Oxy. 2284 (258); 1712 (394); and 1722 (late third/fourth century).

42. Examples of humble language in P. Gen. 47 (346); P. Oxy. 71 (303); and in the whole long tradition of letters of recommendation, many in archives of Theophanes and Abinnaeus, in Libanius and Symmachus. See the good study by G. E. M. de St. Croix, *British Journal of Sociology* 5 (1954) 33f. For the gifts, see P. Lon. 239 (ca. 346), addressed to the local garrison chief, the translation a little uncertain; cf. other presents in P. Lon. 243 and 413, and the "great sacks of beans with which to sow his private acres," offered to the governor of Syria (Liban., *Ep.* 4.23f, quoted in R. Pack, *Studies in Libanius and Antiochene Society* [1935] 30). There are literally scores of references in the *Codes* to the acceptance of bribes and gifts by officials.

43. The *palatinus* patron of Cingulum in Picenum (*CIL* 9.5684 [363]) may be a soldier, not the civilian official of the same title. There are other ambiguous patrons, military or civilian, in Egypt (P. Oxy. 1133 [396]), *epoikion tou deinou apo prinpilarion* (!) and P. Oxy. 1424 (ca. 318) showing a *centurio princeps* writing to his brother a *praepositus* of Dositheon, who, to judge from the context of the letter, evidently runs the village as he wishes. The other city patrons belong to Beneventum and Aquileia (*CIL* 9.2565 and 5.8972), *advocatus fisci summae rei* and *agens pro commentariis summarum privatae*.

44. *Hist. de la Gaule* 8 (1926) 59. Petit also (above, n.1, 385 n.6) is reminded of the Ancien Régime by some aspects of the fourth century, and parallels of taxation, nepotism, delays in government, and favoritism are extraordinarily close.

45. See my article on bureaucratism in *Traditio* 18 (1962) 372f.

46. *The Europa Yearbook 1962* gives for some countries the numbers employed in administration (how defined I do not know): I 308, 372, 567, and 1002; II 679, for Bulgaria, Finland, Great Britain, Rumania, and Israel; and *Newsweek* Jan. 9, 1956, p. 31, for Italy. The figures range from ½ per cent (Rumania) to 3 per cent (Finland). In calculating similar figures for Rome, I use the approximation 50-70 millions of population mentioned by Boak, *Manpower Shortage* 6, without endorsement, but based on the estimates of Bury, Stein, Delbrueck, and Piganiol.

MAENADISM IN THE *ORESTEIA*

BY WILLIAM WHALLON

THE title of this paper is discussed with regard to (I) the dream of Clytemnestra, (II) the chorus of Erinyes, (III) Apollo the *iatromantis*, (IV) the Murray theory of a *sacer ludus*. The argument proceeds from an assumption that the known trilogy of Aeschylus is likely to have drawn upon his previous work.¹

I

In *Iliad* 6.136 Thetis receives Dionysus in her bosom, while his *tithēnai* let fall their *thusthla*, after being stung by the *bouplēx* of Lycurgus. Of probable identity with the *tithēnai* are the nymphs of Homeric Hymn 26, who receive a newborn Dionysus in their bosoms, nurse him during early childhood, and become his boisterous companions. The cult religion thought to speak through these lines² is inaudible in the serene epic idiom, but the persistence of certain rites across a millennium may appear from a patristic admonition, which is reliable because it does not coerce details into complete intelligibility. By this later time the Olympians no longer announce themselves through priests or the thunder or human disguisings; in their stead local deities consecrate votaries in ceremonies which are perhaps edifying and assuredly disturbing. The ox-goad and the wands are combined, Dionysus is a totemistic Zeus, and the nurses are initiates who take to their bosoms a surrogate. Both father and defiler of the maid, "Zeus copulates with her in the form of a snake, his true nature thus becoming evident. The sign given to those inducted into the mysteries of Sabazius, at any rate, is 'the god through the bosom,' ὁ διὰ κόλπου θεός, that is, a snake dragged over the bosom of the neophytes, δράκων δὲ οὗτος διολκούμενος τοῦ κόλπου τῶν τελουμένων, which is testimony to the immoderateness of Zeus. Pherephatta, furthermore, conceives a child which has the form of a bull. In any event, a certain pagan poet says, 'Of the snake the bull, and father of the bull the snake; on hills the herdsman bears his secret goad,' the *kentron*

being, I think, a term for the *narthēx* wreathed by the Bacchic celebrants" (Clem. Alex. in Migne, *PG*, 8.76-77 = Euseb. Pamph. in Migne, *PG*, 21.124-125). The wording is curious and may indicate that the snake is dragged "through the folds of a robe" or "across the loins" instead of "over the bosom." But other scraps of evidence tell of the same or a similar voluptuous distortion without ambiguity. A fresco in the Villa of the Mysteries on the outskirts of Pompeii depicts a seated Panisca with pointed ears who suckles a fawn which stands beside her; a cameo in the Duke of Marlborough collection shows a reclining woman of average age who suckles a lynx.³ Nonnus gave the breasts of his Bassarae or Bacchantes to the young of shaggy lionesses (14.361-362, 45.304-305), and even caused the revels to incite the lactation of a virgin (45.294-303).

But whether such women were thought *Διονύσου τροφοί* in fifth-century Athens remains questionable. The Aeschylean play by that name is hardly informative, since it is best known from the hypothesis to Euripides' *Medea*, which declares only that the trophoi and their consorts are rejuvenated in an Aeson's bath, presumably by being cooked en masse. Euripides' *Bacchae* is in fact the superb and unique existent study of the Dionysiac mania in the Hellenic era. Here women dance in communal ecstasy, twine snakes in their hair (*Bacch.* 102-104), and jostle with gazelles and the whelps of wolves. Re-enacting a myth under the compulsion of delirium, they suckle these incarnations of the god (*Bacch.* 699-702), and figuratively or ritualistically⁴ become his trophoi, the *μεινομένοις Διονύσοιο τιθήναι* who find human and inhuman indistinguishable. Finally they fall upon a lion or a young man and tear him to pieces. Such episodes were a part of lost Aeschylean plays, in particular the *Pentheus*, as the hypothesis by Aristophanes of Byzantium to the *Bacchae* bears witness. That the dream of Clytemnestra in the *Choephoroe* was fashioned from a previous creation of the dramatist thus seems to me very probable — even though the crumpling of a nipple by a snake has the grim neatness that is likely to suggest itself independently to a strong imagination. (Having transformed himself into "the subtlest beast of all the field," the Satan of *Paradise Lost* 9.581-582 speaks of fruit more desirable than "sweetest Fennel, or the Teats of Ewe or Goat dropping with Milk at Ev'n," and the identical jointure in *Antony and Cleopatra* 5.2.308-309 is a haunting extension of Plutarch's hint that the asp left no mark upon the sensuous flesh.)⁵

In the *Oresteia* of Stesichorus, Clytemnestra dreams of a snake, its crest besmeared with blood, from which appears a scion of Pleisthenes.

The debt of Aeschylus to his lyric precursor is obvious, but hardly less so is his innovation, the homologue of a Dionysiac episode postulated in the corpus now lost. Romulus (*Aen.* 1.275) and his ancestor Aeneas (*Aen.* 4.367) may have imbibed from foster mothers the mana of wolves or tigers; conversely, the *dévôte* who suckles a beast becomes *entheos* and akin to the beast. The phantasm that terrifies Clytemnestra is an iconic mark of her own character and anticipates her metempsychosis. Cassandra had named her an amphisbaena (*Ag.* 1233); Orestes had spoken of the adder that slew the eagle (*Cho.* 248–249). The serving women later urge him to become a Perseus (*Cho.* 831–832),⁶ and hail his destruction of the serpent pair, after he has butchered his mother with her alter ego (*Cho.* 1047). Immediately he sees an ensemble of Gorgons encrusted with snakes: Clytemnestra is transmuted and multiplied before him visually.⁷ Then the perspective changes during the entr'acte. The antagonistic elements within Orestes' mind become manifest and struggle to possess him as in a morality play. The serpentine woman he has slain is a spectral dragoness (*Eum.* 128) who arouses the projections of herself.

The suckling beast is a recurrent sign of violence. Iphigenia is raised as a kid to the altar (*Ag.* 232) to requite the portent of the eagles' feast, because Artemis delights in "the groping dewdrops of raging lions and the *philomastois* of all wild things" (*Ag.* 141–142). The Argive Elders return to the dark phrasing of the seer, as they relate an allegory about the youngster of a lion, taken from its milk and *philomaston*, which a certain man nursed in his home (*Ag.* 717–719). The cub is held in the arms like a newborn child (*Ag.* 723–724), as gazelles and the whelps of wolves are held by Bacchantes (*Eur. Bacch.* 699–702), but in time repays its nurture in an unbidden banquet, bespattering the house with blood and giving anguish to the householders. Finally Clytemnestra dreams of a snake at her breast and the aftermath is not dissimilar. She is slain herself and her shades consequently mark Orestes as their own victim, not to be slaughtered at an altar but to be a feast alive (*Eum.* 304–305). Guilt is transmitted along an intricate catena of relationships, and one crime darkly mirrors its causal antecedent. In the palace doorway a man and a woman twice lie slain at the feet of an avenger (*Ag.* 1372ff, *Cho.* 973ff). The feast of Thyestes is likewise ceaselessly atoned for and prepared anew; the interchange of bestial with human young is shattering and persistent. As well as a possibly formalized presage of what is to come, the vision of Clytemnestra is a paraphrase of much that is anterior, a climax of sustained and powerful preoccupation.

Orestes might have been incompletely exonerated by the dry legalism of the close. Though the mother is alleged to be no parent but only the host of the implanted seed (*Eum.* 658–659), he would still retain the lion cub's debt for its *tropheia*, had not a counter-argument been developed dramatically, beyond his awareness but to our own intellectual satisfaction. Clytemnestra assumed she was visited by a straightforward Homeric or Stesichorean premonition, in which Agamemnon reached toward her through the person of his natural ally. Orestes came to this interpretation himself (*Cho.* 540–550), and accomplished the seemingly prescribed retribution, though troubled by the bosom bared for pity (*Cho.* 896–899). But in actuality he had already been shown as innocent of any deed against his *tropheia*. For the gentle and humdrum reminiscence of the nurse revealed her as not merely the former *nutricia* of Orestes but his *nutrix*.⁸ At one time the nurse was known in the poem of Stesichorus, as declares the scholium on *Cho.* 733, and I should like to believe that Aeschylus recast her role, not otherwise than he reshaped the nightmare itself.

II

The authority that Aeschylus exercised upon those who came later was very great indeed; his debt to those who had gone before was by no means negligible; less evident but reasonably conjectured is a further profit he derived from autodidacticism. Because the priestess in *Eumenides* 48–51 compares the Erinyes with Gorgons and Harpies, the beldames known to us are likely to have dominated the *Phorcides* and *Phineus*. Now altered entirely in name and role, they have imperceptibly changed in appearance. Apollo threatens them with a winged glistening snake (*Eum.* 181), a weapon different in species from its target, for though the Erinyes have snakes in their hair (Pausanias 1.28.6) they are themselves wingless and black (*Eum.* 51–52). A repugnant dramatic coterie, they were nevertheless familiar, since women deranged and deformed, likewise with snakes in their hair, had danced in the *Edonians*, the *Bassarae*, the *Trophoi*, the Aeschylean *Bacchae*, the *Xantriae*, and the *Pentheus*. The tragedian solved an exigent problem by refurbishing forms with which he was familiar, and the Erinyes owe their dramatic origin, as do even the Gorgons and Harpies, to thiasoi of Bacchantes by the same creator.

Dionysiac myths were rather easily turned into plays because a splendid role for the chorus was not far to seek, but most other subjects lent themselves to oppressively stylized assemblies of commentators.

A dramatist regarded his chorus as a single-minded actor whenever possible, but was usually compelled to cast mere sympathetic observers, whose caricature in Housman's "Fragment of a Greek Tragedy" is recognizable. All choric roles were as susceptible to reworking as were the traditional legends themselves, but the resultant similarity of roles did not cause the legends to contaminate each other, for the Bassaræ and Trophoi were not more identical than were the Elders of Persia and Argos. The spectacle of the *Eumenides* likewise does not distract from Orestes toward a bizarre consideration of an altogether irrelevant Pentheus, and the Erinyes have the stamp of Bacchantes only because Aeschylus found how his study of a curse might conclude with a chorus of participants.

Such speculation is to a moderate extent supported by posterior evidence. A. Baumeister observes that in the visual arts Erinyes and Bacchantes are sometimes hard to distinguish; both wear snakes in their hair, both are apt to carry wands or torches, and their clothing is often of a kind.⁹ A sculptured Erinyes in the *Enciclopedia dell'arte antica* s.v. "Erinni" resembles the classical descriptions of a Bacchante. Jane Harrison speaks of a Bacchante on a red-figured vase who has been taken for an Erinyes,¹⁰ and Hetty Goldman discusses a Volute Crater on which Orestes and an Erinyes associate with a Bacchante who is a baffling visitor unless she is herself an Erinyes in actuality.¹¹ The lack of visually discernible difference between the two forms seems in fact to comment upon a Virgilian simile (*Aen.* 4.469) where Pentheus demented sees not the Bacchantes but the Eumenides, that is, Erinyes. The forms may have been identified or confused even verbally. The Minyades in Aelian (*Hist. Var.* 3.42) are disinclined to join other women in bacchanalia, and as punishment are scourged with a spontaneous generation of snakes. Now mad, they rip apart one of their own children as if he were a fawn, then rush eagerly to join the other maenads, or Bacchantes, but are pursued by them in consequence of the pollution. The story is strange because the sparagmos, which would normally end the Dionysiac trace, seems to stimulate the Minyades toward further revelry, and the townswomen may plausibly be thought offended because the sacrifice, a sacred act when preceded by dancing and other formalized preparation, was executed in impious isolation from the ritual. Nevertheless, the Bacchantes do resemble Erinyes exacting vengeance for kindred bloodshed.

If in truth mythographers came to regard the names as interchangeable, the influence of artists upon the literary tradition was possibly more vigorous than one would have thought. In painting and sculpture

the similarity of Erinyes to Bacchantes is less remarkable, though still of sufficient interest to warrant a brief quest for their earliest connection, which I would suggest as the dramaturgy of the *Oresteia*. Apollo describes the Erinyes as *margous*, "furiosas" (*Eum.* 67), much as Bacchantes might be named in another situation. Both are maenads in the broad sense of the word, the Erinyes being a kind of *βροτοσκόπων μαινάδων*, *soi-disantes*, as in *Eumenides* 499-500. They are certainly not confessed Bacchantes, but they do resemble their postulated prototypes, in comportment as in lineament, for they mark Orestes as the victim of their ceremony, as might hags in a Dionysiac laceration. I should agree that the trilogy concludes with the finest choric role the theater has seen; I would argue only that Aeschylus planned the role for a cast he had used before.

The snake of the dream is by no means immediately perceptible in terms of Clytemnestra rather than Orestes, and even at length the identification is less demonstrated than suggested. But there is an essential accord among the rational significance of Cilissa's monologue, the accumulation of metaphors for Clytemnestra, and the nature of her reappearance as Erinyes. Whether the ambiguities and ironic delusions of Euripides' *Bacchae*¹² were anticipated by the *Pentheus* is thoroughly unknown; whether the multivalent allusions of the *Oresteia* were developed earlier is yet more remote. What one can perceive is the dream in its manifold relevance. The adder that slew the eagle sees her death from the snake she bore and suckled (*Cho.* 928); the slayer of the serpent-woman finds a throng of Gorgons in his tracks.

III

The Homeric Apollo is perhaps above all a god of archery. Pandarus pledges him a hecatomb before releasing the shaft that breaks the truce (*Il.* 4.119), from a similar promise he influences the marksmanship in the Funeral Games (*Il.* 23.863-876), and upon his feast day the bow is strung in Ithaca (*Od.* 21.258). His traditional epithets are accurate, for he impels arrows of pestilence toward the Achaean host (*Il.* 1.40-52), Idas takes up the bow for suitable combat against him (*Il.* 9.559), and Hector dead lies like one slain by his bow of silver (*Il.* 24.758). But the god of archery is at the same time and without change a god of healing. He answers the supplication of Glaucus (*Il.* 16.528-529), and it is to him that the decimated Achaeans sing the paean (*Il.* 1.473-474), rather than to the divinity of that very name, who will balm the pain of Hades and Ares (*Il.* 5.401-402-5.900-901) and propagate the healing

race of Egypt (*Od.* 4.232). Apollo is the father of Asclepius (Hom. Hymn Asclep.), and hence the grandfather of Machaon and Podaleirius (*Il.* 2.731-732), the battlefield healers of their comrades, except when Eurypylos seeks out Patroclus, the friend of the student of Chiron (*Il.* 11.828-835).

J. Huizinga observes that certain Christian saints who were believed to cure specific maladies, such as St. Anthony and St. Vitus, became in high medieval times associated with the cause of the maladies: "As soon as the thought of the disease, charged with feelings of horror and fear, presented itself to the mind, the thought of the saint sprang up at the same instant. How easily, then, did the saint himself become the object of this fear, so that to him was ascribed the heavenly wrath that unchained the scourge. Instead of unfathomable divine justice, it was the anger of the saint which seemed the cause of the evil and required to be appeased."¹³ Apollo is graced by the analogous and opposite extension of character. At first a destroyer as his ancient titles indicate, he is before long regarded as the source of remedy, for he takes the name of an obsolescent Paeon as a sobriquet, and men who would practice his art pronounce the oath, "I swear by Apollo the Physician." Resident at Delphi he discerns the existence of pollution and prescribes the requisite cure, thus becoming a lawgiver as well as a ritualist, and he further enjoins harmony by alternating his bow with a lyre (*Il.* 1.603, Hom. Hymn Ap. 201, Hom. Hymn Hermes 496, and in visual representations). The earlier concept of Apollo as nemesis survives, chiefly in the performances of the Homeric rhapsodists, but seems an archaism or memory in the age of the *Oresteia*.

The entire available Aeschylean corpus is a warranted explicator of its several parts: as certain choric roles in all probability bore mutual resemblance, many items of thought received expression more than once. Because the scholium on *Iliad* 22.351 tells that the ransom for Hector was visually weighed out in the *Phrygians*, the description of Ares as a merchant trading bodies for gold reaches beyond its context of *Agamemnon* 437ff. The figure of the Danaides as doves in *Prometheus* 857 is extended from *Supplices* 224, and the words of Aphrodite in Nauck Aeschylus *frag.* 44 are akin to the resolution of the *Eumenides*. Since Pelasgus in *Supplices* 263-267 relates that Apis, the son of Apollo and an *iatromantis*, purged the territory of the swarming serpents which bloody deeds caused to arise from the earth, the language of the priestess in *Eumenides* 62-63 seems to possess uncommon significance and even sanctity, for she speaks of Apollo as an *iatromantis* and seer who purges homes of miasma. In their conception of a healer and magus, with

power over Erinyes manifested as snakes, the passages are similar if not congruent. The final surviving instance of the word is the sardonic inversion of *Agamemnon* 1623, where the textual note of Eduard Fraenkel is persuasive in its suggestion of blasphemy, as Aegisthus declares to the Argive Elders that chains and starvation will be the *iatromanteis* to their old age.

In the earlier part of the trilogy the extirpation of the family appears inevitable from the raw and capricious Homeric Olympianism which governs the world. A vindictive Apollo or Pan or Zeus sends ruin toward Troy (*Ag.* 55–56), Apollo has maimed the *manteia* of Cassandra before bringing her to the block (*Ag.* 1270–77), and his injunction to execute Clytemnestra (*Cho.* 900–901) is likely to destroy Orestes. But in the third play the winged glistening snake drawn against the Erinyes (*Eum.* 181) is an instrument of surgery, precisely as was the arrow that slew the Python warding Delphi (Hom. Hymn Ap. 357). The implications of the word *iatromantis* were an enduring segment of Aeschylean belief, and the contrast between a benign and a malevolent Apollo, which may be extrapolated from the *Iliad*, is central to the theology of the *Oresteia*, as to its development in the theater. Though he engages in the wrangling and flytings of the courtroom (*Eum.* 614–673), Apollo ultimately defends sobriety against maenadism.

Should the overlord have sacrificed his daughter or his fleet? Should a man punish or relent when the felon is his mother? Is blood-guilt or righteousness the more deeply rooted? τί τῶνδ' ἄνευ κακῶν; Both contestants upon the final dilemma confidently favor the due process of justice,¹⁴ and the Areopagus is established to decide questions of homicide, the year of the play being a handsome moment for the sanctification of the tribunal, since its powers had recently been curtailed by Ephialtes. But the disputation proves of dramatic interest rather than metaphysical profundity, for the begetting of the judge provides a rhetorical thrust against the matrilineal plaintiffs, and incidentally dignifies the eupatridae including Aeschylus himself, yet can hardly be thought to urge an issue of political consequence. The imbroglio cannot indeed admit juridical resolution; Zeus is incriminated but Orestes is unabsolved. He must be released as an innocent in conscience, for any other outcome is repugnant, but the Erinyes cannot be defeated under the law, and the panel of citizens is unable to make a clear ruling. The acquittal is determined not on the merits of the case but by the foresight of Athene. She compels the old era to close, the cause of Orestes is successful, Zeus is rendered secure in his dominion, the Erinyes become tutelary deities, the tale of a familial curse becomes a civic saga.

Reconciliation has been reached without compromise; satisfaction is plenary and will be lasting; the tragedy is completed without the expected calamity.

Verbal and momentary catachresis or metaphor is no very rare commodity: the *Kḗres ἀναπλάκῃτοι* of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* 472 are perhaps Erinyes in conventional terminology; "the blind Fury with th' abhorred shears" in "Lycidas" 75 is certainly the Fate Atropos. Far more difficult to exemplify is such intellectual and continuous syncretism as the association of the Erinyes with the Eumenides and then with the Semnai. The latter pair of terms are synonymous designations in Sophocles' *Oedipus of Colonus* for the genii at Colonus, who have no crucial connection with their counterparts localized in Athens by the *Oresteia*. The former pair of terms are synonymous a good deal more widely, as in Euripides' *Orestes* 38 and 321 where the chorus speaks euphemistically, or in *Aeneid* 6.280 and 6.375 where the likelihood of euphemism is slight. That Aeschylus was the terminal cause of this interchangeability is not removed from doubt, particularly because the Eumenides receive no mention within the text of the trilogy, but the identification of the Erinyes with the Semnai does seem a creation never anticipated. Homeless spirits of imprecation enter into residence nearby the theater itself, and upon their name as august goddesses will one swear before the Areopagus in times to come (Dinarchus, *Against Demosthenes* 46-47).¹⁵ "If then one should ask, 'What has this to do with Apollo?' we shall say that it concerns him and Dionysus as well" (Plutarch, *The E at Delphi* 388 E).

IV

The Aristotelian derivation of tragedy may be wrong,¹⁶ but cannot be censured as altogether unreasonable, since Bacchylides 18 (17) is a dithyramb in dramatic form, though rather late for admissible evidence about origins. Archilochus *frag.* 77 speaks of the dithyramb as a song to Dionysus, who is therefore not inconceivably associated with tragedy, especially if the word denotes a goat-song or a spelt-song.¹⁷ From the time of Peisistratus the Greater Dionysia were the occasion of the poetic competition, which was observed by a statute of the god previously borne into the theatre, and Dionysus was further honored with sacrifice, though we lack cause for supposing his victims human, as they were before the battle of Salamis (Plut. *Pelopidas* 21). The fact that phalloi were ceremoniously prominent is more difficult for us to accept wholeheartedly than the legend that Dionysus once spoke to

Aeschylus in a dream and bade him compose (Pausanias 1.21.3). Which myths were first enacted cannot be named with certitude, but there may be truth in the report that spectators eventually grumbled, "Nothing to do with Dionysus."

The Golden Bough was no doubt responsible for the anthropological literary criticism of Gilbert Murray, who believed that Greek tragedy resurrected the Eniautos Daimon year after year under a variety of masks. The insufficiency of this theory was demonstrated by A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, and Murray forthrightly assented to the argument brought against him, though with reluctance to think he had been misled altogether. T. B. L. Webster has restored the inoperative sacer ludus as a more pliable tragic rhythm,¹⁸ and I would reach a similar though narrower conclusion from considering practical dramaturgy. If the dismemberment of Dionysus was ever a spectacle in cult worship, the scenario would lend itself readily to plays about Pentheus, Lycurgus, Orpheus, perhaps also Osiris, Marsyas, and others. Convenience alone caused the similarity among several Aeschylean works recorded by title. With the replacement of names they are variations of each other and of a presumptive if incompletely describable prototype, which instituted the lyric dance indifferently appropriate to the greater number of tragedies, except within the severe circumscription of custom.

From Euripides' *Bacchae* and other indications of the Dionysiac rites, the scope of the *Pentheus* can be roughly estimated, one of the probable elements being the suckling of a beast by a woman. Such an episode might subsequently have suggested to its creator a bold modification of the dream from Stesichorus, which retains the nature of an omen in the *Choephoroe* but at the same time suggests the bestiality of maenadism. The feelings of Clytemnestra are not those of a mother, but she is aware of her motherhood as indisputable fact, and finds herself unnerved by the pathological nightmare. At the end of the second play and throughout the third, by a condign metamorphosis seemingly Dionysiac, she takes the likeness of the creature she had nursed, and becomes hallucinatory Gorgons who would suck the blood of Orestes. Their binding spell is possibly a relic from a very early kind of tragedy,¹⁹ and they execute one of the few successful choric roles in the genre. The dramatist assigned a new task to the familiar and effective tribe of Bacchantes; the madwomen associated with Pentheus, Lycurgus, Orpheus, are changed in little more than appellation. The expectation of a Dionysiac sparagmos in the *Eumenides* is not fulfilled, for an iatromantis purges the land of the Erinyes appearing as snakes, a conception expressed in the *Supplices* here becoming dramatic. The maenadism of an antique

legal code is undone, and hostility is replaced by amicability. In significance the *Oresteia* is exceedingly remote from a Dionysiac passion play; as a work for the theater it may now and then resemble a putative ancestor.

NOTES

1. I am extremely grateful for the year at the Center for Hellenic Studies during which this paper was written. John Gould has sharpened my thinking on a few matters. I would also mention the profound reading of the *Oresteia* by my teacher C. M. Dawson. Previous remarks of mine on the trilogy appear in *AJP* 82 (1961) 78ff and *TAPA* 89 (1958) 271ff.

2. E.g. by K. Deichgräber, "Die Lykurgie des Aischylos." *Nachrichten v. d. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, n.s. vol. 3, no. 8, p. 236.

3. C. O. Müller, *Denkmäler der alten Kunst*, continued by Friedrich Wieseler (Göttingen 1854-56), vol. 2, fasc. 3, p. 1, and table 46, plate 579.

4. R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Euripides and Dionysus* (Cambridge, England 1948) 92 and 157; E. R. Dodds ed. *Euripides, Bacchae*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1960), n. on lines 699-702.

5. Masaaki Kubo calls my attention to these astonishing lines from the soprano aria toward the beginning of the Bach *St. Matthew Passion*: "Ach, ein Kind, das du erzogen, das an deiner Brust gesogen, droht den Pfleger zu ermorden, denn es ist zur Schlange worden."

6. In visual representation Orestes is attacked by a pair of Erinyes, one of them holding "a mirror that reflects the image of his murdered mother," whom he may therefore have slain as Perseus slew the Gorgon: Hetty Goldman, "The *Oresteia* as Illustrated by Greek Vase Painting," *HSCP* 21 (1910) 153.

7. See Herbert Weir Smyth, *Aeschylean Tragedy* (Univer. of California 1924) 217, and George Thomson, *Æschylus and Athens*, 2nd ed. (London 1950), 275.

8. Robert F. Goheen, "Aspects of Dramatic Symbolism", *AJP* 76 (1955) 132-137; see also Thomson, *Æschylus and Athens*, 2nd ed., p. 272.

9. *Denkmäler des klassischen Altertums* (Munich and Leipzig 1885-88), s.v. "Erinyen" and "Mainaden."

10. *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Meridian Books reprint 1955) 399.

11. *HSCP* 21 (1910) 152.

12. See Dodds ed. *Bacchae*, n. on lines 987-990, and Winnington-Ingram, *Euripides and Dionysus*, p. 70.

13. *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (Anchor reprint 1956) 173.

14. See K. J. Dover, "The Political Aspect of Aeschylus's *Eumenides*," *JHS* 77 (1957) 230-231, on *Eum.* 490-493.

15. For this reference I am indebted to John J. Keaney.

16. See Gerald F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957) 143-163, on *Poet.* 48b34-49a15.

17. See Harrison (above, n.10.) 415-423.

18. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*, 2nd ed., revised by Webster (Oxford 1962) 126-129, which sums up the differences of opinion.

19. Thomson, *Æschylus and Athens*, 2nd ed., p. 186.

VERBAL PATTERNS IN HESIOD'S *THEOGONY*

BY CORA ANGIER

LIKE all orally composed poetry, the *Theogony* of Hesiod contains a great amount of repetition. Such repetition could often, doubtless, be random and meaningless in the hands of a less skillful singer, but when used by an organizing and classifying mind such as that of Hesiod it contributes greatly to the over-all organization of the poem.

The repetition is of various sorts. It may consist in key words, expressive of key concepts, which keep recurring throughout the whole poem or a major section of it. Limited to smaller sections of the poem and used in a concentrated way this repetition, often involving word-play, sometimes gives the impression that the composer gets a certain idea in mind and plays on it, using various forms of the same word and idea, each word suggested by the preceding. Sometimes the repetition is more simply syntactical; a syntactical pattern is established in a passage, as in the case of anaphora. Often organizing particles and pronouns or like inflectional forms are repeated (usually in identical metrical positions) rather than words expressive of key concepts. Related to this is the use of assonantal patterns (often occurring through the use of identical inflectional forms) which may also end up in word-play and punning. Finally, the most important type of repetition for the structural organization of the poem and that which is most particularly due to the oral technique, is the repetition of lines, or substantially similar lines, or even sets of several lines, especially in the device known as ring-composition, by which there is a return at the end of a section to the subject of the beginning, and the mind of the hearer is brought back to the point from which it originally left.

Of the first category of repetitions, the most important for the *Theogony* is that of words for birth and origin. These include forms of γένος, γίγνομαι, γείνομαι, φύλον, τίκτω, τέκνον, and so on (forms of γίγνομαι, τίκτω and words from these roots 134 times); such formulae as μιγεῖσ' ἐρατῇ φιλότῃτι. One might also include such words as τεύχω (e.g., τετεύχατο, v. 581, used of the making of "Pandora's"¹ crown and τεῦξε, v. 585, of the making of "Pandora" herself), and, as

connected with "birth" and "growth" one could mention forms of *τρέφω* (ten instances).

Another concept and set of words important to the whole of the *Theogony* is that of *τιμή* and *γέρας*. Not only is the *Theogony* a chronicle of the birth of the gods but it is also the story of how they acquired their positions in the divine hierarchy. Hence words connected with "office," "function," or "honor" keep recurring throughout the poem (twenty-nine instances of forms of *γέρας*, *τιμή*, *τιμάω*, *τίω*).

Another idea which keeps recurring throughout the dynastic struggles of the gods is the important part played by the figure of Earth, especially in the phrase *Γαίης φραδμοσίνησι*. Mother Earth not only is the mother of many of the characters and creatures in the poem, but she is back of the divine revolutions against Ouranos and Kronos, suggests bringing back the Hundred-Arms to help the children of Kronos against the Titans (vv. 626-28), suggests giving Zeus the headship of the gods (v. 884), and suggests that Zeus swallow Metis pregnant with Athene (v. 891).

The Prologue contains certain key words which occur in it with frequency but not (at least significantly) in the rest of the *Theogony*.² The most important of these is the idea of singing (ten instances of forms of *αοιδή*, *αοιδός*, *αείδω*, and some thirty³ other expressions referring to song or speech). Connected with this is the idea of the Muses' dancing (chiefly in vv. 1-10 in which there are five expressions; also at vv. 63, 70). Important, too, in this first part of the Prologue, in which the Muses themselves are the subject without relation to anything else,⁴ is the idea of the tenderness of the Muses as creatures. This is conveyed in the phrases *πόσσ' ἀπαλοῖσιν* (v. 3), *τέρενα χρώα* (v. 5), and *καλούς ἡμερόεντας* (v. 8) and also suggested by the phrase *περικαλλέα ὄσσαν ἐείσαι*.⁵

In the same way, the idea of evil and misfortune for mankind runs through the Prometheus story. Forms of the word *κακός* occur ten times in the story, and the idea is reinforced by synonyms (e.g., *πῆμα*, v. 592; *ἔργων* | *ἀργαλέων*, vv. 601-2; *μέρμερα ἔργα γυναικῶν*, v. 603; *ὀλοὸν . . . γῆρας*, v. 604; *αἰάστον ἀνίην*, v. 611). Also running through this story are the words *δόλος* and *δόλιος*, synonyms, and words of related meaning (forms of *δόλος*, *δόλιος*, and synonyms eleven times). The deceit is now practiced by Prometheus on Zeus, now by Zeus on Prometheus.

In the stories of Styx (vv. 383-403)⁶ and of Hekate (vv. 411-52) the idea of *τιμή* and *γέρας* (including related words), one of the central ideas in the *Theogony*, takes on special prominence (twelve instances in the former, fourteen in the latter).

Often a word or its synonyms will keep recurring in an extremely short passage, as if the bard gets an idea into his head and plays with it for a while, exhausting all the possible ways of using a word and its forms, its cognates and synonyms, each phrase suggesting the next in turn. So in the first ten lines of the Prologue the poet plays upon the idea of the delicacy of the Muses, and the notion of the Muses dancing, which keeps recurring in the rest of the Prologue also, is particularly heightened in these lines. Similarly, in vv. 211-13, the idea of birth and race, which is the great central idea of the whole *Theogony*, is heightened by repetition within the space of a few lines:

Νύξ δ' ἔτεκεν στυγερόν τε Μόρον καὶ Κῆρα μέλαιναν
καὶ Θάνατον, τέκε δ' Ὑπνον, ἔτικτε δὲ φῦλον Ὀνειρώων
 — οὐ τινι κοιμηθεῖσα θεὰ τέκε Νύξ ἐρεβεννή —

in which the repetition of *Νύξ* and the repetition of the verb *after* the names also make this an example of ring-composition.

Another example of this sort is the description of the birth of "mild" Leto, "gentlest of the Olympians," and of "fair-named" Asterie (vv. 404-10)

Φοίβη δ' αὖ Κοίου πολυήρατον ἦλθεν ἐς εὐνὴν
κυσαμένη δὴ ἔπειτα θεὰ θεοῦ ἐν φιλότῃ
Λητῷ κυανόπεπλον ἐγείνατο, μείλιχον (αἰεί),
μείλιχον (ἐξ ἀρχῆς), ἀγανώτατον ἐντὸς Ὀλύμπου,
ἥπιον ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν.
γείνατο δ' Ἀστερίην εὐώνυμον, ἣν ποτε Πέρσης
ἡγάγετ' ἐς μέγα δῶμα φίλην κεκλήσθαι ἄκοιτιν.

The repetitions in this passage are manifold. The principal repetitions are of words for "lovely," "gentle," "mild," and of words pertaining to "birth." The idea of "always" is repeated in connection with this — *μείλιχον αἰεί* | *μείλιχον ἐξ ἀρχῆς* — where the beginning of one line picks up the end of the last, as also in the following: *ἀγανώτατον ἐντὸς Ὀλύμπου* | *ἥπιον ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν*. The poet also uses here the collocation *θεὰ θεοῦ* (v. 405) which he has used earlier at v. 380: . . . *ἐν φιλότῃ θεὰ θεῶ εὐνηθεῖσα*.

Another example which goes even more into the realm of word-play, play of assonance, and into the tendency to etymologize⁷ that appears throughout the poem is that of vv. 252-55 (in the catalogue of the Nereids):

Κυμοδόκη θ' ἢ κύματ' ἐν ἡεροειδέι πόντῳ
 πνοιᾶς τε ζαέων ἀνέμων σὺν Κυματολήγῃ
 ρεῖα πρηῖνει καὶ εὐσφύρῳ Ἀμφιτρίτῃ
Κυμῷ τ' Ἡϊώνῃ τε εὐστέφανός Ἀλιμήδῃ.

The progression of the first two of these lines is logical: Wave-Receiver waits; the wave itself comes; Wave-Stopper makes it cease.

This whole catalog, in fact, is full of doubles and names suggested by similar names: *Κυμοδόκη* and *Θόη* (v. 245);⁸ *Εὐνίκη* and *Εὐλιμένη* (vv. 246-47); *Δωτώ* and *Πρωτώ* (v. 248); *Νησαίη* and *Ἀκταίη* (v. 249) *Ἴπποθόη* and *Ἴππονόη* (v. 251); *Ληαγόρη*, *Εὐαγόρη*, and *Λαιομέδεια* (v. 257); *Πουλυνόη* and *Ἀυτονόη* (v. 258).

Assonance, alliteration, and juxtaposition of similar-sounding words is frequent, as in the example just cited, in the collocation *θεὰ θεοῦ* cited above, and in vv. 194-95 (in the story of the birth of Aphrodite) *ἄμφι δὲ ποίῃ | ποσσὶν ὑπο ῥαδινοῖσιν ἀέξατο*. Alliteration is not generally thought of in connection with Greek poetry, but it does occur in Hesiod quite often. Another example is in vv. 860-61 (of Zeus striking Typhoeus with his thunderbolt):

οὐρεὸς ἐν βήσσησιν Ἀίτνης παιπαλοέσσης,
πληγέντος. πολλή δὲ πελώρη καίετο γαῖα.

Still another is in vv. 990-91 (of Phaethon)

. . . καὶ μιν ζαθέοις ἐνὶ νηοῖς
νηπόλον νύχιον ποιήσατο, δαίμονα δίον.

Alliteration and assonance are joined with identity in meaning in v. 554 (in the account of Zeus' wrath at Prometheus)

Χώσατο δὲ φρένας ἀμφί, χόλος δέ μιν ἔκετο θυμόν,

in which the second half of the line simply restates the first. Similar is v. 273 on the Graiai, daughters of Phorkys

Πεμφρηδῶ τ' εὐπεπλον Ἐννύ τε κροκόπεπλον.

In vv. 37-39 likeness of sound comes from likeness of inflectional forms and is united with likeness of meaning:

ὑμνεῦσαι τέρπουσι μέγαν νόον ἐντὸς Ὀλύμπου
εἰρεῦσαι τά τ' έόντα τά τ' έσσόμενα πρό τ' έόντα,
φωνῇ όμηρεῦσαι.

A similar case, though lacking the similarity of meaning is vv. 736-37

ἔνθα δὲ γῆς δνοφερῆς καὶ Ταρτάρου ἡερόεντος
πόντου τ' ἀρυγέτοιο καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἄστερόεντος.

Also vv. 684-85:

ὥς ἄρ' ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι ἴεσαν βέλεα στονόεντα
φωνῇ δ' ἀμφοτέρων ἴκετ' οὐρανὸν ἄστερόεντα.

In one case similarity of sound is possibly responsible for a variation in formula. Verses 150-52, on the Hundred-Armed Monsters

τῶν ἑκατὸν μὲν χεῖρες ἀπ' ὤμων αἰσسونτο
ἄπλαστοι, κεφαλαὶ δὲ ἐκάστῳ πεντήκοντα
ἐξ ὤμων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσι

are identical to vv. 671-73, except that the latter, which are applied to the same trio of monsters, have *πᾶσιν ὁμῶς* instead of *ἄπλαστοι*. Since v. 148,

τρεῖς παῖδες μεγάλοι τε καὶ ὄβριμοι, οὐκ ὀνομαστοί,

has a similar structure to that of the first sentence of the other passage — the adjective in apposition tacked on at the end, although the metrical position of the similar words *ἄπλαστοι, οὐκ ὀνομαστοί* is different — and since the words *ἄπλαστοι* and *οὐκ ὀνομαστοί* are similar in sound and meaning, the bard may have been influenced in his choice of an epithet by the one which he had just used in a similar way. This would account for the difference between v. 151 and v. 672.

Another case in which one can see the poet being led by his train of thought from one expression to another is at vv. 292-4 (of Herakles):

Τίρυνθ' εἰς ἱερὴν διαβὰς πόρον Ὠκεανοῖο
Ὅρθον τε κτείνας καὶ βουκόλον Εὐρυτίωνα
σταθμῷ ἐν ἡερόεντι πέρην κλυτοῦ Ὠκεανοῖο.

It is likely that the expression *πέρην κλυτοῦ Ὠκεανοῖο* was suggested to the poet by *πόρον Ὠκεανοῖο* which he had just used.

One can also watch such a train of thought at the end of the catalogue of Nereids at vv. 261-64

Νησὼ τ' Εὐπόμπη τε Θεμιστώ τε Προνόη τε
Νημερτῆς θ', ἥ πατὴρ ἔχει νόον ἀθανάτοιο.
αὗται μὲν Νηρηῆος ἀμύμονος ἐξεγένοντο
κοῦραι πεντήκοντα, ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυῖαι.

From the names *Θεμιστώ* and *Προνόη* — Lawful and Forethought — he thinks of *Νημερτής* — Infallible — which makes him add ἡ πατὴρ ἔχει νόον ἀθανάτοιο. Because he has the idea of their *wisdom* in his head, he adds that the Nereids are (like *Νηρῆος ἀμύμονος*) ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυῖαι. In the same way, he thinks at v. 233 of *Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα* (an idea which he proceeds to play upon and expand in the lines that follow) because he has just been speaking of Horkos, who punishes those who are *not* truthful. In the case of vv. 878–80 (of the winds which originate from Typhoeus)

αἱ δ' αὖ καὶ κατὰ γαῖαν ἀπείριτον ἀνθεμόεσσαν
 ἔργ' ἔρατὰ φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων
 πιμπλεῖσαι κόνιός τε καὶ ἀργαλέου κολοσυρτοῦ.

the choice of the formula containing the epithet *χαμαιγενέων* is perhaps not only due to metrical convenience, but to the train of thought suggested by the idea of men tilling the earth.⁹

Verbal similarities sometimes almost turn into puns, as in vv. 53–55 (on the birth of the Muses):

τὰς ἐν Πιερίῃ Κρονίδῃ τέκε πατρὶ μιγεῖσα
Μνημοσύνη, γουνοῖσιν Ἑλευθῆρος μεδέουσα,
λημοσύνην τε κακῶν ἄμπαυμά τε μερμηράων

in which there is not only the obvious play of *Μνημοσύνη* | *λημοσύνη* in identical metrical positions, but the repetition of m-sounds also. This is not a case of etymologizing in the sense of claiming that the one word is derived from the other which is similar to it, but the bard doubtless had the same feeling with regard to this pair as he would in the case of actual “etymologies,” that there did, indeed, exist a “real” connection between the one idea and the other, as indicated in the identity of sound in the words.

There are a number of etymologies throughout the *Theogony*, sometimes with the word *ἐπώνυμον*, which Hesiod feels to be true. These are at vv. 139–45 (Kyklopes), 193–200 (Aphrodite), 207–10 (Titans), 252–53 (Kymodoke, Kymatolege; see above), 270–72 (Graiāi), 282–84 (Chrysaor and Pegasos), 775–76 (Styx), 901–3 (Horai). Of these, those for Kymodoke and Kymatolege, Styx (Styx is the river, not the personality), and the Horai are not so much explicit etymologies, since these are obviously derived names and abstractions. The derivation is obvious and need only be emphasized. Verses 886–87 also belong somewhat to this category:

... Μῆτιν
 πλείστα θεῶν τε ἰδυῖαν ἰδὲ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

The derivation in v. 200 of the epithet *φιλομμηδέα* of Aphrodite is particularly interesting as emphasizing what is perhaps an older and less polite form of the more familiar *φιλομμειδής*.

Connections exist in the poet's mind between certain words. The *τιμαί* of Aphrodite are listed in vv. 205-6 as

*παρθενίους δάρους μειδήματά τ' ἑξαπάτας τε
τέρψιν τε γλυκερὴν φιλότητα τε μελιχίην τε.*

This same combination of sex and deceit is shown to be a standardized concept by its appearing in personification among the children of Night at v. 224: . . . *μετὰ τὴν δ' Ἀπάτην τέκε καὶ Φιλότητα*. This is the same attitude that appears in the Prometheus story and with regard to women *passim* in the *Works and Days*.

Another such connection is that in vv. 901-3:

*δευτερον ἡγάγετο λιπαρὴν Θέμιν ἥ τέκεν Ὠρας
Εὐνομίην τε Δίκην τε καὶ Εἰρήνην τεθαυῖαν,
αἱ ἔργ' ὠρεῖουσιν καταθνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι*

where the connection between proper time, work, and justice corresponds to the relation between *Δίκη*, *ἔργα*, and *καιρός*, which is the theme of the *Works and Days*.

Another form of repetition which has a definitely organizing function within a short passage is what could be called syntactical repetition, in which a series of lines exhibit like syntactic arrangement and often share identical pronouns and connecting words, with the like or similar element often falling in the same position metrically. One example, in a catalogue, is vv. 18-20:

*Λητώ τ' Ἰαπετόν τε ἰδὲ Κρόνον ἀγκυλομήτην
Ἥῳ τ' Ἡελιόν τε μέγαν λαμπράν τε Σελήνην
Γαίαν τ' Ὠκεανόν τε μέγαν καὶ Νύκτα μέλαιναν*

in which all three lines have the same structure, the last two using exactly the same formula in the first half, the first lacking the epithet *μέγαν*; the second halves of all use different connectives, but are alike in consisting of a connective plus a noun-epithet group.

Another passage showing similar arrangement but not part of a catalogue, is at vv. 25-29:

*Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,*

The repeated *ἄλλοτε* . . . comes first at the ends of lines, then at the beginnings. This phrase yields to *καί κεν* as an organizational device in the lines that follow. One device suggests another, and the following verses, vv. 839–40

σκληρόν δ' ἐβρόντησε καὶ ὄβριμον (ἀμφὶ δὲ γαῖα)
σμερδαλέον κονάβησε καὶ (οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὑπερθε)

are parallel in thought, syntax (including the adverbial phrases at line ends), and analogous formulae, and are similar in sound. (It is, however, the sound, rather than the syntax, which keys in with the metre.)

Another example of organization by parallel use of pronouns and particles is vv. 871–74 (on the winds which come from Typhoeus as opposed to helpful winds):

οἷ γε μὲν ἐκ θεόφιν γενέη, θνητοῖς μέγ' ὄνειαρ
οἷ δ' ἄλλοι μαψαῦραι ἐπιπνέουσιν θάλασσαν
αἷ δὴ τοι πίπτουσαι ἐς ἡεροειδέα πόντον.

Organization by repetition of more important words at the beginning of lines is achieved at vv. 298–99 (of Echidna):

ἦμισυ μὲν νύμφην ἐλικώπιδα καλλιπάρηρον,
ἦμισυ δ' αὖτε πέλωρον ὄφιν δεινόν τε μέγαν τε.

A less exact corresponson between syntax and metre, but where the corresponson is rather between sound and cognate word and metre, joined with use of alliteration, is found at vv. 637–38 (just following the highly symmetrical passage analyzed above):

οὐδέ τις ἦν (ἔριδος) χαλεπῆς λύσις οὐδὲ (τελευτῇ)
οὐδετέροις, ἴσον δὲ (τέλος) τέτατο (πτολέμοιο.)

The similarity of first words in the lines is due to enjambment (as in vv. 839–40, see above), but the second line is virtually synonymous with the first.¹¹

The most important type of repetition for the total structure of the poem is the repetition of entire lines, or substantial portions of lines, especially in the device of ring-composition. By this device the mind of the hearer is recalled after a digression, anecdote, catalogue, or the like by a repetition, exactly or (more usually) substantially, of the lines which

introduced the section. An example of such a re-echo of an incomplete sort is the similarity between vv. 1-2:

Μουσάων ('Ελικωνιάδων) ἀρχώμεθ' αἰίδειν
αἶθ' ('Ελικῶνος) ἔχουσιν ὄρος μέγα τε ζάθεόν τε

and vv. 22-23:

αἶ νύ ποθ' 'Ησίοδον καλήν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν,
ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ' ('Ελικῶνος) ὑπο ζαθέοιο.

Intervening between these pairs of lines is the description of the Muses and the catalogue of what they sing. One pair begins the description of the Muses; the other begins the account of their teaching Hesiod to sing. Each pair mentions Helikon; the first line of each ends in αἰίδειν / ἀοιδή (which is usually localized in this part of the line), the second in a form of ζάθεος (also usually localized in this part of the line). Each has a relative clause modifying the Muses beginning a line with αἶ plus an enclitic. The second pair is resumptive of the narrative after the catalogue.

So also the end of the Muses' song and their meeting of Hesiod (vv. 21-25)

ἄλλων τ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἑόντων.
αἶ νύ ποθ' 'Ησίοδον καλήν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν
Μοῦσαι 'Ολυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο

are picked up after the end of their speech when they give Hesiod the laurel spray and inspire him with song (vv. 29-34)

ὥς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι
ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μ' ἀοιδήν
θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρὸ τ' ἑόντα.
καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὕμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἑόντων
σφάς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν αἰίδειν

and by the fresh invocation to the Muses at v. 38:

εἰρεῦσαι τά τ' ἑόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρὸ τ' ἑόντα.¹²

An example of repetition with closer corresponson is that of v. 138:

δεινότατος παίδων θαλερόν δ' ἡχθηρε τοκῆα

and v. 155,

δεινότατοι παίδων, σφετέρῳ δ' ἤχθοντο τοκῇι.

The first of these refers to Kronos, the second to all the children of Gaia and Ouranos. The first comes at the end of one of the barer sort of catalogue, consisting mostly of names;¹³ the second resumes the narrative after the insertion of passages on the Kyklopes and the Hundred-Armed Monsters. The formula δεινότατος παίδων of Kronos is somewhat more logical, describing him as "most terrible" of the children of Ouranos who have been named in the catalogue, whereas δεινότατοι παίδων in v. 155 can only be generalizing — "very terrible among offspring."

The story of the vengeance of Kronos is bound together by the repetition of lines and formulae. In v. 158 the poet says of Ouranos . . .
κακῶ δ' ἐπετέρπετο ἔργῳ.

In vv. 164–68 Gaia speaks:

(παῖδες) ἐμοὶ καὶ πατρός ἀτασθάλον, αἶ κ' ἐθέλητε
πείσασθαι, πατρός κε κακὴν τεισαίμεθα λώβην
ὑμετέρου· πρότερος γὰρ αἰκέα μῆσατο ἔργα.
ὥς φάτο. (τοὺς δ' ἄρα πάντας ἔλεν δέος), οὐδέ τις αὐτῶν
φθέγγατο.

Finally Kronos answers (vv. 170–73):

(μῆτερ), ἐγὼ κεν τοῦτό γ' ὑποσχόμενος τελέσαιμι
ἔργον, ἐπεὶ πατρός γε δυσωνύμου οὐκ ἀλεγίζω
ἡμετέρου· πρότερος γὰρ αἰκέα μῆσατο ἔργα:
ὥς φάτο· (γῆθησεν δὲ μέγα φρεσὶ Γαίᾳ πελώρη).

Of the two long passages the second is an answer to the first (substituting μῆτερ for παῖδες, ἡμετέρου for ὑμετέρου). Each ends with a description (introduced by ὥς φάτο) of the reaction of the other party.

In the two stories in which a king of the gods swallows or tries to swallow a possible successor there is repetition, but it is purely resumptive, not question and answer. The story of Zeus being saved from eating by Kronos is bound together by repeated lines and words which bind the sections together. Kronos eats his children because

πεύθετο γὰρ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος
οὐνεκα οἱ πέπρωτο ἑῷ ὑπὸ παιδὶ δαμῆναι (vv. 463–64)

When Rhea is about to give birth to Zeus, she likewise consults Gaia and Ouranos, asking for advice on how to circumvent Kronos:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Δί' ἔμελλε θεῶν πατέρ' ἡδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν
τέξεσθαι, τότε ἔπειτα φίλους λιτάνευε τοκῆας
τοὺς αὐτῆς Γαίαν τε καὶ Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα
μητὶν συμφράσασθαι . . .

οἱ δὲ θυγατρὶ φίλῃ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἡδ' ἐπίθοντο,
καὶ οἱ πεφραδέτην, ὅσα περ πέπρωτο γενέσθαι. (vv. 468-75)

The line which tells how Zeus was rescued

πέμψαν δ' ἐς Λύκτον, Κρήτης ἐς πίονα δήμον (v. 477)

prompts the poet to expand, and he begins the amplification also with "when she was about to give birth . . ."

ὀππότ' ἄρ' ὀπλότατον παίδων τέξεσθαι ἔμελλε
Ζῆνα μέγαν.

The many formulaic correspondences between the story of Kronos' attempting to swallow Zeus and Zeus' swallowing Metis pregnant with Athene (vv. 886-900) indicate that these are oral variants of one type-scene. The latter episode is divided roughly into two parts, the break occurring at approximately v. 894. At this point the poet starts over again, and one part is a variant of the other, with the same formulae occurring in each.

- 886 Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεὺς πρώτην ἄλοχον θέτο Μητὶν
πλείστα θεῶν τε ἰδυῖαν ἰδὲ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ἄρ' ἔμελλε θεῶν γλαυκῶπιν Ἀθήνην
τέξεσθαι, τότε ἔπειτα δόλῳ φρένας ἐξαπατήσας
890 αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισιν ἐὼν ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν
Γαίης φραδομοσύνησι καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος.
τῶς γάρ οἱ φρασάτην ἵνα μὴ βασιληίδα τιμὴν
ἄλλος ἔχῃ Διὸς ἀντὶ θεῶν αἰετιγενετῶν.
ἐκ γὰρ τῆς εἵμαρτο περίφρονα τέκνα γενέσθαι
895 πρώτην μὲν κούρην γλαυκῶπιδα Τριτογένειαν
ἴσον ἔχουσαν πατρὶ μένος καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἄρα παῖδα θεῶν βασιλῆα καὶ ἀνδρῶν
ἤμελλεν τέξεσθαι, ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ ἔχοντα
ἀλλ' ἄρα μιν Ζεὺς πρόσθεν ἐὼν ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν,
900 ὥς δὴ οἱ φράσσαιτο θεὰ ἀγαθὸν τε κακόν τε.

The Prometheus story is likewise bound together with such repetitions, to an even more complex degree. Compare, for instance, the deceptive sacrifice as offered by Prometheus, as discovered by Zeus, and as henceforth offered by man:

τῷ δ' αὐτ' ὅστέα λευκὰ βοὸς δολίῃ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ
εὐθετίσας κατέθηκε καλύψας ἀργέτι δημῷ. (vv. 540-41)

χώσατο δὲ φρένας ἀμφί, χόλος δέ μιν ἵκετο θυμόν,
ὥς ἴδεν ὅστέα λευκὰ βοὸς δολίῃ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ. (vv. 554-5)

ἐκ τοῦ δ' ἀθανάτοισιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ φύλ' ἀνθρώπων
καίουσ' ὅστέα λευκὰ θυθέντων ἐπὶ βωμῶν. (vv. 556-7)

Zeus' anger and his address to Prometheus when he sees the sacrifice trick and when he pretends to be duped by it are also similar in language, and the words used by the poet of Prometheus' trickery (v. 547, *δολίης δ' οὐ λήθετο τέχνης*) are repeated in Zeus' speech to Prometheus (v. 560):

- 542 δὴ τότε μιν προσέειπε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε
Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων ἀριδείκετ' ἀνάκτων,
ὦ πέπον, ὥς ἑτεροζήλως διεδάσσαι μοίρας.
ὥς φάτο κερτομέων Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μῆδεα εἰδώς
τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε Προμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης
ἦκ' ἐπιμειδήσας, δολίης δ' οὐ λήθετο τέχνης.
- 550 φῆ ῥα δολοφρονέων Ζεὺς δ' ἄφθιτα μῆδεα εἰδώς
γνῶ ῥ' οὐδ' ἡγνοίησε δόλον· κακὰ δ' ὅσσετο θυμῷ
- 558 τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὀχθήσας προσέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς·
Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων πέρι μῆδεα εἰδώς,
ὦ πέπον, οὐκ ἄρα πω δολίης ἐπιλήθεω τέχνης
ὥς φάτο χωόμενος Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μῆδεα εἰδώς.

When the poet substitutes for πάντων ἀριδείκετ' ἀνάκτων (v. 543) the phrase πάντων πέρι μῆδεα εἰδώς (v. 559) in the formulaic line for Prometheus, he is using almost the same phrase for Prometheus that he repeatedly uses of Zeus — Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μῆδεα εἰδώς, with the difference that Zeus' wisdom is immortal, but Prometheus' merely excels that of other men.

Divisions in the story are marked not by explicit logical connectives but by repetition.

The Titanomachia (vv. 617-712) is similarly divided by repetitions. The scheme is as follows:

- (1) The Hundred-Arms, bound κρατερῶ ἐνὶ δεσμῶ (v. 618).
They sit underground

. . . ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης.
ἐνθ' οἳ γ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντες ὑπὸ χθονὶ ναιετάοντες
θητὰ μάλ' ἀχνύμενοι κραδίη μέγα πένθος ἔχοντες.
(vv. 620-23)

- (2) Zeus frees them, on Gaia's advice, because they will help in the war with the Titans, for

θηρὸν γὰρ μάρναντο πόνον θυμαλγέ' ἔχοντες
ἀντίον ἀλλήλοισι διὰ κρατερὰς ὕμνιν
Τιτῆνες τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐξεγένοντο.
(vv. 629, 631, 630)

- (3) The battle lines described:¹⁴

οἳ ῥα τότε ἀλλήλοισι χόλον θυμαλγέ' ἔχοντες
συνεχέως ἐμάχοντο δέκα πλείους ἐνιαυτοῦς. (vv. 635-36)

- (4) Zeus receives the Hundred-Arms and addresses them:

ἦδη γὰρ μάλα θηρὸν ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλοισι
νίκης καὶ κράτεος πέρι μαρνάμεθ' ἡμᾶτα πάντα
Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐκγενόμεσθα.
ὑμεῖς δὲ μεγάλην τε βίην καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους
φαίνετε Τιτῆνεσσιν ἐναντίοι ἐν δαῖτ' ἀνιγρῇ
μνησάμενοι φιλότῃτος ἐνέης, ὅσσα παθόντες
ἐς φάος ἄψ' ἀφίκεσθε δυσηλεγέος ὑπὸ δεσμοῦ
(ἡμετέρας διὰ βουλὰς) ὑπὸ ζόφου ἡερόεντος (vv. 646-53)

- (5) The Hundred-Arms answer:

(σῆσι δ' ἐπιφροσύνῃσιν) ὑπὸ ζόφου ἡερόεντος
ἄφορρον δεῦρ' αὖτις ἀμειλίκτων ὑπὸ δεσμῶν
ῥύθομεν, Κρόνου νιὲ ἀναξ, ἀνάελπτα παθόντες.
(vv. 658-60)

Then comes the battle, and at the close of the fighting

ἐκλίνθη δὲ μάχη· πρὶν δ' ἀλλήλοισ ἐπέχοντες
ἐμμενέως ἐμάχοντο διὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας. (vv. 711-12)

It was shown by Milman Parry that the formulaic technique facilitates the poet's task of thinking of words in which to express his thought quickly, as he goes along. As one can see from the examples in this paper, examples in the *Theogony* which I consider most striking, the repetition which is a feature of this technique can also serve as an organizing device, to mark divisions of the narrative and remind the audience of the point of departure for an episode, and also to emphasize certain key ideas, and in this way also impart unity to the composition. The oral poet does not say in a reasoning way "This is a fundamental idea," or "This is my main point," or "This is the connection between these things"; he simply repeats the words over again.

NOTES

For this paper I have used the text of the *Theogony* as printed in Rzach's edition of 1913, but without bracketing any of the lines which he brackets. In passages quoted, I have sometimes had recourse, in addition to the usual broken and unbroken underlining of formulaic analysis, to the use of parentheses to mark instances of recurring ideas or subject-matter, as opposed to simple recurrence of words.

1. Neither the name Pandora nor the etymologizing myth behind it occurs in the *Theogony*. I simply use the name for convenience.

2. Exceptions in the case of "song" are in a similar context: v. 917 ἀοιδῆς also referring to the Muses, and vv. 965 and 1021 in the smaller prologues to the Muses introducing respectively the genealogies of the offspring of goddesses and the *Ῥοῖαι*.

3. I have followed no strict rule on what I call an "expression," as words and formulae overlap, but have tried to distinguish those which are fairly independent. Hence the figures are approximate.

4. The Prologue, as I see it, presents the Muses in a series of relationships:

vv. 1-10: the Muses *per se*, without reference to gods or men (followed by a catalogue);

vv. 22-34: the Muses as teachers of the poet (followed by transitional line);

vv. 36-74: the Muses in their relationship to other immortals, especially Zeus;

vv. 36-51 (including a catalogue): the Muses as entertainers, especially for Zeus; vv. 52-62: birth of the Muses as daughters of Zeus (followed by digression on the Charites and Himeros); vv. 68-74: the Muses' arrival on Olympus to be the entertainers of Zeus (followed by catalogue of the Muses);

vv. 81-103: the Muses' gifts to special classes of mortals — as givers of persuasiveness to kings and of song to poets, and, through the song of poets, of respite from cares to all mankind.

With this picture of the Muses as helpers of kings may be compared the picture of Hekate in the *Theogony* (vv. 411-52) in which her functions, also, include helping kings (vv. 434-30). The description of the Muses in *Theog.* 1-10 bears a strong resemblance to the descriptions of nymphs in the long *Hymn to Aphrodite* (V.258-272) and in the *Hymn to Pan* (XIX).

5. The discussion of this set of words, however, more properly belongs in the next part of this paper, as being not a recurring theme in an over-all story so much as a play of words contained within a small section.

6. This is the so-called *Hymn to Styx*, in which she is thoroughly anthropomorphized and takes her place in the genealogy as a full personality. Contrast the second long section on Styx (vv. 775-806) in the part on the geography of Tartaros, in which Styx is not a "daughter" of Ocean, as earlier, but simply a river which is one branch of Ocean, containing one tenth of its water. Whereas in the earlier passage it is Styx' τιμὴ to be the oath of the gods, in the later one Styx is the source whence Iris obtains water with which to administer the oath.

7. See below, p. 334.

8. If this is the correct reading: see Apparatus Criticus.

9. Cf. *H. Cer.* 352-55:

φθίσαι φύλ' ἀμεινὰ χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων
σπέρμ' ὑπὸ γῆς κρύπτουσα, καταφθινύθουσα δὲ τιμὸς
ἀθανάτων.

10. Cf. *Od.* 19.203,

Ἰσκει ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,

in which the sound pattern is the same but ἵσχω means "to make like," and so the meaning is different.

11. Other examples of the bard's using the same way to get started on a line but finishing it differently are vv. 434 and 430:

ἐν τε δίκη βασιλεῦσι παρ' αἰδοίοισι καθίζει
ἐν τ' ἀγορῇ λαοῖσι μεταπρέπει, ὃν κ' ἐθέλησιν;

vv. 419, 438, 442, 443, 453, ῥεῖα, ῥεῖα, ῥηιδίως, ῥεῖα, 'Ρεῖη.

12. See above, p. 332, for another pattern into which this line fits.

13. This list-of-names type of catalogue, as Mr. Beye has pointed out (Charles R. Beye, *The Catalogues as a Device of Composition in the Iliad*, diss., Harvard University 1960), is more likely to have such expansion at its end.

14. See above, p. 336, for discussion of the syntactical symmetry of this section.

HOMERIC BATTLE NARRATIVE AND CATALOGUES

BY CHARLES ROWAN BEYE

THE Catalogue of Ships cannot be called altogether unique in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* since both epics contain a number of lists throughout the narrative. They are of two types, either expanded, like the Catalogue of Ships, or bare — simply lists of names — like the group of Nereids who lament Patroklos (*Il.* 18.39-49).¹ They all share in the essential quality of a list, namely, isolated pieces of information that gain a modest coherence or unity by the simple fact of juxtaposition. This is something alien to narrative, no matter how paratactic the style in which the narrative is cast. It has recently been observed² that the *androktasiai* of the *Iliad* are in some way similar to the various passages in Homer which have been traditionally called catalogues. The impression that Homeric battle narrative is closely related to bare metered lists is strengthened by the presence in epics in other languages³ of battle scenes still more mechanical and list-like.

Previous discussion has not gone far beyond a mere acknowledgment of this similarity, while attention has been directed rather to whatever poetic or philosophic qualities the battle narratives display. Closer study, however, of the manner of composition of the *androktasiai* helps the student of Homer gain an insight into the continuing question of the degree of inherited and original material in the epics.⁴ The mere fact of the similarity of the battle lists to the Catalogue immediately arouses the speculation that they may be traditional, either completely or in outline. In form each battle list seems to be a thing apart from the general dramatic narrative, often introduced in a way seemingly so consciously artificial as to set the passage very definitely off to itself. Each contains, naturally, a number of names and often a degree of identifying information. Is this, one wonders, traditional information, or a fictional creation of our poet either out of traditional elements or other sources. If these passages do seem to be something distinct so that one could assume them to be taken more or less *in toto* and inserted into the dramatics when the poet wished to create a battle scene, then it is important to analyze the exact relationship of the personnel of the battle lists to the narrative that surrounds the *androktasiai*. For, if the relationship is strong then

the lists were very likely composed with the rest of the narrative. And finally and more generally, an examination of the basic difference between lists like the Catalogue of Ships and those like the Nereid list helps to define the relationship of the Homeric and the Hesiodic style and mentality.

A comparison through analysis of the forms of the Catalogue and of a battle list will help to make the similarity clear. The Catalogue of the Greek contingents consists of twenty-nine items of various lengths, the shortest being two lines for Telamonian Ajax, and the longest being eighteen lines (653-70) for Tlepolemos of Rhodes. The term "item" is used to define each discrete piece of information, the collection of which constitutes a list. In the Catalogue each item provides the same facts, that is, the names of towns, the names of leaders, and the number of ships. The order in which these facts are presented is variable, but every item contains each of these facts. In addition there occur in twenty items such additional data — let us call them anecdotes — as details of the birth of one or more of the leaders, of a myth connected with one or more of the place names, and the like; or details relating to the dramatic setting of the epic, that is, the Trojan War. There are ten of the former⁵ and ten of the latter.⁶

An example, then, of an item would be 2.511-16. I have divided the passage into three parts, termed respectively "basic information," "anecdote," and "contextual information." By the first and last terms I mean to draw a distinction in the item between what is offered as settled fact and what is relevant to the context of the list — in this case the battlefield at Troy.⁷

οἱ δ' Ἀσπληδόνα ναῖον ἰδ' Ὀρχομενὸν Μινύειον
τῶν ἥρχ' Ἀσκάλαφος καὶ Ἰάλμενος υἱὲς Ἄρης

This is the basic information; it is followed by the anecdote:

οὗς τέκεν Ἀστυόχη δόμῳ Ἀκτορος Ἀζείδαιο
παρθένος αἰδοίη ὑπερώϊον εἰσαναβᾶσα
Ἄρηι κρατερῶ· ὃ δέ οἱ παρελέξατο λάθρη.

Finally there appears the contextual information:

τοῖς δὲ τριήκοντα γλαφυραὶ νέες ἐστιχέωντο

There are by my count twenty-one passages⁸ in the *Iliad* that describe mass battle and in which there exists much the same sort of structure analyzed above. As an example, consider 5.37-83. This passage is composed of six items ranging from four to ten lines. Each

encounter is an item; each item offers the name of the slain man, the name of the slayer (basic information), and a description of the manner or means of the former's dying (contextual information). Anecdotes occur five times.⁹

Here are lines 5.49–58 schematized as an item:

First the basic information:

υἷὸν δὲ Στροφίῳ Σκμάνδριον αἶμονα θήρης
Ἀτρείδης Μενέλαος ἔλ' ἔγχει ὀξυόεντι

Then the anecdote:

ἔσθλὸν θηρητῆρα· δίδαξε γὰρ Ἀρτεμις αὐτή
βάλλειν ἄγρια πάντα, τὰ τε τρέφει οὔρεσιν ὕλη·
ἀλλ' οὐ οἱ τότε γε χραῖσμι' Ἀρτεμις ἰοχέαιρα,
οὐδὲ ἐκηβολίαι ἦσιν τὸ πρὶν γ' ἐκέκαστο.

And finally the contextual information:

ἀλλά μιν Ἀτρείδης δουρικλειτὸς Μενέλαος
πρόσθεν ἔθεν φεύγοντα μετάφρενον οὔτασε δουρί
ὤμων μεσσηγύς, διὰ στήθεσφιν ἔλασσεν
ἥριπε δὲ πρηνῆς, ἀράβησε δὲ τεύχε' ἐπ' αὐτῷ.

We may very quickly see how the whole passage can be so arranged if A can stand for the basic information, B for the anecdote, and C for the contextual information. The name of the slayer precedes the slain in this scheme.

- Item 1 Agamemnon/Odios: A 38–39; C 40–42
2 Idomeneus/Phaistos: A 43; B 44; C 45–48
3 Menelaos/Scamandrios: A 49–50; B 51–54; C 55–58
4 Meriones/Phereklos: A 59; B 60–64; C 65–68
5 Meges/Pedaïos: A 69; B 70–71; C 72–75
6 Eurypylos/Hypsenor: A 76; B 77–78; C 79–83

There seems to be an essential tripartite structure for both the Catalogue and the battle item.¹⁰ The latter has as its most typical arrangement the following (2.676–80):

- (1) οἱ δ' ἄρα . . . εἶχον . . . there being here listed the place names;
(2) τῶν αὖ . . . here the names of the leaders . . . ἡγησάσθην;
(3) τοῖς (that is, the people) . . . νέες ἐστιχόωντο.

The following arrangement is commonly found in battle narrative, for instance, at 5.43-47:

- (1) Ἴδομενεὺς δ' ἄρα Φαίστον ἐνήρατο . . .
- (2) τὸν μὲν ἄρ' Ἴδομενεὺς . . . νύξ[ε] . . .
- (3) ἤριπε δ' ἐξ ὀχέων . . .

Modifications of this repeated pattern probably came about either by the necessities of the dramatic situation or by an instinct for variety. Usually the anecdote occurs between the first two parts. The central verb of each item, just as in the Catalogue (where ἄγω and its compounds predominate), is a verb of action suited to the circumstances — that is, physical mayhem — and of a variety to insure the creation of lines containing all sorts of proper names. In this respect the *androk-tasiai* differ from the Catalogue, which has a variety of forms based on a very few verb roots, for the former, employ a much greater variety of verbs. This variety causes the battle narratives to seem less mechanical and indeed less list-like. The Catalogue has obviously had its focus completely directed to the names and numbers; but then it is also obviously far less intimately connected with the action, so that the poet would not necessarily be moved to handle action verbs in an interesting way.

While the action verb serves to hold the basic information together, it is interesting to discover that of itself it is unimportant, since the bard begins again with τὸν μὲν (in part two) to describe exactly the action that the verb of the first part generalizes. This represents an essential division in thought, and suggests that the first part containing the information of the names, frequently together with an anecdote, is an element all its own in the memory of the bard. Enjambment, a hallmark of Homeric epic,¹¹ is almost absent in these lists. The basic information, or anecdote, and the contextual information are normally comprised in one or a larger number of self-contained hexameters. This fact points to the possibility that the several items of the list had an independent existence and then entered the composition of the narrative of the *Iliad* as remembered wholes.

By the means suggested above we may schematize another passage, 6.5-65:

- | | |
|------|--|
| Item | 1 Ajax T./Akamas: B 7; A 8; C 9-11 |
| | 2 Diomedes/Axylos: A 12; B 13-15; C 16-19 |
| | 3 Euryalos/Dresos and Opheltios: A 20 |
| | 4 Euryalos/Aisepos and Pedasos: A 21 ^a ; B 21 ^b -26; C 27-28 |

- 5 Polypoites/Astualos: A 29
- 6 Odysseus/Pidytes: A 30-31^a
- 7 Teukros/Aretaon: A 31^b
- 8 Antilochos/Ableros: A 32
- 9 Agamemnon/Elatos: A 33; B 34-35^a
- 10 Leitos/Phylakos: A 35^b
- 11 Eurypylos/Melanthios: A 36

The slaying of Melanthios is followed by what we may call Item 12, an extended and dramatic description of the slaying of Adrestos by the Atreidai. In Adrestos' speech of supplication (47-50) we have what amounts to an anecdote. Dislocation of the anecdotal material and its elaboration seem to be frequent. In the case of the fatal encounter of Tlepolemos with Sarpedon (5.628ff), the former boasts of his parentage (638-42), and this may well have been the material of an anecdote routinely located in an item in a traditional list. Again, in the case of Melanippos, who is slain by Antilochos (15.575ff), an anecdote occurs somewhat before, when Hektor is scolding him (15.545ff). At 20.382ff, the killing of Iphition by Achilles is related in the common manner, and then Achilles exults over the dead man, ironically remarking on his victim's lineage. Again, perhaps, an anecdote.

Defining lines 6.37-65 as an item lays bare the many inadequacies of schematizing in this fashion. The battle scenes are narrative that seems to hint at some other formal arrangement. In attempting to extract that other form, arbitrary distinctions have to be made. While ampler descriptions are reduced to fit a scheme, very brief ones are accorded inclusion as individual items. In several later battle narratives such brief items predominate. What nevertheless becomes apparent in each *androktasia* is a general rhythm reflecting a form that closely resembles the acknowledged catalogues of the corpus.

The very brief items have their parallels, as a matter of fact, in the passages commonly acknowledged as catalogues. The reference to Ajax Telamonios and his Salaminian contingent (2.557-8), relative to the rest of the Catalogue, is extremely short. In the Catalogue of Noble Heroines (*Od.* 11.225-329), items range from twenty-five lines (235-59) to a two-line reference comprising two ladies (326-7).

These disparities bring on several questions. Do the very brief items reflect a lack of traditional information in the poet? Do they reveal a general tendency at the time the *Iliad* was composed to begin to turn longer, more expanded, lists like the Catalogue into the Hesiodic kind of list? Or, rather, do the longer items reflect a fictionalizing intent on

the part of Homer, who enlarged the bare bones of an original Hesiodic kind of list? Or is none of these likely?

Except that each describes a death in battle, the six items in 5.37-83 have no connection, logical, emotional, or dramatic, one with another. In this respect they again resemble the other acknowledged Homeric catalogues, as well as other lists, in many of which, however, this incoherency has been obscured by the author's attempt at organization. Such is apparent in the tendency toward geographical continuity in the Catalogue of Ships or in the list of places to which Leto travels in the Hymn to Apollo (30-44). This may be some sort of imposition of tradition, such as the Polynesian catalogues of place names that parallel the route by which they emigrated from Hawaii.¹² Or it may simply represent the solution to the dilemma that confronts the composer of dramatic narrative when faced with a series of items that are static, incoherent, and not sequential. His task will be to impose upon them the appearance of logical connection that suggests the logical progression of narrative.¹³

A reading of the first fifty lines of the *Iliad* shows the striking difference between such passages as 5.37-38 and the bard's creation of dramatic running narrative. In 1.1-50, over and above the appositional style, we find immediately a connective thread in the idea of anger that is expanded, shown to be dynamic and a begetter of more wrath: *μῆνιν* (1); *ῥίσαντε* (6); *ἔριδι* (8); *χολωθεῖς* (9); *οὐκ . . . ἦνδανε θυμῷ* (24); *μή μ' ἑρέθιζε* (32); *χωόμενος* (44). Furthermore, the relationships of Apollo, Chryses, his daughter, and Agamemnon are described in their static form and again as they engender situations reacting one upon another (e.g., *ἀρηγτῆρα* of line 11 and the staff of Apollo in 14, together with Chryses' prayer to Apollo 37-42).

Whereas the Catalogue has only a geographical unity external to the plot, in the *androktasiai* unity of a sort is achieved from time to time by means of a dramatic transition from item to item. While there are a variety of these transitional formulae, most items in the battle scenes are, like the items of 5.37-83, unconnected bits of information, capable of any order, or random omission or inclusion. In 5.37-83, as a matter of fact, the poet has conveyed the notion of unity by means of an unobtrusive symmetry in that all the victims are slain while attempting to flee. Compare 5.144-65, where the victims are in pairs. One wonders if *Τευκνός*' unique and vexing Scythian bow stance throughout the scene of battle at 8.253-349 might not be a similar unifying contrivance.

In the battle scene of 4.457-538 there occurs each of these transitional devices, as though the bard in this, his first battle narration, wished to

exhibit all his wares, or perhaps rehearse as many possibilities for variation as he had. They are in part obvious transitional narrative elements suited to the context, either physically, as at 4.463ff, or psychologically, such as at 4.494ff. A major problem with which the narrator is faced is the necessity, on the one hand, of showing the Trojan heroes encountering the major Greek leaders, and, on the other, allowing these Greek heroes to survive the war. Slaughter cannot be all on one side; some Greeks must die. If those who are slain must, for purposes of the plot, be secondary, or are really traditionally more obscure figures, then the lists of slain become detached from the main plot. The solution comes in the transitional device whereby the Trojan misses his major target and a lesser Greek figure is killed (4.498ff) or else the intended target actively avoids the shot (13.183ff).¹⁴

Number is the obvious transitional device in listing, and *πρῶτος*, or its variants, is common to the lists,¹⁵ as in the passage at 5.38ff which begins *πρῶτος δὲ ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων*. Yet the use of number is very much limited in the *androktasiai* as well as in other lists in the *Iliad*; indeed, in the Catalogue it is altogether absent. What significance may we attach to *πρῶτος* when, as it happens, in the *androktasiai* it is not followed by any other number? *δεύτερος*, in the *Iliad*, is used in three senses: "another time" (e.g., 1.513 or 23.605); "in turn," or "again" (e.g., 21.169); and "second" in a series of things. In the sense of "second" it occurs in the episodes describing arming (3.332; 11.19; 16.133; 19.371); in the *teichoskopia* (3.191); and frequently in the funeral games. In lengthy scenes of individual combat that are not list-like, it occurs meaning "in turn," or "again." Perhaps this usage precluded its use in the *androktasiai* meaning "second." Nevertheless, the poet can, it seems, play on words, as, for example, *δευτερον ὀρμηθεὶς* in 16.402, which means "rushing again" (cf. 16.467), although the *πρῶτον* of 399 allows a semantic linkage of *δευτερον* with *υἷόν* of the preceding line.¹⁶ *Theogony* 907 (Rzach) offers a parallel. The line begins the third item in a catalogue of Zeus' loves and offspring. At 901 occurs *δευτερον*, meaning "secondly," and in lines 907ff *τρεῖς δέ οἱ Εὐρυνόμη χάριτας τέκε* is obviously positioned by the word *τρεῖς*. *Τρίτος*, like *δεύτερος*, is absent from the *androktasiai* and found rather in the *teichoskopia* (3.225), the divisions of the Trojan army (12.94), the catalogue of the Myrmidons (16.193), and the funeral games (23.267, 842). Place is important in athletic contests, and the games, however traditional they may be, are designed very much for this particular moment in our *Iliad*. A similar use of number can be found in the athletic contests in the eighth book of the *Odyssey*. In the passages,

then, where the numbers do occur the bard seems to be more consciously manipulating his material, creating hierarchies. A traditional order in the *androktasiai* seems not to have been maintained.¹⁷ If we may, in any case, hypothesize for these battle narratives, a traditional element that is larger than the formulaic phrase,¹⁸ it would be each individual item, isolated, brought in by the demands of delivery or memory's powers.¹⁹ It would not be the collection of items; for a group of items would have a traditional order that in turn would probably need mnemonic devices, such as number to maintain it.

The usage of *πρῶτος* which we have been discussing may be an extension of its use in certain battle sequences in a formulaic question preceding an abbreviated listing of names in the nature of the Nereid list. Of two kinds, these questions form themselves on *πρῶτος*. The one, *ἐνθα τίνα πρῶτον, τίνα δ' ὕστατον ἐξενάριξε* (5.703; 11.299; 16.692; and a variant with an altered second half-line at 8.273), and the other, preceded by an appeal to the Muses, *ὅς τις δὴ πρῶτος κτλ.* (11.218 [not preceding a bare list]; 14.508) are obviously like the appeal to the Muses at the start of the Catalogue of Ships, although there *πρῶτος* is absent, and to a similar appeal in the newly discovered introduction to the *Ῥοῖαι* (*Poxy* XXIII 2354, line 14). The first version of this question, although not mentioning the Muses, is clearly an apostrophe to them. Both questions evoke a grandeur which probably has reference specifically to the bard's impending feat of memory.²⁰

The addition of *τίνα δ' ὕστατον* is designed to indicate the enormity of the list,²¹ which, however, may actually be brief, and is an indirect way of saying what 2.488ff (*πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι κτλ.*) and 12.176 (*ἄργαλέον δέ με ταῦτα θεὸν ὥς πάντ' ἄγορεύσαι*) clearly state. For the moment let us ignore the relationship between these apostrophes, the bare lists which follow them, and the more expanded battle lists into which they are set.

The sense of impending importance which these questions invoke is found magnified and dramatized in the simile-studded prelude to the Catalogue. Every *androktasia* but one has an introduction. The introduction seems to have been conceived for the purpose of setting the list following it into the dramatic or narrative context. References to the moment at hand are few in the course of the *androktasiai*. Perhaps the rigid and tight structure of the battle list was difficult to interrupt. Occasionally it is done, but generally the bard seems to pin down the dramatics of the scene beforehand in the introductions. The need for introductions, as well as the change in narrative texture that they cause, tends to give rise to the feeling that the *androktasiai* are not truly

organic in their context and that the poet himself was conscious of this.

Τρῶας δ' ἔκλιναν Δαναοί· ἔλε δ' ἄνδρα ἕκαστος ἡγεμόνων (5.37-38^a) is slight, but removes the auditor for a moment from the particulars of each unconnected encounter that follows and creates a coherency for the whole. This is true also of 6.1-4 but it does it more fully, mentioning the plain, the weapons, and the rivers. More frequently the stock line precedes or concludes a more elaborate introduction, such as 4.456; 13.155; 13.169; 15.328; 15.414; and 16.275-306. Of the same sort but somewhat longer are 8.253-5, 12.375-7, and 14.440-41. All of these so far noted demonstrate the singularity and the plurality of the scene — for instance, 8.253 . . . οὗ τις πρότερος Δαναῶν πολλῶν περ ἔοντων . . . or 16.306-7, ἔνθα δ' ἀνὴρ ἔλεν ἄνδρα κεδασθείσης ὑσμίνης ἡγεμόνων.

The other introductions are elaborately wrought depictions of the dramatic and emotional locale of the battle lists. At 4.422-56 the view is first created far away (422-45), then brought down into the *melée* (446-55) — specifically by means of the description of Eris (444-5) ἔμβαλε μέσσω / ἐρχομένη κτλ. — and completed by a simple objective statement (456). At 11.84-91 the fatigue of the day's battle is contained in the comparison with the woodcutter's stopping for his evening meal. The introduction of 13.345-60 describes the Olympian context behind the human scene and ends with the metaphor of the rope of discord, extremely apt and evocative. Other such picturesque introductions appear at 5.133-43; 5.519-32; 7.4-7; 15.306-27; 15.405-13; 16.562-8; and 17.593-6.

On three occasions (13.155-68; 16.275-306; and 17.256-87) there occurs within the elaborate introduction a description of a hero killing a victim, in the manner of the brief items that follow, but more elongated and individualized. In the three instances in which one character is described in detail the bard is presenting a magnified incident to guide the audience's imagination during the barren recital of the list to follow. This is similar to the design of many catalogues — for example, the Catalogue of Heroines in the *Odyssey*, where the first few are completely described in a dramatic setting which is then left to be imagined later on.²²

Thus far we have tried to demonstrate certain features of the *androktasiai* which suggest that formally the battle narratives are akin to commonly acknowledged catalogues and to a degree alien to the usual means of epic narrative. So much for the form. There are several questions we might ask about their content. If the *androktasiai* are different from running dramatic narrative that has been creatively

made up (to be sure, out of formulae), do they preserve inherited information as seems to be the case more or less with the Catalogue of Ships?²³ What seems to be the source for the vast number of names found in these passages? Why do some names have anecdotes attached to them, some only the names of fathers? Why are some to be found in bare lists, three or four names to the line and no identifying information? In short, was there a rationale of composition that we may discover?²⁴

The names, whether belonging to Greeks or Trojans in the epic, are primarily Greek, and a number of them seem to have been deciphered on the Linear B tablets.²⁵ The names remain remarkably free of variants in the MSS and papyri. Since so many are metrical equivalents it is peculiar that none is subject to substitution. Either each name and its position in a list had a kind of ritual importance in the saga tradition, or the textual tradition of the *Iliad* from the time it was first committed to writing to Alexandrian times was quite rigid. The first alternative seems so unlikely²⁶ that the second should probably be accepted.

Like Hektor's son, Skamandrios-Astyanax,²⁷ several figures are named from rivers, and endowed with fathers and anecdotes, but they are quite obviously random creations of the moment. Simoeisios at 4.474 has a father Anthemion, suggestive of the epithet *ἀνθεμόεις*, the natural attribute of river banks (cf. 2.467). The anecdote here, as in the case of Satnios at 14.443, equates the name with the river birth-place.

Organization through word association seems to be involved in the making of some of the names. Leukos is killed at 4.491, called simply *Ὀδυσσεός ἐσθλὸς ἐταῖρος*. Identification is given the name, but Odysseus is said to have associations with some such sort of name.²⁸ *λευκός*, the adjective of many shades of meaning, occurs variously in the line in the *Iliad*, but in the phrase *κρὶ λευκόν* always in the position of Leukos in 4.491 (5.196; 8.564; 20.496; see also 5.902).²⁹ Perhaps it could be said that an unformed element — *leuk* — associated itself with Odysseus in the bardic mind, because of the place name Leukas, as well as the possible Leukadion (not to mention the mysterious *Λευκὰς πέτρῃ* of *Od.* 24.11), and that these elements fell into the place of [*κρὶ*] *λευκόν*, in the effort of imagination and name creation.

Victims are frequently named from towns.³⁰ Pedaïos dies at 5.69 at the hands of Mege; at 13.172 Pedaïos is a town, not well identified, where lives Imbrios, slain by Teukros. Imbrios is, of course, simply an Imbrian, elsewhere (21.43) from the island near Samothrace and Tenedos. Eioneus, slain by Hektor at 7.11, is very likely a townsman of Eiones in Diomedes' realm (2.561, and in a metrically similar position).

In the case of Phaistos, killed by Idomeneus at 5.43, there has always been a strong temptation to read some historical significance into this juxtaposition of names.³¹ The great number of human names that derive innocuously from place names makes any historical significance unlikely. Basically the poet is careless about the matter. At 6.21 Euryalos slays two brothers, Aisepos and Pedasos; both are place names elsewhere, the latter, as a matter of fact, a mere fourteen lines further on in the narrative. The distinction between place names and personal names is not strong. So many names are needed that any imagination — even a poet's — will sometimes falter.

Phaistos is described as the son of Maionian Boros, who came from Tarne. Tarne is otherwise unknown; Boros is elsewhere the father of the Myrmidon Menesthius (16.177); Maeonia and the Maeonians are mentioned several times. This anecdote has no reference to historical and traditional Phaistos, and the likelihood of the intrusion of innovation upon the inherited grouping of Phaistos-Idomeneus is not great. Phaistos, much more likely, is simply a ready solution for a name coming out of the natural association between the place and Cretan Idomeneus.

Even more likely examples of invented names are those that come from man's occupations, although anyone can cite plenty of good Anglo-Saxon names that derive from the same source. But Phereklos, at 5.59, whose carpentry brought on his ruin, is too cleverly the son of Carpenter and the grandson of Joiner. The names and the anecdote grew one from the other, and the symmetry achieved is like the list of names at *Odyssey* 8.111-114 — all of them derived from sea occupations — which has been called "an exercise in the formation of names."³²

Certain names are simply metrical conveniences, or formulaic phrases, as, for instance:

- 11.578 καὶ βάλε Φανσιάδην Ἀπισάονα ποιμένα λαῶν
 13.411 ἀλλ' ἔβαλ' Ἴππασίδην Ὑψήνορα ποιμένα λαῶν
 17.348 καὶ βάλεν Ἴππασίδην Ἀπισάονα ποιμένα λαῶν

In each case the line following is parallel (11.579 = 13.412 = 17.349). Hypsenor is a Greek, the others Trojans. There are no distinguishing phrases, and all seem to be random creations out of parts. How, then, does one evaluate the Trojan Hypsenor of 5.76 (who comes metrically later in the line), whose father Dolopion is described in an anecdote, which is perhaps in itself a cliché (cf. 16.604-605)? Evidently the names and the anecdotes do not necessarily have anything to do with one another.

Contexts and themes lie behind some repetitions. Amphios, the son of Selagos, killed at 5.612, dwelt in Paisos. His fate led him, however, to war at Troy (613-4). The other Amphios, at 2.830, together with his brother, leads forces from towns among which is Apaistos (same metrical position); they are sons of Merops, a seer who forbade his sons to fight at Troy. They have disobeyed him and die at the hands of Diomedes (11.329), where their father's prohibition and their disavowal of it is repeated (see also *δήμιον ἀρίστω* of 11.328 and *δήμιον Ἀπαισοῦ* of 2.828). The Amphios of 5.612, his town, and story seem to have been suggested by the Amphios of the Catalogue. Something similar is 15.339, the death of Mekisteus and of Echios, who is elsewhere (8.333; 13.422) the former's father. So also Morys and Hippotion (cf. 13.792 and 14.514).

Conceptions of euphony are probably also operative in the bard's creation. A line such as 8.274, *Ὀρσίλοχον μὲν πρῶτα καὶ Ὀρμενον ἦδ' Ὀφέλεστην*, recalls the kind of repetition of 18.43 . . . *Δωτῶ τε Πρωτῶ . . .* and is to be found elsewhere, as in the list of names at 5.705ff, where a pattern is set up over three lines with *Ὀρέστην . . . Οἰνόμαον . . . Οἰνοπίδην . . . Ὀρέσβιον . . .* (with very possibly some secondary patterns to be found in *ἀντίθεον Τεύθραντ' . . . Τρήχον* and *αἰχμητὴν Αἰτώλων αἰολομίτριν*). The name Orestes here, at first glance startling, is really not so; it means simply enough "mountainer." Elsewhere we find Tros, Dardanos, and Deucalion quite casually introduced as the names of completely shadowy figures. Such usage in the *Iliad* remains surprising, despite the fact that the Linear B decipherment has shown³³ that names which are to us notorious and highly significant were actually applied to nobodies. The saga background of the narrative, one would think, would prohibit the promiscuous use of the names of the legendary heroes. It rather proves again that to Homer names as names were relatively unimportant.

The names in the *androktasiai* seem to be formulaic and mechanical, fictional, and however much traditional, not consciously so. Yet there are perhaps exceptions. The sons of Merops, of which Amphios of the Catalogue (2.830) is one, seem to be real figures in the poet's mind. The repetition of the anecdote at 11.330-1, and the fact that they are simply called "sons of Merops," point to that conclusion. At 5.580 there is slain Mydon Atymniades, and there is possibly a connection between Atymniades and Atymnios, slain at 16.317. The latter's father, Amisodaros (see, however, the several variants in the MSS tradition for this non-Greek name), suggests to Leaf (note *ad loc.*) a town, Amisos, in the Pontus, roughly in the neighborhood of the

Paphlagonians. Mydon is, of course, charioteer to the King of the Paphlagonians. Moreover, in a list of those slain by Achilles, Mydon occurs in the same metrical position (21.209). These victims are described as Paionians (21.205), who, while separated geographically far from the Paphlagonians, precede them directly in the Catalogue (2.848ff). This could just as easily be coincidental, yet some sort of positive arrangement looks to be present, whether subconscious or considered one cannot say. Both Mydon and Atymnios, by the way, are killed by the same man, Antilochos.

In trying to determine which names are most likely traditional the presence of long anecdotes could be a determinant, such as that attaching to Orsilochos (5.543-9) and reflected again in *Odyssey* 3.488-9 (= 15.186-7). The stuff of the anecdotes, when they are of any length, does not vary much in character — a man's birth, a man's wealth, a man's marriage. If these do not represent simply the common motifs of traditional fiction, then we might say that, after all, they are the only enduring things of consequence in the human lot, save children, which are not of prime concern in the heroic mentality of the *Iliad*.

Actually very few anecdotes offer as much information as that concerning Orsilochos. Consider Iphition at 20.382ff, the first victim of Achilles' mad rampage, of whom much is told by the narrator, but much also by Achilles in his sardonic mocking (389-92); here the stuff of Achilles' boast seems to come from an anecdote. There are others of this length. At 11.221ff, Iphidamas' whole life story is related with an interesting reference to his winning his bride. The bride's price (243-5) seems almost to begin an inventory of his wealth that the bard cut short in order to renew the narrative of the battle. (The *πρῶτα* and *ἔπειτα* of 244 are especially characteristic of the catalogue [see note 16].)

As in the Catalogue of Ships, there are a good many anecdotes that are formulated from the materials of the plot. At 20.407 Priam's son Polydoros is killed and the poet says that his father would not let him go to fight, because he was the youngest of Priam's children, and dearest to him. The bard makes Polydoros, youngest and dearest, stand somehow for the fact that the Trojans were reaching the end of their resources and were now sacrificing their most valuable possessions.³⁴ Some anecdotes bring in the background material of the plot, as for instance Pherekles, at 5.59, the builder of Paris' ship, and thereby his own doom, and at 11.122 the sons of Antimachos, who accepted Paris' bribe to vote against returning Helen.

From time to time the entries suggest something traditionally more substantial. Amphimachos, the son of Kteatos, killed at 13.185, is in

the Catalogue at 2.620f, and his father figures in Nestor's tales of early fighting (11.709, 750) and of early games (23.638). There are many other such repetitions which imply tradition, such as Schedios at 17.306ff and Catalogue 2.517ff, or Hippothoos at 17.289 and Catalogue 2.840. Another is Akamas at 6.8 and Catalogue 2.844. He is so well fixed in the bard's mind that he is used in the dramatics of the story (5.462), and very few of those who appear in the battle sequences, although they may illogically turn up in *androktasiai* again and again, ever appear in any other place in the narrative.

The important themes of the anecdotes are

- (1) social position and wealth of the hero: 5.76; 5.533; 6.12; 6.37; 14.489; 16.594; 16.603
- (2) birth: 4.474; 6.21; 7.8; 8.302; 11.221; 14.443; 15.525
- (3) place of origin: 4.499; 5.43; 5.707; 6.33; 17.308; 17.350
- (4) marriage: 11.221; 13.170; 13.363; 13.421
- (5) migration to avoid blood vengeance: 15.332; 15.430; 16.570
- (6) a seer's prophecy: 5.148; 11.328; 13.663

The amount of identifying information surrounding the figures in the *androktasiai* is in sum quite slim. Out of approximately two hundred Greek and Trojan names in these battle scenes — including the names from the absolutely bare lists and counting over again repeated names, but counting as one brothers killed together — roughly only seventy-five have fathers assigned to them, and only sixty, or thereabouts, have any sort of qualifying information beyond the victim's name, father's name, and place of origin. Of these approximate sixty, only about thirty-five have much to say beyond such a thing as ἄρχος Φωκίων, or the like. There are, by approximate count, only thirty place names mentioned in the *androktasiai*, but this is dramatically plausible because most of the victims are from Troy.

The participants in each *androktasia* are for the most part organically suited to the context; some are simply literary cannon-fodder, faceless supernumeraries, so to speak, upon the battle scene. No order is maintained on the basis of prominence in the *Iliad*, nor on any assumed political or military power; nor is there any place of the sort Virgil achieves in his catalogue (*Aeneid* 7.641ff) when he introduces the Rutulian leaders in alphabetical order. The following is a survey of the context of the battle narratives (the conclusions of this survey are found on pages 362ff).

At 4.457-538 — of the victors in each contest Thoas, the Greek, and Peiros, the Trojan, were last mentioned in the Catalogue; Ajax

Telamonian and Odysseus last in the Epipoleis; Antilochos, Agenor, and Antiphos appear for the first time. Of the victims, Elephenor is drawn from the Greek Catalogue, Diores from the Trojan (he is mentioned again once in connection with his son, 17.429); three others appear only here; the Trojan Echepolos, son of Thalysias, turns up in 23.296 as a Greek with the remarkable patronymic, Anchisiades.

At 5.37-83, of the victors Agamemnon, Idomeneus, and Meriones last appeared in the Epipoleis; Menelaos was last dramatically depicted in the third book; Meges and Eurypylos appeared last in the Greek Catalogue. Of the victims, Odios, last in the Trojan Catalogue, will reappear as a Greek herald (9.170); the Trojan Hypsenor returns as a Greek (13.411), and of the remaining four, who appear only here, three are place names elsewhere (Phaistos, Scamandrios, and Pedaïos).

At 5.144-65, Diomedes kills eight Trojans, of whom three appear only here; Astynoös and Polyides reappear as Trojans again; Xanthos is elsewhere either river or horse; Chromios and Thoös are filler names occurring many times.

At 5.533-710, of the victors, Agamemnon, Menelaos, and Antilochos last appeared in battle scenes; Aineias was just dramatically rescued by Aphrodite at 5.311; Sarpedon and Hektor have recently engaged in a sharp exchange of words (5.471); Ajax T. and Odysseus, at 5.520, rallied the Greeks. Of the nine slain (excluding the two bare lists at 5.677-8 and 5.704-7), Pylaimenes and Amphios are from the Trojan Catalogue; Tlepolemos is from the Greek; Mydon and Orsilochos appear again. Many of these names are stock, several careless (Hektor, for example, kills a Helenos at 5.707).

At 6.5-65, Ajax T., Diomedes, Odysseus, Antilochos, Agamemnon, and Menelaos were in the last battle in the fifth book. Also among the victors, Euryalos, Polypoites, and Leitos appear for the first time from the Greek Catalogue, and Teukros for the first time in the entire work. Of the fifteen Trojans killed, Aisepos and Akamas (who at 5.462 was momentarily mentioned in the narrative), come from the Catalogue; the rest, except Adrestos and Opheltios, appear only here.

At 7.8-16, which forms a continuation of the sixth book and begins as though it might be a lengthy battle scene — although it halts abruptly — Paris and Hektor have just been dramatized in their homes at Troy; Glaucus has just exchanged arms with Diomedes (6.234). Of the three Greeks killed, Menesthios reappears as a Trojan.

At 8.253-349, after Diomedes, who was last involved dramatically with Nestor (8.91ff), kills the first man, there is listed a group of Greek leaders who arrive on the scene. The last of the group is Teukros, who

is then the only one described as fighting. Agamemnon, Idomeneus, and the two Ajaxes were in a similar list at 8.78-79. Menelaos, aside from casual remarks about him in the Trojan council at the end of the seventh book, was last stayed from fighting a duel at 7.109; Meriones and Eurypylos last appeared in a list at 7.162-8, where there were also Agamemnon, Diomedes, Idomeneus, the two Ajaxes, Thoas, and Odysseus. The last two do not appear here. Hektor, who wounds Teukros, was last seen attacking Nestor early in the eighth book. Of the ten Trojans whom Teukros kills, four appear only here, and the rest are mostly stock names appearing frequently.

At 11.91-596, of the victors, Agamemnon, Odysseus, and Diomedes were last involved in the scouting party in the tenth book; Ajax T. last appeared in a list at 10.228 as one of the Aiante, Eurypylos last in a list at 8.265; Hektor last in a list at 11.61; two appear only here; Autonoös and Dolops reappear as Trojans, the former in a list. Of the thirty Trojans dead, Antiphos and Ennomos are from the Catalogue; eighteen appear only here; most of the rest are very much stock names, appearing several times. Of the nine Greeks whom Hektor kills in a list, five appear again.

At 12.175-194, Polypoites and Leonteus, who are described earlier as guarding the gate and are from the Greek Catalogue (the former having killed a man [6.29] in the interval), kill eight Trojans of whom five appear only here, and the other three, Ormenos, Orestes, and Iamenos, appeared earlier in other lists.

At 12.378-407, Ajax, Son of Telamon, Teukros, and Sarpedon are all from the preceding narrative. Of the victims, two appear only here, and Glaucus, who is only wounded, is from the narrative.

At 13.156-205, Meriones, and Teukros last appeared in a list at 13.93; Hektor comes from the narrative. Of the victims, Deiphobos, only wounded, was last in a list at 12.94 (his first appearance); of the other two, one appears only here and Amphimachos is from the Greek Catalogue.

At 13.361-672, of the victors, Idomeneus, Deiphobos, Meriones, and Aineias appeared in the preceding narrative. Antilochos last appeared in a list at 13.93; Helenos, Agenor, and Paris in a list at 12.93f; Menelaos appeared last in battle in the eleventh book. Of the victims, Askalaphos, Aphareus, and Deïpyros were called up in a list by Idomeneus (13.478-9) only to be killed. They last appeared in a list at 9.82 (Deïpyros also at 13.93), and Askalaphos is from the Catalogue. Thoös and Oinomaos were in a list at 12.140; Alkathoös from the list at 12.93; three appear only here; Peisandros and Hypsenor have been

killed before; Asios, from the Trojan Catalogue, has appeared more than briefly earlier (12.136ff).

At 14.440-522, of the victors, Meriones, Teukros, Antilochos, and Menelaos were prominently fighting in the thirteenth book; Ajax son of Oileus was mentioned there a few times; Ajax son of Telamon was aimed at and missed at the beginning of the fourteenth book; Poulydamas was in a list at 14.425; Akamas and Peneleos were in lists at 12.100 and 13.92 respectively. Of those killed, Prothoenor last appeared in the Greek Catalogue; Archelochos, from the Trojan Catalogue, last appeared in a list at 12.100; Phalkes, Morys, and Hippotion last in a list at 13.790. The Trojan Periphetes appears again as a Greek; Hypenor, appearing here for the first time, is referred to once again; and six appear only here.

At 15.328-42, Hektor is from the narrative; Poulydamas was in a battle in the fourteenth book; Paris in a battle at 13.660ff; Polites in a battle at 13.533ff; Aineias and Agenor were in a list at 14.425. Of the eight victims, Medon and Stichios are from a list at 13.691-3; Klonios and Arkesilaos last appeared in the Greek Catalogue; two appear only here, and two appear again.

At 15.414-70, Ajax and Hektor are of the narrative, Teukros from a list at 15.302. The three victims appear only here.

At 15.514-91, of the victors, Hektor and Ajax son of Telamon are from the narrative; Poulydamas was mentioned at 15.453, Menelaos and Antilochos in a battle at 13.641; Meges is from a list at 15.302. Of the six victims, three appear only here; Schedios is from the Greek Catalogue and is killed again later; Dolops and Melanippos were killed before; the latter appears once again, to be slain a third time.

At 16.306-418, Patroklos is in the midst of his *aristeia*; Menelaos, Meges, and Antilochos were in the battle at 15.514ff; Ajax son of Oileus and Peneleos were in the battle in 14.440ff. Thrasymedes was involved with his father dramatically at 14.40ff; Idomeneus and Meriones were last in a list at 15.301. Of the twenty-one slain, seventeen — a high number — occur only here, one of whom, Erymas, is twice slain within a space of seventy lines (345 and 415). The other four have previously been slain.

At 16.569-696, Hektor, Patroklos, Glaucus, and Meriones are all from the narrative. Of the thirteen slain, seven appear only here; four have been slain before; two will be slain again.

At 17.288-365, Ajax T. and Hektor are from the narrative; Aineias was in a battle in book sixteen; Lykomedes was in a list at 9.84 (mentioned again at 12.366); Asteropaios was in a list at 17.217. Of the five

dead, two were last in a list at 17.217-8; two were earlier killed; one appears only here.

At 17.597-625, Poulydamas was in a battle in Book 16; Hektor is from the narrative. Of the three victims, the two who are only wounded, Peneleos and Leitos, have been victors in earlier battles, and in a list at 13.91-92, and in the Greek Catalogue.

In Achilles' *aristeia* (20.381-503), of the fourteen who are slain, eleven — a high number — appear only here. Three were slain before, two by Patroklos in his *aristeia*.

Throughout these *androktasiai* the major Greek heroes occur with the frequency that one might expect, and they almost always are drawn dramatically from the narrative that precedes. This is true also of the limited appearances of the major Trojan heroes, who, as we remarked earlier, have little chance to demonstrate their prowess on these occasions. No sort of hierarchy is established in these lists — that is, Agamemnon does not always kill first, or any other of the Greek leaders. This is in keeping with the random chaos of the battlefield, and also implies that the poet learned no traditional order.

Two Greek heroes appear more frequently than the others: Idomeneus and Meriones. The presence of the latter is remarkable in that persons of secondary rank — although this distinction is nebulous in the *Iliad* — such as Teukros, do not persist in entering the dramatic scene. Meriones is always associated in his appearance with his chieftain, Idomeneus. If the names of the slain are largely traditional, are we to suppose that they came to the tradition connected with Idomeneus and Meriones, a sort of contained element that was then dispersed and infused with the whole of the saga and so with its leading figures as well, but retaining the two Cretan leaders as a continual metrical convenience and something congenial to the bardic memory? Perhaps Peneleos and Leitos work in this way on a far more modest scale. It is not only in the battle sequences but in the many lists of names that dot the *Iliad* that Idomeneus and Meriones appear most frequently. Dorothea Gray's recent attempt (see n.20) to localize the fifty-eight names deciphered by Ventris and Chadwick (*Documents* 104-105) around various cycles of myth has revealed the fact that in the battle sequences involving Nestor or the Nestoridai, names from the Pylos cycle occur relatively frequently. It is tempting to draw a connection between the lists of names on Linear B tablets with the legendary king of Crete, but certainly the evidence is much too incomplete to permit this, not to mention the fact that the mainland deposits of tablets complicate the problem.³⁵

The bard seems to have a rather definite mnemonic device with which to retain the names of the minor, as well as some of the major, figures through the lengthy story. In the earlier battle sequences they come from the names of the Catalogue in the second book, and from the Epipoleis in the fourth. Many of the names of those slain in these scenes are given to those killed later in the narrative. By the time the bard has reached 13.361-672 he has changed his orientation, and he now derives his names from lists that he has earlier set up. Wherever he could, he seems to have introduced groups of names in order to rehearse them for himself so that he would be better able to formulate them in the more expanded battle lists.³⁶ This system, however, seems not to be used in the lists of those slain by Patroklos and by Achilles, where an unusually large number of names make their solitary appearance. Obviously they cannot recur, there being no more battle scenes, but it is peculiar that they have not appeared before.

In the case of the Trojans there are special problems in retaining names throughout the narrative. Major figures cannot easily appear in battle episodes depicting the victorious Greeks, for obviously they cannot be killed. The Trojan leaders, therefore, are first listed as far into the story as 11.56-61, where Poulydamas makes his first appearance in the work; Akamas, his first since the Catalogue; Aineias and Agenor, their first after a long absence (6.77; 4.467). Apart from Hektor, who is also in this list, none reappears until the twelfth book, when they all appear in another list at 12.86-107. Thereafter they take a greater part in the narrative.

At 17.215-8 there occurs for the last time (except for the list of Priam's sons at 24.249ff) a listing of Trojans, and it is typical: Glaucus, who was recently of dramatic moment; Chromios, the stock name; Mesthles, who last appeared in the Catalogue; Thersilochos, appearing for the first time here, who will be slain in the twenty-first book; Medon, only here; Deisenor, only here; Hippothoös and Phorkys, last in the Catalogue, soon to be in action; Asteropaios, formerly in a list, soon also to be in action; and Ennomos, of whom it is said (2.858ff) that he will be slain by Achilles in the battle of the river, but whose name, having been remembered this far, goes no farther. Indeed, he may very likely be here because of an association in the bard's mind between Chromios and Chromis, with whom Ennomos is joined in the Catalogue (2.858), and an association between Ennomos and Echemmon, with whom the stock Chromios is slain in 5.160.

It is remarkable that in this list the bard names four persons — a large number — from the Trojan Catalogue: Ennomos, Phorkys,

Mesthles, and Hippothoös, the first three of whom — also remarkable — are the leaders of contingents named successively in the Catalogue (2.858, 862, and 864). Was such a complex relationship carried consciously in the mind through so many verses? Very likely it represents the well-known psychological phenomenon of word association; thus it is tempting to restore the variant reading of 2.848 to the text because Asteropaios, also from this list, occurs in it. If we assume that the Catalogue figures had a special luster for the poet, then he is quite rightly marshaling his grander figures as prelude to the coming *aristeia* of Achilles.

As we have said, the personnel of the lists of those slain by Patroklos and Achilles is unusual. In addition, the amount of anecdotal material (aside from obviously momentary fiction as in the case of Polydoros) is very limited in these lists. There are also in Achilles' list names such as Tros and Dardanos that seem to be too significant and individualized in the saga tradition to be so casually introduced. That these battle lists contain so little detail and so little dramatic interlarding is not of itself odd. Almost every acknowledged catalogue of this type wears itself down; consider the Catalogue of Heroines in the *Odyssey*, or the Trojan Catalogue in the second book of the *Iliad*, or, to go farther afield, the descriptions and list of warriors in the *Tain Bó Cúalnge*.³⁷ Here the catalogue begins with full descriptions, but as the items continue they become more and more sparse. (This pattern is, by the way, quite the opposite of the Nereid-type list, which tends to swell at the end, at least with one or two lines of anecdotal ornamentation attached to the last name.) If we imagine that the bard saw in these several battle lists of the *Iliad* one long recitation, then the instinct to reduce their content would be very natural. Since the creation of the *Iliad* which is so much longer than the usual oral product,³⁸ seems to have been no ordinary feat, the bard's energies may well have simply dissipated themselves.

There are two other unusual features to be found in Achilles' *aristeia* at 20.381–503. With the exception of the first person slain, it is notable that the majority of names have not even the distinction of a father's name attached to them. Beyond this there is the unusual number of names beginning with the same sound (here a delta), a pattern that is found in the bare name lists at 5.705–7 and 8.274–6. One can conceive these names as having been arranged as a bare list of names, an alternate form carried in the bard's memory, out of which the bard elaborated 20.381–503 in the accordion-like manner common to epic reciters.³⁹

The contracted form might have appeared as the following: . . .

καὶ βάλε πρῶτον Δημολέοντα
Ἴπποδάμαντα τ' ἔπειτα Πριαμίδην Πολυδώρον
αὐτὰρ καὶ Δρύοπ' οὐτάσε χ' Ἴππασίδην Χρομίον τε
Δημοῦχόν τε φιλητορίδην ἥν τε μέγαν τε
αὐτὰρ Λαόγονον καὶ Δάρδανον, νῆε βίαντος
Τρῶα τ' Ἀλαστορίδην καὶ Μούλιον ἥδ' Πυλάρτην
αὐτὰρ Ὀρέστην ἥδ' Ἀντήνορος υἱόν Ἐχέκλον
Δευκαλίωνα δ' ἔπειτα καὶ βῆ μετὰ Πείρῳ υἱόν
Ῥίγμον, ὅς ἐκ Θρηκης ἐριβώλακος εἰληλούθει.

(The underlined names are those of the text, all in the same metrical position except for *Πριαμίδης*.)

I think that we have relatively clear evidence that such a technique was practiced by the Greek epic poets when we compare *Iliad* 5.383-404 with a fragment of Panyassis (*EGF* [Kinkel], no. 16, p. 261). They are both lists of gods who suffered at the hands of mortals, developed upon the repeated verb-form *τλή*. In the *Iliad*, Dione is recounting to Aphrodite various instances; there are only three, each elaborated, made into small stories. The Panyassis version is simpler:

τλή μὲν Δημήτηρ, τλή δὲ κλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυγίεις
τλή δὲ Ποσειδάων, τλή δ' ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων, κτλ.

Rather than assuming, as many do, that Homer and Panyassis were both adapting the same passage, it seems easier to suppose that this is a catalogue technique common to them both. The poet of the *Iliad* has employed it briefly, but richly, in contrast to the later, more antiquarian, method of Panyassis, who evidently compressed a great number of these, eliminating the anecdotal material.

During the course of the battle narrations there occur on six occasions⁴⁰ lists of names reduced to the bare delivery that characterizes not only the list of Nereids, but so much of the *Theogony*. If we look at the battle narration of 5.533-710, in which there occur two such lists, it is possible to suggest a reason for them. Of the names in the two lists, several are evidently stock names, since they are repeated elsewhere. This leaves seven conceivably "genuine" names that occur in this instance only (including Teuthras of Hektor's list, a patronymic elsewhere). It is perhaps the case that tradition called for all the names to be handled as separate items of a catalogue, and in making room for dramatic interludes within the *androktasiai* the bard compressed some of these

names into bare lists. Or, more likely, tradition called for all the "genuine" names, so-called, (that is, those never repeated) to be handled as separate items, and the bard in compressing them into lists used stock names as fillers to make up the lines. The digression concerning Tlepolemos and Sarpedon is obviously an elaborated portion of the narrative. It occupies seventy-two lines, and the six or seven "genuine" names in the lists would more or less fill that time if they were expanded into whole items. Mathematics are of course not involved here, but an instinct for the amount of time that ought decorously to be given to all things. In addition, there are minor interludes at 561-75 and 590-607 which seem to result in a good deal of compression of the items that follow immediately thereafter, in 576-9 and 608-9. The same reasoning may be used to acknowledge the presence of such lists at 11.299ff, 16.415ff, and 16.692ff in the midst of well-dramatized battle sequences, whose interludes might demand a corresponding compression in the individual items concluded. This is not true of 8.273ff where the list makes up the entire passage.

The list at 14.508ff is unusual in that it contains various names of victors and action verbs as well as the names of the slain. Otherwise these bald lists are all of men slain and attached to an individual person, once to Teukros, once to Hektor, once to Odysseus, and twice to Patroklos. At first glance one might suppose that since it is possible to imagine that apart from Odysseus these personages are secondary in the saga tradition,⁴¹ the bard had less to go on in their case. The assumption behind this is, of course, that the tradition had already assigned the slain to the victors, and as the tradition was thin in the case of Teukros, Hektor, and Patroklos, so was it in respect to the names of their victims. But this is unlikely. One must take into account the number of lesser figures who enter the battle sequences, and the people they slay, about whom something really descriptive is said. The following is a list of the slain, including material, in addition to the father's name, amounting at the least to the homeland, rank, or something distinctive regardless of its possible fiction. The list is arranged under the names of the victors.

For the Greeks

- Agamemnon (5) 5.533ff; 6.33f; 11.101; 11.122; 11.221
- Diomedes (4) 5.148ff; 5.152ff; 6.12ff; 11.328ff
- Ajax T. (4) 4.473ff; 5.612ff; 6.7f; 17.288f
- Idomeneus (3) 5.43f; 13.361ff; 13.427ff
- Meriones (3) 5.59ff; 13.643ff; 16.603ff

Menelaos (3) 5.49ff; 5.576f; 15.525ff
 Achilles (3) 20.382ff; 20.407ff; 20.484ff
 Teukros (2) 8.302ff; 13.170ff
 Antilochos (2) 15.545ff; 16.326ff (with Thrasymedes)
 Odysseus (1) 4.499f
 Meges (1) 5.69ff
 Eurypylos (1) 5.76ff
 Euryalos (1) 6.21ff
 Ajax O. (1) 14.443ff
 Peneleos (1) 14.489ff
 Lykomedes (1) 17.348ff

For the Trojans

Hektor (5) 15.329ff; 15.430ff; 16.570ff; 17.306ff; 17.610ff
 Paris (2) 7.8ff; 13.663ff
 Aineias (2) 5.541ff; 15.332ff
 Thoas (1) 4.519f
 Agenor (1) 4.463f
 Sarpedon (1) 5.628ff
 Poulydamas (1) 15.518ff
 Glaucus (1) 16.594ff

The number of items with anecdotes assigned to the major figures more or less parallels their relative importance, although one might have expected Odysseus to fare better.

Everything seems to point to the conclusion that there is no significant connection between the names of the slayer and the slain, nor any between slayer, slain, and anecdote, so that the grouping is probably random.

Although the *androktasiai* are more or less dramatic narrative, underneath them all persists, in greater or less degree, the catalogue form. A rhythm of basic information, anecdote, and contextual information is maintained more than casually, even when the anecdotal material is a makeshift as at 5.153ff, where all the concrete realities are absent from the anecdote and the theme alone remains. So the *androktasiai* do seem to have some underlying relation to the Catalogue. Surveying the many kinds of catalogues in the Homeric and Hesiodic corpora and considering as well the state of catalogues in a number of other literatures, I should say that the *androktasiai* have evolved out of a form very much like the Catalogue. One senses, however, that the epic tradition is trying to rid itself of rigid,

artificial battle catalogues in the interests of a more lively style. In the *Iliad* we then behold the process in midway, so to speak.

The same rhythm, although severely altered, appears in the one *androktasia* of the *Odyssey*, wherein the suitors and Odysseus and his helpers finally come to battle. Formally, we may say, the battle list begins when Odysseus first takes aim at Antinous (22.8) and ends with the simile likening the dead suitors to fish in a net (22.384-9). The difference between this episode and its like in the *Iliad* resides in the degree to which the *Odyssey* passage is integrated into the plot and dramatically expanded. There is every reason that it should be so, for the victims are the suitors who have been mainstays of the plot from the first. Since they are well known, there are no anecdotes. Since their deaths are, to an extent, moral victories, there is considerable comment upon this, at least at the first, when Antinous and Eurymachus are slain. Then, too, the *Odyssey* reveals everywhere a greater narrative artistry, a consciousness in refashioning traditional and formulaic narrative techniques and story situations, so as to create a more homogeneous, coherent, and organized plot.⁴⁶ This results in the intrusion into the battle narrative of the suspenseful logistics of the wall and the weapons in the store-room, as well as Athena's appearance, and the sparing of the singer and herald.

The manner in which the poet of the *Odyssey* first introduces the suitors is not the way in which the poet of the *Iliad* might have done. They are first described as a group (1.106ff; 144ff), and then from their number Antinous and Eurymachus speak, identified only by patronymics (1.383, 399). In the second book's assembly, when a variety of suitors are given a chance to speak, the occasion, to my mind, calls for a catalogue giving for each suitor the customary vital statistics found in the epic. The very common theme of a queen and her suitors is, in fact, associated in other literatures with a catalogue of the suitors. The *Iliad* makes much of major lists — the Catalogue of Ships, the Teichoskopia, the Epipoleis, and, perhaps, the awakening scene (10.1-298) — lists which introduce to the auditor a number of the central characters or remind him of them. The author of the *Odyssey* obviously has a sense of introduction and recapitulation as in the reminiscences of Nestor and Menelaos and the early speeches of Telemachus and Athena. Oddly enough, he does not choose to develop the suitors in the commonplace epic context, limiting himself, rather, to a projection of their personalities⁴⁷ — certainly a more sophisticated approach, but, still, unlike the *Iliad*.

We reach a more clearly list-like passage at 241ff, which begins with a bare list of names followed by a descriptive statement (244-5). The bareness characterizes the entire narrative, because, as I have said, there are no anecdotes or other references to the individuals fighting. Ornamentation comes in the small speeches, the first two tactical (248-254, 262-5) and, as such, unusual; the next, a typical boast over the dead (287-291), followed by three entreaties for life which are common to such narratives. The poet of the *Odyssey* is particularly clever in the way he manages to create out of nothing — relatively speaking — the sense of variety, motion, and vastness which characterizes the *Iliad's androktasiai*. At 272ff he introduces a list that is in form like *Iliad* 14.440-522, that is, names of killer and killed listed with a minimum of detail of any sort. Being faced with the problem of having few avenging participants in the battle, and probably few suitors whose names he either knew or cared to invent, he begins by listing three anonymous suitors (ἄλλος, 274, 275, 276) who miss their human targets (who are, in turn, not mentioned as they would have been in the *Iliad*) only to hit the door post, door, and wall. The inanimates provide the stuff of these lines *στάθμον ἔϋσταθέος μεγάρου, θύρην πυκινῶς ἀραρυῖαν, ἐν τοίχῳ, μελίη πέσε χαλκοβάρεια*). The poet also gives the sense of a large number of participants by occasionally introducing Eumaeus and Philoetius as *συβώτης* (e.g., 267) and *ἐπιβουκόλος ἀνὴρ* (e.g., 268).⁴⁸ To refer to persons other than by name is unique to this *androktasia*. The proper names that do appear are generally those that have appeared only once before; there is nothing distinctive about them. The episode seems to show a poet who is thoroughly aware of the proper form for an *androktasia*, but one who has really nothing to fill it with, except the products of a lively imagination.

The frequently appearing bare lists of names in the *Iliad's androktasiai* are indication of a trend toward something like the Nereid list. This is the Hesiodic style, representing the antiquarian, indexing, collecting mentality that in every literature has reduced the ornate, emotional pictorial and dramatic material of saga epic to its so-called essentials — that is, “the facts,” personal names, place names, and the like.⁴² It is conceivable that Homer knew every *androktasia* reduced in form to a bare list of names. Each was then ready to be expanded wholly or in part by the poet, depending upon the needs of the moment; expansion would call for frequent introduction of anecdotes, traditional in origin but in their application fictional. Although the anecdotal material seems to be consciously fictional much of the time, it is a reasonable assumption that the tendency to introduce anecdotes is the

working out of the fact that at an earlier time authentic and full descriptions of the fallen heroes were in the epic material,⁴³ perhaps loosely arranged, then more consciously collected, and organized within a series of battle items. These descriptions, which I call anecdotes, then became displaced by virtue of their being a separate element of the item. Displacement would come about from the slowly growing reconception of these scenes or from the tendency to reduce all lists to bare names. A few of the anecdotes do seem to show that the bard did connect the name of the person to specific descriptive material. These may be traditional associations, but the majority does not show them.⁴⁴

We may say that the poet knew a few items thoroughly and introduced them as he went along through the battle episodes, at the same time including bare lists when compression was called for. As the work grew longer, perhaps beyond his experience, he simply used names from lists⁴⁵ with a minimum of battle description; in the case of Patroklos, whose role was perhaps unusually enlarged, he introduced two such lists. When finally he reaches Achilles' re-entry into battle, he has played himself out, and instead of a traditional battle narration he has contrived something different, concentrating upon the awfulness and savagery of Achilles rather than casting attention upon the slain.

NOTES

1. Zenodotos was the first to remark on its Hesiodic character (Schol. A on 18.39).

2. See G. Strasburger, *Die Kleinen Kämpfer der Ilias*, diss., Frankfurt am Main, 1954.

3. E.g., *Le Chanson de Roland*, lines 80-127. See also H. M. & N. K. Chadwick, *Growth of Literature* (Cambridge, England 1932-40) I 282ff.

4. E. R. Dodds, in *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*, ed. M. Platnauer (Oxford 1954), and F. M. Combellack "Contemporary Homeric Scholarship I" *CW*⁴⁹ (1955) 17ff, survey the current stage of Homeric research very much from this position.

5. 2.513-5, 528-30, 548-55, 594-600, 628-9, 658-70, 673-5, 714-5, 741-4, 752-5.

6. 2.525-6, 542-4, 558, 577-80, 587-90, 610-14, 641-2, 686-94, 699-704, 721-5.

7. On the dramatic relevance of the Catalogue see my article "A New Meaning for *ΝΑΥΣ* in the Catalogue," *AJP* 82 (1961) 370ff.

8. 4.457-538; 5.37-83; 5.144-65; 5.533-710; 6.5-65; 7.8-16; 8.253-349; 11.91-596; 12.175-94; 12.378-407; 13.156-205; 13.361-672; 14.440-522; 15.328-42; 15.414-70; 15.514-91; 16.306-418; 16.569-696; 17.288-365; 17.597-625; 20.381-503.

9. So including the brief *Βάρον, ὃς ἐκ Τάρνης ἐριβώλακος εἰληλούθει* . . . of line 44.

10. One must, of course, beware making an impression over into a rhythmic law as did A. Köchly (*de Catalogi Homerici genuina forma* Zurcher Lections-verzeichniss von 1853) who had so strong an impression of an underlying rhythm that he insisted upon resolving the Catalogue into five-line stanzas.

11. Cf. M. Parry, "Enjambement in Homeric Verse," *TAPA* 60 (1929), and A. B. Lord "Homer and Huso III," *TAPA* 79 (1948).

12. S. Percy Smith, *Hawaiki*⁴ (Melbourne and London 1921), 92-102.

13. In a literary work more is possible; cf. S. Weinstock "The Geographical Catalogue in Acts 2.9-11," *JRS* 38 (1948) 43-46.

14. Strasburger, (above, n.2), 44-45, fn.4, lists passages in which charioteers function in this manner. N. H. A. L. H. van der Valk "Homer's Nationalistic Attitude," *L'Antiquité Classique* 22 (1953) 5-26, sees the prominence of the Greeks in fighting as some sort of bias, but he ignores the technical problems of the narrative.

15. *πρῶτον*, *πρότερος*, *πρώτιστα* occur frequently in all types of lists — e.g., 2.405 in a list of names, 4.457 in a battle list; 19.369 in a description of arming, 20.215 in a genealogy, 23.250 in a list of prizes, 23.288 in a list of contestants.

16. Strasburger, (above, n.2) 60, conceives of a listing based on *πρῶτον* in 399, then *δευτέρον*, followed by *ἔπειτα* in 411, 415, with *πάντας* the résumé at 418.

17. The persons who begin the battle lists are so diverse as to make it hazardous to ascribe to first place the greatest honor. They are Agamemnon (3 ×); Hektor (2 ×); Ajax Son of Telamon (2 ×); Antilochos, Paris, Diomedes, Polypoites, Deiphobos, Idomeneus, Ajax Son of Oileus, Patroklos, Hippothoos, Poulydamas, and Achilles.

18. It seems difficult to believe in the kind of originality that C. Whitman (*Homer and the Heroic Tradition*, Cambridge, Mass. 1958) and H. T. Wade-Gery (*The Poet of the Iliad*, Cambridge, England 1952) see in the *Iliad*.

19. Although perhaps the names are related to cycles of myth. See D. Gray, "Mycenean Names in Homer," *JHS* 78 (1958) 43-48.

20. For the high respect in which catalogues are held by oral poets see the Chadwicks, (above, n.3) and for literary poets, W. H. Auden "The Making and Judging of Poetry," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 199 (1957).

21. For the device in New Testament and Semitic literature see H. B. Swete, *The Apocalypse of St. John* (London 1906) 10-11 (ad Rev. 1.8).

22. This common practice is misunderstood by D. L. Page (*The Homeric Odyssey*, Oxford 1955) when he criticizes the change of direction in that passage (36).

23. V. Burr in *NEΩN KATAΛΟΓΟΣ* (Klio Beiheft 1944), following T. W. Allen *The Homeric Catalogue of Ships* (Oxford 1921), represents more or less the consensus. Cf. G. Jachmann, *Der homerische Schiffskatalog und die Ilias* (Köln 1953) for the opposing view with certain peculiar animadversions.

24. F. M. Combellack "Unitarianism and Homeric Originality," *AJP* 71 (1950) 337-64, reminds us of the fallacy in assuming that proofs can be had that demonstrate either invention or tradition.

25. Listed in M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge 1956) 104-105.

26. A convincing argument for a variety of catalogues of ships is offered by F. M. Combellack, "The Identity and Origin of Eurychus in the Ship's Catalogue of Hyginus," *AJP* 69 (1948) 190-96. See also fragments 95 and following

of Hesiod (Rzach) for a catalogue of Helen's suitors distinctly like the Catalogue of Ships.

27. At 6.402; see Leaf's comment that the passage "looks like an interpolation."

28. See van Leeuwen, *Ilias* (Leyden 1912) *ad loc.*, who is following Strabo (452, 459) and Pliny *N.H.* 4.5, who identifies the town Nerikos sacked by Laertes (*Od.* 24.377) on Leucas Island. Cf. A. Shewan "Nerikos" *CQ* 24 (1930) 136-145. This identification has never been well established, however, even in antiquity (cf. the feeble identification by the scholiast to Thuc. 3.7.4). Van Leeuwen further mentions Strabo's reference (452) to Penelope's brother, Leucadion. Penelope's brother is not necessarily a part of Homeric knowledge. (Strabo is here using an Ephorian source; see Stoll in Roscher's *Lexicon* II-2, p. 1984, 20ff).

29. This is not so in the Odyssey or the Hymns; see Dunbar, *Concordance* 223.

30. Discussed by E. Drerup, *Das Homerproblem in der Gegenwart* (Wurzburg 1921) 306-307, with many more examples.

31. Most recently Whitman, (above, n.18) 21.

32. The Chadwicks (above, n.3) III 804. Cf. 11.489-491 with van Leeuwen's note *ad loc.* Cf. also the *Voluspa* (in the *Poetic Edda*, H. A. Bellows, New York 1936, 1ff), stanzas 10-16, a catalogue of dwarfs. P. Cauer, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik* (Leipzig 1921) 543ff, discusses descriptive names presumably made up by the poet, although caution must be used by virtue of the fact that so many now have been deciphered on Linear B tablets, such as Alektruon. W. Schadewaldt, *Iliasstudien* 139ff, discusses plays on names; J. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (Lund 1949) 120ff, discusses repetition of personal names and kindred sounds as a motif of folk poetry.

33. See the entries, a-ki-re-u and e-ko-to (Achilleus and Hektor) in the "Index of Personal Names," *Documents* 415, 417.

34. Other dramatic anecdotes are at 11.249-55; 13.385-6; 13.394^b-396^a.

35. On the extraordinary position of Meriones in the *Iliad* see A. W. Verrall, *The Bacchantes of Euripides* (Cambridge, England 1910) 203ff.

36. S. E. Bassett, in *The Poetry of Homer* (Berkeley 1938) 118-19, points out that the old men on the wall in the *teichoskopia* are the elders of the five Trojan families who with their servants and friends provide seventy-five of the *Iliad's* *dramatis personae*.

37. Lines 316ff of the translation by J. Dunn (London 1914).

38. C. M. Bowra, "Comparative Study of Homer," *AJA* 54 (1950) 189-90. I accept the theory of A. B. Lord on dictation in "Homer's Originality: Oral Dictated Texts," *TAPA* 84 (1953) 124-34.

39. Examples of expansion and contraction between two different recitals by the same bard are to be found in P. N. Rybnikov, *Pesm* ² (3 vols. Moscow 1909-10), vol. 2, no. 75 (noticed by the Chadwicks). C. M. Bowra, *Heroic Poetry* 232, discusses the technique with examples.

40. 5.677-8; 5.703-10; 8.273-6; 11.299-303; 16.415-7; 16.692-6.

41. For views on Hektor and/or Patroklos as inventions of our poet see J. A. Scott, *The Unity of Homer* (Berkeley 1921) 205ff. R. Scheliha, *Patroklos* (Basel 1943) 233ff; W. Schadewaldt, *Von Homers Welt und Werk* (Stuttgart 1952) 177ff.

42. The Chadwicks (above, n.3) III 746-747, 804-807 *et passim*.

43. The Chadwicks (above, n.3) I 283ff.

44. Strasburger (above, n.2, 15ff) develops a view that is completely the reverse of my own.

45. The Chadwicks (above, n.3, III 141) posit an "independent existence apart from the poems [for the catalogues in Tartar poetry]. This is supported by the fact that some catalogues, such as that of the heroes of Manas' retinue (Radlov, *Proben* V 113, 152) recur several times in different poems in almost identical form."

46. D. L. Page (above, n.22, 1ff) has well explained this in connection with the Polyphemus episode.

47. Strasburger (above, n.2, 118ff) argues that he individualizes only Antinous and Eurymachus as metonymy for suitors and similarly treats Eurylochus and Elpenor for crew. Perhaps they are in no way traditional; Elpenor 'hopeful' and Antinous 'opposition' look like a fictionalist's symbolism.

48. More than once in the *Odyssey*, Homer makes a typical line of three names using such words; e.g., 22.435:

αὐτὰρ ὁ Τηλέμαχον καὶ βουκόλον ἠδὲ συμβώτην

The D. B. Monro-T. W. Allen text of Homer has been used throughout. I should like to thank D. L. Arnaud, W. M. Calder, III, W. S. Noack, A. M. Parry, and S. Dow for their help.

THE COLLECTANEA ALEXANDRINA SELECTED PASSAGES

BY ROBERT RENEHAN

IN this paper I wish to discuss some passages from those Hellenistic writers whose poems are printed in J. U. Powell's *Collectanea Alexandrina*, especially with regard to textual problems. In each case I first give the text as printed by Powell.

I. Rhianus fr. 72 (p. 20 Powell)

Ἡ ῥά νύ τοι, Κλεόνικε, δι' ἀτραπιτοῦ κιόντι
στεινῆς ἤντησαν ταὶ λιπαραὶ Χάριτες·
καὶ σε ποτὶ ῥοδέησιν ἐπηχύναντο χέρεσσιν,
κοῦρε· πεποίησαι δ' ἡλίκος ἐσσι χάρις.
τῆλόθι μοι μάλα χαῖρε· πυρὸς δ' οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἄσσον
ἔρπειν αὐρήν, ᾧ φίλος, ἀνθέρικα.

The final word, ἀνθέρικα, is a conjecture. Powell's *apparatus* reports "ἀνθέρικα Jac., quod confirmatur accentu ἀθέρικαν in *Apogr. Par.*; ἀνθερίκαν Brunnck cum omnibus apographis ('barbara forma' Mein.); ἀθερίκαν P." ἀνθέριξ means, according to LSJ, a "beard of an ear of corn," "the ear itself"; in one doubtful passage of Theocritus (1.52) it occurs as a variant for ἀνθέρικος (= "stalk of asphodel"). This poem is preserved in the *Anthologia Graeca* (12.121); there the Loeb editor translates ". . . it is not safe for a dry corn-stalk to draw nearer to the fire." I find neither this nor any other rendering of ἀνθέρικα especially appropriate here. But this is a matter of feeling; let us turn to fact. The fact — which seems to have escaped the editors' notice — is that ἀνθέριξ (and ἀνθέρικος) is masculine: αὐρήν cannot be construed with it. It is true that the gender of Greek nouns sometimes varies, but to introduce a conjecture which requires a variation in gender nowhere attested is very rash indeed. I suspect that Rhianus wrote ἀνθρακινή: "it is not safe for a dry coal to go too near the fire." The ἀνθρακινή is the poet and the πῦρ Cleonicus. Such expressions were a τόπος of love epigrams; cf. the following examples:

δάκρυα καὶ κῶμοι, τί μ' ἐγείρετε, πρὶν πόδας ἄραι
ἐκ πυρὸς, εἰς ἐτέρην Κύπριδος ἀνθρακινήν;
(Posidippus ap. AP. 5.211.1-2)

οὐ μοι θήλυς ἔρως ἐγκάρδιος, ἀλλὰ με πυρσοὶ
ἄρσενες ἀσβέστω θῆκαν ὑπ' ἀνθρακιῇ

(Anon. *ap.* *AP.* 12.17.1-2)

ἢ μὴ δὴ τόξοις ἔτι βάλλετέ μ', ἀλλὰ κεραυνοῖς·
ναὶ πάντως τέφρην θέσθε με κἀνθρακιήν.
ναί, ναί, βάλλετ', Ἐρωτες.

(Asclepiades *ap.* *AP.* 12.166.3-5)

Note that two of these instances come from the twelfth book of the *Anthology* (= Strato's παιδικὴ Μοῦσα): it is in this same collection that Rhianus' epigram is preserved. Epictetus *Diss.* 3.16.2 may also be compared: καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρακα ἀπεσβεσμένον ἂν θῇ παρὰ τὸν καιόμενον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου <ἀποσβέσει> ἢ ἐκείνος τοῦτον ἐκκαύσει (here, too, the words are metaphorical). ἔρπειν means simply "go," as often in poetic diction; cf. Sophocles *Ant.* 1209-10 τῷ [sc. Κρέοντι] δ' ἀθλίας ἄσημα περιβαίνει βοῆς / ἔρποντι μᾶλλον ἄσσον . . . and 1212-13: ἄρα δυστυχεστάτην / κέλευθον ἔρπω τῶν παρελθουσῶν ὁδῶν. For the Hellenistic period compare, for example, Callimachus, *Epigram* 40.6 and Theocritus 5.45 and 18.40. Indeed, the native dialect of Rhianus (who was from Crete) was Doric and in this dialect, even in prose, ἔρπω was used to mean "go" (the aorist being supplied by ἔμολον and ἦνθον). The form ἀνθρακιήν seems required here, but the *vox nihili* of the MSS ἀνθερίκαν suggests that the word had been "trivialized" to ἀνθρακιάν before it was corrupted; cf. *fr.* 67.5, where Powell has conjectured ὀρείη for ὀρεία. For the epithet αὐγρὴν with ἀνθρακιήν *AP.* 5.209 (Poseidippus or Asclepiades) may be compared: καιόμενος δ' ὑπ' Ἐρωτος ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἄνθρακας ὠνήρ / ξηροὺς ἐκ νοτερῆς παιδὸς ἐπεσπάσατο

In connection with this epigram of Rhianus, I would like to consider Callimachus, *Epigram* 44 (45), since this poem is of similar theme and itself has a corruption in the final line:

"Ἔστι τι ναὶ τὸν Πᾶνα κεκρυμμένον, ἔστι τι ταύτῃ
ναὶ μὰ Διώνυσον πῦρ ὑπὸ τῇ σποδιῇ·
οὐ θαρσέω· μὴ δὴ με περίπλεκε. πολλάκι λήθει
τοῖχον ὑποτρώγων ἡσύχιος ποταμός·
τῷ καὶ νῦν δείδοικα, Μενέξενε, μὴ με παρεισδύς
οὗτος ἴοσειγαρνης εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα βάλην.

Here again we have an instance of the type of τόπος which I have illustrated above. ἀνθρακιή, to be sure, does not appear, but the connotations of σποδιή are very similar. (Note that in *AP.* 12.166, cited above,

τέφρη and ἀνθρακίη are paired.) Similar, also, is the way in which the poet fears to be close to his ἐρώμενος: μὴ δὴ με περίπλεκε.

For the meaningless οὐτοσοσειγάρνης Bentley conjectured οὔτος ὁ σιγέρπης from Hesychius: σιγέρπης·λαθροδάκτης. In 1870 Otto Schneider could remark in his edition of Callimachus “ὄσειγάρνης *Pal.*, quod ingeniose correxit Bentr. cum editorum omnium plausu.” More recent editors, however, tend to reject this conjecture; Wilamowitz, Cahen, and Pfeiffer all still dagger the passage. In his *Hellenistische Dichtung* (I 173) Wilamowitz observes that “Bentleys σιγέρπης ist mit seiner wunderbaren Gelehrsamkeit herangeholt, aber Sinn gibt es noch nicht.” Objections to σιγέρπης are apparently based on Bentley’s own interpretation of the meaning of the word: “*Σιγέρπης apud Hesychium λαθροδάκτης, serpens vel canis clam subrepens et morsum inferens. idem: λαιθαργοὶ κύνες, κρύφα δάκνοντες. et alibi: ληθαργὸς κύων, ὁ προσσαίνων μὲν, λάθρα δὲ δάκνων.*” This interpretation of Bentley’s is followed, for example, by the Loeb editor, A. W. Mair, who accepts the conjecture and notes “σιγέρπης Bentley from Hesychius’ σιγέρπης·λαθροδάκτης, used of a dog which fawns only to bite.” However, in lines 3 and 4 we have a comparison to a “quiet river”; line 5 then begins τῷ καὶ νῦν — “Therefore even now . . .” — so that it is natural to assume that the figure of a river is still being kept up. The introduction of a “fawning dog” at this point would be inept and inappropriate, and the rejection of σιγέρπης so understood is correct.

I believe that Bentley’s restoration is right, but that his *interpretation* is not. Callimachus calls his ἐρώμενος a σιγέρπης, a “*silent creeper*,” precisely because he is continuing the comparison to a “*quiet river*” (ἡσύχιος ποταμός) creeping past. Can this interpretation of σιγέρπης be reconciled with Hesychius’ explanation λαθροδάκτης? I think not only that it can, but that actually the explanation itself gives further confirmation of Bentley’s conjecture. λαθροδάκτης (also in the form — δήκτης) is applied to dogs, but it need not be exclusively so used. Antiphanes (*AP* 11.322) sarcastically refers to certain grammarians as λαθροδάκναι κόριες. In Modern Greek the technical name of a certain type of spider is λαθροδήκτης. The word might be legitimately applied to any person or thing which “bites secretly.” It should be observed that under the entry σιγέρπης Hesychius makes no explicit mention of dogs; he has only one word: λαθροδάκτης. (Bentley’s note, if hastily read, can be deceptive in this respect.) Elsewhere, κύων is always expressed with λαθροδάκτης (see H. Stephanus, *Thes. Gr. Ling.* s.v. λαθροδήκτης). Furthermore, Phrynichus (*PS* p. 87 B) states that it is an erroneous usage to apply λαθροδήκτης to dogs: λαθαργός should be

used instead. If he is correct in this, we may wonder whether a professional lexicographer (Hesychius or his source) would be likely to commit such an error. It is not at all certain, therefore, that λαθροδάκτης alone in our passage must mean *canis clam subrepens et morsum inferens*, and the fact that σιγέρπης is glossed by this word does not preclude a reference to the *river* of line 3. Still, it is obvious that λαθροδάκτης, "secret biter," and σιγέρπης, "silent creeper," are not synonyms. Why then did Hesychius — or rather his source — equate them? We possess Hesychius' work only in an abridged form preserved in a single fifteenth-century manuscript. The work ultimately derives in good part from "Spezialwörterbücher" of earlier grammarians, and consequently many entries in Hesychius' lexicon are explained on the basis of one specific passage. In its original form the work gave references to the passages in which the rare words explained occurred (compare Hesychius' prefatory letter to Eulogius), so that, had Hesychius come down to us entire, we could have seen immediately whether or not he was citing σιγέρπης specifically from this epigram of Callimachus. Nevertheless, even in its present abbreviated form the entry is sufficient to suggest that Hesychius had this very poem in view: λαθροδάκτης is an *interpretamentum* of σιγέρπης based on lines 3 and 4 (πολλάκι λήθει τοῖχον ὑποτρύγων ἡσύχιος ποταμός). The grammarian who used λαθροδάκτης here realized that Callimachus called the boy a σιγέρπης because he was comparing him to the river of lines 3-4 which "escapes notice as it eats away gradually ('eat away from below' LSJ s.v.) a wall." This boy, like the "quiet river," was a λαθροδάκτης: λαθρο- was intended to be an echo of λήθει (line 3) and -δάκτης of ὑποτρύγων (line 4). Presumably in its original full form (lost to us) this interpretation of the grammarian would have been clearer.

To conclude: not only does σιγέρπης, when properly understood, make excellent sense in this passage, but the explanation λαθροδάκτης, preserved in the grammatical tradition, seems directly inspired by lines 3 and 4 of this poem. Hesychius is of acknowledged value for recovering "glosses" corrupted or replaced in the direct manuscript tradition of Greek authors (including Callimachus), and palaeographically the corruption of οσιγερπης to οσειγαρηνης is readily understandable. Bentley's σιγέρπης should once more be read in our texts of Callimachus.

On page 28 two lines of the epic poem Theopompus of Colophon are printed under the title Ἀρμάτιος. What this title may mean escapes me; our source for the fragment is Athenaeus 4.183 B: . . . καὶ Θεόπομπος ὁ Κολοφώνιος ἐποποιὸς ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Ἀρματίῳ.

The correct title must be 'Αρμάτιον (= *parvus currus, curriculum*); for the diminutive compare for example, σώμα: σωμάτιον, αἷμα: αἰμάτιον, πρᾶγμα: πραγμάτιον, στόμα: στομάτιον. I note that *PW* s.v. *Theopompus* 7 gives the correct form 'Αρμάτιον.

Phanocles, *fr.* 1 (pp. 106-7) tells the story of Orpheus' murder at the hands of the Thracian women; in the last six lines (23-28) the reaction of their husbands to this crime is recounted:

Θρήγκες δ' ὡς ἐδάσαν ἀρήϊοι ἔργα γυναικῶν
 ἄγρια, καὶ πάντας δεινὸν ἐσῆλθεν ἄχος,
 ἄς ἀλόχους ἔστιζον, ἔν' ἐν χροῖ σήματ' ἔχουσαι
 κυάνεα στυγεροῦ μὴ λελάθουντο φόνου.
 ποινὰς δ' Ὀρφῆϊ κταμένῳ τίνουσι γυναῖκες
 εἰσέτι νῦν κείνης εἵνεκεν ἀμπλακίης.

Here is Powell's *app. cr.* for line 27; "τίνουσι γυναῖκες *Ruhnken Ep. Crit.* ii, p. 303: στίζουσι γυναῖκας S (στίξουσι MA), *et, ut videtur, Plut. Mor.* 557 D (οἱ Θρηῖκες) στίζουσιν ἄχρι νῦν, τιμωροῦντες Ὀρφεῖ, τὰς αὐτῶν γυναῖκας. *Sed neque cum στίζουσι neque cum ποινὰς congruit dativus. Damagetus, qui circa 220 a.C. floruit, eadem tradit: AP* vii.10.3 στικτοὺς δ' ἡμάξαντο βραχίονας." The transmitted words στίζουσι γυναῖκας make perfect sense and should not be removed by conjecture. ποινὰς is in apposition to the sentence="as a punishment" and Ὀρφῆϊ is *dativus commodi*. Kühner-Gerth (II.i.284 sq.) give numerous examples of this appositional construction: (thus: εὐκλέων δ' ἔργων ἄποινα χρή μὲν ὑμνήσαι τὸν ἐσλόν (*Pindar, I.* 3.7); οὐ τοῦτον ἐκ γῆς τῆσδε χρήν σ' ἀνδρηλατεῖν, μiasμάτων ἄποινα (*Aeschylus Agam.* 1419-20). For the *dativus commodi* in such a construction, compare *Asclepiades ap. AP* 6.308.3-4: κάμει, χάριν Μούσαις, τὸν κωμικὸν ᾧδε Χάρητα, | πρεσβύτην θορύβῳ θῆκέ με παιδαρίων. Note the correspondence of the lines with *Plutarch: ποινὰς Ὀρφῆϊ = τιμωροῦντες Ὀρφεῖ, στίζουσι γυναῖκας = στίζουσιν τὰς αὐτῶν γυναῖκας, εἰσέτι νῦν = ἄχρι νῦν.*

II. Antagoras, *Fr.* 1, line 1 (p. 120 Powell)

ἐν δοιῇ μοι θυμός, ὃ τοι γένος ἀμφίσβητον

This verse is imitated by *Callimachus, Hymn. in Iov.* 5:

ἐν δοιῇ μάλα θυμός, ἐπεὶ γένος ἀμφήριστον.

Powell's apparatus for line 1 is as follows: "ἀμφιβόητον *codd.: corr. Mein., Meibom.; cf. Callim. Hymn, in Iov.* 5, *Wilam. Antig Karyst., p.* 69, ἐν δοιῇ μάλα θυμός, ἐπεὶ γένος ἀμφήριστον." Several corrections must be made here. *Wilamowitz (loc. cit.)* prints these two verses;

there the line of Antagoras reads: 'Εν δοιῇ μοι θυμός, ἐπεὶ γένος ἀμφήριστον. The way in which Powell's apparatus is set up, one would assume that the verse coming immediately after the reference to Wilamowitz was the line as read by that scholar; actually it is Callimachus' imitation (which Wilamowitz quotes in his apparatus). Powell and Wilamowitz disagree in two places in their readings of Antagoras' line; ὁ τοι Pow.; ἐπεὶ Wilam.; ἀμφίσβητον Pow.: ἀμφήριστον Wilam. ἐπεὶ is Meineke's conjecture for ὁ τοι of the Mss. (which he made, of course, because of Callim. *Hymn. in Iov.* 5); the two words could easily be confused in uncial letters (ΕΠΕΙ: ΟΤΟΙ) and this conjecture should at least be recorded in the apparatus. Wilamowitz later (*Hellenistische Dichtung*² II 2 n.3) called it "wohl unvermeidlich." In his *Antig. Karyst.* p. 69, as we saw, this same scholar conjectured from Callimachus ἀμφήριστον for ἀμφιβόητον; later, however, he felt that ἀμφιβόητον was sound and that his alteration was "töricht": "Von Eros gab es viele Genealogien, da traf zu, dass seine Herkunft „umschrien“ war" (*Hell. Dicht.* II.2). This kind of τόπος is as old as the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* (lines 19-20):

πῶς τάρ σ' ὑμνήσω πάντως εὐνυμνον ἑόντα;
πάντη γάρ τοι, Φοῖβε, νομὸς βεβλήσεται ᾠδῆς.

The poet sings his perplexity before not a lack, but a superabundance of material. Callimachus' ἀμφήριστον is a conscious change from Antagoras' ἀμφιβόητον, just as μάλα is from μοι; this argues strongly that ἐπεὶ also was deliberately changed from ὁ τοι. There is no question of corruption here; all six words are sound in their respective places. (I assume — following Wilamowitz, *Antig. Karyst.* — that Callimachus was the borrower, not Antagoras. But even if Antagoras was the borrower, the argument is not affected. It simply means that he, not Callimachus, deliberately changed his source.) Therefore, restore the codex reading ἀμφιβόητον in line one.

III. Hermocles, lines 1-8 (pp. 173-74 Powell)

ὥς οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν θεῶν καὶ φίλτατοι
τῇ πόλει πάρεισιν
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ Δήμητρα καὶ Δημήτριον
ἅμα παρήχ' ὁ καιρός.
Χῆ μὲν τὰ σεμνὰ τῆς Κόρης μυστήρια
ἔρχεθ' ἵνα ποιήσῃ,
ὁ δ' ἱλαρός, ὥσπερ τὸν θεὸν δεῖ, καὶ καλὸς
καὶ γελῶν πάρεστι.

Powell, following Bergk, assumes that some lines have dropped out at the beginning; certainly *ὡς* (*ὦς* Hulleman) *οἱ μέγιστοι κτλ.* is a very odd beginning for a poem, and there probably is a lacuna here. There is some material evidence for it: the poem is preserved by Athenaeus VI 253 D-F (= *FGrHist.* 2 A 141.23 sq.) where we read *ὁ μὲν οὖν Δημοχάρης τοσαῦτα εἶρηκε περὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων κολακείας· Δοῦρις δ' ὁ Σάμιος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῶν ἱστοριῶν καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν ἰθύφαλλον· “ὡς οἱ μέγιστοι κτλ.”* What verb governs *τὸν ἰθύφαλλον*? To understand *εἶρηκε*, from the preceding clause, is very harsh; Hullemann added *<παρατίθεται>* after *ἰθύφαλλον* (accepted by Jacoby, *FGrHist.* 2 A 141). Whether this conjecture is correct or not, it seems that something must be added after *ἰθύφαλλον*: what fell out may well be not just a verb, but several lines. In line 3 it should be indicated that *γὰρ Δήμητρα καὶ* is a conjectural addition of Toup and that *Δημήτριον* is Casaubon's correction for *Δημήτριος*. In line 4 *παρῆχ'* is a conjecture of Richards; Porson conjectured *παρῆγ'* (accepted by Jacoby). The Mss. give *παρῆν*; I think that this is nothing but an itacism for *παρεῖν* (= *παρεῖναι*). For the construction, cf. e.g. Aesch. *Ch.* 710-11: *ἀλλ' ἔσθ' ὁ καιρὸς ἡμερεύοντας ξένους / μακρᾶς κελεύθου τυγχάνειν τὰ πρόσφορα*. Hdt. 8.144.5: *πρὶν ὧν παρεῖναι ἐκείνον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ὑμέας καιρὸς ἐστὶ προβοηθῆσαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην*. Aris. *Plutus*, lines 255-6: *ἴτ', ἐγκονεῖτε, σπεύδεθ', ὡς ὁ καιρὸς οὐχὶ μέλλειν, / ἀλλ' ἔστ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἣ δεῖ παρόντ' ἀμύνειν*. If the temporal sequence (*ὡς . . . πάρευσιν — παρεῖν' ὁ καιρὸς — Χῇ μὲν . . . ἔρχεθ'*) offends, one should recall that *ἔρχεθ'* need not be progressive (= “she is coming”), but may be general (= “she comes” *sc.* as is her custom). Regarding the elision, “der Diphthong *αι* ist elisionsfähig in den Endungen, in welchen er in Beziehung auf den Accent als Kurz gilt” (*Kühner-Blass I.i.237*); *αι* is elided below in lines 6 and 9. Powell (below, in the *app.* to Phoenix 2.20, p. 234). lists examples of the elision of *αι* in infinitives ending in *-ναι*. *παρεῖν*=*παρεῖναι* is also possible, since *εἶν* = *εἶναι* occurs (cf. Powell. *ibid* and the references there); I think, however, that the elided form is more likely here.

IV. *Anon. Pap. Lond. et Bodl.*, lines 23-26 (p. 214 Powell)

ἐπὴν ἔχῃς τι, πάντα σοι φίλων πλήρη,
 πλουτοῦντα γὰρ σε χοῖ θεοὶ φιλήσουσι,
 ἐὰν <δὲ> μὴ ᾗς μῆθ' ἐν, οὐδὲ κηδεσταί,
 πένητα δ' ὄντα χῇ τεκοῦσα μεισῇσει.

In line 23 *πάντα σοι φίλων πλήρη* is probably a play on Thales' famous dictum *πάντα πλήρη θεῶν* (*VS* 1.79.26 sq.) — especially if

these verses belong to the Cynic Cercidas ("Cercidae, ut videtur, Iambi," Powell). In Phoenix, *fr.* 3, line 3 (p. 234) Powell reads κάλαλή "μύρον χεῖτε"; except for Lachmann's correction χεῖτε for κείται, this is the transmitted text (preserved in Athenaeus). *LSJ*, s.v. ἀλαλή quote μύρου χεῖτε; whether this is due to a slip or is a conjecture made after the printing of the *Coll. Alex.* I do not know. There certainly is some elegance in the partitive genitive.

V. Cleanthes, *Hymn. in Iovem*, lines 1-6 (p. 227 Powell)

Κύδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυνύμμε παγκρατὲς αἰεῖ,
 Ζεῦ φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν,
 χαῖρε· σέ γὰρ καὶ πᾶσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσανδᾶν.
 Ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γενόμεσθα, θεοῦ μίμημα λαχόντες
 μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζῶει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν·
 τῷ σε καθυμνήσω, καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν αἰέσω.

In line 2 read νόμου μέτα; there is anastrophe here just as below, line 35, δίκης μέτα. In line 3 καὶ πᾶσι is the conjecture (for the transmitted πᾶσι) not of Scaliger, as Powell reports, but of Mosheim; Scaliger conjectured πάντεσσι, and this is usually read in the text here (e.g. by Wachsmuth, Pearson, Von Arnim, Wilamowitz). The fourth line is probably the most famous verse of this the most famous philosophical hymn in Greek literature.¹ Unfortunately, it has come down to us in a corrupt state and has not yet been corrected. The hymn is preserved in Stobaeus' *Eclogae* (lines 25-27 Wachs.); there the verse is given the following form: ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἑσμέν, ἥχου μίμημα λαχόντες. The unmetrical ἥχου is clearly corrupt; a number of conjectures have been made, which (apart from mere φλυαρίαι) represent essentially three different interpretations of the verse. Some see a reference to human speech here; this seems reasonable enough and I have noted a similar thought in the Septuagint: ἔδωκεν κύριος γλώσσάν μοι μίσθόν μου, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ αἰνέσω αὐτόν (LXX. *Sir.* 51.22). Thus Brunck (considering ἥχου to be a gloss) conjectured ἰῆς and Usener ὕδῆς. However, the expression should explain why man is Διὸς γένος; the cause of this οἰκειότης between man and Zeus is not speech, but (as will be seen below) reason. Furthermore, if ἰῆς — or ἥχου — μίμημα is Greek at all, it can only indicate the ability to imitate sounds, not express thoughts in words; and even so we would expect not μίμημα, but μίμησις (= ἡ δύναμις τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι). Such a reference is pointless here (and excluded by line 5, for man is scarcely alone in his ability to mimic sounds). Along similar lines Von Arnim² conjectured ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος εἶς ἥχου μίμημα λαχόντες: "ἥχου μίμημα

... recte dici puto de musica vel cantu, qui sonis aliquid imitatur; eo refertur τῷ v. 6." Wilamowitz³ observes here: "Ganz undenkbar ist, in ἦχος, Schall, irgendwelche Musik zu suchen." Further, the change to εἶς' is thoroughly improbable (that γένος ἐσμέν is quite sound will appear below). A second interpretation is that of Bergk,⁴ who conjectured ὅλου μίμημα: "*Haec enim Stoicorum fuit sententia, animum hominis ex anima mundi originem ducere divinaeque mentis esse particulam et quasi imaginem quendam.*" Bernays⁵ accepts ὅλου and quotes the Hippocratic work *Regimen*, I.11: θεῶν γὰρ νόος ἐδίδαξε μιμέεσθαι τὰ ἐωυτῶν, γινώσκοντας ἃ ποιέουσι καὶ οὐ γινώσκοντας ἃ μιμούνται. Wilamowitz (*Hell. Dicht.* 2.259) also comes out in support of ὅλου and quotes I.10 of the same Hippocratic work: ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ πάντα διεκοσμήσατο κατὰ πρόπον αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ πῦρ ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου. The thought sequence "We are your offspring because we have obtained an imitation of the universe" is too obscure, even if Zeus is specifically equated with τὸ ὅλου. Cleanthes' mode of expression in this point varied: "*Cleanthes . . . tum ipsum mundum deum dicit esse, tum totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen . . . tum nihil ratione censet divinius.*"⁶ In this hymn, however, Cleanthes clearly conceives of Zeus as the guiding intelligence of the universe, not the universe itself (cf. e.g. lines 2-3, 7-8).⁷ All doubts as to the real meaning of this verse are removed by a comparison⁸ with a fragment of the Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus (ap. *Stob.* 5.1057 Hense): καθόλου δὲ ἄνθρωπος μίμημα μὲν θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ παραπλησίως ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς· ἐπεὶ μὴδ' ἐν θεοῖς μὴδὲν ὑπονοῆσαι κρεῖττον ἔχομεν φρονήσεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἔτι δὲ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης. The agreements (μίμημα; μῦνοι — γαῖαν: μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων) are too close to be accidental; the two Stoics are stating the same doctrine. Man acquires virtue through his *reason*: "Virtue [sc. according to the Stoics] is exclusively a matter of reason — in short, it is nothing else, but rightly-ordered reason" (Zeller).⁹ It is reason that man alone shares with God. (This is why Cleanthes may say not that man *is* — as Musonius says — but rather *has obtained* this μίμημα; he has in mind specifically that part of man which constitutes the likeness: reason.)

The concept that man should make himself like God as far as possible (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) first appears clearly stated in Plato¹⁰; it and the related idea that man is an *imago Dei* were to remain remarkably fruitful throughout the whole course of Greek thought. The Christian thinkers — and before them Philo of Alexandria — combined this with *Genesis* 1.26: καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον

κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. The great historian of Christian philosophy Étienne Gilson calls this concept the "central notion in Greek theology."¹¹ Its history in Greek thought has been studied by various scholars, most recently by Merki.¹² Such studies have not, I think, taken account of Cleanthes' hymn (no doubt because of the corrupt condition in which verse 4 is usually printed); it seems to me practically certain from the parallel in Musonius that there lies hidden in the corrupt verse a reference to this doctrine.¹³ For a similar reference in Greek poetry (previously unnoticed, *ni fallor*), cf. the *Oracula Sibyllina* 8.402: εἰκὼν ἐστ' ἄνθρωπος ἐμὴ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἔχουσα. These "oracles" are in the Judaeo-Christian tradition and εἰκὼν (=μίμημα) is probably from *Genesis*; λόγον ὀρθὸν, however, is from the Stoa (cf. *SVF Index*, s.v. λόγος p. 93; Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* 15.155 says the Stoics believe that κοινωνίαν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους [sc. θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους] διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν). This verse is an example of that fusion of the Greek philosophical "image" teaching with *Genesis* which I referred to above. There is another example of this doctrine in Galen's great work *De Usu Partium* (3.80 K); it has not been noticed before (most likely because the expression "image of God" is not explicit there). It is probably Stoic in inspiration and so I give it here. Galen, in a discussion of the anatomical structure of the ape, states: ὅπως μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ [τῷ πιθήκῳ] τὸ σύμπαν σῶμα μίμημα γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου, προϋὼν ὁ λόγος ἐπιδείξει. Here we are taken one stage further. Just as man is an (inferior) μίμημα θεοῦ, so the ape is a μίμημα ἀνθρώπου. That we have here the same set of concepts is clear from the end of the paragraph where Galen explicitly contrasts man with other ζῷα on the grounds of his reason; man is a σοφὸν ζῷον. Here he is speaking contemptuously of those who have no understanding of man, the "best ordered of all animals" (τὸ μάλιστα πάντων κεκοσμημένον): such people δεδίασι μή πως δειχθῶσιν ἢ ψυχὴν ἔχοντες σοφωτέραν τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἢ κατασκευὴν σώματος πρέπουσαν ζῳῷ σοφῷ.

The meaning of verse 4 seems to me established; Cleanthes is describing man as a μίμημα θεοῦ. Let us now see if the *ipsissima verba* can be recovered. Even before Pearson had cited Musonius Rufus, many had seen what the line must mean; no one, however, had proposed a satisfactory correction of ἥχου (Peterson's ὁ σου is ungrammatical and Gedicke's ἐκ σοῦ unmetrical). It was thought by some that the corruption was not localized in ἥχου. Meineke conjectured γενόμεσθα λόγου and Pearson γενόμεσθα θεοῦ, which Powell prints in his text. In his *app. crit.* Powell objects to ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν; "... γένος σοῦ ἐσμέν *vel.* γενόμεσθα ἐκ σοῦ *proprie dicuntur*, *vix* γένος ἐκ σοῦ ἐσμέν." He

thinks that γένος ἐσμέν is the result of a conflation with Aratus, *Phaenomena* 5 τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰμέν (the famous words quoted in Paul's speech, Acts 17.28). This objection is invalid; the similarity with Aratus is due to the fact that both Aratus and Cleanthes were Stoics, both in fact students of Zeno. Each is inspired by a common source or (more probably) one has borrowed from the other. The grammatical construction ἐκ σοῦ γένος ἐσμέν is quite possible, as may be seen from *Il.* 5.896: ἐκ γὰρ ἐμεῦ [sc. Διὸς] γένος ἐσσί. In the *Coll. Alex.* itself cf. Theolytus, *fr.* 1, line 3 (p. 9): ἔνθεν ἐγὼ γένος εἰμί. γένος is often used by the Greek poets to denote divine descent: φῆσθα σὺ μὲν ποταμοῦ γένος ἔμμεναι εὐρὺν ῥέοντος, / αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ γενεὴν μεγάλου Διὸς εὐχομαι εἶναι (*Il.* 21.186-7); καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ γένος εἰμί Σελήνης ἡυκόμοιο (Epimenides, *VS* 1.33.1); examples appear also in the "Orphic" gold plates: καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὑμῶν [τῶν θεῶν] γένος ὄλβιον εὐχομαι εἶμεν (*VS* 1.16.10); καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὑμῶν γένος εὐχομαι ὄλβιον εἶναι (*VS* 1.16.22). The Latin poets imitated such expressions, e.g. Ovid, *Met.* 4.609-11: . . . *genusque / non putet esse deum neque enim Iovis esse putabat / Persea*. Ennius (*ap. Cic. Or.* 46.155) even has the expression *ex te genus*.¹⁴ In Cleanthes' hymn, ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν is quite sound (γένος may be accusative of specification, but this is not necessary). A further confirmation of these words may be found in Acts 17.28: . . . ὡς καὶ τινες τῶν καθ' ὑμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασιν τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν. τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν is from Aratus' *Phaenomena* (I.5); why then the plural τινες? (Cf. *Ep. Tit.* 1.12, where Paul quotes Epimenides: εἰπέν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης· Κρήτες αἰεὶ ψεύσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί.) The commentators have correctly understood that τινες is used because the sacred writer is thinking not only of Aratus' verse, but also of Cleanthes'. This close association of the two verses is most readily understandable if Cleanthes wrote γένος ἐσμέν, corresponding to Aratus' γένος εἰμέν. Finally, in view of the "image" doctrine which I have discussed above, the metrically correct μίμημα λαχόντες is almost certainly sound. The corruption therefore is most probably in ἤχου alone.

I conjecture that Cleanthes wrote ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, ἀγοῦ μίμημα λαχόντες. Zeus is often referred to as the "leader": Ζεὺς . . . μέγας ἀρχὸς πάντων (*Orph. fr.* 168.6 Kern); Ζῆνα . . . ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων (Plato, *Crat.* 396 A); ὁ δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς (Plato, *Phaedr.* 246 E). These, however, are just general parallels, which I have culled from the same chapter of Stobaeus in which Cleanthes' hymn is preserved: *nunc ad ipsos Stoicos transeundum est*. It was especially appropriate for the Stoics to call Zeus, the *totius*

naturae mens atque animus, "leader" (ἡγεμών etc.), since their technical term for reason and intellect was τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, "the part which leads." Among the fragments of Zeno there is a reference to Διὶ, καθηγέμονι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι (*SVF* 1.43.2-3). In Cleanthes' hymn itself, Zeus is called φύσεως ἀρχηγέ (line 2) and the universe (πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος) in its motions goes "wherever Zeus leads" it (ἡ κεν ἄγῃς, line 8). Musonius Rufus' famous student Epictetus calls Zeus ἡγεμών (*Diss.* 2.17.23; cf. 3.21.11); in *Diss.* 3.26.29 he speaks of singing hymns to God the leader: πείθομαι, ἀκολουθῶ, ἐπευφημῶν τὸν ἡγεμόνα, ὑμνῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἔργα. In the "philosopher-king" Julian's *Hymn to the Mother of the Gods* we read ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ κελεύουσιν ἐκτέμνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀπειρίαν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας.¹⁵ ἄγος is a poetic equivalent of ἡγεμών; cf. *Orac. Sib.* 9 (11). 98: εἰς ἔσται δὲ μέγας τούτων βασιλεὺς ἄγος ἀνδρῶν. In the *Χρησίμων Lexicon* there is the following entry (Bekker, *Anecd. Gr.* I 338): ἄγος (*leg.* ἄγος). ὁ Ζεὺς παρὰ Κυζικηνοῖς. (Of course, Cleanthes was not influenced by cult-names at Cyzicus; I cite this simply as an instance of ἄγος applied specifically to Zeus.) The shift from second to third person (ἐκ σοῦ . . . ἀγοῦ) is no difficulty; it is paralleled in the passage from Julian cited above (where ἡγεμόνας = θεούς) and in Cleanthes' hymn itself where (line 24) — Zeus is still being addressed — we read θεοῦ (= Διὸς) . . . νόμον. Callimachus, in his hymn to Zeus employs the same device: lines 79-80 (a direct address to Zeus) read "ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες," ἐπεὶ Διὸς οὐδὲν ἀνάκτων / θειότερον τῷ καὶ σφετερὴν ἐκρίναο λάξιν κτλ. Such shifts are common in religious language; in the Septuagint, for example, the author of the apocryphal *Psalms of Solomon* exclaims (9.6) τίνι χρηστεύσῃ, ὁ θεός, εἰ μὴ τοῖς ἐπικαλουμένοις τὸν κύριον; Palaeographically, a corruption of ἀγοῦ to ἥχου is not difficult, since γ and χ were often confused (due to a similarity of pronunciation of these gutturals); the same confusion seems to have occurred in line 32, where Meineke corrected ἀρχικέραυνε of the MSS. to ἀργικέραυνε. (Wilamowitz still retains ἀρχικέραυνε, wrongly, I believe. ἀρχικέραυνος elsewhere occurs only in a few passages as a variant for ἀργικέραυνος, which is a common epic epithet. It seems to me to be confirmed here by the word which precedes it — κελαINEφές: Zeus sends his *bright* thunderbolts through the *dark* clouds.)¹⁶

APPENDIX

I have noted a number of misprints and slips in the *Coll. Alex.*, which it may be useful to list here: in *fr.* 16 of Rhianus (p. 12), correct the

comment "... *ex Achaicis uspic* ..." to "... *ex Achaicis suspic* ..."; in *fr.* 28 of Rhianus (p. 14) for 'Ριανὸς read 'Ριανός; in *fr.* 1 of Neoptolemus of Parium (p. 27) for ἀκροδύων read ἀκροδρύων; on p. 28, line 3 from the bottom, in the extract from Suidas, *s.v.* Εὐφορίων, delete the comma before χρησμούς; in *fr.* 27 of Euphorion (p. 35) for δόλω καὶ ἀπάτη read δόλω καὶ ἀπάτη; in the scholium at *fr.* 98 of Euphorion (p. 48) for οἱ ἀνοικοῦντες read οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες; in *fr.* 127 of Euphorion (p. 52) for βύνης καταλέκτριαι αὐδηέσεως read Βύνης καταλέκτριαι αὐδηέσεως (and cf. Callimachus *fr.* 745 Pfeiffer); in line 5 of Maiistas' *Aretalogia* (p. 69) for οἱ read οἷ; in *fr.* 5 of Philetas (p. 91) for ἀλώμενος read ἄλώμενος; the source for *fr.* 8 of Hermesianax (p. 105) is *Paus.* vii. 17.9, not vii. 17.5; in *fr.* 5 of Phanocles (p. 108) for τῶν Ἑλλήνων βασιλέα read τὸν Ἑλλήνων βασιλέα; in *fr.* 5 of Simias (p. 111) Scaliger conjectured for σχόμενον not ἐχόμενος but ἐχόμενον; in the *Paean* of Isyllus line 78 (p. 134) for Λαχεδαιμονίοις read Λακεδαιμονίοις; in the title of the hymn on p. 171 for *Idaeo* read *Idaeos*; on p. 174 the reference should be to *Athen.* vi. 253 D–F, not vii. 253 D; in the third line of the apparatus to *fr.* 5 of the *Lyrica Adespota* (p. 184) for "circ. 150 B.C." read "circ. 150 A.C." (Latin!); in *fr.* 21 of the *Lyrica Adespota* (p. 192) in the eighth line read ἦδ' for ἦδ'; in *fr.* 4 of Cercidas, line 39 (p. 204) for οὐρανίδας read Οὐρανίδας; in *fr.* 7, line 2 of Cercidas (p. 209) for ἐκλαξε read ἐκλάξε (from κλείω); on p. 212, *fr.* 13 of Cercidas, for "Cf. *Frag.* iv. 4" read "Cf. *Frag.* iv. 43;" on p. 228 in the apparatus, line 4 "... IC XY *i.e.* Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ" the abbreviation of the genitive of this *nomen sacrum* should be IY XY; in the Index, *s.v.* Αἰών add the reference *Lyr. Ad.* 35.17. Finally, on p. 15, several fragments from Rhianus' Θεσσαλικά have been assigned to wrong books. *Fr.* 38 belongs to the seventh book, not the sixth ('Ριανὸς . . . ἐν τῇ ζ'); *fr.* 39 to the eighth, not the seventh ('Ριανὸς ἢ Θεσσαλικῶν); and *fr.* 41 to the ninth, not the eighth book ('Ριανὸς . . . ἐν θ' Θεσσαλικῶν).

NOTES

1. The most recent discussions of this hymn are those by J. D. Meerwaldt (*Mnemosyne* 4 (1951) 40–69; 5 (1952) 1–12) and G. Zuntz (*HSCP* 63 (1958) 289–308). These references were given to me by Professor George Huxley after I had written this article. I am in disagreement with both of them as to the reading of line 4; Meerwaldt, conjectures ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, ὅπῃς τίμημα λαχόντες and Zuntz tentatively proposes ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, ἄνωθε νόημα λαχόντες. Nevertheless, both these scholars give much that is useful and that should be read. Where we are in agreement our arguments usually supplement each other rather than overlap. It should be acknowledged that *Il.* 5.698 which I cite in defense of ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν was already cited by Meerwaldt and that he defended the conjecture ἀργικέραννε in line 32 along lines similar to — though not identical with — my interpretation (*viz.* by a contrast with κελαυνεφές).

2. *SVF* I. 121-2.
3. *Hellenistische Dichtung* ² 2.259.
4. *Kleine philologische Schriften* 2.238 sq.
5. *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* I.20 n.2.
6. *Cic. De Nat. Deor.* I.37 (= *SVF* I.120).
7. The expression ἀπομίμησις τοῦ ὅλου which, as we saw, has been cited in support of ὅλου μίμημα was not uttered by a Stoic and was not said of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος. There is a more pertinent parallel in the Stoic Epictetus (*Diss.* 2.5.26), and this has not yet been quoted: τί γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος; μέρος πόλεως, πρώτης μὲν τῆς ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς ὡς ἔγγιστα λεγομένης, ἣ τί ἐστι μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα. (ἡ ὅλη πόλις = τὸ ὅλον; cf. 3.22.4, where Epictetus refers to the universe as ἡ μεγάλη αὐτῇ πόλις). But here it is not man, rather his πόλεις that are an "imitation of the whole."
8. If I have understood Powell's *app. crit.* correctly, the comparison was first made by Pearson; it was not known to Bergk, Bernays, and Wilamowitz (who surely would have cited it, had they known it).
9. *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, Eng. trans. (London 1880) 254.
10. *Rep.* 613 B; *Theaet.* 176 B.
11. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York 1955) 94.
12. 'Ομοίωσις Θεῷ *Von Der Platonischen Angleichung An Gott Zur Gottähnlichkeit Bei Gregor Von Nyssa* (Paulusverlag, Freiburg, Schweiz 1955). See the important review of this work by W. Jaeger in *Gnomon* (1955) 573-81 (= his *Scripta Minora* (Rome 1960) 2.469-81).
13. For the existence of this doctrine in the Stoa of Cleanthes' time, see Merki, (above, n.12) 67.
14. For other instances in Latin see Lewis and Short s.v. 1. *genus* II A.
15. 169 C (I have taken this reference from Merki [above, n.12] 34). ἡγεμόνας is Shorey's conjecture (*ap.* Loeb ed.) for ἡμῶν of the Mss. In the Loeb edition 170 A, B is compared; cf. further 138 C; 147 D; 149 A; 151 A, B; 152 D; 159 B. ἡμῶν was perhaps written because of the repeated ἡμῶν.
16. I would like to thank Professor George Huxley of the University of Belfast and Messrs. Guido Donini, Charles Murgia, and Stanley Shechter of Harvard University, all of whom very kindly read this paper and made useful suggestions.

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF ART IN PLATO'S AESTHETICS

BY JOSEPH P. MAGUIRE

EVEN if one sets out to write an aesthetics, he will have trouble in defining, and his readers will have trouble in apprehending, its object. For, what is aesthetics about? Beauty, or art, or both? If beauty, is beauty an objective property, or a subjective state, or a composite of both? And, in any of these cases, what kind of property, or what kind of state, or what kind of composite? Or is "beautiful" simply a general term of approbation, with no determinate reference — roughly synonymous with "excellent," "admirable," or "desirable?"¹ But, even if so, why do we apply it more readily in some "approval" situations than in others, and what differentiates these "approval" situations?

If aesthetics is about art rather than beauty, how does one determine the limits of art? *If* we distinguish, *how* do we distinguish between a work of art and an artifact? Indeed, what is the "work" we are talking about? The mental act of the artist, or the sensible externalization of that act, or the response of the individual percipient, or the sensible object plus the sum of its historical interpretations?² And, once again, what kind of act of the artist, and what kind of response by the percipient?

Finally, if aesthetics is about both beauty and art, on the assumption that "beautiful" is a descriptive term, what is the relationship between it and art? Is beauty coextensive with art,³ or only with "agreeable" art,⁴ or with both art and nature? Or, does it extend also to the non-sensible realm of ideas and logical systems? If the last, what, if any, is the difference between the beauty of art on the one hand and that of nature and mental constructs on the other? And so forth.

A professed aesthetician will, of course, provide answers to certain of these, and of many similar questions that could be asked. Both his selection of questions to be answered and the answers he provides will depend on his general philosophic principles,⁵ and may well be satisfactory within the limits of his own system. But whether there will be wide agreement beyond these limits that his answers are clear and

coherent, and at the same time just to the extreme variety of things men regard, or have regarded, as art or beauty, is quite another matter. It is not without reason that after all the centuries of thought devoted to it, aesthetics can still be called the "nightmare science," and that its readers are still afflicted with its "dreariness."⁶

If this is the situation for the professed aesthete and his readers, it is infinitely worse for Plato and his: Plato, who, initially at any rate, strives not for differentiation but for synoptic generalizations drawn from apparently diverse particulars; who tends to identify an extreme instance of a species with that species, and if it is bad, to condemn the species, and if good, to reject or ignore all its other instances; and who, in any case, never sets out to write an aesthetics at all.

The root of the difficulty here, as elsewhere in Plato, is that he "carves the joints of reality" differently from us. He "combines" what we "divide," and "divides" what we "combine." Thus he has no aesthetics at all in the sense of a study which tries to isolate art or beauty, and investigate it for its own sake. It would never occur to him that the term "beauty" could somehow be reserved to denote the property of an art-object, or the imaginative act of an artist, or one or more of the various psychological states produced in the percipient by the object. No more would it occur to him that "fine" art could be studied by and for itself, independent of "art" on the one hand and of ethics, politics, ontology, and epistemology on the other. The beauty of which he speaks is not limited even to sensuous experience in general, much less to the perception and enjoyment of "fine" art. The art of which he speaks is hardly differentiated from science, craft, and "insight" on the one side, and from various types of "imitation" on the other. In final analysis, indeed, the only true artist, for him, is the philosophic statesman.⁷

We can, of course, try to elicit from the Dialogues an implicit theory of aesthetics — what Plato *would*, perhaps, have said, did he agree that art and the beauty of art could be studied in isolation from other things. There are, however, two converse difficulties in the way of doing even this much. The first is that these implicit theories are themselves "synoptic," as viewed from our perspective. If, for example, we examine the twenty definitions of beauty which Ogden, Richards, and Wood have distinguished in the history of aesthetics, we see that at least eleven of them can be elicited from the Dialogues, if not as definitions of beauty, at least as predicates of art, or of some art.⁸

The converse difficulty is that Plato "divides" what we "combine." So, for example, though he has much to say of beauty and of art separately, unlike us he rarely associates the two.⁹ He has vivid descriptions

of the aesthetic experience (which is one possible meaning of "beauty") in *Symposium*, *Phaedrus* and *Republic* VI-VII; and he makes frequent reference to the pleasure produced by art (which is another possible meaning of "beauty") in a number of Dialogues, from *Gorgias* or *Hippias Maior* to *Laws*. But the aesthetic experience he describes is felt before intelligible Ideas, not objects of art; and he explicitly *contrasts* the pleasure and the beauty of art in his most detailed and careful discussion of the subject.¹⁰ It is surely noteworthy, in this connection, that his not infrequent formal lists of beautiful things usually do not even include works of art as such.¹¹ The most striking fact of all, perhaps, is that on the rare occasions that Plato does relate art and beauty, especially in his solemn assertions that the love of beauty is the aim of art,¹² the beauty he mentions seems to be a moral, not an aesthetic, value.¹³

Under these conditions the best that the most intrepid investigator can hope for is to reconcile some of the inconsistencies which seem to be inherent in Plato's statements about art and beauty; to recognize where the data are insufficient for any theory, however implicit; perhaps to guess, on the basis of his over-all philosophic theory, and especially of his philosophic practice, the direction toward which Plato's aesthetic thinking seems to point; and, above all, to remove some problems of our own making.

The chief problem of our own making is due to our failure, often, to distinguish levels of art in Plato's statements. The result is that we tend to refer what he says about trivial or pernicious art to art generally; or, conversely, to convert every attack on art in the Dialogues into an indirect praise.¹⁴ Plato, it must be admitted, does little to oppose these tendencies. If he were writing as an aesthetician, and studying art as an autonomous form of expression or communication, and if, especially, he regarded "art" as an "honorific" term, he would presumably do as other aestheticians do: refuse to include under "art" what failed to satisfy his aesthetic criteria. But, as it is, when he is speaking about art he is usually concerned not with art but with its ethical influence; he feels no proprietary interest in the term, "art" (indeed, he has no such term, and the descriptive phrase he does have, is derogatory in its connotation); and he is not only willing to — he *must* — measure against his ethical criteria every man-made product with ethical influence, good or bad. This means: every man-made product which is not an artifact. Every such object will be a work of art, and if the object under discussion is morally useful, "art" will appear valuable; if the object is morally harmful, "art" will appear so too. But if we are to find even an implicit aesthetic in Plato, we must try to find other, however

subordinate, criteria of art, and use them both to grade the works of art he discusses in relation to one another and to distinguish them all from artifacts and natural objects.

The possible means Plato gives us for such differentiations are: his classifications of art; and four conceptions relating to the model, the artist, the percipient, and the art-object, respectively: imitation to the model, inspiration to the artist, pleasure to the percipient, and beauty to the art-object.¹⁵ All four are generalizing categories, applicable to many spheres and objects, and hence not, as such, differentiae of art. But the *mode*, if not the fact, of its imitativeness, and the *kinds* of beauty it manifests, at least, do partially differentiate the work of art from natural object and artifact; while the nature of the model and the kind of pleasure felt by the percipient distinguish good art from bad, if not art from craft; and the inspiration and technical competence of the artist perhaps differentiate both art from craft and nature, and good art from bad.

Plato's classifications of art, for all their inconsistencies, point to imitation as the differentia of what we would call "fine" art from other kinds of "making." His normal division of the genus art is threefold: into imitative, demiurgic, or constructionist, and therapeutic, art;¹⁶ and he normally includes under "imitative" what we would include under art or fine art; viz., sculpture, painting, architecture, music (both purely instrumental and accompanied by words), dance, and literature (all normative verse and prose, including philosophical treatises, rhetorical discourses, and myths¹⁷). It is true that sometimes "imitative" is used as a derogatory designation of one subspecies of imitative art;¹⁸ and that oftentimes music and the plastic arts are classed with demiurgic, not imitative, arts.¹⁹ But this does not change the general picture. From one point of view, impersonation by an actor, or an observer's self-identification with the person represented in imitative art (which are what are meant in *Republic* III and *Sophist*), is peculiarly "imitative." And from one point of view too — that of their technique — sculpture, painting, music, and other imitative arts *are* demiurgic, since they "make" in the same way and by the same technical standards as, for example, carpentry.²⁰

Apparently, then, by Plato's own classifications, "fine" art is "imitative" art. The trouble with that as a differentia, however, is that for Plato *everything*, natural and artificial, except the Ideas,²¹ is an imitation. In particular, fine art as a whole is no more an imitation than statesmanship as a whole, or than craft as a whole.²² Nor is it true that

the imitation which is fine art is distinguished from that which is craft or statesmanship by a generic difference in the nature of the objects imitated, despite the notorious statement to the contrary in *Republic* X.²³ According to that passage the craftsman imitates Ideas, while the best the painter can do is imitate the fragmentary (*smikron ti hekastou ephaptetai*, 598B) and superficial aspects of sensible models (*phainomena*, 596E, 598A).

Is it, however, the best he can do? The distinction in *Sophist* 235D–236B between “eikastic” and “phantastic” imitation, suggests that there is a better way than this of imitating even sensible models; and a comparison of the distinction in *Sophist* with the parallel discussion in *Laws* II 667D–668E on imitative “correctness,” suggests that the model need not be sensible at all. According to *Sophist*, “eikastic” imitation produces copies (*eikōnes*) by preserving the true proportions (*symmetrias*) of the model, and by assigning the “due” (*prosēkonta*) color to each part (235D–E); and “phantastic” produces “phantasms” and *eidōla* by constructing, not the true proportions (235E 7, 236A 5), but those which merely appear beautiful, by being seen “from an unbeautiful vantage” (236B 4). And according to *Laws*, “imitative correctness” (*orthotēs*) is a duplication, in the copy, of the “numbers” of the model; the number, nature, and “due” (*prosēkousan*) order of its parts; and its colors and attitudes (*schēmata*, 668E).

Now, on the face of it, the passage in the *Sophist* refers to two actual schools of plastic art: the “eikastic” being archaizers who aimed at a stylized and probably “canonic” correspondence with a logical construct of the human body; and the “phantastic” being modern “impressionists” who aimed at fidelity to the visual facts.²⁴ And it is the latter “phantastic,” school which seems to be referred to in *Republic* X and identified with art simply. If so, by that fact alone the general condemnation of art there must be severely qualified. But the necessary qualifications go further than that: the reference in “eikastic” and “phantastic” imitation cannot possibly be restricted to the plastic arts, even if they are primarily in view in *Sophist*; the proportional similarity and dissimilarity between model and copy in “eikastic” and “phantastic” imitation, respectively, cannot possibly be restricted to similarity and dissimilarity of physical proportions; and, consequently, the emphasis upon the sensible nature of art’s model in the derogatory passage of *Republic* X is misleading. For, even in the case of plastic works of art which purport to represent, for example, gods or virtues, or even good men, if it is their goodness and not their physiques that is in point, it is nonsense to speak of a similarity or dissimilarity between

the number of parts in a statue and their mutual relationships on the one hand, and the number and relationships of the model's parts on the other. It is greater nonsense still to speak in this way about the relationship between model and copy in music and the language arts (which are, after all, the subjects of the discussion in *Laws* II on "imitative correctness"). In all these cases, "proportional similarity" can mean no more than "what is appropriate" (*to prosēkon*), or "fitting" (*to prepon*), to the original.²⁵ And "proportional dissimilarity" would have to refer not to visual distortion but to distortion of interpretation.

The poetic instance of this, which Plato later in *Republic* X equates with the visual distortion of the painter, is the representation of men indulging in self-pity (604D-605C). The distortion in this case apparently consists in enhancing one facet of the model (his emotions) at the expense of another (his reason), thus altering, for effect on a certain class of percipients, the proportion which really obtains between these facets in the model. But if this be so, the model — the "original," whose "proportions" the art-object should reproduce — is not necessarily an actual model, but Man;²⁶ or the man who realizes the "nature," "form," *ousia*, or "good" of man.

It would seem from this that the first requisite for any imitator is an acquaintance with the nature of his "model," if not by knowledge, at least by right opinion derived from the judgment of those who use his product. For the artist, whose products are normative, and ethically normative,²⁷ the ultimate "user" can only be the community as a whole, represented by the statesman; and few, if any, actual artists are guided by a philosopher-statesman's judgment.²⁸ Fewer still, Plato assumes, themselves know the norms of human "characters and actions." He assumes this because of the extremely high level of abstraction from which he approaches any differentiated activities: just as the ruler *qua* ruler looks always to the good of his subjects, however concerned with his own good a concrete ruler may be (*Rep.* I 342E), so the artist *qua* artist is concerned with representing what is before his mind or eyes, not with its truth. He must, of course, interpret what is before his eyes, and what is before his mind *is* an interpretation, or an "opinion"; but whether his "opinion" is "right," and, much less, whether it may be "knowledge," he has no criteria by which to judge.²⁹ The craftsman, on the other hand, even if he does not adequately apprehend the intelligible structure (or *Idea*) of his product, will quickly be instructed by his dissatisfied customers.

It is really on this ground, then — viz., that the "popular" (*Rep.* X 602B, 604E, 605A, and so on) artist possesses neither knowledge nor

right opinion of his model (598E; cf. *Soph.* 267B) — that he is rated inferior to the craftsman (*Rep.* X 601B–602B),³⁰ not because the model of art as such is necessarily sensible while that of craft is Ideal. If interpreted loosely enough, the alleged “sensible” nature of art’s model can perhaps serve to distinguish different levels of fine art from each other, and hence perhaps one level from a different level of statesmanship or from craft,³¹ but not to distinguish art as a whole from craft as a whole or statesmanship as a whole.

If the differentia of art is not to be found in the fact that it is an imitation, nor in the sensible nature of the object imitated, it can perhaps be found in its function. The proper function of a work of art is to “point to” its model by representing it in a different medium.³² The function of an artifact, on the other hand, is not to “point to” the model it represents, but to point away from the model and toward the job it was conceived to do. And, similarly, the function of statesmanship is not to point to the Good, the Right, and the Noble, but to translate them into institutions for the good life. It is to this absence of predestined purpose beyond that of backward reference to its model that Plato refers when he often says that art is a species of play, and is “of no serious import,” (cf. n.16 above). Lacking any inherent signs for its own use, the work of art tends to be directed only to the production of deleterious, or, at best, inconsequential, pleasure.³³ The absence of predestined purpose also explains why there is no Idea of a work of art as there is of an artifact, in the Dialogues, at least;³⁴ and why a work of imitative art is an *eidōlon* par excellence, analogous with images or reflections in water and mirrors,³⁵ despite the fact that *everything*, insofar as it is an imitation, is also an *eidōlon*.³⁶

Finally, the absence of a predestined purpose in a work of art beyond that of representation helps to explain Plato’s so-called “moralistic” approach to art. If its proper function is to represent faithfully a model for contemplation, if the model is “the characters and actions of men,” if such representation is necessarily normative, based on an interpretative judgment by the artist and evoking “imitation” by the percipients, the work of art takes on a secondary function, which is, indeed (to use a distinction drawn by Bosanquet in another connection) its proper function *par excellence*. A proper function *par excellence* is the best work an object can do, and this, for a work of art, is to represent moral Ideas for a pedagogical purpose — something it *can* do because it always produces pleasure in percipients, and percipients tend to become like what they like. This function of representing moral Ideas for a pedagogical purpose is implied in the notion of the art which

Plato praises and advocates; and the notion of such art, therefore, like so many other notions in Plato, seems to be composite, denoting an imitation, connoting a particular kind of model and a particular use for the imitation. The consequence is that Plato tends either to approve "art" because of its moral effects (when he identifies this ideal art with art as a whole), or to condemn it as morally harmful (when he identifies certain contemporary artistic fashions with art as a whole). He uses other, more aesthetic, criteria too in judging the work of art: and even in judging the nature of the model, the criterion of its *moral* effects is not the ultimate one.³⁷ But it does seem that the "moralistic" aspects of his criticism are a direct consequence of the fact that the work of art has a proper function *par excellence* different from its proper function.

In any case, the function of art's imitation, whether interpreted as the bare representation of (any) model, or as the representation of an ideal model for pedagogical purposes, does seem to differentiate art as a whole from craft and all other forms of imitation. Its function is simply to represent the model whether as a stimulus to philosophy, or for possible "imitation" by percipients, or only for their pleasure.

The next question is whether the inspiration, possession, or enthusiasm of the artist is a similar means of differentiating "fine" art from "art" as a whole, including craft. The answer seems to be a hesitant "yes." In its cognitive significance, inspiration seems to differentiate "fine" art, pejoratively, from "art," which is a rational system based on knowledge of causes. Thus, the point is made in *Apology*, *Ion*, and *Meno* that the poet, even when he attains truth, cannot explain how he attained it, or why it is true. He speaks, in such cases, as one inspired or possessed.³⁸ The distinguishing feature of the possessed poet, according to *Laws* IV 719C, is that he is "outside himself," given over uncritically to the stream (cf. *Phaedrus* 238D) of his images and impressions. The characters he "imitates" while in this ecstasy display diverse, often contradictory, qualities; and therefore, since he has no external standard by which to "correct" them, he often contradicts himself.³⁹

This is the obverse of the inspired poet's ability to speak truth. From a purely aesthetic point of view, the fact that his characters manifest self-contradictory states might, it would seem, be sometimes a virtue: the characters might be Aristotle's "consistently inconsistent" men (*Poetics* 1454a 26-28). But not if the model is Man himself; and not if the poet's responsibility and cognitive capability are the subjects of discussion. In that case the poet is contradicting *himself*; and, in so doing,

he reveals how fortuitous his occasional "fine" utterances are. Inspiration, thus, is the best, and perhaps only, way of accounting for the poet's true insights when he obviously does not know whether or why they are true — "obviously," because otherwise he would not so readily set beside them other utterances which are untrue and, indeed, contradictory.⁴⁰

These passages give the negative side of inspiration: as a mode of cognition, it is vastly inferior to philosophy, being at best right opinion, never knowledge. It is also inferior to — and differentiated from — every rational system, including craft, for the same reason: because it cannot "give an account" of its insights. But there is a positive side too. The uninspired versifier is nothing beside the inspired poet (*Phaedrus* 245A; *Ion* 533E, 534B). Even from the cognitive point of view, irrational insights are better than no insights at all. More than that, indeed, a similar irrational intuition is the ultimate mode of philosophy itself. But probably the more striking differentia between the inspired and the uninspired poet is in their emotional commitment⁴¹ and their consequent expressiveness. Poetic inspiration is a species of divine frenzy, coordinate with Eros or Love (*Phaedrus* 244A–245C). Indeed, it *is* Eros, insofar as it is the source of a poet's creativity. The (inspired) poet is driven by the pressure of the seeds of "wisdom and the rest of virtue" in him to communicate them, to beget in "beautiful" souls poems which shall be his claim on immortality (*Symp.* 209A, D). No doubt, *qua* poet he stops short of the dialectic discipline (the "ladder of Eros") which would do away with the contradictions inherent in his conceptions by reducing them to the unity of the Idea;⁴² but at least he is "enthusiastic," and is literally compelled to communicate the object of his "enthusiasm." The uninspired poet, on the other hand, is like the poet, logograph, or nomograph of *Phaedrus* 278C–E, who mechanically glues his works together out of pre-existent parts, according to the rules in the handbooks. He is not driven to communicate or express anything, and, indeed, has nothing to communicate or express.

Inspiration, then, regarded as the source of artistic creativity, certainly differentiates "real" poetry from hack-composition; and one would be inclined to think it differentiates "real" poetry, and perhaps "real" art,⁴³ from craft also. Yet, to the extent that inspiration can be identified with Eros, it seems to belong to some craft too. At any rate, "inventive demiurgy" is paired with "good" poetry in *Symposium* 209A, D,⁴⁴ as equally a product of Eros. This may or may not be seriously meant. It may be *merely* a reminiscence of Agathon's praise of Eros in

197A as the guide of Apollo when he “invented” archery, medicine, and divination; in which case it is a *pro forma* reference to the mythological inventors of the arts and says nothing about actual artisans. Or it may refer also to actual artisans who advance their crafts by technical innovations. In this case, however, Eros is not ascribed even to the “good” artisan as such, but to the artisan who transcends his craft;⁴⁵ and, anyway, the generic Eros which here motivates the “inventive” artisan as well as the “good” poet, is probably not quite the “possession” or “divine frenzy” which inspires the poet in *Phaedrus* 244A f. If it were, the artisan would be as unable to “give an account” of his work as the poet of his; but, in fact, the artisan — presumably even the “inventive” artisan — knows quite well what he is doing, or, at any rate, what he has done, in his own field (*Apol.* 22D), while the poet does not (*Apol.* 22B). Both may be motivated by Eros, but only the poet is made mad, and only the artisan innovates.

In summary, inspiration, regarded as a mode of cognition, does differentiate poetic (or artistic) from all rational and systematic thinking, including that of craft. Regarded as the source of creativity and expressiveness, it at least differentiates “good” art from “bad,” and probably “good” art from craft as well.

The pleasure of percipients is even less clear-cut a differentia of art than inspiration. One or more of many kinds of pleasure always attend the perception of a work of art for some class of percipients, but whether any kind attends it *qua* work of art exclusively — whether, in short, there is any such thing as specifically aesthetic pleasure — is another matter.

To help us decide we can distinguish two ways of regarding a work of art: as an imitation; and as a formal organization. As an imitation, a work of art re-presents a model. If it is an accurate re-presentation, one kind of pleasure produced by it will depend upon, and vary with, the nature of the model and the character of the percipients. Men enjoy what they are used to (*Laws* VII 802C–D), or what is akin to their own characters (*Gorgias* 513C; *Laws* II 655D–E, 656B), or what permits them to express, vicariously, their inhibited desires (*Rep.* X 605C). That is why Plato insists that pleasure cannot be a criterion of the beauty or worth of a work of imitative art: only the pleasure of the best men can.⁴⁶ The pleasure of the many is worse than useless as a criterion of good or bad art.⁴⁷ Pleasure, in fact, is not an autonomous criterion or aim. It can present itself as a criterion or aim at all only by the default of objective criteria or aims. When “correctness” and “beauty” are

lacking or ignored, there is no other standard by which to measure the value of art *qua* imitative than the pleasure which is always there for someone.

The only possible suggestion that the pleasure which is dependent upon its imitative character is in any way a differentia of a work of art occurs in the discussion of *Laws* II on the interrelations among the pleasure, correctness, and beauty (or utility) of art. The statement is made (667C–D) that in arts producing likenesses, pleasure (sometimes) attends the successful achievement of this, as a by-product (*parepomenon*). At first glance, this looks like Aristotle's intellectual (but artistic) pleasure felt at the recognition of the relationship between model and copy (*Poetics* 1448b 16–19).⁴⁸ If so, it is at least distinctive of an imitative work which represents a model for contemplation; and thus differentiates art from craft, at any rate, if not also from the construction of replicas or reproductions. But the "sometimes" (*ean gignētai*) raises doubts: why not always? Further, even if the pleasure is understood to be a function of the work's imitative character, the context suggests that what Plato means to say is not that pleasure is a by-product of a correct imitation, but that it is a by-product of a correct *and beautiful* imitation. In that case, since "beauty" here means moral excellence, the pleasure follows not simply the recognition of the resemblance between model and copy, but that *plus* a sympathy with the moral worth of the model. This interpretation would explain the "sometimes": this kind of pleasure would be felt only by good men before a correct copy of a good model. But it would seem to relate the pleasure primarily with an ethical, rather than an aesthetic, object. Finally, it is just as likely that Plato is not specifying the source of the pleasure at all. His main point is that a work of representational art must be judged by its "correctness" and "beauty," not by the pleasure it gives. He assumes that it will give pleasure, because every work of art does for someone (not necessarily for everyone: *ean gignētai*). The pleasure may result from the percipient's self-identification with the character represented, good or bad; or from his perception of the formal aspects of the work. In either case the pleasure felt is incidental (*parepomenon*) to a judgment of the work's value.

If we regard the work of art not as an imitation but as an organization of certain materials, other kinds of pleasure appear. There is, at a pre-formal stage, the pleasure associated with the perception of certain sensuous qualities in the materials or elements of art-works: lines, pure sounds, and colors (*Phil.* 51B–D). At an intermediate stage of organization, there is a pleasure associated with the perception of simple rhythms

and harmonies in movement and sound,⁴⁹ and, presumably, of simple plane and solid figures.⁵⁰ At the level of full organization, there are perverse pleasures associated with excessive exploitation of the artistic medium: the pleasures derived from virtuosity, complexity, or variegation.⁵¹ But there is also, no doubt, a pleasure which attends the perception of unity amid variety, or of the balance of parts in a whole — the formal beauty of a work of art, without reference to the content it informs. And finally, if we regard the work of art as both an imitation and as an organization of materials, there is, no doubt, also, a pleasure which attends the perception of the fusion of form and ideal content.⁵²

All these kinds of pleasure, however, are either trivial, or, if important, depend at least as much on the character or training of the percipient as upon any quality of the art-object. And, for a man like Plato, so objective in his thinking that he can define even a mental state like opinion or knowledge only in terms of what is opined or known, that fact alone would disqualify pleasure as an autonomous differentia of art. We have to look for the objects correlative with these different kinds of pleasure. And we find them (except for the perverse pleasure in virtuosity) in corresponding kinds of beauty conceived as qualities of the art-object.

Beauty then, is the next — and the last — possible differentia of art we shall consider. As with the correlative pleasures, there is a beauty which belongs to a work of art *qua* imitative, and others which belong to it *qua* formal organization. Actually, the two kinds are simply particular manifestations of two general kinds of beauty which intertwine throughout the Dialogues. One belongs to an object insofar as it performs its function efficiently;⁵³ the other, insofar as its parts interrelate harmoniously to form it.⁵⁴ The two kinds have been called that of “external purposiveness” and that of “internal purposiveness,” respectively. The beauty of external purposiveness, in the case of a work of imitative art (whose proper function is to re-present), would depend, one might think, chiefly on the correctness of its imitation. But, in fact, Plato distinguishes between the correctness and the beauty of a work of art.⁵⁵ The reason is that, for him, since art is normative, the external purposiveness of a work of art is expressed rather by its proper function *par excellence* than by its proper function. That is, its function of imitating cannot, in his view, be divorced from the nature of the model imitated;⁵⁶ and it is the nature of the model — viz., its moral excellence — which primarily determines the beauty of the art-work. The upshot is that even its function *par excellence* is a differentia of art, since art does

imitate in a unique way — by pointing back to the model; but that the beauty which is an essential part of this function *par excellence* seems more a moral, than an aesthetic, value, and in any case seems to involve rather the model's beauty of internal purposiveness than the art-object's beauty of external purposiveness.⁵⁷

The other kind of beauty — that of internal purposiveness — wherever it appears (in art-work, natural object, or artifact), is a product of the interrelationships of the parts in a whole. Beauty and wholeness go together for Plato.⁵⁸ Wholeness, for him, involves: self-completeness, or *all* necessary parts;⁵⁹ limitation, or a first part and a last part;⁶⁰ economy, or *only* necessary parts;⁶¹ and *taxis*, or necessary order, of parts, and, hence, a *middle*, as well as a beginning and end.⁶² Self-completeness implies that the parts be complementary, and therefore diverse; actually, Plato thinks of them as hostile, and even contrary, in nature.⁶³ Being such, if they are to be unified, it must be by some proportionality among them,⁶⁴ in size, intensity, power, or whatnot, to achieve a balance of tensions. But the balance he conceives is not that of equal forces but one which involves an adjustment of the rest to the dominance of one hierarchic part.⁶⁵ Hence Plato's wholes are marked by self-completeness, limitation or measure, economy, necessary arrangement of contrasting parts, proportionality, balance, and centrality.

These are the basic categories of analysis used by every aesthete since Aristotle in studying the formal aspects of works of art. It might be thought, therefore, that wholeness so characterized would certainly be a differentia of art in Plato. The trouble is again, however, that Plato characterizes *every* whole in this way — those of the cosmos, the just state and soul, and the good life, for example, as well as that of the work of art.⁶⁶ The most that can be said, therefore, for this formal beauty as a differentia of art is that when Plato wants an ideal example to illustrate a properly organized state, it is a "beautiful" statue he points to (*Rep* IV 420D). It may have seemed to him that the work of fine art is the pre-eminent example of formal beauty; that sometimes, at least, it *can* be regarded there, under the titles of "grace," "eurhythm," and "accord" (*Rep* III 401A ff), as an end in itself; whereas in an artifact, it is at best the condition for achieving another end, or a by-product of having achieved it.

The surest differentia of art based on its beauty, however, is that which includes both its beauty of external purposiveness and its beauty of internal purposiveness; in other words, the fusion of what is expressed with what expresses it, or the unity of form and ideational content. A work of representational art seems to be the only possible means

of achieving this; and, in fact, a rhetorical discourse is the only object Plato considers in this light. For that is what the *Phaedrus* is about.⁶⁷

If this is correct, it seems possible to say — in summary about beauty as a differentia of art — that the beauty of external purposiveness is a partial differentia of art from craft: the correctness with which art represents its model, if it performs its proper function efficiently, is admirable — and beautiful — in a unique way; that is, by pointing back to the model. The same, moreover, is true even if, as Plato insists it must, the nature of the model is taken into the account, and the term “beauty” is reserved for the correct representation of a worthy model; although in that case the moral may be thought to encroach on the aesthetic. With respect to the beauty of internal purposiveness, regarded as a purely formal character, the work of art may be said to be first among equals: this beauty perhaps belongs pre-eminently to it,⁶⁸ but, if so, it belongs also to many other things, including, no doubt, craft. Even the combination of the beauties of external and internal purposiveness, considered abstractly, is probably not a conclusive differentiating factor: probably anything whatever that is beautiful in one way is beautiful also in the other. In the case of an artifact, for example, the beauty of internal purposiveness can only be defined in terms of the function the beautiful object is designed to perform; and, of course, the beauty of external purposiveness is, in turn, dependent on the object’s internal *kosmos*.⁶⁹ However, the combination of the two beauties in a work of art is somewhat different. It is not a question there of a single relation between the internal order and the function of the art-object; there is also the relation between the internal order of the art-object and the internal order of the model. In fact, the latter relation is the decisive one, determining not only the art-object’s beauty of internal purposiveness, but also its beauty of external purposiveness, since, for Plato, this is defined not by the correctness of the imitation, but by the correct imitation of a “beautiful” model. But the internal order of art’s model is already organized ideational content. Since it is ideational, truth is relevant to it; and its beauty cannot be divorced from its truth, whether beauty is a quality of the ideational element, or of its organization, or, as is in fact the case, of both.⁷⁰ In this respect the combination of the beauties of internal and of external purposiveness in an art-object is unique, and serves to differentiate it absolutely from craft and everything else.

If we add this differentiation, based upon the unique combination of the two kinds of beauty in an art-object, to the differentiations based upon art’s imitative function and upon the inspiration which belongs

to it and to no other productive art, it is not so obvious as it seems, for example, to Collingwood, that the Greeks generally, and Plato in particular, make no distinction whatever between art and craft.⁷¹ Indeed, it even seems slightly misleading to say, as McKeon does, that Plato discusses not the products but only the conditions of art; and that he normally does not differentiate art from nature, or separate aesthetic from moral criteria of art.⁷² In reality, he does all three — after his fashion.

NOTES

1. So, R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (1938) 37-41.
2. So, M. Macdonald, in W. Elton, ed., *Aesthetics and Language* (1954) 128-29.
3. It is sometimes argued, as by R. Fry, *Vision and Design* (Phoenix Library 1928) 30, and C. Lalo, *Notions d'esthétique* (1925) 5, that there is no beauty in works of nature, since beauty depends upon the *intention* of the artist to communicate it. Conversely, the term "beauty" is sometimes applied *only* to works of nature, the term "goodness" being reserved for works of art, as it is by H. Knight, in W. Elton (above, n.2) 147.
4. Whether "agreeable" art — and, along with it, beauty — is being consciously decried, as it is, e.g., by J. A. Passmore in *Aesthetics and Language* (above, n.2) 50-51, and by A. Malreaux, *Psychology of Art* (n.d.) 87f, 107f; or "agreeable" art is being identified with art simply, as by Lessing, *Laocoön*, chap. ii.
5. See S. C. Pepper, *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts* (1949); and especially R. McKeon, "The Philosophic Bases of Art and Criticism," *Mod. Philol.* 41 (1943-44) 65-87; 129-71.
6. Cf. W. Elton (above, n.2) 2; and J. A. Passmore (above, n.4) 36-55.
7. This is the chief point of R. C. Lodge, *Plato's Theory of Art* (1953). For some of the complex reasons why these fusions occur, see the admirable study by D. R. Grey, "Art in the *Republic*," *Philosophy* 27 (1952) 291-310.
8. C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and James Wood, *The Foundations of Aesthetics* (1925) 20-21: Anything is beautiful
 - I. which possesses the simple quality of Beauty.
 - II. which has a specified Form.
 - III. which is an imitation of Nature.
 - IV. which results from successful exploitation of a medium.
 - V. which is the work of Genius.
 - VI. which reveals (1) Truth, (2) the Spirit of Nature, (3) the Ideal, (4) the Universal, (5) the Typical.
 - VII. which produces Illusion.
 - VIII. which leads to desirable social effects.
 - IX. which is an Expression.
 - X. which causes Pleasure.
 - XI. which excites Emotions.
 - XII. which promotes a Specific emotion.

- XIII. which involves the processes of Empathy.
- XIV. which heightens Vitality.
- XV. which brings us into touch with exceptional Personalities.
- XVI. which conduces to Synaesthesia.

Of these, at least I, II, III, V, VI (1), VI (3), VII, VIII, X, XI, XII, can be found in Plato without much imaginative effort; and, with somewhat greater effort, two or three of the others could be found. See also M. C. Nahm, *Aesthetic Experience and its Presuppositions* (1946) 12, for Platonic anticipations of still other aesthetic theories.

9. So N. R. Murphy, *The Interpretation of Plato's Republic* (1951) 233.

10. *Laws* II 667C-669B, especially 668A-B. Beauty in song and dance consists rather in the virtue of the objects imitated than in the correctness or fidelity of the imitation (654B ff, 655B, D-E, 656B; cf. 660E ff); and its correctness, in turn, does not consist in the pleasure it provides (655C-D, 657B, 668A, 700E).

11. They do not in *Hipp. Mai.* 292D, 294C, 295C-D, 296A, E, 297B, 298D; *Gorg.* 474D-475A; *Symp.* 210A-D. In *Hipp. Mai.* 298A art-works are included among "beautiful things" defined as things which give pleasure to eye and ear; in *Polit.* 306D, among "things which we call beautiful," whether the things themselves or their images; and in *Rep.* III 401A ff, among the graceful and harmonious images of good characters, where "graceful" is apparently glossed by "beautiful" in C 5 (*tēn tou kalou te kai euschēmonos phusin*). In addition to these inclusions by the back door, works of art are, of course, often called "beautiful" in a popular way; e.g., *Apol.* 22C 3; *Ion* 533E 7, 534A 2, D 8, E 3, 535A 1; *Meno* 91D (Phidias); *Soph.* 236A 5, B 5; *Rep.* 420C-D, 476B 5, 480A 2, 540C 3, 598E 4, and so on; *Symp.* 179C, 209C-E. Some of these are rhetorical tags; in others, notably in *Ion*, the works are designated "beautiful" because the poet "says many beautiful things about *pragmata*" (534B 8; cf. 538D 5 with C 4 and E 4; cf. *Laws* II 654B).

12. *Rep.* III 401C, 403C; *Laws* II 668B.

13. We shall have to try to distinguish between these two kinds of beauty in Plato. I see no possibility of doing so, however, as H. Perls does: by transferring the problem to the realm of Ideas, distinguishing the Idea of Beauty from the Idea of Good, and making the Idea of Beauty the source of aesthetic beauty only (H. Perls, *Platon. Sa conception du kosmos* (New York 1945) I 112-23; II 20-123, *passim*). The problem still remains. If a virtuous soul, an athlete's body, a craftsman's tool, and a painting are all beautiful, it is because they all participate in the Idea of Beauty. What common character in them indicates that participation? And can a virtuous soul and a painting be distinguished from each other, *qua* beautiful?

14. So, for example, H. Perls (above, n.13) converts *Rep.* X 603A-B on the remoteness of painting and poetry from truth (II 49-50); and *Soph.* 235E, on "phantastic" art (II 67; 49). Perls also constantly misreads profound meanings into passing analogies with art: e.g., according to I 21 (cf. p. 34), *Rep.* VI 484C-D, 500E, 501A, state that the painter sees to the heart of truth, and *Polit.* 304A, that painting is perhaps the most useful of all sciences.

15. I see no point in discussing the *Idea* of Beauty as the object, or an object, of Plato's aesthetics (cf. above, n.13, and the "theory of transcendental ateleological form" in M. C. Nahm above, n.8, 27ff, though Nahm grants that Plato is less concerned than some of his successors with thus separating Beauty from

beautiful things). No doubt, there is no beauty in the concrete without this Idea — just as there is no right without the Idea of Right, and no good without the Idea of Good. But we can, and indeed must, discuss Plato's political theories in terms of the concrete manifestations of the Ideas of the Right and the Good — or in terms of their absence. The important question is: what, in Plato's view, are these manifestations, and how are they to be realized by the statesman? So, too, with the Idea of Beauty and the artist. To discuss beauty is perhaps to discuss Plato's aesthetic theory, or a part of it; to discuss the Idea of Beauty is to discuss Plato's theory of Ideas. In the latter case, all that can be said of it is that it is an Idea, like any other, except that its instantiations, whether natural or artificial, have a special attraction for human observers.

16. *Soph.* 219A–B; probably *Rep.* VII 533B; cf. also *Phaedrus* 248D–E. Demiurgic: *Rep.* X 596B, *Symp.* 209A. Imitative: *Laws* II 668A. Imitative arts are also classified as forms of “play” (*paidia*), in contrast with the “serious” demiurgic and therapeutic arts: *Soph.* 234B; *Polit.* 288C; *Phaedrus* 276E (on literature); *Laws* X 889D–cf. VII 796B; *Rep.* X 602B.

17. Philosophical treatises: *Laws* VII 811C; cf. also Arist. *Poet.* 1447b 11, on “Socratic *logoi*” in particular. Rhetorical discourse: *Soph.* 234C, *Phaedrus* 276C–E. G. M. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (1935) 208 notes also the way *Gorg.* (e.g. 502B) moves from the condemnation of rhetoric to that of poetry, and the way *Phaedrus* continually broadens out from the discussion of rhetoric to that of all literature, at least. Myths: *Critias* 107B; *Rep.* II 376E ff; in *Polit.* 268D, the myth is a *paidia*, like any imitative work.

18. *Soph.* 267A; *Rep.* X 595A, III 392D, 393C, D, 394A, and so on. Cf. also J. Tate, *CQ* 22 (1928) 16–23; and 26 (1932) 161–69 . . . W. C. Greene, *HSCP* 29 (1918) 50–56, and “The Greek Criticism of Poetry: A Reconsideration,” in *Perspectives of Criticism*, ed. H. Levin (Cambridge, Mass. 1950) 28, 51, doubts that the discrepancy between *Rep.* II–III and X is due merely to a double use of the term “imitation.”

19. Painters, composers, housebuilders, and shipwrights are alike “demiurges” in *Gorg.* 503E and *Phaedo* 86C; in *Rep.* V 476B, the products of music and the plastic arts are called *dēmiourgoumena*; and in *Phil.* 55C–57E, music is classified, along with architecture, medicine, navigation, and strategy, not as an imitative art, but as a demiurgic art or handicraft, in contrast to the educational art of mathematics. Even in *Rep.* X 596C, D, E, in a context (595C–601B, 601C–602B) which is explicitly distinguishing the two, an imitator is called a demiurge, or handicraftsman; he is the demiurge of an image (599D 3, 601B 9).

20. They are “demiurgic” in another sense, too: ideally, at any rate, they have a function to perform in the community, just as other demiurgic arts have — in their case, to foster the virtues of good citizenship (cf. *Gorg.* 503A f, *Rep.* III 402B f, *Laws* II 660A f, 662B ff; R. C. Lodge, *Plato's Theory of Art* (above, n.7) 278 n.9 and chaps. v–vi; and perhaps to provide community recreation (cf. J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman* (1952) 181 n.1, on *Polit.* 288C).

21. Perhaps, even: “except the Idea of Good”; cf. R. Schaerer, *La Question platonicienne* (1938) 157–58.

22. On the imitativeness of statesmanship, cf. my “Plato's Theory of Natural Law,” *YCS* 10 (1947) 166–67 and n.51: ideal statesmanship imitates the Ideas, especially the Ideas of Good, Right, and Noble; “good” statesmanship imitates the ideal state of the ideal statesman in all essentials except the irresponsible

power granted to the philosophic ruler; and "bad" statesmanship imitates the distorted reflections and shadows of the "good" state contained in conventional and Sophistic value systems . . . On the imitativeness of craft, compare n.23 below.

23. *Rep.* X 598A, B, 596E; cf. *Crat.* 389A–C with 423C–E.

24. So, P. M. Schuhl, *Platon et l'art de son temps* (1933) 3–31; R. G. Steven, "Plato and the Art of His Time," *CQ* 27 (1933) 149–53. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (1935) 198, denies that the distinction between "eikastic" and "phantastic" imitation refers to a distinction within art itself at all, and, *a fortiori*, that it refers to a contemporary "querelle des anciens et des modernes": all art, he thinks, is "phantastic." However, the reference to colossi in *Soph.* 235E, and the reference in 236A 4 to "artists now-a-days" (*hoi demiourgoi nun* — Cornford translates as if *nun de*: "artists do in fact . . .") seem to support Steven's and Schuhl's main distinction between two kinds of plastic art. R. K. Hack, *CP* 30 (1935) 273, agrees with this, though he doubts the "archaizers." He accepts the reference to the recent progress of illusionistic painting in Apollodorus, Zeuxis, and Parrhasius; but in sculpture he thinks the reference is to the colossal statues of Phidias, not to any new methods of Euphranor and Lysippus, as opposed to Polyclitus.

25. So, N. R. Murphy (above, n.9) 246, 231–33. Cf. *Laws* 668E, 670B, E; *Crat.* 430C–D; *Hipp. Mai.* 290D; *Rep.* IV 420D.

26. Or, it may be, God (*Rep.* II 377D ff, *Laws* XII 941B–C); or moral Ideas (*Rep.* III 402B–C); or moral verities (*Rep.* III 392B; *Laws* II 660E ff, 662B, XII 957D).

27. The usual description of art's model in Plato is: the "characters and actions" (*ēthē kai praxeis*), or *schēmata* (*Laws* II 660A), or *tropoi* (*Laws* VII 798D), of men. This is so for music (*Laws* II 655D, VII 812C (*pathēmata*), *Rep.* III 399A–C, Ef, 402D; for poetry (*Laws* IV 719C); for tragedy (*Laws* VII 817A–B); and for imitative art generally (*Rep.* X 603C).

28. If they are, their immediate model will be "characters and actions" certified as good by the philosopher-statesman, and their art-object will be a "likeness of a copy of the beautiful" (*Laws* II 668B: *tēn echousan tēn homoiotēa tōi tou kalou mimēmati*). Cf. the "good" statesman in n.22.

29. *Laws* II 670E expresses it: the poet need not know whether his work is "beautiful" or not. In another context, which contrasts the philosopher's concern with truth and the literateur's concern with formal rules of rhetoric, the poet *qua* poet does not even aim at re-presenting what is before his mind or eyes, but only at a mechanical organization of his material according to the directions in the handbooks: *Phaedrus* 278C–E.

30. Cf. the same order among the transmigrating souls of the Myth of Er, 620A–D, if the ape, Thersites, ranked behind Epeius, the craftsman, represents mimetic art — an order which is similarly regulated by knowledge. That the artist is superior to the craftsman in *Phaedrus* 248D–E seems due to a different principle of gradation, apparently the double principle of "forgetfulness and vice" (C7). Cf. R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's Mathematical Imagination* (1954) 142, 154–55, 203–8.

31. On the levels of statesmanship, cf. above, n.22. In art at least four sets of levels are distinguishable, graded, respectively, according to (I) the enthusiasm of the artist and the expressiveness of his work; (II) the fidelity with which the art-work re-presents the external model; (III) the relationship between the image or concept in the artist's mind and the external model; and (IV) the nature

of the external model. By these criteria we get: (I) "inspired" and "uninspired" art (cf. p. 397 below); (II) "eikastic" and "phantastic" art (p. 393 above); (III) art which imitates (1) a particular model; or (2) a composite model (*Rep.* V 472D (cf. VI 488A), according to the interpretation of Adam *in loc.* — the kind of model Zeuxis is said to have used for his painting of Helen, ap. Artist. *Pol.* III 11, 1281b 15; Xen. *Mem.* III 10, 2; J. Overbeck, *Antike Schriftquellen z. Geschichte d. bild. Künste bei d. Griechen* (1868), nos. 1667–1669); or (3) an imagined model, better than any actual figure or any combination of actual figures (*Rep.*, *ibid.*, perhaps — such as the idealization ascribed to Phidias in the creation of his statue of Zeus by Plotinus, *Enn.* V 8, 1, and Proclus *in Tim.* 84D (cf. P. M. Schuhl, *Platon et l'art de son temps*, pp. 55–56, and Overbeck, nos. 689ff); (IV) (1) art, paralleling Sophistic "statemanship" (above, n.22) based on illusion (e.g. *Rep.* X 598A ff) and directed solely toward pleasing the mob (e.g., 604E ff); (2) art, paralleling "good" statesmanship, which imitates the characters and actions of men certified as good by the statesman (e.g., the representational art of the ideal states of *Rep.* II–III and *Laws* II–III, VII 800A ff, and so on); (3) perhaps art, paralleling Ideal statesmanship, which imitates Ideas. This might include: (a) the abstract plastic art of *Rep.* III 401A–B; (b) literary treatises like the *Laws* (cf. VII 811C–E), or the true discourses of *Phaedrus*; I discuss the possibility of these plastic and literary arts in a paper, yet unpublished: "Beauty and the Fine Arts in Plato: Some Aporiai," *Aporiai* 6 and 3; (c) poems which might conceivably be composed by worthies like those of *Laws* VIII 829C–D, but more skillful, on the basis of knowledge, rather than, at best, right opinion (cf. p. 394 above); and conceivably also (d) representational plastic art produced by artists who know. Plato seems to ignore the possibility of this class; but that is apparently so only because he is describing either actual artists or artists working under the direction the philosopher in the ideal state, and because he is rigidly applying his one-man-one-work principle. According to this principle, the artist *qua* artist does *not* know (p. 394 above). The situation seems to be, however, like that of the philosopher king in *Rep.* V 473B ff, VI 499B–D; it is difficult but not impossible that either a philosopher became an artist, or an artist a philosopher.

32. W. J. Verdenius, *Mimesis: Plato's Doctrine of Artistic Imitation and its Meaning to Us*, Leiden (1949) esp. p. 43, n. to p. 22, makes just this function of "pointing to" the key notion of Plato's aesthetics: the function of art is to "point to" ideal Beauty (pp. 17–21).

33. *Rep.* X 605A, 607A, D; N. R. Murphy (above, n.9) 229.

34. The Idea of an artifact is its function, objectivized as the law or *schema* of its structure: *Crat.* 389A, 390A; cf. 394A–C, *Rep.* V 477D (two things which have the same "power," or reproduce the same "form," "nature" or "ousia," are the same, regardless of differences in externals). That is why Plato can say, from one point of view, that it is the "maker" of an object (in contrast with the imitator) who "knows" (*Rep.* X 596A–601B), and, from another, that the man who "knows" is not the maker of an object, but its user (*ibid.* 601B–602B). The maker is concerned with structure and the user with performance of function.

35. *Rep.* X 598B, 599A, D, 600E, 601B, 605C; *Soph.* 239D, 234C. According to *Soph.* 266 B–C, there is a proportionate relation between mirror-images and imitative art-works: the latter are related to the products of crafts in the realm of human creation as the former are related to natural objects in the realm of divine creation.

36. *Rep.* VII 520C; cf. VI 510B 4 (Adam *in loc.*). The two kinds correspond

to the images and the shadows of images in *Rep.* VII 516A, 517D, 532B, 520C-D (the Cave), and to the objects of sense and opinion and their images in VI 509E ff (the Line). It is true, however, that when the two kinds are being considered in relation to each other, and not to the Ideas, the shadows and reflections are considered as *eidōla* of the objects (*auta*, e.g. 516A 8; cf. 510B 4 with E1 and 511A 6).

37. I discuss this in the unpublished paper, "Beauty and the Fine Arts in Plato: Some Aporiai," *Aporia* 4.

38. *Apol.* 22A-C; *Ion* 533D-535A, 535E-536D; *Meno* 98D-100B (which identifies the "right opinion" whereby oracle-chanters, prophets, poets, and politicians oftentimes speak better than they know, with the "divine possession" of *Ion*), 97C-98B (which distinguishes this "right opinion" from knowledge by the fact that it is not "tied down by the reasoning of cause"); *Laws* III 682A; cf. VII 811B; *Phaedrus* 244A; *Symp.* 202A (which uses the intermediate nature of "right opinion," between knowledge and ignorance, to illustrate the intermediate nature of Eros, between beautiful and ugly), 209A ff (where Eros appears as the source of achievement, not only in Homer and Hesiod, but also, and especially, in Lycurgus and Solon. This, assumably, is to be compared with *Meno* 98D ff, where Themistocles, Pericles, and Thucydides achieved by "right opinion," or "divine frenzy.")

39. For references to, and illustrations of, such self-contradiction, cf. *Rep.* II 380C, 391C, D, III 408B-C.

40. This, of course, creates a problem: if possession by the Muse (*Laws* 719C), or God (*Ion* 534C) explains the poet's true utterances, what explains his false utterances when he is in the same state of possession, since God is always true (*Rep.* II 382E)? A. E. Vassilion, "The Platonic Theory of Inspiration," *The Thomist* 14 (1951) 466-89, states the problem at its starkest. W. J. Verdenius, *Mimesis* 3-14, suggests a way out: the state of possession is a *contact* with the divine which must be interpreted, but how the poet — or the prophet (*Tim* 71E-72B) — interprets his experiences when he returns to sanity is no concern of the Muse. Perhaps Heraclitus. fr. B 93, is relevant: "The Lord to whom the Delphic oracle belongs does not speak, nor does He hide; He hints." Cf. P. Merlan, *Proc. XIth Internat. Cong. Philos. XII*, Amsterdam and Louvain 1953, p. 59; and p. 60: "Heraclitus' recognition of the divine ambiguity is a recognition of the numinous character."

41. Cf. *Ion* 535B-536B, if we can transfer without modification what is there said about the ecstasy of the rhapsode (and his audience) to the poet, as the continuity of the magnetized links from Muse to audience suggests we can. Cf. also the etymology in *Crat.* 406A: *Mousa* and *mousikē* from *mōsthai*.

42. On this, see L. Robin, *Platon* (1935) 74-79.

43. The doubt implied is whether inspiration (i.e. truth) is relevant to all art, or only to literary art. The question is discussed in "Some Aporia" (above, n.37), *Aporiai* 5 and 6.

44. Strictly, it is paired with "all" poetry in 209A, but the "all" seems to be implicitly limited to the "good" in 209D 2 (cf. *Ion* 533E) . . . It is curious that the note of novelty, or originality, which becomes the predominant one in the conception of inspiration among subsequent aestheticians (M. C. Nahm, *The Artist as Creator* [1956] 7ff), is, by Plato, not attributed to artistic inspiration at all. For Plato, artistic inspiration achieves truth — sometimes — by "right opinion"; it is only "heuristic" craft that achieves novelty.

45. Cf. *Symp.* 203A, where the "daemonic" man who is inspired by Eros is distinguished from the "banausic" one who is "wise in arts or crafts." It is true that the "daemonic" man here is identified as the priest or the prophet or the master of charms and incantations, not as the poet or artist. But, as we have just seen, the "good" poet is equally inspired by Eros, according to 209A, D (so, too, *Phaedrus* 245A).

46. *Laws* II 658E; cf. 663C-D, VII 802C 1, II 670D 7; 655E-656A.

47. E.g., *Rep.* III 387B, 397D, VI 493C-D, X 605A; *Gorg.* 502B ff; *Laws* II 659A-C; III 700C-E.

48. So, e.g., M. Vanhoutte, *La Philosophie politique de Platon dans les lois* (1954) 126, taking *Laws* 669A 5-6 to mean that practically everyone can recognize beautiful *zōia*.

49. *Laws* II 653D-654A; cf. 664E-665A, 670D, 672C-D, 673C-D; *Tim.* 80B; *Rep.* X 601B, 607C.

50. *Phil.* 51C. Actually, Plato, thinking solely of the purity of the pleasure involved, makes no distinction here between these figures and the individual lines, pure tones and colors mentioned above: both are equally "beautiful in themselves" and equally give "pure" pleasure. If he were thinking of their beauty, and from an aesthetic point of view, however, I suspect he would distinguish as we are now doing. (This point is discussed more fully in "Some Aporiai" (above, n.37) *Aporiai* 7 and 8.) Since the *Philebus* establishes such a close correlation between beauty and pleasure, we can probably adduce the beautiful triangles of *Tim.* 53D ff, and the beautiful sphere of 33B as further instances of intermediate organizations which give pleasure. The artistic analogues of these geometrical figures might be found in ornament: architectural moldings, egg-and-dart ornaments, geometric designs on vases, and so forth.

51. *Laws* III 700D; *Rep.* III 387B, 397D. For the attractiveness of complexity in general, see *Rep.* VIII 557C, with 559D, 561E, 568D; *Critias* 116B. For examples in art: *Rep.* III 397C, 399C ff.

52. These probably exhaust the kinds of pleasure associated with art, though it is often hard to determine what kind Plato refers to in a particular passage. When, for example, he defines the beautiful as what is pleasing to eye or ear (*Hipp. Mai.* 297E-298A, 299B); or notes that the beauty of all beautiful things must be determined by their utility, *pleasure-content*, or both (*Gorg.* 474D-475A), and that there is a harmless pleasure connected with the perception of beauty (*Hipp. Mai.* 303E); or that poetry has a power of "charming" (*kēlēsin tina Rep.* X 601B, 607A, C); or that art-works are fashioned with an eye to pleasure only (*Gorg.* 501D ff, *Polit.* 288C), he could have any one or more kinds in mind.

53. An object's "virtue" is correlative with its "work" (*Rep.* I 353B); and its virtue, correctness *and* beauty are relative to its "use" (*Rep.* X 601D, E, 602A). This is the conception contained in the tentative definition of beauty as the useful in *Hipp. Mai.* 295C, 296D-E (cf. 290E-291B, 293E): in the suggestion of *Gorg.* 474D-475A that utility may be the — or a — determinative of beauty; and in the famous formula of *Rep.* V 457B: *to men ōphelimon kalon . . .*

54. *Phil.* 64E; *Rep.* IV 444D; and incidental remarks (e.g., *Polit.* 273B f) which make *kosmos* a synonym, and "absence of order" (*ataxia*) the contrary, of beauty.

55. *Laws* II 654B ff; 655B, D-E, 656B.

56. Cf. *Laws* II 654B: one "sings beautifully" if he "sings of beautiful things."

57. The point is developed in "Some Aporiai" (above, n.37) *Aporiai* 4 and 3.
58. *Rep.* IV. 420D, *Tim.* 87D.
59. This notion of self-completeness is especially prominent in *Tim.* (30C, 32C ff, 33B, 34B, 41B-C, 69C, 92C), where also the beauty of the cosmos is a preoccupation (28A-B, 29A, 30B, 31C, 33B, 40A, 42E, 53E-54A, 68E). Cf. also *Phil.* 22B, 60C, 61A, 67A, and R. G. Bury, *Philebus of Plato*, App. B. and G. For the state: *Rep.* II 371E, IV 427E. For human virtue: *Laws* I 643D 3, E 5; II 672C 1; III 678B; VI 757E 1, 765E; VII 806C 2, 807D 5, 822E f; XII 950C-D, 951B.
60. *Phil.* 31A; cf. 31D-32B, 42C-D; *Parm.* 137D-E, 144E-145A, 158D, 165A-C.
61. See A. E. Taylor, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (1928) 370-71, on the beauty of the elementary triangles in *Tim.* 54A.
62. *Taxis*: *Phaedrus* 268D, 264C, 269C; *Phil.* 26B; *Gorg.* 503E. Middle: *Soph.* 244E; *Parm.* 145A, 137D, 165A.
63. Unlike parts: *Gorg.* 503E; *Rep.* IV 443D-E; *Polit.* 308C ff, 311A; *Phil.* 63E. Contrary parts: *Polit.* 306C (cf. *Laws* III 689D); *Phil.* 25D-26B (cf. *Symp.* 185E-188D).
64. *Gorg.* 507E-508A; *Phil.* 64D-E; *Soph.* 228A; *Laws* V 741A; *Tim.* 31B-32C, 87C-89D.
65. This is so much so that the whole is often identified with its hierarchic part: man, e.g., is not merely his hierarchic part, soul, but the hierarchic part of his hierarchic part: *Alc.* I 133B-C, 129E-130E (cf. *Meno* 88E-89A); *Rep.* IX 586D-E, 588B-E, X 611E f, IV 430E (cf. *Laws* I 626E ff), and so on.
66. Most of the references in notes 59-65, and most of the references which can easily be added to these, are to such wholes. I intend to go further into this in a study of the influence of the art-analogy on Plato's thinking.
67. I analyze the *Phaedrus* from this point of view in "Some Aporiai" (above, n.37), *Aporia* 3.
68. The evidence for this is the beautiful statue of *Rep.* 420D. It should be noted, however, that the "appropriateness" of the parts in the whole there seems relative, not to each other or to the whole statue, but to the corresponding parts of the model (cf. above, n.25). That is, whatever may have been the intent of the analogy between the state and the statue, the beauty of the statue seems to be, not that of internal order, but of external purposiveness.
69. *Rep.* X 601D, E, 602A; *Gorg.* 506D. This is discussed more fully in "Some Aporiai," *Aporia* 1.
70. So, "Some Aporiai," *Aporia* 5.
71. R. G. Collingwood (above, n.1) 15ff. On Collingwood's identification of the two, see also S. H. Rosen, *Phronesis* 4 (1959) 136-37; and for the truth which underlies it, D. R. Grey, *Philosophy* 27 (1952) 304-6.
72. R. McKeon, *Mod. Philol.* 41 (1943-44), 77-81 *passim*.

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS
FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D. (1963)

MARC RAPHAEL GUTWIRTH — *Hesiod and His View of Man*

THE object of this study is to clarify the conscious or implicit concern with the human race which is woven into the fabric of the *Theogony* and becomes the main subject of the *Works and Days*. The procedure in reconstructing the anthropology of the earlier poem is to follow its own sequence, section by section; the method used in studying the ethical part of the *Works and Days* is to relate Hesiod's view of man to his beliefs about Zeus.

In telling of his encounter with the Muses, Hesiod shows the human import of their mission, which is to guide kings in the just settlement of disputes and to reveal to the poet the true accounts of gods and heroes, the recitation of which may restore the hearts of the afflicted.

In his cosmogony, the emergence of Gaia, Tartarus, and Eros from Chaos parallels the order of sense-perception from the outer to the inner realm of human experience. In the story of the Titans and the emasculation of Ouranos, we can discern three elements which are typical of the *Theogony*: an adaptation of epic technique to primaeval subjects; a desire to find the origin of religious or mythical traditions; and a half-conscious projection of family and political tensions onto the evolution of the cosmos. The offspring of Night and Strife born outside the progeny of Gaia and Ouranos represent some benign, and many sinister, forces in human life, the latter of which are not to be superseded, but only mitigated by the advent of Zeus and his children.

The generations of Pontos account for numerous aspects of seafaring and for sundry monsters which have been, or still are, a menace to human safety. From Oceanus and Tethys are born the Rivers and numerous powers above and below ground which help Apollo to nurture young men. From various Ouranids issue the Sun, the Moon, the Winds, and the gods who will give birth to Leto and to Hecate, both of importance to men. It is suggested in this study that the mutual relations of Styx and her four children pledged to Zeus are complementary and not artificial, as previously thought. In the hymn to Hecate the poet's vision of her benefactions to men is akin to prayer as well as to description.

The first of these goddesses is especially significant to the idea of social cohesion.

Since Zeus and his generation play a crucial role in human life, no less than the future of man is at stake in this god's struggle with Kronos. Although the latter swallows five of his children lest one overthrow him, the chances of mankind are momentarily saved when Zeus is secretly kept from him by Gaia and Ouranos, that he may become king of gods and men. As Kronos pays retribution not only for keeping down his offspring, but also for the "legitimate" mutilation of his father, the idea of retribution seems halfway between ethics and law of nature, and may anticipate Anaximander's view of passing-away as penalty paid by the new thing to its supplanted predecessor.

As for the power of Zeus, it undergoes its first test when he is cheated by Prometheus in behalf of men, and his revenge is inflicted not only on Prometheus, but on the human race, to whom he sends a deceiving woman. When Zeus meets his most severe test in the battle against the Titans, his allies, the Hundred Hands, acknowledge his intellectual power, while his effective use of thunder establishes his physical respectability to men as god of the sky.

The vast area of Tartarus into which he hurls his enemies provides a sample of the cosmological imagination in Hesiod's time, and suggests a likely source of scientific speculation among the Greeks. Even so physical a power as Styx becomes an effective champion of intellectual probity, since her water brings long paralysis and banishment to the gods who break their solemn oaths, and is a stern warning to men not to invoke the deity in vain.

In the tremendous struggle of Zeus against Typhoeus can be seen the Greek's loathing for deformity, which Hesiod identifies with violence and disorder, apparently to counterbalance the attribution of human likeness and beauty to the qualities of law and harmony.

At last human society comes to the fore when Zeus marries some ancient and some new deities who give birth to personified symbols of Intelligence, Poetic Power, Law, Justice, Peace, Destiny, and Social Refinements. And to conclude the poem, human history is ushered in with the account of goddesses giving birth to heroes destined to become protagonists in the great epic cycles known to Heriod.

Whereas the human race was taken for granted in the *Theogony*, it occupies the center of attention in the *Works and Days*. As Hesiod seeks to correct the contentiousness of his idle brother and to reprimand his judges for their venality, he meditates deeply on the vital role of productive labor and of justice in keeping society healthy and prosperous.

Being a farmer, he is highly qualified to offer practical advice on agriculture, weaving, and navigation, but these material occupations are set against a background of ethical and theological considerations.

Hesiod here revises the *Theogony* by adding the good Strife as a source of productive competition to the evil Strife which was a cause of internecine rivalry. Besides the offspring of Night which represented cosmic evils in the earlier poem, he now introduces Pandora, a creation of Zeus and a gift of all the gods, who is responsible for human sicknesses and other evils.

This vindictive phase of Zeus differs widely from his subsequent roles as the creator of the bronze and heroic races and as the father of Dike. Under his second aspect, he destroys the race of silver, the men of bronze destroy one another, and the heroes who survive the famous wars are made immortal. In his third phase, he threatens to annihilate the iron race, which he has not created, but his daughter Dike can dissuade men from harming each other.

Since the new dispensation of Zeus appeals more intimately to a man's free choice between righteous and wicked conduct, the appearance of Dike suggests a deepening affinity between the sagacious man who considers all things by himself and the mind of Zeus, who sees all things.

By means of this new distinction between the three phases of this god it becomes possible to explain various discrepancies in the composition of the *Works and Days*, and to draw new parallels between Hesiod's thought and the social phenomena which certain recent anthropologists have observed in the transition between a shame-culture and a guilt-culture.

PHILIP A. STADTER — *The Mulierum Virtutes of Plutarch*

The *Mulierum Virtutes*, a collection of twenty-seven anecdotes of acts of virtue performed by women, was dedicated by Plutarch to his friend Klea, a priestess at Delphi, in the latter part of his life, probably after 115 A.D. These historical and semihistorical accounts, which range in time from Bellerophon to Mithridates and in place from Spain to Persia, are interesting both for the bits of information which they preserve and for the opportunity they offer to study Plutarch's historical anecdotes, their sources and their treatment, as they here appear isolated from the mass of material which surrounds them in the *Lives*.

The first chapter, after a review of the meager evidence for the date of the *Mulierum Virtutes*, briefly surveys the Greek attitude toward women

prior to Plutarch and notes the gradual growth of respect for women, first in theory, later in practice. Musonius Rufus, a Roman Stoic philosopher under Nero and Vespasian, receives special attention for championing the practical advantages of virtue and education in women. Plutarch supports this opinion, but goes much beyond Musonius in expressing his esteem for women as individuals possessing virtue and ability. He presents numerous sympathetic portraits of women in the *Lives*, and especially considers their role in society in the *Praecepta Coniugalia* and the *Amatorius*. In the latter he proposes woman as an object of love (*eros*) and heterosexual love as the best means for the philosopher to achieve that completion envisioned by Plato in the *Symposium*. The *Mulierum Virtutes* is a product of this high regard for women, for in it he attempts to prove by historical examples the proposition that "the virtue of men and women is one and the same" (242 F). His intention in this treatise is to put forth great deeds of women, which we may compare with those performed by men, and thus learn that virtue, and courage in particular, is common to both sexes.

Only a few names in Photius and Suidas and an anonymous collection of the lives of fourteen famous women (Westermann, *Paradoxographoi*, 213–218) survive of preceding collections of women's deeds. None of the fourteen women in that collection is the subject of an anecdote by Plutarch, who professes in his introduction to avoid the common, well-known accounts.

The second chapter examines the relation of the *Mulierum Virtutes* to Polyaeus, who in the last two books of his *Strategemata* gives nineteen of the twenty-seven anecdotes found in Plutarch. In 1884 Otto Knott, rejecting previous opinion, argued that Polyaeus did not take these anecdotes from Plutarch but from a common anthological source ("De fide et fontibus Polyaei," *Commentationes philologiae ienenses* 3 [1884] 75–80). His conclusion was accepted by J. Melber in his extensive study of Polyaeus' sources ("Über die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung Polyaeus," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Suppl. Bd. 14 [1885] 683 *et alibi*), and has since become widely accepted. A careful study of the two collections, however, reveals that Knott's conclusions are invalid and unwarranted, and completely vindicates the earlier opinion that Polyaeus took these stories from the *Mulierum Virtutes*. Polyaeus often repeats word-for-word phrases and sentences from Plutarch, and although he occasionally sharply abridges Plutarch's account, he never adds a fact not found in that author. Of the stories which treat incidents also found in the *Mulierum Virtutes*, only one, Poly. 7.45.2, is not taken from its counterpart in Plutarch

(*Mul. Virt.* 5, Persian women). This anecdote, because it names the satrap Oibares not mentioned by Plutarch, and because it is separated from Polyaeus' other stories about women taken from him, is evidently from an independent source, and only by coincidence is also found in Plutarch.

There follows a commentary on each of the anecdotes in the *Mulierum Virtutes*, which especially attempts to discover the source of each story and to define Plutarch's contribution to each account. The following stories are of special interest:

1. The Trojan women: This seems dependent on another version of the story found in *Romulus* 1, which in turn is based on Aristotle (as is clear from a third version in *Quaestiones Romanae* 265 B.C.). Plutarch, however, has changed Aristotle's account so that the settlers at Rome are Trojans and not Greeks.

2. The Phokian women: This account of a Phokian-Thessalian war, according to Plutarch's explicit statement, is based upon his lost life of the Phokian hero Daiphantos. Plutarch also refers to decrees and a feast he attended which even in his time still recalled the heroism of the women.

4. The Argive women: Plutarch's account of Kleomenes' unsuccessful attack on Argos is taken from a complex Argive tradition. The anecdote has no historical basis, for it is only an Argive literary invention based on Herodotos 6.75-81. Plutarch cites Sokrates of Argos, not for the whole story, but for a single variant, as was seen by Jacoby (*FGrHist* 310 F 6 [p. 46]).

14. Valeria and Cloelia: This account is a second version of that in *Publicola* 18-19, with only minor changes.

15. Mikka and Megisto: Phylarchos was used for this long but selective account of the fall of the tyranny of Aristotimos in Elis in 262 B.C.

17. Polykrite: Plutarch cites the Naxian writers and Aristotle for two slightly different versions of the same story. There is every reason to believe he used them directly.

18. Lampsake: Charon of Lampsakos is cited as the authority for this half-legendary, half-historical account of the founding of Lampsakos in the mid-seventh century.

22. Chiomara: Polybios is the source of this anecdote of the Roman invasion of Galatia in 190 B.C. which is also found in Livy and later Latin writers.

24. Timokleia: This chapter is neither derived from, nor the source

of, the parallel version in *Alexander* 12. In both cases Plutarch drew directly from his source, Aristoboulos, although the version of *Mul. Virt.* 24 seems to reflect the original more accurately.

25. *Eryxo*: The murder of the tyrant Learchos of Cyrene, recorded in a sentence by Herodotos (4.160), is narrated at length in this chapter. The account, presumably that of a Cyrenian local historian, identifies Learchos as a friend, not a brother, of Arkesilaos II, correcting the error of Herodotos.

27. Pythes' wife: Pythes, whose wealth and misfortune aroused the interest of Herodotos (7.27–29, 38–39), is here made an actor in a moral fable very similar to the Midas story. The two episodes in this chapter are known only through Plutarch.

The last chapter of the thesis considers the results of the analysis made in the commentary. Plutarch fulfilled his promise to avoid in this treatise the familiar stories about women: of the twenty-seven accounts, eighteen are known only through Plutarch, and the remaining nine are distinctive either because they treat relatively obscure incidents, or because they present new details not found in traditional accounts. For this work Plutarch used many different authors: Ephoros, Phylarchos, Polybios, Ktesias, Aristoboulos, Aristotle, Sokrates of Argos, Charon of Lampsakos, the Naxian writers, and other unidentified authors. Upon consideration of the citations of these authors in the *Parallel Lives* and other works of Plutarch, it becomes evident that Plutarch read all or large parts of the works of these historians. The case of Phylarchos is representative: a number of citations in these lives as well as historiographical research reveals that Phylarchos was an important source for the *Pyrrhus*, *Aratus*, and *Agis and Cleomenes*. However, Plutarch's acquaintance with Phylarchos was not limited to the few chapters which treated these men — much less to excerpts compiled by earlier biographers — for in *Mul. Virt.* 15 (Mikka and Megisto) Plutarch follows Phylarchos' account of the end of Aristotimos, an episode which falls between the death of Pyrrhus and the rise of Aratus, and was unnecessary to either biography. It is thus certain that Plutarch read all or most of Phylarchos' history.

This use of the same authors in the *Mulierum Virtutes* as in the other historical works, the existence of stories related to the biographies because they refer to the same period or scene of action, and the repetition of cognate versions of the same story in different works all argue that Plutarch did not derive his information about the events, lives, or periods of which he wrote from predigested biographies or handbooks.

Rather he enjoyed history, read historical works, and poured out the knowledge thus acquired in his writings, in the *Mulierum Virtutes* as well as in the *Parallel Lives*. His historical writings must be understood as an expression of his own learning and interest in the past, and not a compilation put together from earlier writers.

THOMAS FRANCIS HOEY, S.J. — *Presentational Imagery
in the Trachiniae of Sophocles*

This thesis, like the play it discusses, has two parts whose inter-connection may not at first be obvious. Part I of the thesis is generic and theoretical; Part II is particular and textual. Part I begins by examining the concept of *action* as that concept appears in Aristotle's *Poetics* and in Francis Fergusson's *Idea of a Theater*. It is then suggested that the action of the *Trachiniae* may be expressed in the infinitive phrase, "to achieve home." Next, an attempt is made to connect action, expressible through an infinitive phrase, with presentationalism, this latter term being drawn from the writings of Susanne Langer and of Cedric Whitman, and having to do with a mind's ability, or at least ambition, to grasp an infinity of knowledge all at once, and (more largely) having also to do with an individual's ability or ambition to grasp an infinity of Being all at once. An effort is thus made to construct a theory about mental operations — and about poetry, as being one of the more supreme of these — on the basis of presentationalism. The theory would also embrace human actions generally. A relation is indicated between presentationalism and the nature of divinity, which nature each man is implicitly bidden, through the most basic thrusts of his own personality, to capture and somehow share. Divinity is presentational already; humanity is not, but wants to be. The activity of the poet, seeking, as it does, to catch and hold infinity at a point, to capture the universe in a single imagistic atom of expression, is one of the major manifestations of man's presentational drive. I have suggested that, in its thrust toward divinity, the human mind is imitative of Greek heroism, in the sense in which Greek heroism has been elucidated by Professor Whitman in his two books so far published on the subject, the first about Sophocles and the second about Homer. It is further suggested, though not elaborated until Part II of the thesis, that the *Trachiniae* presents, perhaps more obviously than do other plays by Sophocles, an effort by human agents to seize the completeness of Being, and to do this (as one would expect of Sophoclean heroes) in a single atomic moment.

Tragically, it is a failing effort. A happy union of the separated elements in the situation is not achieved, and the result is a house divided. It is the main argument of Part II that this is precisely what is imaged in the divided structure of the play.

Part II proceeds scene by scene, and more or less line by line; but there is a broad subdivision into three chapters: (1) The tragedy of Deianeira; (2) the problem of unity; (3) the problem of finality. In each of these chapters, the action is, the writer hopes, seen in relationship to the infinitive phrase, "to achieve home." Clearly, this phrase can be read on several levels, and it takes on depth as the play proceeds — in fact, even as the play begins. In a physical sense, one might say Deianeira is at home; but she is displaced in her soul, and is just as much a wanderer as Heracles. Her journeys tend, like those of Oedipus, along the wandering ways of thought. And her final journey is achieved, the Nurse tells us, without her moving a foot. It is ironical that her departure coincides, except for the transitional section (vv. 863–970), with the arrival of Heracles. At no time in the play are the two of them at home together; at no time is there really a house; and the chief image of the play is of a broken house, or, perhaps better, of a house that never came together. In my treatment of the above-mentioned transitional section, I argue (1) for the house as an image, and indeed a somehow animate one; (2) against unity of protagonist; and (3) for unity of action. It is impossible for an image to reflect a broken reality in any other true way than brokenly. But this does not imply dramatic disunity. There are, for dramatic purposes, mediating agencies which bridge the break, and these are explored in the discussion of the transitional stasimon (947–970). In the chapter on the problem of finality, I explore the question whether there is any home for the protagonists in *another* world. I can find the symbols of the exodos leading nowhere but to ambiguity and to the mystery of Zeus, a name with which the exodos is shot through and through, and which is the last word of the play. In this connection I note the theory of Susan Taubes (and of others) about the equilibrium of tragedy.

Though a house is the play's chief image, other important imagistic constellations are discussed as they occur and recur: sun-imagery investing Heracles; night-imagery investing Deianeira; images of fusion and love, with usually an attendant suggestion of something diseased or black-magical, the result being disintegration. I have frequently attempted to show presentationalism at work within smaller

compass than that of the whole play. Which is to say, I have tried to show how, under the magical Sophoclean hand, a single word or image can be made to resume in a flash a whole cluster of preceding words or images, which are thus seen to depend from that single one.

JAMES R. MCCREDIE — *Fortified Military Camps in Attica*

In 1960 test excavations were made on the Koroni peninsula on the east coast of Attica to determine the nature, purpose, and date of its considerable ancient remains [*Hesperia* 31 (1962) 26-61]. The results of these excavations showed that Koroni was the site of a fortified military camp built by a Ptolemaic army in the second quarter of the third century B.C. Koroni was the first site of this sort to have been carefully examined, and it provided a basis upon which other, apparently similar sites might be studied.

A review of the evidence from Koroni and a consideration of its significance are undertaken in chapter I. A naturally strong position was chosen for the camp, and this was fortified where necessary with heavy rubble walls. Within the walls a number of buildings, including storerooms and barracks, were built; these were neither arranged according to any regular general scheme nor individually built to regular plans. Especially significant were the coins, pottery, and other objects found in the excavations. The many coins of Ptolemy II Philadelphos, which point to a date between 270 and 260 B.C., establish a chronology for the site which fits well with what is known of Attic history in this period; for the only known involvement of Ptolemaic forces in Attica during the third century was during the Chremonidean War (265-261 B.C.). The pottery found was, however, of the sort that has usually been assigned to the end of the fourth century or the very beginning of the third century. It is argued that this date for the pottery is based on insufficient evidence and that the fact that it was in use as late as the Chremonidean War must now be accepted.

Chapter II is a provisional corpus of fortified military camps in Attica. Thirty-one sites which are to a greater or lesser degree similar to Koroni are considered, and most are described in detail for the first time. Sketch-plans as well as photographs are included.

The characteristics of Attic fortifications are considered in chapter III in an effort to distinguish the character of the sites included in the corpus. The defense of Attica was based on a series of garrisoned forts which differ from the sites described in chapter II in their position and their construction. There were, however, fortifications subsidiary

to the great garrison-forts, perhaps used only in a time of special danger; Katsimidi, Plakoto, "Ereneia," and Korynos are probably sites of this sort. Also connected with the system of Athenian forts are signalling posts; the Atene fort and Vari-Anagyrous are examples of these.

The rubble fortifications have been identified in a number of ways — as the acropoleis of demes, as refuges to which the population might flee in time of danger, and as medieval or modern structures. Fortified demes would, however, have had no purpose after the synoikismos, and, except for the few instances where the location of a deme-center and an Athenian garrison-fort coincided, fortified demes do not seem to have existed. The garrison-forts seem also to have served the function of refuges, and the existence of separate fortifications for this purpose is doubtful.

Many of the sites considered have provided no evidence for dating, and it is possible that some belong to the Middle Ages or to the Greek War of Independence. There is, however, no evidence that this sort of fortification was built during medieval times, and comparison with a known nineteenth-century defense suggests that few of the Attic fortifications are likely to be from that period.

What is known from ancient literature about military camps corresponds well with the archaeological evidence. Greek camps lacked the regular organization of Roman camps, and only general characteristics such as the choice of site and the crude construction of walls and buildings are common to all Greek camps. It appears that the word *χαράξ*, used of camp-fortifications by the historians, can apply as well to rubble walls as to wooden palisades, and the choice of material used in building a camp was evidently determined by what was most readily available.

A few camps have evidence to connect them with a specific historical event; Dekeleia was built by the Spartans in 413 B.C., and Koroni, Patroklou Charax, Vouliagmeni, and Helioupolis may be connected on either numismatic or literary evidence with the Chremonidean War. Possible dates for other camps are discussed in chapter IV. The close resemblance of these camps to one another and to Koroni and Patroklou Charax, as well as the difference between them and Dekeleia, supports the suggestion that they all come from a fairly short period of Athenian history. All the sites that have provided datable material are assigned to the period between about 325 B.C. and 250 B.C. The numerous invasions of Attica and sieges of Athens in this period provide possible occasions for the building of camps, and the Chremonidean

War, where four separate forces were engaged in Attica, has unique conditions.

A reconsideration of the literary evidence bearing on this war, together with the new archaeological evidence, suggests that several details of the accepted reconstruction of the events must be changed. It appears that the allied Spartan and Ptolemaic forces took a much more active part in the war than has been thought; the Spartan force did, in fact, invade Attica during the first year of the war, and the Ptolemaic forces did disembark and establish fortified positions on the Attic mainland. The new reconstruction of events provides a situation with which not only the coastal sites of Vouliagmeni, Patroklou Charax, Koroni, and Kynosoura may be connected, but also the entire series of fortifications which rings the Athenian plain and that which lies in the Aigaleos-Parnes gap leading into the Athenian plain.

The results of this study of fortified camps in Attica have been necessarily tentative because of the lack of definite and abundant information from the sites themselves. This information can be obtained by excavation, and excavation should be undertaken quickly before the present rapid expansion of modern building destroys the sites.

An appendix cataloguing additional surface-finds from Koroni and one with new information on some Attic towers are added.

ROBERT FRANCIS RENEHAN — *Leonis Medici Synopsis De Natura Hominum. Primum Edidit Robert Renehan*

This thesis is a critical edition with preface of the Greek medical abridgement *περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπων* of a certain *Λέων ἰατρός*. The work consists almost entirely of excerpts from the treatise *περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου* of Meletius Monachus (ninth century?). The first chapter of the preface (*De Leone conditore synopsis de natura hominum*) deals with the identification of Leo. It is disputed among scholars whether this Leo is identical with the famous *Leo Philosophus*, the Byzantine encyclopedist and contemporary of Photius. On the basis of manuscript inscriptions, chronological arguments, and other evidence, it is argued that *Leo Medicus* probably was *Leo Philosophus* and not some other person. The second chapter of the preface (*De codice A et codicibus Meletii*) describes the *codex Scorialensis* Φ.-III.-7 (=A), the only manuscript in which Leo's treatise has been preserved to us, and the manuscripts of Meletius which are employed in establishing the text of his treatise for comparative purposes with the treatise of Leo. The third

chapter (*De ratione edendi*) first sets forth the principles which I have followed in constituting the text of Leo and then considers certain difficult passages whose obscurity seemed to demand explanation and discussion. There follows the Greek text itself with an *apparatus criticus* which includes not only a recording of the readings of *A* and the Meletian manuscripts but also certain explanatory notes, so that it is to some extent *commentarioli instar*.

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